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Abstract:  
This PhD research is concerned with the legal system for the settlement of petroleum 
disputes according to Iraqi law.  It deals with international commercial arbitration as a means of 
resolving such disputes under Iraqi law, since Iraq does not have an adequate legal system for 
resolving disputes arising from petroleum agreements.  It has not yet enacted specific legislation 
regulating or governing international commercial arbitration in general, and petroleum 
arbitration in particular.  It is still dependent on the Code of Civil Procedure of 1969, which does 
not suffice to attract international investment.  In addition, Iraq has not yet ratified or signed the 
leading international conventions concerning arbitration, such as the New York Convention of 
1958 or the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).     
The thesis of this PhD is that Iraq needs special rules for the arbitration of petroleum 
disputes.  These rules should achieve the balance between the needs of Iraq in its transitional 
period and foreign investors’ interests.  The promulgation of a petroleum arbitration laws is an 
important legal guarantee which can attract international petroleum companies to Iraq.  
 
Both referencing and black- letter analysis methodology is followed in this thesis.  The 
referancing approach consists of referance to the laws of selected developing countries, 
especially China and the United Arab Emirates, which have experience and expertise in 
investment and arbitration.  The black- letter analysis approach is also deployed to analyse Iraqi 
attitudes towards arbitration, the legal nature of petroleum agreements and the challenges facing 
Iraq causing reluctant and hesitation in developing a comprehensive petroleum arbitration 
regime.  
This study tests, and finds it convincing that petroleum agreements are, indeed a special kind 
of investment agreement.  The subject matter of this agreement is of exceptional monetary value 
and belongs to the Iraqi people.  Article 111 of the Iraqi Constitutional of 2005 provides that “Oil 
and Gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all regions and governorates”.1 Therefore, these 
agreements should be treated differently by subjecting them to a specialised arbitration regime 
                                                          
1 Iraqi Constitution of 2005 publishes in Official Gazette issue 4012 of 28 May 2005.  An English Language 
translation of the 2005 Constitution is available at <http://investpromo.gov.iq/policies-and-laws/ > accessed on 
10 April 2014. 
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rather than ordinary international commercial arbitration.  The author’s vision, set out in this 
work, is that Iraq should promulgate petroleum arbitration laws and develop a specialised system 
to support this.  These laws would lend weight to the application of Iraqi national law, and make 
the country more attractive for foreign investment.  An independent petroleum arbitration centre 
should be established along the lines of Dubai’s International Arbitration Center and the Chinese 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission.  Its awards should be considered as 
final and enforced in the same manner as domestic awards.  
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Chapter One: Introduction  
     1. 1. Introduction: 
 There is no doubt that petroleum has a great influence on a state’s economy, whether that 
state is a producer or a consumer.  Some countries, including for example the United States of 
America (hereinafter USA), produce oil, but in insufficient quantities, and need also to import it.  
The discovery of this fuel in some countries led to a revolution in the level of living standards.  
In some oil producing countries, petroleum became the primary source of income.  For example, 
the Arab Gulf countries were formerly dependent on the export of agricultural crops and the 
trade in some marine produce as their sources of income.1  These countries were poor and 
undeveloped before their discovery of petroleum, which: subsequently became their main source 
of income and the source of rapid growth and modernisation.  Consequently, many oil producing 
countries try to protect this wealth, which dominates their economies.  The discovery of 
petroleum has not only had an impact on the economy of the oil-producing countries, it has also 
played an important role in reshaping the history of these countries.   
Of course, there must be a demand for a commodity in order for it to be valuable.  
Consumer countries seek ways to gain and secure this vital material to sustain their factories, 
transportation and military power.  The demand for petroleum from these countries has 
dramatically increased.  Oil prices have risen as a result of competition between users, and tax 
revenue from oil has also been a factor. 
Competition between some of these countries has led to strife between some consumer 
countries and some oil producing countries.  The consumer states have made efforts to gain 
control over petroleum.  Competition2 also emerged between oil producing countries themselves 
                                                          
1 Khaldoun Nassan Al-Naqeeb, Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula: A Different Perspective 
(Routledge 2012) 169.  
2 Vally Koubi, Gabriele Spilker, Tobias Böhmelt and Thomas Bernauer concluded that “our review of the literature 
suggests that there is some evidence on the association of resource abundance and conflict.  Hence, many 
empirical studies show that resources can play a role in armed conflict”. Vally Koubi et al., ‘Do Natural 
Resources Matter for Interstate and Interstate Armed Conflict?’ [2013] Journal of Peace Research 1. 
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and led to war as in, for example, the war between Iraq and Kuwait in 1991.3  The competition is 
not only between the oil producing countries but also exists within the oil producing countries, 
and has led to disputes, such as the disputes between the Iraqi Federal Government (hereinafter 
IFG) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (hereinafter KRG). 
Dispute settlement is a significant aspect of any contractual relationship, particularly in 
international petroleum agreements.  This is because, on the one hand, a large amount of capital 
is invested by the international petroleum company in such an agreement and, on the other hand, 
the subject of the petroleum agreement represents the natural resources of the host nation and 
dominates its economy.  The stakes are very high for both sides.  It is a situation in which neither 
party wants to risk losing, and therefore choosing a suitable method for resolving disputes arising 
from such agreements is considered vital in determining any agreement between the parties.  
There are different means of settling the dispute:  the parties can agree to recourse to mediation, 
negotiation, litigation or arbitration.   
Arbitration is a popular means of resolving disputes in commercial matters.  It has 
become the primary and most effective system for resolving commercial disputes.4  
Nevertheless, the attitudes to arbitration are different with regard to petroleum disputes.  While 
international petroleum companies5 prefer this option, oil producing countries, among them Iraq, 
take a suspicious view of arbitration as a way of settling disputes.  Some oil producing states 
believe that submitting a petroleum dispute to arbitration is a violation of sovereignty.6  In 
addition, the disparity between the economic capacities of the contractual parties, which is 
reflected in the petroleum agreement terms, obliges the developing countries to take a tough 
stance in order to protect their interests from the overwhelming economic power of these 
companies.7  Arbitration centres in particular do not apply the national laws of the host states and 
                                                          
3 Stephan Schmid, Gulf War II (1990/91) - Iraq Between United Nations’ Diplomacy and United State’s Policy 
(Auflage 2006) 5; Zachary C. Shirkey, Is This a Private Fight or Can Anybody Join?: The Spread of Interstate 
War (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009) 193. 
4 Gary Brain Born, International Commercial Arbitration in the United States: Commentary and Material (2nd edn, 
Kluwer Law International 200) 1-2.   
5 Hans Smit, ‘The Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transnational Institution?’ (1968-1987) 
25 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 9. 
6 Gus Van Harten, ‘The Public- Private Distinction in the International Arbitration of Individual Claims against the 
State’ (2008) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 371. 
7 M. Sornarajah, ‘The Myth of International Contract Law’ (1981) 15 Journal of World Trade Law 187. 
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these arbitration chambers tend to adjudicate in the petroleum companies’ interest.8  Because of 
these circumstances, many host states have decreed that the national court has exclusive 
authority to settle disputes arising from petroleum contracts.  
Iraq has one of the world’s largest deposits of petroleum.  Its modern history has been 
shaped by petroleum.  In the last three decades, Iraq has endured three successive wars,9 as well 
as the economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council (hereinafter the SC), which 
continued for more than 13 years.10  These sanctions did not allow Iraq to make any commercial 
transactions or foreign investments, apart from exporting a limited amount of petroleum.11  Iraqi 
petroleum revenues earned from the sale of this limited amount were subjected to the supervision 
and control of the United Nations (hereinafter the UN).12  These revenues served to provide Iraq 
with food and other necessities.13  Such events impacted negatively on the Iraqi economy, 
particularly on the petroleum industry sector.   
After 2003, Iraq sought to revive its economy and to overcome the challenges facing it by 
attracting foreign investors and companies to invest in Iraq, especially in the petroleum sector, 
which is considered to be the backbone of the Iraqi economy.  The aim was to restore Iraq to its 
place among the oil producing countries and also to restore its active role as the state with the 
second greatest petroleum reserves in the world.  The author regards the arbitration method of 
resolving disputes as a strategic tool for attracting foreign investors, especially in a complex 
situation such as the one faced by Iraq.  It should be considered one of the most important 
guarantees given by host states in order to attract foreign investors, particularly in post- conflict 
states in which investors will be mindful of the type of forum that will undertake to resolve 
petroleum disputes.14   
 
                                                          
8 Samson L. Sempasa, ‘Obstacle to International Commercial Arbitration in African Countries’ (1992) 41 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 387. 
9 The war between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988); the first Gulf War 1991: the second Gulf war 2003.  
10 UNSC Res 661 (6 August 1990) UN Doc S/RES/0661. 
11 UNSC Res 986 (15 April 1995) UN Doc S/RES/986. 
12 UNSC Res 986 (15 April 1995) UN Doc S/RES/986. 
13 UNSC Res 986 (15 April 1995) UN Doc S/RES/986. 
14 Virtus C. Igbokwe and Obijiofor Aginam, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Post-Conflict Countries’ in Virtus C. 
Igbokwe, Nicholas Turner and Obijiofor Aginam (eds), Foreign Direct Investment in Post- Conflict Countries: 
Opportunities and Challenges (Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd 2010) 3. 
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           1.2. The Importance of This Research:  
This study, focusing on the settlement of disputes in petroleum agreements by arbitration 
in Iraqi law, has been chosen for several reasons. These are as follows: 
1. Arbitration has grown rapidly in the last decades as an effective means of 
resolving disputes in commercial agreements in general, and in petroleum disputes 
particularly.  Most petroleum agreements refer to arbitration as a means of settling any 
dispute arising from such agreements, either through ad hoc or institutional arbitration.  
2. Arbitration occupies a large area of legal debate, especially in disputes 
arising from petroleum agreements, which have special conditions.  The subject matter of 
the agreement is petroleum, which is different from other economic commodities, like 
tin, copper and iron, because it involves the issue of state sovereignty.  Therefore, it has 
become a major concern, not only for all stakeholders in the petroleum investment sector, 
but also for lawyers and the academics.  Arbitration is an active field of law in practice 
and theories in many international conferences and media.15   
3. While the importance of arbitration increases in the world, Iraq has not yet 
enacted specific legislation regulating or governing international commercial arbitration 
in general and petroleum arbitration in particular.  Although the Draft Law of Oil and 
Gas16 2007 (hereinafter DLOG) refers to resolving petroleum disputes by arbitration, the 
Representative Council of Iraq did not adopt it.  Iraq depends on certain legal texts that 
are found in the Code of Civil Procedure Law No. 83 of 196917 (hereinafter CCP) and 
these provisions are unsatisfactory, being both incomplete and out of date.  The 
legislation itself is obsolete and has a number of unclear issues, especially with regard to 
                                                          
15 For example, the annual International Bar Association conference (IBA) available at < http://www.ibanet.org/ 
LPD/Dispute_Resolution_Section/Arbitration/Conferences.aspx>  accessed on 10 April 2014 and the 
International Chamber Of Commerce (ICC) available at  <http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/organization/icc-
training-and-conferences/ > accessed on 10 April 2014. 
16 Article 39 (B) of DLOG which provides that: 
       If the dispute cannot be resolved by agreement, the matter shall be referred to the Minister to resolve 
through discussions with senior officers of the holders of rights concerned. Failing resolution through 
these discussions the matter of dispute may be submitted to arbitration or to the competent judicial 
authority.   
This translation from Arabic language to English Language by Council of Ministers Oil and Energy Committee the 
whole text is available at <http://www.krg.org/uploads/documents/Draft%20Iraq > accessed on 10 April 2014.  
17 Iraqi Civil Procedures Law No 83 of 1969 published in the Iraqi Official Gazette vol 2, 1969 477. 
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applicable laws.  Thus, this study is giving weight for the arbitration of petroleum 
disputes in Iraqi law.  Furthermore, Iraq has not enacted any laws to regulate the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Iraq.  The implementation laws in Iraq focus on 
foreign judgments.  They do not offer any mechanism for the regulation of foreign 
arbitral awards.  Meanwhile, many developing countries are enacting and updating their 
international commercial arbitration, as well as establishing new centres for arbitration.  
Iraq needs to modernize across the board in order to keep up with the competition.   
4. After 2003, Iraq’s petroleum sector suffered greatly, not only because of 
the mistaken policies of Saddam Hussain towards the petroleum sector, but also because 
of violence, and the invasion of Iraq.  After the above mentioned date, Iraq tried to revive 
its exhausted economy and depended on petroleum sector revenues to improve other 
sectors, for example, agriculture, industry and tourism.  For these reasons Iraq has 
reviewed its economic policy in an attempt to revive this important sector.  It has to 
attract foreign investors by providing them with legal and financial safeguards.  On the 
other hand, Iraq has to ensure special protection of the wealth of the Iraqi people and to 
take their interests into account.  Iraq should encourage foreign investors by providing 
them with a legal safeguard to preserve their rights.  One of the important ways to entice 
foreign investors to invest in Iraq is arbitration, especially concerning the settlement of 
disputes arising from petroleum agreements. 
1.3. Petroleum Arbitration a Brief Review of the Academic Literature: 
 
Arbitration occupies a significant place in legal studies.  This is not only because it has 
become the dominant method for resolving disputes arising from investment agreements and one 
of the most effective ways for a state to attract foreign investors.  It is also considered the most 
controversial method for settling such disputes, particularly when the subject matter is 
petroleum.  International arbitration impedes the authority of national courts to settle petroleum 
disputes and, in many cases, prevents the host states from applying their national laws.  This 
arouses suspicions among the host states with regard to arbitration and increases the intensity of 
the debates concerning national courts and the jurisdiction of national laws.  The applicable law 
is not the only obstacle facing petroleum arbitration.  There are also sovereignty issues, 
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particularly when one of the parties to the dispute is the host state, which also has sovereignty 
over natural resources.18  Sovereign immunity would be waived by the host state if it chose 
arbitration to settle petroleum disputes.  The state may waive its immunity, either before the 
dispute arises, when this is agreed in advance within the contract, or after the dispute arises.  
Therefore, the choice of arbitration as a means of settling petroleum disputes entails important 
concerns for host states such as Iraq, which seeks to develop and attract foreign investors to its 
energy sector.  The Iraqi legal system does not provide any specialised method of resolving 
petroleum disputes which arise in ordinary times, let alone in transition.  Iraq has no arbitration 
law, although the draft of an international commercial arbitration law was proposed in 2011.19  It 
still depends on some articles in the CCP which was designed to settle domestic disputes.  
Foreign investors in particular would prefer national courts not to settle such disputes.  This is so, 
even if this court has independence from the political system in a host state in economic 
transition, as in the case of Iraq.  The absence of any such arbitration mechanism therefore deters 
much needed foreign investment in Iraq, notably in the economically vital national energy sector.    
 There is also the question of how Iraq will deal with the enforcement of arbitral awards, 
whether foreign or local.  Iraq does not enforce any foreign judgments unless it has an agreement 
with the state issuing such a judgment.  This creates difficulties, because Iraq is not party to any 
international conventions for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, such as the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 195820 
(hereinafter the New York Convention of 1958).    
Close study of the literature reveals that in the general field of arbitration, some authors do 
focus on the energy sector.  These legal authors hold different views about international 
arbitration as a method of resolving petroleum disputes.  Some of them claim that international 
arbitration is a good way to settle such disputes.  On other hand there are those, particularly 
authors from developing countries who, for differing reasons, do not favour international 
arbitration to settle petroleum disputes.  
                                                          
18 Article 111 of Iraqi Constitutional Law of 2005.  Iraqi Constitution of 2005 publishes in Official Gazette issue 
4012, 28 May 2005.   
19 In 2011, Iraq attempted to design a draft law on International Commercial Arbitration (DICAL) to resolve 
international commercial disputes.  However, this draft has not yet been passed by the Iraqi parliament.  In this 
study the author will review and discuss some of these draft Articles.  
20 The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, adopted on 
3 May 1956, entered into force on 7 June 1959, UNTS vol 330, 3.   
7 
 
W. Michael Reisman states that:  
The private actor is generally unwilling to subject itself to the jurisdiction of courts 
in command economies or economies in transition and even when a local judiciary can 
boast a degree of independence, (…….) Hence the need for a neutral forum, which 
modern international commercial arbitration provides.21 
  
Reisman concluded that arbitration is the best method for resolving disputes in countries 
which have special systems of economic or political organization.  However, petroleum 
companies prefer to settle their disputes with the host state by arbitration, even if those states 
have not adopted command economies or if the political situation is stable.  Therefore arbitration 
is a method welcomed by petroleum companies, whether or not the host state has special 
circumstances.  Iraq formerly had a socialist economic system, but after 2003 the country sought 
to open its doors to foreign investment and make arbitration one of its methods for resolving 
disputes in the petroleum sector amicably, in the same manner as the United Arab Emirates 
(hereinafter the UAE) and the People’s Republic of China, (hereinafter the PRC), which have 
stable economic systems.   
Thomas Wälde argues that arbitration can offer better expertise than national courts, 
particularly in the petroleum and energy industry.  He reasoned that: 
 National courts are generally not considered as expert and accepted, in particular 
between companies from different countries, as arbitration.  The move towards 
horizontal, contractual and international transactions in the electricity and gas industry 
means that commercial disputes multiply and arbitration (plus ADR) seems the only 
acceptable method of dealing with them.22  
His view is that national courts do not have sufficient expertise to resolve the disputes 
arising from investment agreements, especially disputes concerning the energy sector.  Therefore 
arbitration is considered by petroleum companies to be a preferable means of resolving such 
disputes.  However, although arbitration provides the expertise required for both parties, each 
party is either a host state or a petroleum company.  The international petroleum companies 
which prefer arbitration as a method of resolving petroleum disputes arising between host states 
and petroleum companies do “not resort to arbitration against each other.”23  
                                                          
21 W. Michael Reisman, ‘International Arbitration and Sovereignty’ (2002) 18 Arbitration International 231. 
22 Thomas Wälde, ‘The Role of Arbitration in the Globalisation of Energy Market’ [2000] CEPMLP Journal Online 
< http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/htm > accessed on 29 June 2011. 
23 ibid.  
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Jan Paulsson has stated that “it would be a fundamental error to think that arbitration is 
designed to serve the interests of industrialized countries”.24 He submits evidence to support his 
statement.  He based this on a 1982 report25 which showed that the number of parties who 
preferred arbitration under the rules of the ICC increased in recent years with north-south 
contracts.  However, despite the evidence submitted by Paulsson of the increasing popularity of 
arbitration, many host states continue to believe that arbitration is devised to serve petroleum 
companies only, as will be seen in later parts of this work.  This is one of the crucial reasons why 
arbitration has been rejected as a method of resolving petroleum disputes in many host states.    
There are several stands in the writings that come from the developing world.  Some argue 
that, if they had their own way, host states would not choose to select arbitration to resolve 
disputes at all.  Samir Saleh said “It can almost be said that it is only when left with no 
alternative –and then racked by apprehension- that an Arab party will comply with an arbitration 
clause”.26 He sees arbitration as something imposed by foreign companies and, if there is any 
other option, the host states from Arab countries will not agree to settle their disputes by 
arbitration.   
Virtus Chitoo Igbokwe justifies the host states’ fear of international arbitration as follows: 
“one reason for the suspicion of international arbitration of oil investment is the perceived bias in 
the choice of law applicable to the merits of the disputes.”27  Although applicable law is one of 
many concerns it is considered the most important, since it is linked to the issue of violation of 
sovereignty, especially in cases where the subject of the dispute is petroleum.   
Masood argues that the:  
 International arbitration of petroleum investment disputes can be an effective 
process for the settlement of disputes arising out of oil agreements if the reasons for the 
suspicion by developing countries are removed.  This can be achieved by fair 
representation from developing countries in the international arbitration institutions and 
                                                          
24 Jan Paulsson, ‘Third World Participation in International Investment Arbitration’ (1987) 19 ICSID REVIEW- 
Foreign Investment Law Journal 44. 
25 Arbitration between parties from industrialized and Less Developed Countries, Report of the Committee on 
International Commercial Arbitration to the 1982 International Association Conference in Montreal, prepared by 
Professor K.-H. Bockstiegel.  
26 Samir Saleh, ‘The Settlement of Disputes in the Arbitration World Arbitration and Other Methods’ (1986) 4 
Berkeley Journal of International Law 280. 
27 Virtus Chitoo Igbokwe, ‘Developing Countries and the Law Applicable to International Arbitration of Oil 
Investment Disputes: Has the Last Word Been Said?’ (1997) 14 Journal of International Arbitration 99. 
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by subjecting the petroleum contracts to the national law of the host States, unless it is 
agreed otherwise.28  
 
Masood’s opinion is consistent with the resolutions of the General Assembly of the UN,29 
which recommend that host states should have the right to apply their national laws over natural 
resources.  Despite the UN Resolutions recommending the application of host states’ national 
laws, there are nonetheless many cases30 where laws other than those of the host state are applied 
to petroleum disputes. 
Lawrence Atsegbua concludes that “the future of international arbitration of oil investment 
disputes may lie in accepting the superiority of municipal law over international law in time of 
conflict between the two systems and not in the theory of “internationalization” of oil investment 
disputes”.31 He argues that in future, municipal law will have primacy over international law, 
which is considered to be one of the important reasons behind the host states’ fears of arbitration.   
He believes that this will help to “dispel the cloud of suspicion by developing countries towards 
international arbitration, particularly in respect of oil investment disputes.”32 However, foreign 
petroleum companies as investors in the petroleum sector prefer to not to apply the national laws 
of the host state and seek to apply laws that are not those of the host state because they think that 
the host state’s laws are not sufficient to govern petroleum agreement in cases where disputes 
arise between the host state and petroleum companies.33    
Sornarajah argues that the success of arbitration in other fields, such as the sale of goods,  
[C]annot be transferred to petroleum disputes.  Nor can the trade, investment or 
commercial relationships between private parties from different countries be transferred 
to the area of petroleum where the disputing parties are in different positions.34  
 
He argues that petroleum agreements and petroleum disputes have characteristics which 
make them distinct from ordinary investment agreements and that this is because both parties 
to this agreement have different positions.  The host state, which is one of the arbitration 
                                                          
28 Masood Hossain Masood, ‘International Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes’ (Ph. D thesis, Aberdeen University 
2004) 79. 
29 UNGA Res 3171 (17 December 1973) UN Doc S/RES/3171; UNGA Res 3201 (1 May 1974) UN Doc S/RES/ 
3201; UNGA Res 3281 (12 December 1974) UN Doc S/RES/3281. 
30 For example, Petroleum Development Ltd v. The Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR 144; Ruler of Qatar, 
International Maritime Oil Company (1953) 20 ILR 534. 
31 Lawrence Atsegbua, ‘International Arbitration of Oil Investment Disputes: The Severability Doctrine and 
Applicable Law Issues Revisited’ (1993) 5 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 634. 
32 ibid. 
33 This issue will be discussed in Chapter Three and Five.  
34 M. Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts (Longman 1990) 8.  
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agreement parties, possesses sovereignty, which is not found in petroleum companies.  
However, the author justifies that petroleum agreements differ to other investment agreements 
because petroleum agreement’s parties’ legal condition is not because of subject matter of 
petroleum agreement which is petroleum.  However, the host state obviously can waive its 
sovereignty and both parties then occupy an equal position.   
El-Kosheri and Tarek Riad also argue that petroleum agreements are different from other 
commercial agreements.  
Contrary to these commercial law transactions, in the petroleum development 
agreements the foreign private person undertakes to contribute equity and/or technology 
in the process of consolidating the national economy through the exploitation of a vital 
economic sector still insufficiently developed.35  
 
The authors point to the economic and technology value of these agreements as a feature 
distinguishing them from normal investment agreements.  However, one could argue that the 
criterion adopted by these authors is found also in ordinary investment agreements: most 
investment agreements have economic value and require high levels of technology.  Thus, they 
seem to be overstating the case.   
Abdullah Alsaidi36 also argues that petroleum agreements have different features which 
make them different from investment agreements.  He cites three features which make these 
agreements different.  These are: the period of time involved, which is longer in petroleum 
agreements than in investment agreements; the scope of petroleum agreements, which is wider 
than in investment agreements; and finally the “cost recovery which simply means that all 
petroleum companies have the right to cover all their exploration costs once petroleum has been 
discovered”.37 It seems that the author here depends on features found in concession agreements, 
which represent an earlier generation of these agreements.  However, in modern agreements, the 
situation is different: most of the new petroleum agreements specify the scope of land that would 
be the subject matter of the exploration process and a period of time shorter than in a concession 
agreement.  Therefore, these features cannot be depended upon to distinguish petroleum 
agreements from investment agreements.  Moreover, in the present author’s view, petroleum 
                                                          
35 Ahmed S El-Kosheri and Tarek F Raid, ‘The Changing Role in the Arbitration Process (With Regard to the 
Applicable Law Governing the New Generation of the Petroleum Agreements)’ (1985-1986) 1 Arab Law 
Quarterly 475. 
36 Abdullah Mohammed Alsaidi, ‘Petroleum Arbitration: Applicable Law and Appropriate Arbitral Forum (A Study 
of Petroleum Disputes in Arab Countries)’ (Ph. D thesis, Queen Mary, University of London 2004) 66- 68.  
37 ibid.  
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agreements are merely a type of investment agreement, and they are additionally regulated by 
constitutional law which, in the case of Iraq, underscores the sovereign interests in the subject 
matter of the agreement. 38  
Abdullah Al- Faruque rightly claims that petroleum agreements are also distinct from 
investment agreements because the former contain a risk element.  He states that “the probability 
of different kinds of risk and uncertainties remains a basic feature of petroleum contracts”.39  
Obviously, the risk element is found in every agreement, whether it is a petroleum or an 
investment agreement.   
Blyschak correctly argues that the developing countries have come to believe that arbitration 
is a “sword used by (….) investors to attack legitimate government regulation in the public 
interest”.40  
According to Blyschak many host states conscious of the significance of consent to a waiver of 
state sovereignty.  They feel that “this consent has been illegitimately expanded”.41 However, 
many states regulate the limit of waiver of sovereignty through bilateral agreements between the 
host states and investors or through the contract.   
The participation of the host state in arbitration as one of the dispute parties gives the 
arbitration process special features.  This is because the host state has a sovereignty by which it 
will not be subject to any foreign jurisdiction unless chooses to waive that sovereignty.   
There are several aspects linked to sovereignty concerns in this area: sovereignty over 
natural resources as an inherent part of the right to state, sovereignty over disputes resolutions for 
disputes arising from them over, from immunity jurisdiction and sovereign immunity.  The host 
state has permanent sovereignty over natural resources as the political entity through which “a 
people” entre to the right to govern themselves their resources.  Therefore, for the host state itself 
to submit to arbitration is in conflict with the principle of the permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources of the host state which owns these resources.  Lawrence Atsegbua accurately indicated 
that “most developing countries see international arbitration as directly incompatible with the 
                                                          
38 This issue be discussed extensively in Chapter Two of this thesis.  
39 Abdullah Al- Faruque, ‘Stability in Petroleum Contracts: Rhetoric and Reality (Lessons from the Experiences of 
Selected Developing Countries and Economies in Transition (1980-2002) (Ph.D thesis, University of Dundee 
2005) 22. 
40 Paul Michael Blyschak, ‘State Consent, Investor Interests and the Future of Investment Arbitration:  Reanalyzing 
the Jurisdiction of Investor-State Tribunal in Hard Cases’ (2009) 9 Asper Review of International Business and 
Trade Law 99. 
41 ibid.  
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principles of permanent sovereignty over natural resources”.42 However, every host state has a 
right to permanent sovereignty over its natural wealth.  The state should also manage this wealth 
in a way that attracts foreign investors and achieves benefits for its people.  In this regard, 
arbitration is considered to be one of the most important guarantees to foreign investors, 
especially in investments requiring a high degree of technology and capital investment, as in the 
petroleum sector.  However, most developing countries who seek to attract foreign investors 
update and promulgate those of their laws which involve investment, including arbitration 
laws.43 
A host state waives its sovereignty when it agrees to recourse to arbitration.  Georges R. 
Delaume stated that “all concur that a state party to an arbitration agreement is precluded from 
asserting its immunity in order to frustrate the purpose of the agreement”.44 According to 
Delaume that arbitration agreement would not be effective unless the state waived its 
sovereignty.  Therefore state sovereignty would render the arbitration agreement fruitless.  The 
author does not explain here whether the waiver of sovereignty agreed by the state should be an 
implicit or an explicit waiver but some suggests it would be both, and the effect is the same.   
Hazel Fox rightly suggests that the host state’s laws should express this waiver, especially 
those laws of the state by means of which the parties sought to enforce the arbitral award.  She 
suggests that states who are parties to the ICSID should ensure that “their law on state immunity 
relating to enforcement of arbitral awards conforms to the minimum international standard”.45 
However, Fox does not state whether the state should express the waiver of jurisdiction 
sovereignty; she merely refers to the waiver of sovereignty of execution.   
Yemi Osinbajo points out that the court will judge whether to reject or accept that 
submission to arbitration constitutes a waiver (according to the arbitration agreement concluded 
by parties); also that the subject matter of the dispute may itself determine the question of state 
immunity.   He states that: 
 [I]n the case of a court this will depend on whether the court accepts or rejects the 
view that submission to arbitration by agreement would itself amount to a waiver of 
                                                          
42 Lawrence Atsegbua, ‘International Arbitration of Oil Investment Disputes: The Severability Doctrine and 
Applicable Law Issues Revisited’ (1993) 5 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 634. 
43 As will be seen in Chapter Three of this work. 
44 Georges R. Delaume, ‘State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration’ (1981) 75 The American Journal of 
International Law 784. 
45 Hazel Fox, ‘State Immunity and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Do We Need an UNCITRAL Model Law Mark 
II for Execution against State Property?’ (1996) 12 Arbitration International 89. 
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immunity, and whether in the particular circumstances (even if it were to hold that such 
an arbitration agreement would not amount to a waiver) the subject matter of the dispute 
is itself one for which immunity can be legitimately claimed.46  
  
Yemi Osinbajo tries to create a link between the arbitrability issue and sovereignty.  
However, the arbitrability issue is regulated by host state laws that decree which issues can be 
the subject matter of arbitration agreement and which cannot.   
Sovereign immunity is not limited to the state but is extended to its entities.  This point is 
made by Maniruzzaman, who reported that: 
 State practice suggests that whether a State is seeking immunity from jurisdiction 
or from execution against State owned property, the State and its wholly-owned or 
controlled enterprise consider themselves to be functionally the same, so that the 
activities of State enterprise are considered to be carried out by the State in its exercise 
of sovereign authority.47  
 
He also states that “A State or State enterprise that is legally part of the State itself can 
waive immunity either expressly or implicitly by a contractual provision or an arbitration clause 
in a contract with another party.”48   
Maniruzzaman reported that the enterprises of the host state have sovereignty.  Those 
enterprises can waive their sovereignty in different ways.  However, Maniruzzaman does not 
explain the extent to which these enterprises may enjoy sovereignty.   
The UAE and China are countries that have been selected for comparison with Iraq.  Gary R 
Feulner and Amjad Ali Khanted claim that in the UAE the waiver of sovereign immunity should 
be incorporated in the main contract “In international contracts involving the State, appropriate 
waiver of sovereign immunity and provisions safeguarding a party from acts of State should be 
incorporated, to the extent that such terms are negotiable”.49 These authors focus on a case in 
which the state waives its sovereignty before the dispute arises:  they do not discuss cases in 
which disputes arise after the conclusion of the investment agreement and this agreement does 
not include clause of sovereignty waiver.  
                                                          
46 Yemi Osinbajo, ‘Sovereign Immunity in International Commercial Arbitration:  The Nigerian Experience and 
Emerging State Practice’ (1992) 4 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1. 
47 A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, ‘State Enterprise Arbitration and Sovereign Immunity Issues” (2005) 60 Disputes 
Resolution Journal 1. 
48 ibid. 
49 Gary R Feulner and Amjad Ali Khanted, ‘Dispute Resolution in the United Arab Emirates’ (1986) 1 Arab Law 
Quarterly 312.  
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Wang Houli showed that “China stands by traditional principles of the jurisdictional 
immunity of states (……) [A]ccordingly, courts at various levels in China do not hear cases 
against foreign states or governments”.50  He also argues that China’s view of sovereignty “is not 
merely a customary rule, but a fundamental principle of international law in the modern 
international community”51  
Wu Dawei explains that “Nowadays, internationally, the approach to grant immunity to 
sovereign states and their property has been universally shifted from the original absolute 
immunity to restrictive immunity of sovereign states and their property”.52  This explanation of 
WU Dawei gives us evidence that the Chinese view of absolute sovereignty has changed to one 
of restrictive immunity.  However, Lijiang Zhu expresses a different opinion; He argues that 
China has not changed its view about sovereignty, which is absolute sovereignty.  He states, “I 
could not see the indication of the acceptance of the restrictive approach from Article 1 of the 
Law of Judicial Immunity of 2005”.53  
Huang Jin and M.A Jingsheng claim that: 
 China insists on the sovereign immunity of the State per se, which means that all 
activities carried on in the name of the State should enjoy immunity, unless the state 
voluntarily waives its immunity.  This is the principle of absolute sovereign immunity.54   
 
However, on 14 September 2004, China signed the United Nations Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 200555 (hereinafter CJISTP). This 
convention designed a restrictive approach to state immunity.  According to this convention the 
signatory states will be subject to the same jurisdictional rules as private structures in regard to 
commercial activities.  
                                                          
50 Wang Houli, ‘Sovereign Immunity: Chinese Views and Practices’ (1987) 1 Journal of Chinese Law 23. 
51 ibid 31. 
52 Wu Dawei, ‘Explanations’, Gazette of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s 
Republic of China, N07, 2005, Published on 15 November 2005, Beijing, 546. 
53 Lijiang Zhu, ‘State Immunity from Measures of Constraints for the Property of Foreign Central Banks: The 
Chinese Perspective’ (2007) 6 Chinese Journal of International Law 67. 
54 Huang Jin and M.A Jingsheng, ‘Immunities of States and Their Property:  The Practice of the People’s Republic 
of China’ (1988) 17-18 Chin Yrbk Intl L 179. 
55 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property was adopted during the 65th 
plenary meeting of the General Assembly by resolution A/59/38 of 2 December 2004.  In accordance with its 
articles 28 and 33, the Convention shall be open for signature by all States from 17 January 2005 until 17 
January 2007, at United Nations Headquarters in New York. 
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Iraq has a suspicious attitude towards arbitration.  The main reason behind this suspicion is 
the sovereignty issue.  Iraq sees arbitration as a violation of its sovereignty.  The Iraqi Office of 
Legal Codification explained in Decree No. 122/1978 as of 28 of August 1978 the reasons 
preventing Iraq’s ratification of the New York Convention 1958:   
The International Commercial Arbitration included foreign element, where it held 
beyond the borders of Iraq and the arbitrators could be foreign nationals, applying 
foreign law, either substantive law or procedural law.  Therefore, the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards inside Iraqi republican territories faces legal and sovereignty 
obstacles (….) therefore the issue of adhering to the New York Convention in 1958, 
recognizing and enforcing foreign awards, requires the agreement of the Iraqi 
authorities which plan prospective public economic policy. Because of the many 
political aspects involved in this accession, it would involve the reform and change of 
Iraqi law. 56     
Haider Ala Hamoudi sees the sovereignty issue as one of the legal obstacles in the petroleum 
sector.  He said that “there are significant legal obstacles to consider.  Iraq does not currently 
offer sovereign guarantees on its oil contracts.  The oil contracts that exist are as between the 
international oil consortia bidding on them and a state-owned oil company in Iraq.”57 
Sovereignty over resources, sovereignty over disputes and sovereign immunity are there for 
important obstacles facing petroleum arbitration.   
1.4. Aims and Objectives: 
The main aim of this study is to discuss that Iraqi legislation for the resolution of 
petroleum disputes is inadequate, and that therefore Iraq requires special legislation for the 
arbitration of petroleum disputes.  This legislation should contain rules for creating a balance 
between the petroleum companies’ interests and Iraqi national interests.  They should be 
considered as protective rules for host states and petroleum companies.    
                                                          
56 Decree No. 132/1978 as of 28 of August 1978.  The translation from Arabic to English by the author. See below 
the Arabic text: 
  ق نوقبطي دق بناجا نيمكحم ىلا هب دهعتي دقو .دلبلا دودح جراخ متي دق هنا ثيح .ايبنجأ ارصنع نمضتي يلودلا يراجتلا ميكحتلا نأ نم ءاوس ايبنجأ انونا
 هيروهمجلا قاطن لخاد هيبنجلأا ميكحتلا ماكحأ ذيفنت نأف هيلعو .هيئارجلأا دعاوقلا ةيحان نم مأ هيعوضوملا دعاوقلا ةيحان ي هيقارعلا لئاوح هنود يقلا
 كريوين ةدهاعم ىلا مامضنلأا نأف هيلعو ).......( هيدايسو هينوناق1958 ر جارختسأ مزلتسي اهذيفنتو هيبنجلأا ميكحتلا ماكحأب فارتعلأا نأشب يأ
يغبني هيسايس بناوج مامضنلأا كلذ يف نلأ هماعلا هيداصتقلأا هسايسلا طيطختب موقت يتلا ايلعلا تاهجلا تايضتقمو اهتاعارم  يعدتست هيلمع
.اهليدعتو هيقارعلا نيناوقلا ةعجارم بجوتسي مامضنلأا كلذو هساردلا 
57 Haider Ala Hamoudi, ‘Iraq Oil Sector Misfortunes’ (6 August 2012) <http://jurist.org/forum/2012/08/haider-
hamoudi-iraq-oil.php> accessed on 19 September 2014. 
16 
 
The aims and concerns of this thesis involve the following: 
1. To review and assess the relationship between Iraq and the international 
petroleum companies.  
2. To examine and determine the legal nature of petroleum agreements, 
focusing on Iraq in respect of the legal nature of these agreements.  
3. To examine and analyse the developing countries’ and international 
petroleum companies’ attitudes to arbitration as a means to resolve petroleum disputes 
and to review the factors which contribute to altering some host states’ attitudes towards 
this means, focusing on the attitudes of Iraq, UAE and China.  
4. To analyse that petroleum arbitration agreements are independent of 
petroleum agreements under Iraqi Law.  
5. To examine and determine the proper law which should govern the 
arbitration procedures and the substantives of petroleum disputes.  And also to critically 
analyse that national laws can be a preferable means of governing petroleum agreements 
and arbitration procedures. 
6. To discuss Iraq’s ability to create the legal environment in which foreign 
arbitral awards can be enforced.  
7. To suggest a proposal for Iraqi petroleum arbitration.    
1.5. The Thesis Statement: 
While this thesis explores many legal and policy issues that have implications for other 
states in a similar position, it is focused on the unusually complex situation of petroleum 
arbitration in Iraq.  Exhausted from wars and conflicts and multidimensional challenges, Iraq has 
been looking to rebuild its economy by attracting and maintaining foreign investment, 
particularly in the critical petroleum industry.   
 This Ph.D thesis proposes that Iraq, a country in transition and aspiring to attract foreign 
investment yet desirous to retain sovereignty, including control over its vital economic resources, 
cultural concepts and future progress, is in particular need of a national strategy and 
implementation plan. These must take into account the interests of stakeholders, whether 
domestic or foreign, who invest large amounts of capital and an enormous amount of 
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technological equipment in the petroleum sector, and also the special needs of Iraq.  The Iraqi 
state understandably seeks to exploit its most valuable natural resource, petroleum, and in doing 
so it must achieve the balance between the needs of stakeholders, whether from Iraq or from 
different nationalities, and the needs of Iraq.  The commercial environment remains under- 
developed.   Due to the political circumstances in Iraq, it has not been possible up to the present 
time to provide a sufficient legal framework to regulate petroleum agreements, let alone settle 
disputes arising from them.  This thesis argues that the formal justice system in Iraq does not 
offer means of dispute settlement which are sufficient to attract and maintain international 
investment.  It argues that arbitration can supply the necessary balance between the needs of Iraq 
and her people, and the interests of those foreign corporations and individuals that invest in the 
Iraqi petroleum industry sector.  This thesis argues that arbitration is the best way to resolve 
disputes arising from international petroleum agreements.  Furthermore, the author will 
demonstrate that petroleum is a special case that petroleum agreements are in fact a special sort 
of investment agreement, and that petroleum agreements therefore should be treated in different 
way.  Furthermore, petroleum arbitration needs a special regime going beyond ordinary 
commercial arbitration.  The comparative approach, especially in developing countries like 
China and the UAE, and their experiences and expertise of investment and arbitration, provides a 
good source of inspiration.  It will be argued that Iraq does have the ability to create and 
establish an efficient arbitration system.  The author argues that, under the critical circumstances 
facing Iraq, the country should enact legislation to regulate foreign investment in general and the 
petroleum industry in particular, legislation that provides for arbitration of disputes through a 
permanent specialised autonomous arbitration institution, located in Baghdad.  Such a plan by 
passing the ordinary court system, will allow for the development of Rule of Law in Iraq by 
insulating the still embryonic and fragile Iraqi justice system from highly contentious and 
politically sensitive disputes, while developing a specialised new skill around petroleum 
arbitration.   
Accordingly, the thesis will conclude with a suggested Petroleum Arbitration Law, which 
is in line with international practices and is tailored to the particular circumstances of Iraq and 
the corporations and individuals seeking to invest in her petroleum industry.   
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1.6. Research Questions:  
Each investor will be anxious about three issues: stability, monetization rights and 
international arbitration.  Consequently, if one of these factors is not present the investor may be 
discouraged from investing.58 The main questions which this thesis aims to answer are the 
following:   
1. Is the existing arbitration regime in Iraq sufficient for dealing with petroleum disputes?  
2. Do petroleum disputes in Iraq require a modern, special and comprehensive regime of 
arbitration, going beyond commercial arbitration and achieving the balance between Iraqi 
interests59 and foreign investors’ interests?  
In exploring the author’s hypothesis, the following additional research questions must be 
answered: are petroleum agreements investment agreements under Iraqi law?  What is the Iraqi 
attitude to petroleum arbitration? Does Iraq still harbor suspicions with regard to international 
commercial arbitration as a means of settling petroleum disputes, or has there been a change in 
its attitude? Are petroleum disputes arbitrable under Iraqi law? Do current provisions concerning 
arbitration agreements are sufficient to deal with petroleum arbitration agreement, or there is a 
need to update and amend them?  Does the arbitration clause remain valid and effective if the 
main petroleum agreement becomes invalid in Iraqi law?  Is submitting Iraqi petroleum disputes 
to arbitration by arbitration agreement to be considered as a waiver of its sovereignty?  And what 
is the law governing the petroleum arbitration agreement under Iraqi law?  Do current provisions 
regarding law applicable of petroleum arbitration adequate to deal with petroleum disputes or it 
is need to update and modernize them?  What are the laws governing petroleum arbitration 
procedures and substantive issues under Iraqi law?  Do current provisions of enforcement foreign 
                                                          
58 David Brent Grantham, ‘Caveat Investor: Assessing the Risks and Rewards of IOCs Entry into Iraq’ (2010) 3 
Journal of World Energy Law & Business 304. 
59  The second paragraph of Article 112 of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 provided that: 
      The federal government, with the producing regional and governorate governments, shall together 
formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the 
highest benefit to the Iraqi people using the most advanced techniques of the market principles and 
encouraging investment.   
The translation from Arabic Language to English Language is available at <http://investpromo.gov.iq/policies-and-
laws/ > accessed on 12 April 2014. 
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judgments is sufficient to deal with foreign petroleum arbitral awards or these provisions need 
update and amend? 
Also, is the lack of implementation laws to regulate the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards a hindrance to the enforcement of such awards? How will Iraq deal with the sovereign 
immunity of execution in regard to petroleum arbitral awards?    
The author tries to answer these important questions in the following chapters and 
sections of this study.   
1.7. Methodology: 
In order to answer the research questions and attain the stated objectives of the project, 
this study will rely on both analytical and comparative approaches in combination. 
Analytical approach: this study depends on black letter legal analysis.  It analyses the 
important arbitral awards concerning petroleum disputes and the texts of laws, such as PRC 
arbitration law and UAE arbitration law, as well as relevant Iraqi laws.  In addition, this study 
analyses the Iraqi relationship with international petroleum companies, the legal nature of 
petroleum agreements and the problems and issues facing Iraq in enacting petroleum arbitration. 
The reasons why Iraq and other developing countries have antipathy towards arbitration will also 
be examined.  This thesis will analyse all these subjects.   
The referencing approach has been used in order to answer the main questions of this 
study and to propose optimal and sufficient rules that should be adopted by petroleum arbitration 
law.  It is necessary to have recourse to special referencing to laws from different countries and 
to choose those rules which are most appropriate for the draft law annexed to this thesis.  
Therefore, as noted earlier this study draws on the UAE and PRC Arbitration Law.60 Both of 
those countries became parties to important international conventions, such as the New York 
Convention of 1958 and the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes61 
                                                          
60 Both of these countries’ arbitration laws will be the subject of extensive discussion in Chapter Three. 
 61 According to Washington Convention the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes was   
established in 1965 to settle the disputes between the states and nationals from other states.  It is known as ICSID 
Convention or Washington Convention.  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
20 
 
(hereinafter ICSID).  Both of PRC and UAE are developing countries which have followed a 
successful investment policy by investing outside their states’ borders and also by attracting 
foreign investment by promulgating and updating their arbitration laws to be consistent with 
international standards.62 In addition, they have centres for international commercial arbitration 
which have become famous throughout Asia and the Middle East.  Therefore, those countries’ 
laws will offer a rich foundation for our study.  The UAE is a member of Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (hereinafter OPEC) and is considered to be an active member in 
regard to OPEC policy.63  It shares this position with Iraq, which is also considered one of the 
more important OPEC members.  The UAE’s successes in investing its petroleum revenue and 
improving its economic position may inspire Iraq in transition.  The PRC has also had a 
favourable experience regarding investment after changing its economic policy in the 1970s from 
a centralized social economic system to an open door policy.  This change contributed to 
attracting investment and also Chinese investment outside China’s borders.  One of the reasons 
for choosing to reference to the PRC’s law to Iraqi law is that China concluded many investment 
agreements with Iraq, especially in the development of the petroleum sector.  The PRC’s 
companies have developed an important petroleum field in Iraq, the Al- Ahdab field.64  In 
addition, China has a strict attitude towards sovereignty, yet has been prepared to resolve 
disputes arising from investment agreements.  Therefore, for general and specific reasons this 
study will depend on referncening to these countries’ laws.   
This study depends on primary sources and secondary sources.  The primary sources 
consist of international commercial arbitration legislations from Iraq, the UAE and the PRC.  
This study not only depends on international commercial arbitration laws; it also depends on 
different legislations which are relevant to this study, for example, constitutional law, civil law, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Nationals of Other States, adopted on 18 March 1965, enterd into force on 14 October 1966, UNTS, vol 575, 
159. 
62 For example, China promulgated the Arbitration Law in 1994 and the UAE promulgated the Federal Arbitration 
Law in 1992.  Recently The UAE reviewed a new draft of the 2008 International Commercial Arbitration based 
on UNCETRAL Model Law.  
63 Nicholas B Angell, ‘Regulation of Business under the Developing Legal System of the United Arab Emirates’ 
(1986) 1 Arab Law Quarterly 119.    
64 This field developed by China National Petroleum Company according to agreement between the Iraqi 
government and the abovementioned company in 2008.  The agreement between Iraq and the company take the 
type of technical service contract.  It will be continue for 23 years.    Al-Ahdab field considered one of the major 
fields in Iraq.  It is expected to produce three millions tons of crude petroleum per year.  Edward Wong, ‘China 
Open Oil Fild in Iraq’ The New York Times (New York, 28 June 2011) < http://www.nytimes.com/2011 
/06/29/world/asia /29chinairaq.html?_r=0 > accessed on 2 September 2014.  
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and oil and gas laws in the countries referenced.  This study also relies on petroleum agreements 
concluded between Iraq and foreign petroleum companies and also petroleum agreements 
between other countries and petroleum companies, as well as international conventions involved 
in arbitration in general and international conventions involved in the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in particular.  Moreover, it deals with the most 
controversial arbitral awards.   
The secondary sources are varied.  There are specialised books in different languages, for 
example books in the Arabic language, especially books containing topics related to Iraq and the 
UAE.  It should be mentioned here that there are few sources in the English language which 
address arbitration in Iraq.  Therefore the author depends on important books in the Arabic 
language. These books and articles has been translated from Arbic language to English by 
author.  Use is also made of articles, publications and reports issued by the Iraqi Oil Ministry.  
The author also depends on books and articles concerning arbitration in China written in English 
language for Chinese authors and some formal website contain Chinses laws and regulation 
written also in English languge.   
In this study reference to the host states will be used to point to the petroleum producing 
countries and also this study will depend on petroleum to reference to oil and gas.   
1.8. Contribution of Knowledge:   
           As mentioned previously in the literature review section,65 many authors66 claim 
that petroleum agreements are different from ordinary investment agreements and attempt to 
provide reasons for the difference.  The author, however, argues that under Iraqi law, although 
petroleum agreements are a special kind of investment agreement they are not totally different 
from the ordinary kind .of agreement, with which they have features in common.67 It was also 
argued that petroleum agreements constitute a special case under Iraqi law, not because of their 
                                                          
65 See pages 9, 10 and 11 of this chapter.   
66 M. Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts (Longman 1990) 8; 
Ahmed S El-Kosheri and Tarek F Raid, ‘The Changing Role in the Arbitration Process (With Regard to the 
Applicable Law Governing the New Generation of the Petroleum Agreements)’ (1985-1986) 1 Arab Law 
Quarterly 475; Abdullah Mohammed Alsaidi, ‘Petroleum Arbitration: Applicable Law and Appropriate Arbitral 
Forum (A Study of Petroleum Disputes in Arab Countries)’ (Ph. D thesis, Queen Mary, University of London 
2004) 66- 68.  
67 This issue will explain in pages 65 and 66 of chapter two.  
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long duration or their need for advanced technology but because petroleum is owned by the 
entire Iraqi people.68 Petroleum is a sovereignty issue.   
This thesis also proposes a comprehensive petroleum arbitration law for Iraq and gives 
details of how it should be formulated. Some authors advocate petroleum arbitration but fail to 
specify precisely what form it should take. Others focus on currently applicable law and give 
weight to national law. The present author maintains that an Iraqi form of petroleum arbitration 
should be promulgated. The legislation should contain special rules and include within its scope 
not only applicable law but also arbitration agreements and the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards. These rules should be compatible with Article 111 and 112 of the Iraqi constitution of 
2005 and should aim to achieve a balance between the interests of foreign investors and the 
needs of Iraq.  
1.9. Structure of the Work: 
This work is divided into seven chapters.  The first chapter (the present one) is devoted to 
an introduction to the key issues of the thesis and contains reasons for the study, objectives of the 
study, thesis statement and research questions.  Chapter Two focuses on petroleum agreements, 
which are considered as the foundation of petroleum disputes.  It presents the background to 
Iraq’s petroleum industry and illustrates the role played by actor states and international 
petroleum companies in formulating the history of this industry.  This chapter also shows the 
types of petroleum agreement.  Moreover, this chapter explains why the petroleum agreement is 
considered by the author as a special type of investment agreement and that it therefore requires 
a special regime of arbitration.  Furthermore, this chapter discusses and examines the legal nature 
of petroleum agreements and reviews the various opinions expressed about this legal nature.  
Most of the references relate to petroleum countries, especially the developing countries, which 
are suspicions about arbitration, which they believe to a require waiver of sovereignty to a 
private party or entity.  By accepting arbitration, they allow foreign law to govern disputes, 
which are submitted to courts other than their own.  Meanwhile, the petroleum companies and 
western countries prefer international commercial arbitration as a means of settling any disputes 
arising from petroleum agreements.  Therefore the attitudes of both parties diverge.  These 
                                                          
68 Article 111 of Iraqi constitution.  
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attitudes will be represented in Chapter Three, with a focus on the attitudes of Iraqi, the UAE and 
PRC towards arbitration.  Chapter Three is linked with Chapter Two.  It gives us a clear picture 
of the realities of petroleum agreements and the arbitration regime in Iraq.  The fourth chapter 
focuses on petroleum arbitration agreements through analysis of the provisions which regulate 
arbitration agreements in Iraq and discussing the extent to which current provisions can be relied 
on in dealing with petroleum arbitration.  In addition, this chapter asks whether these provisions 
need to be updated and if so, suggests how this might be done.  Chapter Five discusses and 
analyses the method that determines which laws govern the obligations and rights arising from 
petroleum agreements and the laws governing the procedures of arbitration. In addition, the 
chapter reviews the most important arbitral awards in this area and the international 
organizations, such as the United Nations (hereinafter UN) and the OPEC.  Furthermore, Chapter 
Five enquires whether current provisions are sufficient for the needs of petroleum arbitration in 
Iraq, and whether they need to be modernised.  Chapter Six is devoted to examining the 
enforcement of arbitral awards and how Iraq can deal with this issue in cases where Iraqi 
implementation laws do not explain expressly the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in 
general and petroleum arbitral awards in particular.  The chapter evaluates the legal regime of 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and enquires whether this regime is sufficient to deal with 
petroleum arbitral awards.  It is suggested that Iraq should reform its laws to facilitate and 
enforce arbitration awards.  Chapter Seven is divided into four sections.  Sections one and two 
are devoted to the important conclusions of this study, while section three will contain proposals 
for a comprehensive Iraqi petroleum arbitration regime drawing from international best practice. 
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Chapter Two: Petroleum Agreements in Iraq     
   2.1. Introduction:  
  There is a strong connection between the production of petroleum and the economic health 
of Iraq.  The country depends almost totally on petroleum revenue.1  For this reason, this revenue 
was considered as a foundation for the rebuilding the Iraqi economy in the aftermath of the 
second Gulf War, especially with regard to infrastructure. 
The Iraqi petroleum industry has a long history, beginning in 1925 when Iraq was the first of 
the Arab countries to sign a concession agreement.  This industry has affected and influenced the 
major political events experienced by Iraq.  Foreign petroleum companies played a great role in 
shaping Iraqi modern history.  It could be said that petroleum was the main reason behind the 
numerous recent conflicts and wars in which Iraq has been engaged.   
The form of petroleum agreement governing the relationship between Iraq and the 
international petroleum firms developed dramatically after the Second World War.  The new 
generation of petroleum agreements has features that differ from the earlier concession 
agreements.  In the new generation of petroleum agreements, Iraq as a host state has a major role 
in negotiation and has developed a strong position as a contractual party.  Petroleum agreements 
therefore hold a special position under Iraqi law, and need to be treated differently from ordinary 
investment agreements.  The legal nature of petroleum agreements has been debated by many 
contemporary writers, and no consensus has ever been reached.       
In order to give an adequate account of petroleum arbitration, it will be necessary first to 
present a history of the Iraqi petroleum industry.  This chapter will therefore relate that history 
and review the relationship between Iraq and foreign companies.  The chapter explains the types 
of petroleum agreements and examines the main factors behind the emergence of a new 
generation of these agreements.  In addition, the chapter argues that petroleum agreements have 
special characteristics distinguishing them from investment contracts, and consequently there is a 
                                                          
1 Petroleum revenue accounts for about 90% of the Iraqi economy.  David Brent Grantham, ‘Caveat Investor: 
Assessing the Risks and Rewards of IOCs Entry into Iraq’ (2010) 3 Journal of World Energy Law & Business  
304. 
 
25 
 
need for petroleum arbitration to exist. Finally, the chapter discusses the legal nature of 
petroleum agreements.   
        2.2. Historical Perspective: 
Bell argues that there is an overlap between the petroleum industry and international 
relationships.2  The Iraqi political situation has been affected by petroleum since it was first 
discovered in commercial quantities in Naftakana, a region near the border with Iran.3  
The history of the petroleum industry of Iraq can be divided into four phases. First, the 
beginnings of the discovery of petroleum in Iraq; second, the pre-nationalisation era; third, the 
post–nationalisation era; and fourth, post- occupation Iraq.   
    2.2.1. The Discovery of Petroleum and Early Extraction (1872-1920): 
Iraq was a part of the Ottoman Empire (it became a modern state in 1920).4  It was divided 
into three provinces, Mosul, Baghdad and Basra,5 all controlled by the Ottoman Empire.   
The first attempt to develop a petroleum industry in Iraq took place during the time of the 
Ottoman Empire. Medhat Pasha (1869-1872)6 built a refinery in 1871 in order to refine the 
petroleum extracted in the town of Mandele, which is located in the north of Iraq.  German 
experts helped with the construction of this refinery.7 
In 1882, the Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)8 ordered all the petroleum land in 
Mosul, including Al-Qayarah, to be brought under the control of his own private Treasury in 
                                                          
2 Dawn Bell, ‘International Control of Iraq Oil: How the Oil –For – Food Program Fits in, and Implications for the 
Future’ (2004) 8 Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 129. 
3 M. S. Vassiliou, The A to Z of the Petroleum Industry (the A to Z Guide Series) (Scarecrow Press, Inc 2009) 272. 
4 V. J. Parry et al, A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730 (M. A. Cook ed, Cambridge University Press 1976) 
143; Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2002) 8; Jan Hallenberg and Håkan 
Karlsson (eds), The Iraqi War: European Perspectives on Politics, Strategy and Operations (Routledge 2005) 
84. 
5 ibid. 
6 21 ،1980 توريب ،1952-1925 قارعلا يف طفنلا تازايتملأ يسايسلا خيراتلا ،ديمحلا دبع يرون  
    [Noree Abdul Hameed, The Political History of Iraq Oil Concession Agreements 1925-1952 (Beirut 1980) 21]; 
Lucy Dean et al (eds), The Middle East and North Africa 2004 (50th edn, Europa Publication 2004) 445. 
7 21 ،1980 ،توريب ،1952-1925 قارعلا يف طفنلا تازايتملأ يسايسلا خيراتلا ،ديمحلا دبع يرون 
   [Noree Abdul Hameed, The Political History of Iraq Oil Concession Agreements 1925-1952 (Beirut 1980) 21]. 
8 Gökhan Çetinsaya, Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890-1908 (Routledge 2006) 2. 
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return for a small sum of money, claiming that he was safeguarding these lands from foreign 
exploitation.9 
 Abdulhamid II subsequently subjected all petroleum agreements to his own control by 
decrees enacted in 1889 and 1898.  According to these decrees, the conclusion of petroleum 
concession agreements was limited to exploration and exploitation, and these were to be 
conducted in Baghdad and Mosul under the auspices of his private Treasury.10  Henceforth, all 
negotiations would be conducted with Sultan Abdulhamid II.11  
The first flow of Iraqi petroleum in commercial quantities was in 1913, in Naftakana, south 
of Kanaqien, and was engineered by the Anglo- Persian Oil Company, which was later to 
become the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company and finally British Petroleum (hereinafter BP).12 The 
petroleum discovered at that time was used solely to supply domestic demand and was not 
exported.13  The next important discovery was in 1927 in Baba Gurgur, Kirkuk, and was made 
by the Turkish Petroleum Company (hereinafter the TPC) which was renamed the Iraqi 
Petroleum Company (hereinafter the IPC) in 1929.14  
As previously indicated, the petroleum industry influenced the politics of the region.  It also 
drew in other states during this period, namely Britain, Germany, France, and The United States 
of America.  
 
 
 
                                                          
9 Edwin Black, Banking on Baghdad: Inside Iraq’s 7,000- Year History of War, Profit, and Conflict (John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc 2004) 104. 
10 27- 1977،20 ،توريب ،1972-1901 طسولاا قرشلا يف لورتبلا خيرات ،راطعلا داوج 
    [Jawad Al-Ataar, The Petroleum History in the Middle East 1901- 1972 (Beirut 1977) 20-27]. 
11 Ibid; 155،هيناثلا هعبطلا ،1974 يبارافلأ راد ،برعلاو طفنلا، دمحأ دمحم 
    [Muhammad Ahmed, Petroleum and the Arabs (2nd edn, Al-Farabi house 1974) 155]. 
12 James Bamberg, The History of The British Petroleum Company: Volume 2 The Anglo- Iranian Years, 1928- 1954 
(Cambridge University Press 1994) 156. 
13 M. S. Vassiliou, The A to Z of the Petroleum Industry (the A to Z Guide Series) (Scarecrow Press, Inc 2009) 272. 
14 Abbas Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq: Oil, War, Destruction of Development and Prospects, 1950-2010 
(Greenwood Press 2010) 2; Laura S. Etheredge (ed), Region in Transition: Iraq (Britannica Educational 
Publishing 2011) 38. 
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    2.2.1.1. The Role of Germany:   
Germany was one of the main international actors in this period.  In 1903, it was the first 
state to take advantage of the opportunity to explore Iraq for petroleum.15 The Anatolian Railway 
Company, which was a German corporation financed by Deutsche Bank, obtained a concession 
agreement to build the Berlin to Baghdad railway.16  According to this concession, the company 
was also permitted to excavate minerals and petroleum in areas on both sides of this railway up 
to 20 kilometres.17 
On 17 July, 1904, the Anatolian Railway Company signed a contract with the Sultan’s 
Treasury.  Under this contract, the company undertook to carry out preliminary investigations to 
explore for petroleum in Baghdad and Mosul for a period of one year.18  Moreover, the company 
was granted the right to exploit these fields that it discovered, if it so wished, under a special 
agreement involving cooperation with the Treasury and under special supervision.19 It had a right 
to gravel pits, forest and quarries, and to the establishment of tile and brick works, hydro-electric 
plants and storehouses.20 
A coup d’etat in the Ottoman Empire in 1908 led to the end of the project.  However, that 
was not the end of German ambitions in Iraq. In 1911, Germany and Britain established a 
company21 called the African and Western Concession Co, Ltd.  The company was reconstituted 
in 1912 and its legal nature was changed from a limited company to a joint stock company, with 
its headquarters in London.22  As well as changing its name to Turkish Petroleum Company 
                                                          
15  Mohamed bin Abdul Latef, Middle East Oil: A Redistribution of Values Arising from the Oil Industry (University 
Press of America 1991) 26. 
16 George W. Stocking, Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy (Vanderbilt University 
Press 1970) 41; A. K. B Evans and J. V. Gough (eds), The Impact of the Railway on Society in Britain: Essays in 
Honour of Jack Simmons (Ashgate Publishing Company 2003) 88. 
17 ibid. 
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(TPC),23 this company obtained the right to the exploitation of petroleum in Iraqi territory, 
particularly around the province of Mosul.  However, little came of this arrangement.24  
In 1914, negotiations between the German government, the British government, the National 
Bank of Turkey, the Shell Company and the Anglo – Persian Oil Company resulted in a re-
distribution of the TPC’s share ownership, as follows: 50% for the Anglo – Persian Oil 
Company, 25% for Deutsche Bank and, 25% for the English – Saxon Oil Company, which was a 
branch of the Royal Dutch- Shell Company.25 
Negotiations then commenced between the British, German and Turkish governments in 
respect of concessions for exploiting the petroleum in Iraq territory.  However, the TPC stopped 
its petroleum extraction activities in Iraq after the outbreak of World War 1.26 
    2.2.1.2. The Role of Britain:  
Britain had no direct interest in Iraqi petroleum until the early twentieth century, when it 
found the penetration of Germany to be a threat to its economic and political interest in the 
Persian Gulf.27 Britain tried to limit this infiltration and became drawn into the intense 
competition to obtain petroleum concessions.28   
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This competition between the Great Powers intensified when oil began to be used as fuel for 
their naval craft. It then became the most essential raw material.29  In 1901, Britain obtained the 
rights to the Turkish petroleum refinery at Shat al- Arab.30  Britain entered into an agreement 
with the Ottoman Empire: petroleum would be exported from the Ottoman imperial lands, 
including Iraq, in exchange for British military protection.  By 1912, the British government was 
urgently seeking sources of petroleum in order to provide the British naval fleet with fuel.31 In 
that year, Britain, together with the Netherlands and Germany established the TPC to exploit 
petroleum in the Mosul and Baghdad provinces.32  The British Navy converted from using coal 
to using oil in 1912-1913 and this decision by Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, in 
1913, significantly impacted on the increasing competition for petroleum between Germany and 
British.33  
Turkey took part in the First World War as an ally of Germany.  Britain invaded Iraq, which 
was part of the Turkish Empire, in 1916.34  British troops occupied Baghdad in 1917 and Kirkuk 
in 1918.35 Stephen Pelletiere explained the Britain interest in Iraq as follows: 
 A big question about World War I is why the Allies devoted so much time and 
resources to waging the fight in the Middle East (….) [o]nly one explanation carries 
weight, that the British were determined to take control of the area because of its oil.36 
In 1916, Britain and France signed the Sykes – Picot treaty.37  According to this treaty, 
Britain and France divided spheres of influence between themselves.38  France anticipated the 
presence of copious quantities of petroleum in Mosul in northern Iraq, which was within the 
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French sphere.39  Britain therefore placed itself in a critical position in relation to France when it 
entered Mosul and started drilling wells, and also built a railway between Mosul and Kirkuk.40  
Britain was in breach of the treaty as a result of entering the French zone of influence, but France 
merely submitted a protest note.41 At the end of the First World War Britain took possession of 
Germany’s share in the TPC, putting an end to Germany’s role in Iraq, and inaugurating a new 
era there.42 It could be said that Britain was successful in excluding the competition of other 
powers in Iraq.      
2.2.1.3. The Role of France:  
France was one of the great powers that sought to obtain a petroleum concession in the Iraq 
region of the Ottoman Empire.  French attempts to obtain petroleum concessions in the Iraq 
region had started at the end of the nineteenth century, when French petroleum experts had 
helped to develop and increase petroleum production in the Toz Kormatoo and Baba Gurgur 
petroleum fields.43  France, like Britain, became aware of German influence in the Iraq region in 
the course of its attempts to establish its place among the powers that owned the Middle East 
petroleum industry, which at the time were Britain and the USA.44 France’s need for petroleum 
increased notably in the period from 1914 to 1918, as it was the fuel used by its navy during the 
war.  It was for this reason that France agreed to conclude the Sykes- Picot treaty in 1916.45 The 
latter agreement gave France control over Syria, and the petroleum-rich province of Mosul as a 
part of Syria.46  French ambitions to control Mosul province led to disputes with the British, who 
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wanted this province to be within their own sphere of interest.47 However, after a series of 
negotiations between France and Britain, the agreement was amended and Mosul became part of 
the region that was to be under the British government’s control.48  In 1920, France owned a 
quarter of the shares in the TPC as a consequence of Germany’s defeat in the First World War,49 
and this is provided the basis of the French petroleum industry in the last century.   France’s role 
in Iraq expanded after the First World War, and it concluded important agreements to enhance its 
petroleum industry and to ensure access to petroleum.  The French were major participants in the 
Iraqi petroleum industry prior to its nationalisation.50  
2.2.1.4. The United States of America (USA): 
The United States had long sought to find ways to reach Iraq’s petroleum, and it was for this 
purpose that Colby M. Chester was sent to Turkey in 1908.  Chester was a retired Admiral and a 
former attaché at the American embassy, and his mission was to negotiate with the Ottoman 
authorities on behalf of the USA to obtain a concession for the Anatolian Railway Company to 
construct a line between Mosul and Kirkuk, and in addition, for the right to be granted to the 
USA to exploit petroleum in the area on both sides of the railway. Chester’s efforts were 
facilitated by the Chamber of Commerce, the Commercial Office and the Transport Association 
of New York, which provided him with large sums of money. 51 
Due to American political support and his previous relationship with the Turks, Chester 
succeeded in gaining some concessions to exploit petroleum in some parts of the Ottoman 
Empire.   However, the USA was unable to implement these concessions because of the coup 
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against Sultan Abdulhameed II that occurred a few weeks after the concessionary agreement was 
signed.  Subsequently, the concessions had no legal validity. 52 
As noted competition between the Great Powers to secure petroleum supplies increased 
because of the importance of petroleum as an essential fuel for naval vessels during World War 
I.  The great powers were thereby motivated to enter into petroleum concession agreements with 
the Ottoman Empire. They also entered into agreements with each other so as to secure 
petroleum, as in the Sykes Picot agreement.  These agreements between the Great Powers reveal 
the disputes between them53 over petroleum areas in the Middle East, and notably in Iraq.  These 
agreements between the great powers reshaped Iraq after the First World War. Iraq had 
previously been subject to the control of the Ottoman Empire, and had no role in the 
management and control of its own natural resources.  The Ottoman Empire controlled Iraq most 
valuable form of natural wealth, petroleum, and petroleum concessions were given to the 
Empire’s allies.  The end of the Ottoman era, however, did not give Iraq the opportunity to 
control its own petroleum; instead a new era began, in which control was exercised by British 
companies.   
   2.2.2. The Pre – Nationalisation Era in Iraq (from 1920 to 1972):  
After the allied victory in World War I, the competition between the allied nations became 
intense.  In their efforts order to secure control over resources, these nations began to dispute 
with each other over control of petroleum regions.  The origin of these disputes is to be found in 
the Sykes – Picot agreement,54 which took place before the war ended.  However these disputes 
were settled in 25 April 1920, when France and Britain met in Italy to conclude a treaty known 
as the San Remo agreement.55  Under this agreement, mandate territories were created from parts 
of the former Turkish Empire and divided among the allied powers.  Lebanon and Syria came 
under a League of Nations Mandate56 administered by the French, while Iraq and Palestine came 
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under a British mandate.57 Furthermore, the dispute over Mosul, settled in this agreement, gave 
to France Germany’s shares in the TPC, which amounted to 25%, in return for France’s waiver 
of its claims on Mosul in favour of Britain.58 The French government was obliged to facilitate 
the building of pipelines to transfer petroleum from fields in Iraq and Iran to seaports in the 
Mediterranean.59 
Meanwhile the news of this agreement, which was limited to Britain and France, was leaked 
to the USA.  The Americans then protested that, under the terms of the mandate, the granting of 
monopoly concessions was prohibited, and it insisted on having its own share in Middle East 
petroleum.60  Britain suggested that all US companies should be integrated into one company, to 
be known as The Middle East Development Company.  This company came to own 25% of the 
TPC.61 
In 1920, Iraq became independent of the Ottoman Empire under the nominal kingship of 
Amir Abdullah, who was the son of Sharif Husain and the brother of Amir Faisal.  The country 
was nevertheless under a British mandate.62 In 1921, a kingdom was established and Amir Faisal 
became the first King of Iraq.63 After the founding of the Iraqi state, the TPC submitted a request 
to the Iraqi government for the grant of a concession to exploit petroleum in Baghdad and 
Mosul.64 In 1923, the Iraqi and British governments began negotiations over these new 
petroleum concessions.  During the negotiations, Iraq insisted on a 20% share in the TPC.65 
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Finally, in 1925, the Iraqi Council of Ministers agreed to grant this company a concession for a 
period of 75 years.  None of the Iraqi demands were met, except those relating to Khanqin and 
Basra.  This agreement became the first petroleum concession in the Arab world.66 
In that period, the Iraqi state had a major role in influencing the Iraqi petroleum industry.  
To highlight this role, I have divided my discussion into two parts.  The first part deals with Iraqi 
state intervention in the petroleum industry before World War II.  The second part focuses on the 
Iraqi state’s role after World War II.   
  2.2.2.1. The Iraqi State’s Intervention in the Petroleum Industry before World War II: 
The discovery of petroleum in the Middle East led to drastic changes in economic, social 
and political life.67 The political aspect is notable because the exploitation of petroleum came to 
be associated with the history of the Middle East.  The Great Powers, particularly, Britain,68 used 
different ways to secure control over petroleum resources.  For example, Britain signed a series 
of agreements with tribal leaders in Iraq and imposed its dominance in the Persian Gulf.69  
Britain also developed a procedure for determining prices and restricting business and other 
activities of petroleum companies that were operating in the Middle East subject to British 
protection.70 The policy followed by Britain impacted on the historical development of the 
activities of the Iraqi Petroleum Company (hereinafter the IPC).71 In 1928, shareholders in the 
IPC signed an agreement to prevent them from competing among themselves, or with the IPC, 
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for concessions inside the areas formerly controlled by the Ottoman Empire.  This agreement 
was known as the Red Line Agreement72 and it remained in force until 1948.73  
The IPC did not discover petroleum in commercial quantities until 14 November 1927, 
when petroleum began to flow from the Baba Gurgur field in Kirkuk.74 This is considered to be 
the second most important petroleum discovery in Iraq.75   
In 1931, the Iraqi government announced its willingness to pave the way for new foreign 
companies to obtain concession contracts outside the IPC’s areas. It is worth noting that this 
announcement was an attempt by the Iraqi government to attract rival companies in order to 
create new concessions with fairer terms.  A new competitor appeared in the form of British Oil 
Development Ltd, (hereinafter BOD).76 This company was able to win a concession to exploit 
petroleum in Iraq.  The IPC tried to stand against the company through granting an increased 
number of concessions within the Red Line Agreement territories.  It succeeded in challenging 
the BOD’s influence and ultimately purchased all BOD shares.  BOD changed its name to the 
Mosul Petroleum Company (hereinafter the MPC) and gained a further concession. With these 
important concessions, Iraqi oil fields came under the control of the IPC.77 This company 
imposed its dominance on competitors in the area and emerged as an influential authority by 
tightening its grip on all concessions and challenging those which the Iraqi government granted 
to other companies.          
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By 1938, the Basra Petroleum Company (hereinafter the BPC) was granted a concession for 
a period of 75 years, covering all Iraqi territory that had not been granted to other companies, 
and also including Iraqi territorial waters and Iraq’s share of neutral waters.78 
In the light of the above, it may be seen that the petroleum companies that were granted 
concession agreements before World War II extended their domination over the Iraqi petroleum 
industry.  Taking advantage of unfair terms, the foreign petroleum companies controlled all areas 
rich in petroleum and were granted concessions in large areas of Iraqi territory.79  Moreover, the 
petroleum agreements concluded in that period were of long duration, like the 1925 agreement 
between Iraq and the IPC, which extended for 75 years.  What is more, these companies enjoyed 
a monopoly of all petroleum operations, from the initial exploitation to the refinement stage and 
including its export and sale in international markets.  They were also mapping the entire policy 
of the Iraqi petroleum industry.  These companies, it can be said, curtailed Iraq’s right to exploit 
its petroleum wealth fairly through their formulation of unclear and unfair terms in concession 
contracts held with the Iraqi government.80   
In the short period between the acquisition of the concessions and the outbreak of World 
War II, the petroleum industry of the Middle East in general, and of Iraq in particular, continued 
to rely entirely on foreign companies.  Consequently the Iraqi government played no part in the 
petroleum industry.  Opposition to any interference from the Iraqi government was in the foreign 
petroleum companies’ interest.  An example of this was the petroleum agreement of 1925.  When 
Iraq laid claim to 20% of the TPC: Iraq signed the agreement but its claim was not recognised.81   
The Iraqi government at this time was not strong enough to negotiate concession agreements 
with foreign companies on equal terms.   
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   2.2.2.2. Iraqi Government Intervention in the Petroleum Industry after World War II: 
The end of World War II82 was a turning point for most petroleum- producing countries.  
The petroleum countries of the Middle East, particularly Iraq, started paying more attention to 
their petroleum wealth and realized the importance of petroleum in the shaping of international 
political relationships.  Moreover, four important factors stimulated many of the petroleum 
production countries to intervene in the petroleum industry.83 These factors are as follows:  
1. The emergence of new companies that were independent of the existing major 
companies. The French Organization for Oil Prospection and Activities (hereinafter the 
ERAP) was one such newcomer.  These companies offered better terms than those 
offered by the major companies.  In order to obtain more concessions, these companies 
laid claim to areas where the presence of petroleum was potential, or areas where 
concessions had been waived by the main companies because they could not find 
petroleum.84 
2. The intervention of foreign investment companies gained influence on the internal 
affairs of the host country, and were therefore able to control policies for the production 
and sale of petroleum and to set the price.  In addition, the production of crude petroleum 
was not sufficient when compare the production of petroleum with the petroleum 
quantities found in these fields.85 
3. The spread of nationalisation in the Middle East petroleum countries, a particular 
example being the nationalisation of Iranian petroleum in 1951,86 when the Iranian 
parliament, during the premiership of Dr Mohammed Mosaddegh, enacted legislation to 
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nationalize the petroleum industry in Iran.87  This law conveyed a strong warning to the 
companies that monopolized the oil industry in the region. 
4. A new type of petroleum contract appeared.  The profit- sharing principle 
emerged in Venezuela in 1948, when legislation was enacted to impose an additional tax 
on the profits of petroleum companies, whereby the government’s share of net income 
was to be at least 50%.88 This new tax system moved from Venezuela to the Arab Gulf 
countries. In 1950, Saudi Arabia was the first of the Middle East countries to apply this 
form of taxation, doing so by means of a Royal Decree. It subsequently became 
widespread in the Middle East.89  
During this period, the Iraqi government’s role in the petroleum industry increased and 
became more effective, in a process that evolved through three stages.  
The first stage began after the Second World War II and lasted until 14 July 1958 revolution, 
when Iraqi government appealed to the IPC to review the Iraqi share. Article 10 of the IPC 
concession agreed with the Iraqi government in 1934 provided that Iraq had a right to reconsider 
the concession twenty years after the commencement of petroleum exports, which was in 1934.90 
The position taken by the Iraqi government came as a result of neighboring states amending their 
concession agreements with petroleum companies.91 
On 24 May 1950, the Iraqi Minister of the Economy sent an ultimatum to the MPC to export 
the largest possible quantity of crude petroleum.92 A month after this ultimatum he sent another 
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to the BPC ordering an acceleration of drilling operations.93  The Minister warned the company 
that if it did not export a sufficient quantity of crude petroleum this would be viewed as an 
unjustified disregard of the Iraqi government. The company was also placed under an obligation 
to export a large quantity of crude petroleum as quickly as possible.94 
The Iraqi government signed an agreement with the Khanaqin Oil Company in 1951.  This 
agreement gave the Iraqi government the right to buy the petroleum produced as from the 1 
January 1952.95  
Subsequently the Al- Rafidain Petroleum Company, which was owned by the IPC, took over 
the sale of petroleum.  The Iraqi government took control of all sales activity and also obliged 
this company to operate the Al- Wonde refinery and to increase its production of crude 
petroleum to as much as 2 million tons annually.96 
 Another important achievement for the Iraqi government during this period was the signing 
in 1952 of a profit- sharing agreement between Iraq and the major petroleum companies in the 
country (IPC, MPC, and BPC).97 The most significant term of the agreement is Article 4, which 
allocates 50% of the profits to the Iraqi government.   Article 6 sets out the minimum amounts 
payable by the three companies, which were to be not less than 20 million pounds per year.98 
These achievements, however, were insufficient to satisfy the Iraqi government, which by this 
time aspired to complete control over its most important natural resource. However, the Iraqi 
share of the profits did not rise above 50%, while in other states, such as Venezuela, the 
government share of the profits jumped up to 50%.99  
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The second stage began in 1958 when Iraq abolished the monarchy and became a republic, 
with Abdul Kareem Qasim as its first president.  The first act taken by the new government was 
to acquire the Kanaqin Petroleum Company,100 which could not fulfill its obligations towards the 
Iraqi government under the 1957 agreement described above.101 By 1959, the Al-Rafidain 
Petroleum Company had disappeared and an oil products distribution company was established 
in its place.102 
The main obstacle facing the new government was that there was no investment in the Iraqi 
territory controlled by the petroleum companies under the terms of the concession.  Several 
rounds of negotiations between Iraq and the petroleum companies failed to settle this issue of 
non-investment.  Eventually, in 1961, Iraq enacted Law No 80103 to force these companies to 
waive their control of land amounting to about 99% of the concession areas.104 Despite the IPC’s 
protest that Law No 80 was inconsistent with the terms of the concession agreements concluded 
in 1925, 1932, and 1938, it finally submitted to this law and limited its activities to areas 
specified by it.105  
These achievements were in domestic affairs.  At the foreign policy level, Iraq sought with 
other petroleum- producing countries, namely Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, to 
establish an organization for countries which exported petroleum.  Accordingly, a conference 
was held in Baghdad between 10 and14 September 1960,106 the result being the foundation of the 
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OPEC.  The main objective of OPEC was to create unity and a common petroleum policy among 
its members.107  
In 1964, the Iraqi government established the Iraqi National Oil Company (hereinafter the 
INOC) in accordance with Act No (11),108 which was reformed three years later in accordance 
with Act No. (123) 1967109 and also Act No, (97) 1967,110 which provided in its Article (1) that 
the Iraqi National Oil Company should have an exclusive right to invest in all Iraqi areas.   
At that time, the Iraqi government was in a strong position.  It subjected all the petroleum 
companies to its legislation.  Its determination to control its own natural resources was expressed 
through laws enacted in this period.  For example, the provisional constitution enacted on 29 
April 1964 provides in Article 9 that all natural resources and their revenue were to be owned by 
the Iraqi state in order to ensure that this revenue was exploited in the best way.  
The third stage began with the outbreak of the revolution of 17 July 1968, when the Baath 
Party took power in Iraq.  This period was characterised by political stability.111 
Iraq achieved some important successes at this time, for example, in compelling the 
petroleum companies to increase their production of crude petroleum during negotiations in 
Tehran.112  Iraq took part in these negotiations in cooperation with representatives from OPEC 
countries.113  The consequences of this agreement were an increase in crude petroleum prices and 
an augmentation of tax from 50% to 55% and cancellation of the marketing deduction. In June 
1971, the government revived its demand for the price of Iraq’s petroleum to be raised to the 
same level as that of Libya, and the IPC agreed to this increase.   
                                                          
107 The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, a Brief History: article.  <http://www.opec.org/opec_ 
web/en/about_us/24.htm > accessed on 21 August 2014.  
108 The Law in the Establishment of the Iraqi National Oil Company No. 11 of 1964 published in Iraqi Official 
Gazette, Issue 912 on 8 February 1964 64.  
109 The Law in the Establishment of the Iraqi National Oil Company No. 123 of 1967 Published in Iraqi Official 
Gazette, Issue 1474 on 21 September 1967 588. 
110 The Law for the Determination of the Investment Area of the Iraqi National Oil Company Published in Iraqi 
Official Gazette, Issue 1449 on 7 August 1967 482. 
111 Dawn Bell, ‘International Control of Iraq Oil: How The Oil –For – Food Program Fits in, And Implications For 
the Future’ (2004) 8 Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 129. 
112 Tehran negotiations it is sign as of 14 February 1971. 
113172 ،1978 ،ثلاثلا ددعلا ،هيمنتلاو طفنلا ةلجم ،ايقئاثو 1971 نارهط ةيقافتا ةصق ،سابعلا دمحا مساق  
     [Qasim Ahmed Al –Abass, ‘The Story of the Tehran Agreement of 1971 Documentary’ (1978) 3 The Oil and 
Development Journal 172]. 
42 
 
In 1968, the INOC concluded a service contract with the ERAP.114 Two years after this 
agreement France received its first imports of Iraq petrol.115 It is apparent from these events that 
the Iraqi government had begun looking for other opportunities and contracts in order to achieve 
its aims.  This contract also demonstrated the Iraqi government’s ability to control its natural 
resources.  
  2.2.3. The Post – Nationalisation Era (1972 – 2003): 
Iraq concluded several new contracts with foreign petroleum companies other than the major 
ones.  Cooperation with these smaller companies helped to set Iraq on the road towards 
developing its national petroleum industry and motivated it to promulgate, on 1 February 1972, 
Law No 69.116  By the terms of this law all operations of the IPC were nationalised.117 The Iraqi 
government subsequently promulgated a series of laws to regulate nationalisation, such as Laws 
No 70, 90 and 101 of 1973.  By virtue of these laws some of the common shares in the BPC were 
nationalized. Finally, Act No 200 in 1975118 nationalised all remaining shares in this company.  
Thenceforth Iraq controlled its export operations directly.119 In that period, Iraq adopted three 
approaches to sustain its petroleum industry.  First, it promulgated rules to regulate the industry 
and to secure complete control over it.120 Second, it followed a policy of looking for areas not 
previously subject to petroleum exploration, mainly in the north of the country, employing 
companies specialising in geological scans.121 Third, it signed contracts with companies from 
Germany, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (hereinafter the USSR), Bulgaria, Romania, 
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and Czechoslovakia to undertake survey operations and exploration.122 In that period the USSR 
played an important role in the Iraqi petroleum market.  It helped to provide the INOC with 
equipment, to train the company’s staff and helped Iraq to develop skills such as well-drilling 
and transportation.123  In this period Iraq created successful policies for the development and 
control of its petroleum industry.  A landmark was reached in 1972, when Iraq exported its first 
consignment of petroleum products to the global market.  The country had demonstrated its 
ability to explore and export petroleum to the international market and at the same time to fight 
against the monopolies of the petroleum companies, and in doing so became the first Gulf state 
to control its own petroleum revenues.124 
In 1979, relations between Iraq and Iran deteriorated because of a border dispute.125  The 
war between Iraq and Iran began in 1980.  Both countries possessed vast petroleum wealth, 
which in each case was exposed to severe damage.  In 1984, a tanker war began,126 and ships 
carrying petroleum were bombed by military aircraft.  The attacks not only involved the warring 
states but extended to other countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.127  As a result of these 
attacks, Iranian production of crude oil was reduced and Iraqi revenues also fell below the 
normal level. The petroleum industry in Iraq was exposed to extreme damage, not only to its 
tankers but also to pipelines, petroleum exporting ports, and refineries.128  For example, the most 
important refineries in Iraq, Basra and Kirkuk in the north of Iraq, was bombed. The revenue 
from petroleum was spent on arms and other sectors were deprived of this revenue.129 By 1987 
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Iraq was facing economic problems as a result of its policy towards the petroleum sector during 
the war.  It therefore raised its production of crude petroleum above the percentage level 
prescribed by OPEC.  The other OPEC countries were concerned about this increase in 
production, and some countries tried to limit the increase by halting Iraq’s use of pipelines which 
extended into their territory.130 
In 1987 the INOC was abolished, having been merged with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, in 
accordance with Act No 267 of 1987.131  
The war between Iraq and Iran ended in 1988132 and in that year several OPEC members, 
including Kuwait, diverged from the common policy on production, and caused a lowering of 
petroleum prices.  This change of policy badly affected Iraqi petroleum revenue.133  Iraq claimed 
that Kuwait was trying to sabotage the Iraqi economy through the lowering of petroleum prices.  
It also accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil from the Rumaila oil field, through drilling in a way 
that facilitated the extraction of oil across the border.134  As a consequence relations between Iraq 
and Kuwait became increasingly strained.  Finally, on 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait.  As a 
result of the invasion occupation, Iraq was subjected to military attack by the United States of 
America and its allies for a period of six weeks.  Most of these attacks targeted the Iraqi 
infrastructure, including petroleum refineries and pipelines.135 In addition, the United Nations 
Security Council issued Resolution No. 661,136 providing for the imposition of economic 
sanctions on Iraq.  This resolution was followed by another, No. 687, which subjected Iraq to the 
demands of the international community and required a withdrawal from Kuwait as a condition 
for lifting the sanctions.  This resolution forced peace on Iraq and included the following terms: 
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Section C, decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept, under international 
supervision, the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of its weapons of mass 
destruction, ballistic missiles with a range over 150 kilometres, and related production 
facilities and equipment. It also provides for establishment of a system of ongoing 
monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance with the ban on these weapons and 
missiles. It requires Iraq to make a declaration, within 15 days, of the location, amounts 
and types of all such items.137  
Under these resolutions, Iraq was also prevented from trading, and its assets were frozen in 
international banks.  This led to shortages of human needs, such as food, medicines and medical 
equipment.  In 1991 the United Nations agreed that Iraq needed to rebuild its infrastructure and 
to ensure its humanitarian needs.138 
This report revealed living conditions in Iraq, and paved the way for the Security Council to 
adopt Resolution No. 986 in April 1995.139  Under this resolution Iraq was allowed to sell a 
limited quantity of petroleum for the provision of basic humanitarian needs, under UN auspices.  
Iraq was able to sell petroleum to the value of one billion US dollars every three months.140  This 
was a relatively low quantity, and was insufficient to meet all the essential needs of Iraq.  
Despite this shortcoming, the programme was the largest one implemented by the UN.  It aimed 
to secure Iraqi needs for supplies of food and medicine, but also to retain UN supervision of Iraqi 
petroleum revenues.  This was to ensure that Saddam Hussein did not use this revenue to develop 
a nuclear weapons programme.  It was not until 1996 that Iraq resumed its shipments of crude oil 
to world markets.141 
Saddam Hussein encouraged foreign petroleum companies to sign contracts in order to 
pressure the international community into lifting economic sanctions.  Iraq concluded a contract 
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with the China National Petroleum Company, allowing China to exploit oil from the Al- Ahadab 
petroleum field.  In addition, a 23 -year contract was signed in 1997 with a Russian Company, 
LUK Oil, to develop the Al-Qurna petroleum field.142  
It is clear from the above that in the post-nationalisation era, the Iraqi petroleum industry 
was drastically affected by historical and political events.  In the 1970s the industry flourished 
and developed rapidly.  Many factors contributed to this flourishing, such as the nationalisation 
laws promulgated by the Iraqi government, the involvement of new companies and the 
conclusion of service and development agreements.  However, in the 1980s and 1990s the 
petroleum industry witnessed a collapse of the 1970s achievements because of two successive 
wars, which caused severe damage to petroleum infrastructures, and also because of UN 
sanctions.  Furthermore, some of the petroleum agreements concluded with various foreign 
petroleum companies was not sufficient and do not serve the Iraqi interests.   
2.2.4. Post Occupation Iraq 2003 Onwards: 
In March 2003, the United States, Britain, and their allies launched a military attack on Iraq 
in order to eliminate the authority of Saddam Hussein.  The USA gained UK support owing to a 
claim that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and was a threat to world 
peace.  As a result of this attack the USA and its allies were able to impose their control on Iraq 
and to occupy it.143 However, the international community was aware that these claims were 
false, and built on incorrect intelligence information.144 Iraq emerged from these events with a 
devastated economy and with debts amounting to $380 billion.145 On 22nd May 2003, the UN 
                                                          
142 Sandra T. Vreedenburgh, ‘The Saddam Oil Contracts and What Can Be Done’ (2003-2004) 2 DePaul Business 
&Commercial Law Journal 559; Darius Adam Marzec, ‘The New Iraq: Resolving Public and Private Obligations 
Incurred under Saddam Hussein’s Rule in the Context of International Arbitration’ (2005) 7 Cardozo Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 163; Robert D. Tadlock, ‘Occupation Law and Foreign Investment In Iraq: How an Outdated 
Doctrine Has Become an Obstacle to an Occupied Population’ (2004-2005) 39 University of Francisco Law 
Review 227. 
143 Robert D. Tadlock, ‘Occupation Law and Foreign Investment In Iraq: How an Outdated Doctrine Has Become an 
Obstacle to an Occupied Population’ (2004-2005) 39 University of Francisco Law Review 227; Owen 
Bonheimer, ‘The Duty to Prevent Waste of Iraqi Assets during Reconstruction: Taming Temptation through ICJ 
Jurisdiction’ (2004-2005) 34 Public Contract Law Journal 273. 
144 George A. Lapzo and  David Cortright, ‘Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked’ [2004] (83) Foreign Affairs 
< http://www.heinonline.org.unicat.bangor.ac.uk > accessed on 4 January 2011. 
145 Thomas D. Grant, ‘The Security Council and Iraq: an Incremental Practice’ (2003) 97 the American Journal of 
International Law 823. 
47 
 
Security Council passed Resolution 1483,146 in accordance with which Iraq could export its 
crude oil again.  This Resolution paved the way to end the Oil-For-Food programme and its 
supervision by the occupying power.147 The reasons behind this resolution were the increasing 
need for petroleum and gas, particularly since Iraq is a major source of petroleum, and to give 
the Iraqi people the right to build institutions and infrastructure through the investment of 
petroleum revenue.  Iraq was then able to restore its petroleum industry and to conclude new 
contracts with international petroleum companies freely in order to develop its petroleum 
sector.148 On 8 June 2004, the UN issued Resolution No 1546,149 allowing it to keep control over 
the Development Fund for Iraq (hereinafter the DFI) because of the unstable political situation 
and because there was no permanent government.  On 18 December 2007, the SC extended the 
power of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (hereinafter the IAMB) over the DFI, 
and the surviving Iraq assets in foreign banks were frozen in accordance with Resolution 1790, 
paragraph 3.150 This was followed by the issue of Resolution No1859 on 22 December 2008,151 
to extend the provisions of paragraph 22 of resolution 1483152 until 31 January 2009, and to 
retain the supervision of the IAMB over petroleum revenue.153 Finally, the Oil-For-Food 
programme was terminated in accordance with Resolution No 1958,154 on 15 December 2010. 
As noted, these UN resolutions contributed to the revival of the petroleum industry by 
allowing Iraq to export its petroleum again.  However, the industry faced significant obstacles in 
this period.  After 2003, there was looting to contend with, and destruction of the infrastructure, 
especially in petroleum pipelines.  Another problem was the smuggling155 of petroleum products 
or crude oil across borders, which further deprived Iraq of petroleum revenue.156 Many factors 
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encouraged smuggling, not least the operations of insurgency groups.157  The problems caused 
by the theft of petroleum were aggravated by the sabotage of installations and pipelines.   
 The main cause of the problems facing the industry, however, is corruption.158 The high 
price of petroleum and the fragility of Iraq’s institutions159 have meant that petroleum revenue 
has been subject to misappropriation and misuse.160 
These critical problems facing the industry have deprived Iraq of a significant amount of the 
revenue needed to rebuild the exhausted petroleum sector.  However, Iraq has undergone 
important political, economic and social changes during this period.  Among the many legislative 
innovations has been the drafting in 2007 the DLOG, which has not yet been ratified by the Iraqi 
parliament. This law determines the general principles of foreign investment in the petroleum 
sector.  It also contains basic regulations for the formation of an Iraqi National Oil Company 
which was abolish, revenue sharing, and the reorganization of the Ministry of Oil. 161 
2.3. Types of Petroleum Agreement: 
Petroleum contracts between the host state and petroleum companies are a fundamental legal 
instrument governing the exploration and exploitation of petroleum wealth.  Despite the 
importance of petroleum in international politics and economics,162 petroleum contracts signed 
prior to World War II failed to achieve a balance between the interests of the producing country 
and those of the investment companies.163 This was due to a lack of capital and technical 
expertise on the part of the producing countries and the greater degree of economic and political 
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control exercised by the multinational companies.164 These factors allowed petroleum companies 
to obtain contracts with no dispute over the terms of the concession.  These unequal agreements 
severely affected the economies of the petroleum- producing countries, depriving them of the 
benefits of petroleum revenue necessary for economic development. The nature of these 
contracts changed significantly after the Second World War, due to growing foreign investment 
in petroleum countries and the emergence of competitors to previously monopolistic companies.  
New types of concession appeared, bearing names such as service contract, production- sharing 
contract and participation agreement.165 The reasons for this will be further discussed in point 
two of this section.  Therefore this section is divided into two points; first, traditional concession 
contracts second, modern concession contracts.   
2.3.1 Traditional Concession Contracts:  
Concession agreements first emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century in the Middle 
East, when foreign petroleum companies entered this area.166 The first foreign petroleum 
company to enter the Middle East was the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, when on 28 May 1901 
the Iranian government granted an Englishman named William Knox D’Arcy a concession for 
the exploration and exploitation of petroleum in the Persian Gulf for a period of six decades.167  
In return, sixteen per cent of the company’s profits were to be paid to the Iranian government.168  
This was the best known concession of the time.  Then in 1933, Saudi Arabia gave a concession 
to the Standard Oil Company of California to utilize an area larger than that for which D’Arcy 
had obtained a concession in Iran.169  
The petroleum industry in the Middle East before the Second World War was controlled by 
a few giant companies, namely the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, (hereinafter the CFP), 
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British Petroleum (hereinafter BP), Gulf, Mobile, Exxon, Standard Oil of California (hereinafter 
SoCal), Royal- Dutch, and Texaco.170 
A traditional concession agreement is a contract between two parties; the first is the host 
state and second is the petroleum company, called the concessionaire.  The host state gives the 
company rights to exploration, extraction and production extraction within the territory of the 
host state for an extended period of time.171 It is concluded directly between the host state and 
the petroleum company seeking to obtain the concession.  In recent decades, the concession has 
come to take three forms:   
1. The concession concluded between the petroleum producing country itself and the 
foreign company. After the discovery of petroleum in commercial quantities, a company 
should be established involving the petroleum producing state and the concessionaire.  
The host state contributes to the capital of this company.  Iraq, however, did not adopt 
this form of contract.172 
2. The concession signed by the host State, with its national company as a first party 
and the concessionaire as a second party.173 
3. The concession is signed between a State owned company as a first party and the 
concessionaire as a second party.174   
The traditional concession agreement has many features that differ from other contracts.  
The duration of the concession agreement is very long, up to 75 years or more.175  The 
concession agreement covers a large area of the host state’s territory and may include all of it.176 
The petroleum company in a concession agreement may be obliged to pay a small royalty to the 
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host state in proportion to the quantity of petroleum produced, without taking into consideration 
the market price.177 For example, in the concession agreement between the Iraq and Kanaqin Oil 
Company, this company was obliged to pay just 4 gold shillings for each ton of petrol.178  The 
government of Muscat and Abu Dhabi was paid 3 rupees per ton of petroleum.179 In traditional 
agreements, the concessionaire is granted the exclusive right to the area designated in the 
concession contract.  Article 1 of the agreement between the Iraqi government and the BPC in 
1938 provided the BPC with the right to drill in order to extract petroleum and natural gas and to 
prepare these materials for trading.180  The company had exclusive rights to exploit and produce 
the petroleum within the area specified in the agreement181 and, moreover, the concession 
agreement did not allow the first party (the host state) to renegotiate the terms of the 
concession.182 However the concession agreement was simpler than modern concessions, since 
the concessionaire took possession of all the petroleum produced in any quantity, while the host 
state received only a small amount of taxation in return.183 
The petroleum company which had a concession agreement was not subject to the local 
judiciary with regard to most of the issues connected to their activity. It was considered 
preferable to present these issues for international arbitration.184 
2.3.2. The Modern Concession Agreement: 
The modern concession agreement appeared after World War II, which involved a number 
of political and economic events, and circumstances that contributed to the evolution of this type 
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of contract in terms of diversity of form and content.  Included among the new kinds of contract 
were the production-sharing agreement, the participation agreement and the service agreement. 
Overtime, the producing countries become aware of the importance of petroleum in the 
domestic and global economy and of the benefits which its revenues could contribute to other 
sectors of their economy, such as agriculture, industry, education, and transport.  As a 
consequence, these countries followed two paths to regain their wealth: first, by nationalisation 
of the petroleum industry and second, by renegotiation of contracts with foreign companies.185 
For several reasons, the petroleum companies were obliged to accept re-negotiation and thus 
we see the emergence of new types of petroleum agreement.  Firstly, new petroleum companies 
began to compete with the major monopolistic companies, and these newcomers offered more 
favourable terms to the petroleum countries.186 There was also the formation of OPEC, which 
played a part in obliging petroleum companies to renegotiate concession terms.187 OPEC 
instigated a new kind of relationship between producing countries and petroleum companies that 
strengthened the producing countries’ bargaining position.  It also played a crucial role in setting 
petroleum prices and facilitated the exchange of information between OPEC members, who were 
able to conclude agreements that offered more favourable terms to the host states.  Their example 
encouraged other producing states to question the terms of their own concession agreements.188 
A trend towards nationalisation was another reason for petroleum companies to be 
apprehensive about their concessions.  Iran, for example, nationalized its petroleum industry in 
1951.189 An important role was also played by a United Nations resolution 1803 that recognized 
the right of every state to have sovereignty over its own natural resources.190  These resolutions 
were adopted by various different states and included in their constitutions.  Such were the 
general conditions contributing to the appearance of new types of petroleum agreement.  As for 
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Iraq, there were additional factors involved in its decision to adopt this modern form of 
concession agreement.  Because of the nationalisation of Iran’s petroleum industry in 1951, 
production in that country decreased.191 Consequently, the petroleum companies sought to 
extend their activities to Iraq and Kuwait so as to increase the production of petroleum and also 
to thwart the programme of nationalisation in Iran.192 There was also an increased global demand 
for petroleum after World War II due to construction and reconstruction in many states, and there 
was also an expansion of military industries.193  
Modern concessions have characteristics different from those of traditional concession.  
First of all, the financial benefits in modern concessions are varied, and include royalties, taxes, 
rents and bonuses.   
      Royalty:  The payment of royalties relies on the amount of production.  The oblegation is 
imposed on the petroleum companies regardless of whether the project realizes profits.194 It is a 
specified amount of money that is separate from the profits,195 and is the return paid by the 
petroleum company to the host state in exchange for each unit of petroleum production.  It is 
different from the initial fee and the rent, as the petroleum company does not pay these unless it 
discovers petroleum in commercial quantities.196  In 1974, many OPEC member-countries which 
literally raised royalty interests to 20%.  The royalty regime was rejected by some countries, 
such as the United Kingdom, Norway, and Denmark.197Article 34 of the DLOG provided for the 
percentage of royalty to be 12.5% of gross production, while the Kurdish law of Oil and Gas No.  
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22 of 2007198 imposed royalties based on a density criterion (article 37/E of the draft stipulated 
7.5% royalties for heavy crude oil, rising gradually to 10% for light and medium petroleum).   
      Taxes: By the 1950s the notion of taxation of concession revenue had become widespread in 
the contracts between the concessionaire and the host country.199 The tax is associated with 
profits.  The percentage increases when the company achieves high revenue and decreases when 
profits are low. It is this factor which distinguishes taxes from royalties.200 Before the Second 
World War, petroleum companies were exempt from paying taxes to the host state,201 but after 
the war this situation changed because of the high prices of crude petroleum, which were 
reflected in the companies’ profits, whereas the host state earned little revenue.  Hence, the host 
states began their struggle with the petroleum companies, seeking by re-negotiation or the 
enactment of new laws to impose taxes on the companies’ profits.202 Ultimately, the petroleum 
producing countries were able to subject the companies to these demands,203 and as a result the 
role of the producing countries changed dramatically in terms of the equality of oil contracts.  
The host countries gained the upper hand in the decision- making at all stages of production, and 
turned out to be effective and influential partners. 
     Bonuses: Generally, petroleum companies pay bonuses to the host government.  There are 
three types: the bonus that comes with the signing of the contract, the bonus at the start of 
production bonus, and the exploration bonus.204  
     Rent:  Host countries charge the petroleum company a rent as a part of the revenue.  It is the 
amount of money paid by the petroleum company to the host state due to the latter’s ownership 
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of the territory in which the petroleum field is located.  The petroleum company pays the rent in 
return for the utilization of this area of land.  The amount of the rent is determined by the size of 
the area and its location.205     
      Secondly, the scope of the concession is more limited in the modern petroleum agreement 
than in the traditional concession, which sometimes included the whole territory of the host state 
so as to prevent competition from other companies.  As a consequence, a vast remainder of the 
territory went without investment, and the host state was also deprived of the optimal exploration 
of its territory which competition would have allowed.206  
      The situation altered after World War II.  The relinquishment clause became an important 
feature of the modern generation of concessions.  Petroleum agreements restricted the petroleum 
company’s right to control the land of the host country by means of a provision involving 
relinquishment of territory.207  Many states were keen to include such a regulation in their 
laws.208 In relinquishing certain areas defined in the contract where oil was not discovered in 
commercially viable quantities, the concessionaire is more quickly able to move to those areas 
where petroleum is to be found in larger quantities.209 This restriction stimulates the investor to 
expedite exploration and exploitation, so as to implement the contract on time, since the 
concessionaire would be obliged, after a fixed period starting from the signing of the contract, to 
relinquish certain previously identified areas.210 This term helps each party to avoid disputes. 
The company’s right to exploit the area is not absolute but is restricted to the period of the 
concession.  The contract determines the area which the petroleum company can exploit.  Also, 
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the petroleum arrangement provides the mechanism by which the petroleum company is given 
the means to rent a part of the land and to put its equipment on it. 
       Third, the period of the modern concession is shorter than that of earlier concessions.  The 
contract duration is 20– 30 years, although this period will probably be extended if both parties 
agree.  Generally, the host state tends to decrease the period of concession by compulsory 
relinquishments, and also by fixing the period of time.211  
      Fourth, modern concession agreements contain so-called adaptation clauses, or re-negotiation 
clauses, which are intended to help the contractual parties to avoid a dispute when a new 
circumstance appears, and to provide them with the necessary protection if facing hardship.212  
The host country obligates the petroleum company to re-negotiate in accordance with changes in 
its political or economic policy or an alteration of its laws, instead of altering the conditions of 
the contract individually.213  
       Fifth, the international petroleum company is obliged to submit to the host state details of 
the minimum of cost per year of exploration activity for each square kilometre of the exploited 
oil field,214 
       The different forms of the modern concession agreement, production sharing agreements, 
service agreements, and participation agreement, will be illustrated in this section. 
2.3.2.1. The Production Sharing Agreement (PSA): 
The production sharing agreement215 (hereinafter the PSA) is based on the important 
principle that petroleum is under the ownership of  the host state and that only the host state has a 
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right to the disposal of petroleum.216 This type of agreement results from the principle of the 
permanent sovereignty of the state over natural resources.217 In accordance with this agreement 
the host state grants the petroleum company rights to the exploration and exploitation of 
petroleum in a specific area for a limited duration.  In return the company retrieves the expenses 
incurred during its exploration activities, together with a percentage of the profits, or a portion of 
petroleum, the amounts of these to be determined by a contract.218 
This agreement is based on the notion of risk, since the petroleum company may conduct its 
exploration operations in areas where there is only a minimal expectation of discovery, or in 
areas that have not yet yielded petroleum in commercial quantities.  The state bears the expenses 
of the survey and of whatever excavation is necessary in order to reach the petroleum reservoirs.  
The petroleum company undertakes that in conducting exploration activities it does so without 
any costs paying by host state to petroleum company until the discovery of petroleum.219 If the 
company detects oil in commercial quantities, it will establish a new contractual relationship 
between itself and the host country.  This contract takes the form of a PSA.  However, if the 
company does not find the petroleum in sufficient quantities there would be no responsibility 
placed on the parties, and in addition the host state would not be required to pay the cost of 
drilling and the geological survey or any additional expenses to the petroleum company.220  
The fundamental difference between the traditional concession and the PSA is the allotment 
of production between the host state and petroleum firms in the PSA.  It is usual in these 
conditions that a share of production is held in reserve in order to allow petroleum companies to 
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recover expenditures incurred in exploration and development operations.221 Concession 
contracts differ from the PSA in two respects: possession and title.  In the traditional concession, 
the petroleum company has the right to carry out mining, to extract crude oil and to sell it in the 
global market.  By these means, it maintains control of all exploration activities.  However, in a 
PSA, the company undertakes to execute the production operation for the benefit of the host 
state.  The host country retains possession and controls the mining rights.  It has the title to 
petroleum wealth, while the petroleum company possesses the proportion of production provided 
by the contract.222 
PSAs have significant features, and the most important of these is that the petroleum 
company bears all the risks involved in failure to find petroleum, and also carries all the 
operation costs, while the host state only pays these costs if the petroleum company finds 
petroleum in commercial quantities.223 In that case the petroleum company can regain its 
expenditure on production operations by receiving a share of the petroleum production. This 
share is known as cost petroleum.  The contract sets the percentage of the cost petroleum that the 
petroleum company is allowed to own, usually around 30% to 40%.  The remaining oil, which is 
known as profit petroleum, is split between the petroleum company and the host state in 
accordance with the ratio agreed in the contract.224 This percentage is dependent on the level of 
production.  It may start at 25% for the foreign partner, or at a specific rate, followed by 
reduction of this rate whenever production increases.225 The petroleum firms are obliged to pay 
taxes on the output from their activities.226 
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Despite the proliferation of these agreements, some countries continue to ban foreigners 
from possession, or participation in the production of mineral resources.  For example, the 
Mexican Constitution of 1917, Article 27, prohibits foreigners from owning the country’s natural 
resources.   
   Iraq signed a production sharing agreement for the first time in March 1997.227  It was 
between the Iraqi Oil Ministry and a coalition of Russian companies, and concerned investment 
in the western part of the Qurna oil field in the south of Iraq.  In July 1997, another contract was 
concluded between the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and a coalition of Chinese companies for investment 
in the Al- Ahdab petroleum field, also in the south of Iraq.228 The latter was called the 
Development and Production Contract.  Both were, in essence, production sharing agreements.  
As mentioned previously, Saddam signed these contracts with the aim of attracting investment 
from foreign oil companies, and used these companies to as a means of pressurizing the 
international community to lift sanctions on Iraq.229 
The KRG concluded a production sharing agreement with the Norwegian firm DNO in 
2006.  This is regarded as the first production sharing contract signed after the second Gulf War, 
and involved the Twake field.230 Subsequently, the KRG signed negotiated and signed contracts 
with a variety of petroleum corporations of various nationalities: Dana Gas from the UAE, the 
Canadian companies Western Sands and Heritage Oil, a British company, and Reliance Oil from 
India.  Despite objections from the central government in Baghdad concerning the validity of 
these contracts, the KRG overrode the opposition and signed seven agreements with different 
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petroleum companies.231 The KRG argued that the agreements signed with the international 
petroleum companies were valid according to Articles 110, 114 and 115 of the Constitution of 
Iraq of 2005, which identified the exclusive and shared powers of the IFG and the KRG but did 
not refer explicitly to the right to limit oil and gas production to the Iraqi Government.232  
Some international organizations tried to persuade Iraq that the production sharing 
agreement was the best form of contract for attracting foreign investment companies, in view of 
the unstable security situation.233 In the present author’s view, Iraq should not use this type of 
contract to motivate petroleum firms to invest in Iraq. Contracts of this kind are suitable for 
countries where the probability of discovering petroleum is minimal, but this is not the case with 
Iraq, a country with the third largest reserves of petroleum.  They are suited to developing 
countries lacking the financial ability to fund exploration operations where there is only a 
possibility of petroleum reserves.  In Iraq, petroleum extraction costs only one dollar for each 
barrel,234 even though the situation is unstable due to the amount of violence and destruction in 
the country.  Iraq needs to provide the petroleum companies with a climate of security, and either 
it should contract private security companies or the petroleum companies themselves should 
contract these companies to secure their exploration operations. Iraq’s additional costs can be 
deducted from Iraqi petroleum, so that finally Iraq will be a mortgagee to the oil companies.  
   2.3.2.2. Service Agreements: 
According to this form of agreement the host country grants the petroleum company rights 
to mining and exploration in exchange for payment, previously agreed between the parties of the 
agreement.235 Hence the international petroleum company will be a contractor in the service of 
the national petroleum company or the petroleum exporting country, in return for a fee.  Either 
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the company pays cash or the host state is obliged by the terms of the contract to sell the crude 
petroleum to the petroleum company at a reduced price.236 Based on this, there is no legal 
relationship between the foreign petroleum company and the petroleum sources in the ground.  
The national oil company remains the owner of the petroleum resources.237 
 This form of petroleum arrangement is considered a cause for concern with regard to the 
sovereignty of the host state because it puts the foreign company in the position of an 
entrepreneur, and not as a partner with a share in production petroleum.  Another concern relates 
to the ownership of petroleum resources in concession agreements and the concessionaire’s 
ownership of the petroleum resources in return for royalties.238        
The first service agreement in the Middle East took place in Iran on 12 December 1966, 
when the Iran National Oil Company signed a service contract with the French company ERAP.  
Some authors regard this as the first service agreement in the world.  Iran then signed seven 
service contracts in 1974.239 
The first service contract in an Arab country was agreed between the INOC and the ERAP 
in Iraq on 3 February 1968.240 Iraq concluded two further contracts, one with the Petrobras Oil 
Company of Brazil,241 and then a second with the India Oil and Natural Gas Company.242 After 
the signing of agreements of this kind, the door to investment in Iraq was closed to the 
international oil companies.  This was despite the INOC announcement to the world’s press in 
1973 that there were large areas of lands available to the international oil companies for 
investment through service contracts like the one with ERAP.  A proposal for putting an end to 
all the outstanding issues between Iraq and the international companies resulting from 
nationalisation was submitted by the European Companies Group after the signing of the 1973 
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convention, but was rejected by the Iraqi government.243 However, Iraq contracted for a second 
time in 2008 with respect to some petroleum fields.244  
There are three kinds of service contract: the pure service agreement, the risk service 
agreement, and the technical assistance contract.   
The pure service agreement is common in the United States. It does not give rights to 
production, and so it is not preferred by foreign companies.  By the terms of the pure service 
contract, the national oil company contracts the foreign petroleum firm to carry out a definite 
service in exchange for a fee.245 Some countries try to make this contract more attractive by 
allowing the petroleum company to have crude oil as a fee.  This is called a buyback agreement.  
It has come into use in some oil fields in Iran.246 
The risk service contract is widespread in Latin America.  Under this type of agreement the 
foreign company explores a limited area of land.  If it finds petroleum in commercial amounts, 
the firm undertakes to develop it and in return has a right to lien, which would either be in the 
form of cash or in kind, by taking crude oil at a reduced price.247 If, however, the company fails 
to find petroleum, it would nonetheless bear all the costs and also would have no exploration 
rights.248 
The third sort of service contract is a technical assistance contract.  It is common in Arab 
Gulf countries and is considered more advanced than other types of service agreement.  
According to this contract, the petroleum company supplies the host state with technical 
assistance in all exploration operations, and sometimes in refining petroleum. The petroleum 
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company’s services may include supplying equipment and training staff.  In return, the host 
country is obliged to pay the company’s costs.249 
The service contract is in some ways similar to the production sharing agreement.  The 
company’s petroleum exploration is limited both in area and in duration.  The contractor 
undertakes to bear the whole cost and to carry all the risks arising from exploration operations, 
and also agrees to apply a relinquishment term.  The contractor often undertakes to fund the 
development and exploration operations after finding petroleum in commercial quantities.250 
However, service contracts differ from other types of oil agreements.  In this type of contract, the 
oil produced belongs to the host state, which has a right to dispose of the oil and is committed to 
pay all the costs accrued by the contractor.  The host country either pays in cash, or in kind, as a 
share of the oil produced, and either without the payment of interest, or with interest paid in 
advance.251 
The contractor’s contribution to the management of exploration operations in the wake of 
the discovery of petroleum is established in the agreement.  The host country has a large part of 
the responsibility for management, more so than the contractor but, prior to the discovery, the 
management of operations is shared between the state and the contractor.252 
  2.3.2.3 The Participation Agreement: 
The idea underlying the participation agreement is that the petroleum company owned by 
the host state are partners, sharing completely in the exploration for petroleum but with the 
foreign partner bearing the risks of the exploration.253  In other words, the foreign partner bears 
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the whole cost of the exploration operations and the host country does not pay if petroleum is not 
discovered in commercial quantities.254 
If petroleum is found, however, the contract will be changed into a development and 
production contract.  The participation agreement would be as a joint venture with the host state 
or its petroleum entity.  The host country has a significant role and also maintains its 
sovereignty.255 The host state and the foreign petroleum company form a joint venture to develop 
the petroleum reserves.  In the joint venture, the foreign company contributes capital, 
technological equipment and expertise while the host state contributes the acreage.256  
Accordingly, ownership and management are divided equally between the parties.  The foreign 
company pays royalties taxes if it achieves profit. 
The participation agreement is considered a significant step forward when compared to the 
concession agreement.  It also paves the way to limiting the concession regime by giving the 
national partner an opportunity to participate in the exploration operations.  In addition, the host 
country makes a major contribution to management and planning, and with this experience 
obtains the ability to train its own citizens to conduct exploration activities in the future. 
This arrangement made its first appearance in Iran and Indonesia between 1957 and 1960.257  
In Iran, the parliament approved the first production sharing agreement, which was signed 
between Iran and the Italian oil company ENI, on 24 August 1957, after a series of meetings in 
Cairo and Tehran attended by Enrico Mattei, the president of the ENI.  Enrico Mattei also 
attended the Iranian Council meeting at which a petroleum law was enacted in 1957. The 
suggestions made by Enrico Mattei to the Iranians played a major role in the formulation of the 
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production sharing agreement approved in this law,258 and also in the arrangements for it to be 
changed to a participation agreement. 
In fact, the concept is not new.  Its origins pre-date the discovery of petroleum in 
commercial amounts in the Middle East.  The San Remo convention provided in Article 8 that 
petroleum countries have a right to share a percentage of the corporate capital with the 
international oil company.  This principle was confirmed again in the Iraq Oil Company 
agreements in 1925 and those of the MPC in 1932, and also those of the BPC.259 
    2.4. Are Petroleum Agreements Different from Investment Agreements under 
Iraqi Law? 
There is an important question to be answered here. Is the petroleum agreement different 
from an investment agreements and if so, can it be said that these agreements have a special 
nature and require a special regime of arbitration?  
Some authors260 argue that petroleum agreements have features that distinguish them from 
other investment contracts.  This is so because these agreements contain a risk element, as in, for 
example, the production sharing agreement and the risk service contract.261 However, risks in a 
petroleum agreement stem not only from internal issues specific to the industry.  They may also 
arise from external factors, such as revolutions or coups in the petroleum-producing countries, or 
changed political circumstances, particularly in states dominated by dictatorial regimes.  These 
events create an unstable environment for petroleum contracts.  In this regard, the political 
context may lead to a change in the economic policy of the host state.  This issuing of new laws 
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by host states may expose petroleum agreements to risks, for example, nationalisation laws, 
which have been widespread in the Latin America and the Middle East.262 
Moreover, the scope of the petroleum contract covers wide areas and extends to the sea, 
including territorial waters and beyond.263 Furthermore, the duration of petroleum agreements 
can be in excess of 75 years.   
However, are the above mentioned factors sufficient justification for regarding petroleum 
agreements as unique? Despite the special features of petroleum agreements, it is unjustifiable 
for petroleum agreements to be given a special status under Iraqi Law.  This is so because most 
of these features may be commonly found in investment agreements.  The risk factor may be 
found in other agreements where the investment project may be subject to nationalisation, as was 
the Suez Canal, nationalized by the Egyptian government in 1956.  Also in regard to the area of 
the petroleum agreement, it could be said that most modern petroleum agreements contain an 
aside of relinquishment, and that the petroleum agreement is limited in terms of the real area of 
exploration and exploitation. The duration of modern petroleum agreements is also less than in 
concession agreements.  The long time periods and wide territorial areas were one of the most 
important features of the concession agreement but, as mentioned in the previous section, the 
latter are considered as belonging to an older generation of petroleum agreements and are now 
disappearing.   
However, the author argues that the petroleum agreement in Iraq is special kind of 
investment agreement, different from ordinary investment agreements.  This is so because its 
subject matter is petroleum, which is Iraq’s most valuable natural resource. Petroleum is a 
special case under Iraqi law, and was so even under former Iraqi governments.  Iraqi law adopted 
the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and deemed petroleum to be 
owned by all of the Iraqi people.264 Under various circumstances of Iraq, the people its 
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government have complete sovereignty over petroleum.265  The abolished interim constitution of 
Iraq of 1970 provided that in Article 13 “National resources and basic means of production are 
owned by the People. They are directly invested by the Central Authority in the Iraqi Republic, 
according to exigencies of the general planning of the national economy”.266  It was clear from 
this Article that the Iraqi national resources were owned by the Iraqi people and the Iraqi central 
government had the power to dispose of this asset in accordance with the requirements of the 
national economy of Iraq.  The Iraqi constitution of 2005267 asserts the same principle, and 
petroleum remains under the ownership of the Iraqi people.  Article 111 sets out this principle, 
stating that “Oil and Gas are owned by all the people of Iraq in all regions and governorates”.268  
This article gives all Iraqi people equally the full and complete ownership of oil and gas and 
gives the IFG the power to control and manage this important wealth.  Article 112 section (2) 
stipulates that: 
 
The federal government, with the producing regional and governorate governments, 
shall together formulate the necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas 
wealth in a way that achieves the highest benefit to the Iraqi people, using the most 
advanced techniques of market principles and encouraging investment.269 
 
This article gives the IFG the main role in conceptualizing and formulating strategic policies 
for developing oil and gas wealth.  These agreements have special features not present in 
ordinary investment agreements, distinguishing petroleum agreements from other investment 
agreements under Iraqi law on account of their subject matter and the ownership of petroleum by 
the Iraqi people which is regulated by previous and current Iraqi constitutions. 
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Therefore, in fixing the scope and provisions of investment, Iraqi investment law No 13 of 
2006270 excluded oil and gas extraction and production.  Article 29 of this law provided that “All 
areas of investments shall be subject to the provisions of this law except: 
“First: Investment in Oil and Gas extraction and production”.271  
It can be seen from Article 29 of this Investment Law that Iraqi law gives petroleum agreements 
a special position by not subjecting them to the provisions of other investment agreements.  This 
enhances the author’s argument that petroleum agreements need special provisions of arbitration 
compatible with their special status.   
  2.5. The Legal Nature of Petroleum Agreements: 
The importance of identifying the legal nature of petroleum contracts becomes apparent 
when substantive law is applied to these contracts, that is, when it has to be decided whether 
these contracts are international agreements, administrative contracts or civil contracts.  The first 
of these is subject to public law and the latter to private law.  Identifying the legal nature of these 
agreements is important in deciding whether they should be subject to national litigation or 
arbitration. In addition, the determination of the legal nature of petroleum agreements entails a 
determination of the type of arbitration that is, whether it is to be international arbitration or 
domestic or private arbitration. The discussion which follows assesses the legal nature of 
petroleum agreements. 
2.5.1 Is a Petroleum Agreement an International Treaty? 
 
It should be express that the petroleum contract is neither an international treaty nor has it the 
effects of a treaty.  According to Iraqi law, petroleum agreements are not international treaties 
because petroleum agreements are concluded in a manner that distinguishes them procedurally 
from international treaties.  Petroleum agreements are subject to Iraqi law272 rather than 
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international law.  Under Iraqi law, an international treaty will not be valid unless approved by 
the Iraqi Parliament, whereas a petroleum agreement does not need to be validated by the Iraqi 
Parliament.  The international treaty parties are nation states, whereas the parties to petroleum 
agreements are the host state and the petroleum company.  
However, in international scale, there is a trend towards giving such agreements an 
international character.273 Stephen Schwebel, later to become an International Court of Justice 
(hereinafter ICJ) judge has agreed that the agreement is represented as an international treaty, 
subject to international law.274  Friedmann has agreed that this is because these contracts 
contribute to the building of the national economy of the host state.275 According to this view, the 
foreign company is treated as if it were a subject of international law with an international 
character.  It is treated for this purpose, as being equivalent to a state.276 Curtis claims that “[a] 
significant part of public international law is devoted to the interpretation and effects of treaties, 
which are contractual agreements.  Many of the rules of treaty law can be applied to economic 
development agreements” 277 
However, this view is opposed by some authors, who argue that a contract is not an 
international treaty.  As Bowett stated the contract:  
(…) [n]ot only is not a treaty but cannot even be regarded as analogous to a treaty.  
For there is a world of differences between an agreement under international law 
between two equal, sovereign states and a contract between a state and a private party 
governed prima facie by the state’s own law. 278 
Similarly, Mansour Al- Saeed said: 
Economic development agreements (…) are not in fact treaties, since one of the 
parties in the economic agreement is a private individual or corporation.  Superficially, 
they look very similar to treaties, both in their negotiation and drafting.  However, they 
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cannot be regarded as treaties since they are not between subjects of international 
law.279  
This view can also be found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Art (a), 
which stipulates that: 
““treaty” means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whatever its particular designation;” 280 
According to this article of the Vienna Convention, the petroleum agreement is not an 
international treaty because the parties of international treaties are states whereas, in the case of a 
petroleum agreement, one of the parties is a company or private individual.   
The ICJ adopted the view that the petroleum agreement before it was not an international 
treaty in the Anglo- Iranian Oil Co.281 The dispute arose between Iran and the Anglo-Iranian oil 
company regarding the petroleum agreement signed between them in 1933.  In 1951, Iran 
enacted a law to nationalize its petroleum industry.  The UK brought this dispute to the ICJ.  The 
ICJ rejected the case for lack of jurisdiction.  This is best explained in the separate opinion by Sir 
Arnold McNair:  
The Court cannot accept the view that the contract signed between the Iranian 
Government and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company has a double character. It is nothing 
more than a concessionary contract between a Government and a foreign corporation. 
The United Kingdom Government is not a party to the contract; there is no privity of 
contract between the Government of Iran and the Government of the United Kingdom. 
Under the contract the Iranian Government cannot claim from the United Kingdom 
Government any rights which it may claim from the Company, nor can it be called upon 
to perform towards the United Kingdom Government any obligations which it is bound 
to perform towards the Company. The document bearing the signatures of the 
representatives of the Iranian Government and the Company has a single purpose: the 
purpose of regulating the relations between that Government and the Company in 
regard to the concession. It does not regulate in any way the relations between the two 
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Governments.282 
Similarly, in the Saudi Arabian v. Arabian American Oil co (Aramco),283 the arbitration 
tribunal did not apply international law to the agreement because the concession agreement was 
not considered to be an international treaty.  
Hence the connect view would be that, the petroleum agreement cannot be considered 
international treaty and has the implications of the treaty.  This is because an international treaty 
is concluded between two or more states having sovereignty, and in the case of a petroleum 
agreement the oil company has no sovereignty.   
2.5.2. Is a Petroleum Agreement an Administrative Contract?  
An administrative contract is a contract between two parties one of them is public person.  
Iraq is a civil law country therefore it is important to wender if the petroleum agreement has 
administrative contract nature. It should be made clear from the beginning that the petroleum 
agreement is not administrative contract under Iraqi law.  The Iraqi state as a host state concludes 
petroleum agreements with petroleum companies in equal footing.  It is not like an 
administrative contract where only the state has the authority to change the contract.  In 
petroleum agreements, the host state cannot change the agreement terms unless the second party 
accepts the change.  Petroleum agreements, unlike administrative contracts, contain a 
stabilization clause.   
  However, petroleum agreements can be considered by some to be similar to administrative 
contracts and subject to administrative law.  This is because the contract is governed by the 
public law of the host state in some aspects, which sets it closer to the idea of the administrative 
contract.284  
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Both are concluded by a public authority in order to achieve a public interest.  Hence, the 
host state can make amendments to the petroleum agreement unilaterally, or abrogate it without 
any liability.  However, the second party in petroleum agreement can reserve the right to 
sufficient compensation for any damages that may be realized by the adjustment or abrogation of 
the contract.285 In contrast to the administrative contract, the private contract, which is subject to 
private law, contains principles such as the binding force of the contract and the equal legal 
status of the parties.  This view is reflected in the laws of countries influenced by the French 
legal system.286  The French State Council has held that administrative contracts have particular 
features and should be governed by specific rules in order to protect the public interest.287  Civil 
laws, according to this opinion, are enacted to protect the individuals’ interest.  Therefore, the 
law emphasizes the principle of equality.  So, from the point of view of the French State Council, 
the application of the civil law to these contracts would impede the functioning of public utility 
or prevent it from performing its services well.  Hence, these rules should be abandoned.288 
On this basis, the administrative law considers that contracts are administrative contracts 
when entered into by a legal entity, or concluded by governments in order to conduct a public a 
facility, or public utility.  Al Saeed argues that they therefore also include conditions uncommon 
in private law.289  
  In the BP v. Libya290 arbitration, the arbitrator considered petroleum agreements to be 
administrative contracts according to Libyan law.  The same consideration applied to the Aminoil 
v. Kuwait 291 arbitration. 
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With regard to a petroleum agreement concluded between a government or public entity and 
a concessionaire, its aim is arguably to achieve a public interest.  However, in contradistinction 
to the particular terms found in the administrative contract, the petroleum agreement includes a 
clause intended to maintain the stability of the contract, called the stabilization clause. In 
accordance within this clause, the host state cannot change the contract terms as a result of the 
enactment of new laws unless the second party agrees to a change in these terms.292  
The administrative contract was distinguished from the petroleum agreement in arbitration 
involving Texaco, in the matter of Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. Libyan Arab 
Republic.293 The Libyan government signed agreements with Texaco and Calasiatic in 1955 and 
1968, and the dispute arose between the contracted parties when Libya enacted law No.66 of 
1973 to nationalize the Texaco and Calasiatic concessions.  Both companies notified the Libyan 
government that they would submit their dispute to arbitration.  The sole arbitrator, Dupuy, 
refused to uphold the Libyan government’s claims that the concession signed between it and the 
two companies was an administrative contract.  Dupuy showed that the Libyan government’s 
contract with the two companies placed the parties on an equal footing and that the contract did 
not contain any exceptional conditions.294 
Thus, the petroleum agreement is not considered as a public or administrative contract under 
Iraqi law even if it involves some public law elements, such as taxes or royalties.  Nevertheless 
this contract also contains elements of private law including, for example, consent and provisions 
of compensation which resulting from damage.  Moreover, Iraq, when concluding the contract 
with a petroleum company, signs it on an equal footing.   
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  2.5.3 Is a Petroleum Agreement a Private Contract? 
Some authors hold the view that petroleum agreements are private contracts because these 
agreements contain elements related to private law and exist as a consequence of the commercial 
nature of the transaction.295  
These private elements are represented by the parties’ freedom to choose the way to settle 
disputes either by submitting the dispute to the national court or by arbitration, and also the 
allowing of the contractual parties to choose the applicable law that governs the contract.296  In 
addition, petroleum contracts contain stabilization clauses which prohibit the host state from 
enacting in the future any legislation that may change the conditions of the agreement.   
According to Iraqi law,297  agreements in which the subject matter is petroleum are a special 
type of private contract.  This particular form of wealth is given special protection by the Iraqi 
constitution.298 Iraqi law must exclusively govern the substantive issues of such agreements.299 
However, the petroleum agreement cannot be regarded as a private contract by virtue of 
these elements alone.  It cannot deny or ignore the aforementioned public law elements.   
  2.5.4. Petroleum Contracts Contain a Mixture of Public and Private Law Features: 
The position here is that petroleum agreement is not a private contract, since a sovereign 
state is one of the parties.  Nor is it a public service contract.  But, Mafi argue, it contains 
elements of both private and public law.300  
This view was adopted by the arbitrator in the Liamco v. Libya 301 case, when he stated, 
“although a concession contract partakes of mixed public and private legal character, it retains a 
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predominant contractual nature”.302 In this regard, the arbitrator Cavin, in Sapphire v. National 
Iranian Oil Company 303 indicated that a petroleum contract has a nature distinct from that of 
other commercial contracts.304  
Dr Al-Khunami has shown that the petroleum concession is a legal act and has a dual legal 
nature. From one aspect, it creates the rights of the concessionaire to exploit oil, and this is 
regarded as an administrative decision, but from another aspect, it regulates the process of 
exploration and is to be regarded as a contract.305 This raises an important question as to which 
elements predominate in these agreements, those of public law or those of private law.  How can 
it be determined which elements relate to private law and which to public law?  This is not an 
easy question to answer because the elements are various and depend upon the nature of the host 
state’s legislation policy.306 For instance, in the United Kingdom the state owns and natural 
resources.  It does not allow any person to claim rights over resources unless a licence has been 
conferred by the Crown recognizing those rights.307  These licences are regulated by binding 
legislation and ratified by Parliament despite their having a contractual basis and containing 
some aspects of a commercial transaction.308 According to British law, therefore, the petroleum 
agreement should not be regarded as having only a contractual private aspect only, since there is 
also an element of regulation by the state.309  
France embodies another example of state ownership of natural resources. French law 
confers on the state the exclusive right to exploit these resources.  In addition, the concession 
agreement granted to the investor party is regulated by an administrative contract.  Thus, the 
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latter contract is a unilateral amendment or abrogation on the part of the state by virtue of public 
interest.310  
To sum up, it is clear that scholars and contemporary writers and also arbitrators hold 
differing views on the legal nature of petroleum agreements.  Arguably, these variations and 
divisions of opinion suggest the view that petroleum agreements have a dual legal nature.  The 
division of opinion originates from the tunnel vision of writers and arbitrators with regard to the 
elements of law regulating these agreements.  Each previous view has focused on one element of 
the law, either public or private, while ignoring other elements.  The present author is of the view 
that these agreements have a special legal nature, consisting of private and public law elements 
which are shaped by a state’s own legal system. Each of the elements will carry a different 
weight when considered in the light of the nation state’s legislation and its policy with regard to 
natural resources.    
2.6. Conclusion:  
This chapter has presented the Iraqi petroleum industry from the first discovery of its 
petroleum until the present time, focusing on the important role played by international 
petroleum companies in shaping not only the development of the Iraqi petroleum industry but 
also Iraqi political history.  The chapter also reviewed the experiences of other petroleum 
producing countries insofar as they impact directly or indirectly on the development of the Iraqi 
petroleum industry.    
The Iraqi government had no significant role in the management of its petroleum industry 
until 1958.  This is reflected in its petroleum agreements, which contained unfair terms.  After 
1958 the role of the government of Iraq became stronger through the promulgation of important 
legislation for the regulation of the petroleum sector and the nationalisation of petroleum.  It also 
reviewed many of the petroleum agreements previously concluded with petroleum companies.  
 However, despite Iraq’s vast reserves of petroleum and its low exploration costs, 
opportunities to achieve the required level of investment were lost.  Wars, mistaken policies and 
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corruption led to a decline in this vital sector.  The international community’s sanctions regime 
had a devastating effect. 
Petroleum agreements in Iraq developed remarkably in the second half of the last century, as 
a result of Iraqi state intervention in the industry and also because of various political and 
economic factors in the world as a whole.  These factors included the appearance of new 
competitors to the monopoly petroleum companies and UN resolutions which encouraged host 
states to control their own natural resources and to achieve complete control of their economies.  
In addition, host states acquired an increased awareness of the importance of this vital resource.  
Modern petroleum agreements reflect an equality of economic relationship between the host state 
and the petroleum companies.  In these new types of agreement, the role of the producing 
country is altered. Instead of merely collecting royalties, it owns its recourses and shares in the 
companies’ profits.  
According to the Iraqi constitution of 2005, petroleum, which is Iraq’s most valuable natural 
resource, is owned by the Iraqi people.  Petroleum agreements occupy a special position owing 
to their subject matter, and petroleum agreements need to be treated as a special type of ordinary 
investment agreement.  As a result of the peculiarity of petroleum agreements, arbitration, which 
is considered an alternative to judgment by an Iraqi national court, is also different from 
investment arbitration.  
These agreements have a dual legal nature.  They are subject to a mixture of elements of 
public and private laws.  The contracts have a special character and legal nature making them 
different from other investment contracts.  As a consequence, petroleum arbitration should be 
governed by special rules, particularly since arbitration has considerable influence in petroleum 
transactions as an instrument for settling disputes.  
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Chapter Three: An Evaluation of the Attitudes of Host States and Petroleum 
Companies towards Arbitration as a Means of Settling Petroleum Disputes 
3.1. Introduction:  
The petroleum agreement is a long term contract, extending for decades, and during this 
long period events may occur that cause disputes.  Dispute settlements are an important aspect of 
the legal framework governing these agreements: their subject matter is natural resources, which 
is an important source of income for some countries, and in some cases the only source.  The 
agreements also involve a large volume of the petroleum company’s capital.  Thus, if these 
disputes remain unsettled for a long period, perhaps several years, they may cost both parties 
large sums and, if petroleum prices change during that time, large losses may be incurred by both 
sides.  It is therefore important for the parties to find an appropriate means to save time and 
costs.  International commercial arbitration includes this feature which makes it an optimal 
means for petroleum companies to resolve disputes.  In addition, arbitration can be seen as the 
best alternative to the national court of the host state.  It is also consensual, because the parties 
agree to resolve the disputes through a third party, to choose the law and to select arbitrators who 
have experience in such disputes. 
Despite these characteristics, arbitration is viewed with antipathy by many host countries.  
They see it as impugning the sovereignty of the state, since, in submitting itself to a non-national 
decision- maker and subjecting itself to foreign laws, the state waivers that sovereignty.  There is 
particular antipathy to the institutions and laws of Western countries, which colonized some of 
the host countries in the past.  In addition, arbitration for the settlement of disputes is a system 
designed and developed by the institutions of Western countries.  
This chapter will review and analyse the points of view in this area. It will focus on the 
situations of different groups of countries and their changes of attitude towards arbitration, and 
will analyse the causes and effects of these changes.  The attitudes of Iraq, the UAE and PRC 
towards arbitration as a means of settling petroleum disputes will be highlighted.  Moreover, this 
chapter presents the point of view of the petroleum companies and the reasons for their 
preference for arbitration.  
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3.2. A Global Overview of Host States’ Attitudes towards Arbitration:  
International commercial arbitration is still the means preferred by foreign investors for the 
settlement of disputes, particularly petroleum disputes.1  They consider it an effective mechanism 
for resolving disputes, and also as a way to protect themselves.  This is because arbitration 
achieves neutrality by excluding the courts of the host state, and also because of the savings it 
efforts, in terms of both cost and time.2 The role of arbitration developed steadily after ‘gun boat 
diplomacy’ ceased to be a means of settling disputes, and especially with the spread of 
nationalism in Asia and Africa.  Arbitration has adopted by developed countries,3 and many 
petroleum companies include arbitration clauses in their agreements with host states.   
However, many host states from the developing world took a different view of international 
commercial arbitration, as this chapter will show. While it affords protection and safety to 
foreign investors, it arouses concern and suspicion in many host states.  These states view 
arbitration as an instrument designed to serve the petroleum companies’ interests4 and as a 
surrogate for diplomatic interference.  There are several reasons for this attitude.  Some host 
states from developing countries were colonised over a long period of time by Western 
countries.5 Thus, the relationship between these countries was not equal or based on mutual 
interest, and the inequality was reflected in the economic field. The host states, which had natural 
resources, concluded unbalanced petroleum contracts, such as concession agreements with unfair 
terms.6  International arbitration as a system for settling disputes arose from the investment 
agreements developed by western countries.  These countries and the multinational companies 
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played an important role in establishing arbitration centres, of which the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC)7 is a typical example. 
Some host states view international arbitration as a direct violation of the principle of 
sovereignty, since their own judiciary authority and national laws are exclud by subjecting 
petroleum disputes to a foreign law or third party.8 The host state’s concerns are intensified by 
the fact that the disputes concerned natural resources, which constituted the backbone of these 
countries’ economies and which they feared to lose.9  Moreover, some host states lack a culture 
of arbitration, and there is unequal participation and unequal representation on the part of some 
host states’ lawyers in the international institutions.10  
These factors increase the antipathy of many host states towards international commercial 
arbitration.  The following sections will discuss the attitudes of different groups of host states 
towards arbitration and will also review and analyse the factors behind the changes in those 
attitudes.     
3.2.1. The Latin American Attitude with Regard to Arbitration: 
Historically, Latin American states have been known for their hostility and antipathy to 
arbitration.11  These countries have not accepted arbitration as a way of resolving disputes,12 
instead requiring investors to have recourse to their domestic courts.  
In dealing with foreigners, Latin American countries were keen to preserve such norms as 
non-interference in internal affairs, regional integrity, national sovereignty and also to give 
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priority to national courts and laws when disputes arose between foreign investors and the state 
or its entity.13  
The Calvo doctrine14 emerged as a reaction to what is called the “diplomatic protection 
policy” applied by some Western countries towards their citizens abroad.  Foreign countries 
would intervene militarily under the plea of protecting its citizens.  Example of this policy was 
the French military interventions in Mexico in 1838 and 1861,15 based on complaints made by 
French investors against the Mexican government.16  
The Calvo doctrine aimed to subject foreign investors and their property to national laws 
and jurisdiction, to place foreigners on an equal footing with citizens of the country, to prevent 
foreign interference and to eliminate ‘gunboat diplomacy’.17  In addition, it aimed to develop the 
principle of reciprocity regarding the payment of compensation to foreigners.18 This principle 
was also called the “national standard,” as opposed to the “minimum standard” of treatment19 
applied by major powers and states which exported capital.  This principle aimed to treat foreign 
investors according to the principles of justice and the rules generally accepted by civilized 
nations, especially with regard to compensation for expropriation.20   
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In nineteenth century Latin America, the political, economic and social circumstances 
lacked stability, resulting in injury and damage to the properties of foreign investors, who 
dominated the investment sectors, especially natural resources.  This led to increased demands 
by foreign investors for the intervention of their governments to protect them, in view of the 
inability of local courts to do so.21 Latin America was subjected to this intervention, which 
became normal behaviour on the part of the international community.22 The repetition of 
intervention crystallised the practice, and this came to underpin the Western countries’ 
relationship with the Latin American countries.  Consequently, the latter adopted the Calvo 
doctrine of the primacy of national law and equal treatment for national and foreign investors,23 
after which the resolution of disputes by international arbitration or international law became 
impossible in these countries.24         
The Calvo doctrine became widespread in all Latin American countries and occupied a 
significant place in regional legal life.25 The importance of this doctrine is apparent in the treaties 
concluded by Latin American countries, which contained what was known as a Calvo Clause.26 
These countries came to insist on such clauses being included in investment treaties.  Many 
constitutions of Latin American countries also included the doctrine, as, for example, Article 27 
(I) of the Mexican Constitution of 1917: 
Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican companies have the right to 
acquire ownership of lands, waters, and their appurtenances, or to obtain concessions 
for the exploitation of mines or of waters. The State may grant the same right to 
foreigners, provided they agree before the Ministry of Foreign Relations to consider 
themselves as nationals in respect to such property, and bind themselves not to invoke 
the protection of their governments in matters relating thereto; under penalty, in case of 
noncompliance with this agreement, of forfeiture of the property acquired to the Nation. 
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Likewise, Article 136 of the Constitution of the Republic of Peru of 1979 provided that: 
Foreign enterprises domiciled in Peru are subject without restriction to the law of 
the Republic.  In any agreement which the state signs with foreigners or with juridical 
person, or in the concession which are granted to them, the express acceptance by the 
former of the jurisdiction of the laws and the courts of the Republic and their 
renunciation to any diplomatic recourse must be made clear.27 
The Andean Code states in Decision 24: 
[In] no instrument relating to investment or the transfer of technology shall there be 
clauses that remove possible conflict or controversies from the national jurisdiction and 
competence of the recipient country or allow the subrogation by states to the right and 
action of their national investors28  
This principle was supported by Article 2 (2) (c) of General Assembly Resolution No 3281, 
which provided that “in any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, 
it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals.”29 
The Calvo doctrine was applied for decades, not only by Latin American countries but also 
by other countries who voted for the aforementioned United Nations resolution.  It succeeded in 
eliminating the policy of diplomatic protection formerly pursued by western countries, thus 
restricting foreign interference in the internal affairs of Latin American countries.30 In those 
countries, it led to a rejection of the international “minimum standard” and of the practice of 
resolving disputes by international law, which meant that international arbitration was effectively 
frozen.31 
However, the attitude towards arbitration in Latin American countries started to change 
dramatically.  The reasons behind this change are the willingness of the leaders of these countries 
to overcome poverty by attracting foreign capital and finding outlets in the global markets, 
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particularly for petroleum.32 Peters and Schrijver argue that this could not be achieved unless 
steps were taken to liberate their economic systems from certain restrictions and to find methods, 
such as arbitration, to attract the foreign investment and also to help resolve the crisis in the 
judicial system of Latin America and find alternative means to resolve disputes.33   
Therefore, many of Latin America States become party to various conventions of arbitration.  
The participation of these countries in arbitration conventions had a great impact on the growing 
confidence in arbitration. These conventions were considered as one of the main factors 
encouraging these countries to choose arbitration as a means to settle disputes.34  Many Latin 
American Countries try to attract foreign investors who prefer arbitration to resolve their with 
host state.  Therefore Most of these countries ratified the New York Convention of 195835 for the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards which facilitate enforcing foreign arbitral 
awards,36 and this convention paved the way for the change to arbitration as a means of dispute 
settlement.37 Another significant development in the situation of Latin American countries’ was 
when these countries ratified the World Bank Convention, or what is called the Washington 
Convention of 1965.38  The convention which has long been viewed by Latin American states as 
incompatible with the Calvo doctrine.39 The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(hereinafter MIGA) also succeeded in attracting many countries from Latin America.  The 
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MIGA provided, in its Annex II, for the resolution through arbitration of the investment disputes 
between the host state and the MIGA.40 The Latin American countries subscribed not only to 
global conventions, they also signed many regional conventions.  In 1975, the Latin American 
Countries41 ratified the Inter- American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,42 
which is known as the Panama Convention.  Modelled on the New York Convention, it aims at 
the recognition of arbitral awards.43 This convention is applied when the parties fail to reach an 
accord on the procedural rules for the management of the arbitration.44 This convention was also 
ratified by the United States in 1990.45 Bilateral treaties played an important role in increasing 
the adoption of arbitration as a means of settling disputes between the member countries.46 A 
significant event was the promulgation of the UNCITRAL Model Law by the United Nations in 
1985.47 This model law had considerable influence on the Latin American countries and many of 
them adopted these rules in whole or in part.48  
All these factors and reasons contributed to encouraging Latin American countries to adopt 
commercial arbitration as a method for settling disputes.  The change in the situation of these 
countries was apparent when the Andean Pact issued Decision 220 in 1987 which provided, in 
Article 34, “For the settlement of disputes or conflicts deriving from direct foreign investment or 
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from the transfer of technology, Member Countries shall apply the provisions established in their 
local legislation.”   
This development in Latin America’s attitude towards arbitration has impacted positively on 
legislative policy in these countries.  It is evident that in many of them there was an acceleration 
in the enactment of laws governing commercial arbitration. These laws became a guide that 
spread through the Latin American countries, and the use of arbitration was adopted by Peru, 
Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile Bolivia, Chile, Venezuela and Uruguay.49 Interestingly, these 
countries were not only overcoming obstacles by enacting laws enabling arbitration; they were 
also eager to develop sophisticated legislation of their own.  In this regard, the Chilean 
experience should be mentioned.  Chile has taken some important steps in order to raise the 
profile of commercial arbitration and has achieved a great deal in improving its commercial laws 
and creating a climate favourable to arbitration.  It has signed and ratified international 
conventions for arbitration, either international or a regional, such as the New York convention 
of 1975 and the Panama convention of 1976, and has also enacted Law 19.917 which attempts to 
bring Chilean law closer to the UNCITRAL Model Law.50 
To summarise, over the past decades Latin American attitudes to arbitration have changed.  
There are many factors behind this turnaround, which is represented by the decisions of these 
countries to join conventions for commercial arbitration, such as the New York Convention, the 
ICSID, and the Panama Convention. Latin American countries also desire to stimulate 
investment and attract foreign capital, and these motives have encouraged these countries to 
overcome their suspicion and mistrust regarding arbitration, with many of them enacting 
commercial arbitration laws. 
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3.2.2. The Attitudes of African Countries towards Arbitration:  
  Like many host states, African states have long expressed mistrust and dissatisfaction 
towards arbitration as a means of settling disputes.51 The attitudes of these countries did not 
emerge from a vacuum.52 Many factors have contributed to this view and have led these 
countries to prefer other methods to resolve their disputes, such as negotiations and 
conciliation.53    
Some African countries fear the multinational companies, which have financial balances 
exceeding that of their own countries and also have overlapping relationships with other states 
and therefore the ability to influence the political decisions of governments.54 In addition, these 
multinational companies have played an undeniably important role in instituting the famous 
international arbitration centres and it is to these centres that these companies prefer to bring 
their disputes for settlement.55 African countries viewed arbitration laws and institutions as 
instruments in the service of developed countries, as was indicated by the Afro-Asian Legal 
Consultative Committee (hereinafter AALCC).  This committee stated in 1976 that:  
These institutions had rules which did not work out particularly favorably for the 
developing countries in the matter of venue, choice of arbitrators, and also fees and 
charges leviable by the institution concerned.  Since most of these institutions 
functioned under the auspices of chambers of commerce and other association of trade, 
it was difficult to visualize the manner or the means by which practical steps could be 
taken to effect modification of the rules of such institutions to bring them into 
conformity with the interests of developing countries 56 
The AALCC Committee proposed that the international institutions of arbitration should 
take into consideration the interests of developing countries and should amend the rules of these 
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institutions in order to afford adequate protection to developing countries.57  According to 
Asante, this proposal was a result of AALCC Committee’s statement that “the rules of some of 
those arbitral institutions in developed countries did not provide adequate procedure to protect 
the interests of parties from the developing countries,”58 and that, if these institutions did not 
respond to this request, these countries would not enforce the arbitral awards issued by these 
institutions.59  
Arbitration occupies an uneven position in the continent of Africa, as is apparent from the 
participation data compared by Asante which shows that Sub- Saharan African participation in 
arbitration is lower than that of North African countries.60 Geographic factors were involved 
here, since, due to their greater proximity, these countries have a long history of economic 
relationships and commercial transactions with Europe.61 
African countries, like most developing countries, were subjected to colonialism for many 
decades.62 This is reflected in their legal systems, including the systems of arbitration.  
Arbitration law was generally handed down by the colonial administration and its rules were 
restricted to the regulation of domestic arbitration.  They did not include international arbitration 
and moreover were too inadequate to cover the entire arbitration process.  Domestic courts, 
therefore, had an important influence on the arbitral tribunal.63 The scantiness of those laws and 
their inability to constitute a comprehensive legal system to govern arbitration on the one hand, 
and the lack of international arbitration rules on the other hand, led to reluctance on the part of 
African states to recourse to arbitration as a means of resolving disputes.  
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Eventually, the situation of African countries changed, particularly after they won their 
independence. These states started to emerge as independent members of the international 
community and began to re-evaluate their economic relations with the colonial powers through 
reforms to their economic and commercial laws.   
Apart from the political events mentioned above, there were other reasons behind this 
change in attitude.  The ICSID was established on 18 March 196564 and African countries were 
among the first to sign65 and ratify66 this convention.  As Rosalyn Higgins affirms, “The draft 
[ICSID Convention] (...) received the support of many African states, especially Nigeria, who 
feel that it gives them a basis for proceeding against the excesses of private contractors.”67 The 
response of the African countries to the ICSID convention and their participation in it was 
greater than that of Latin American countries.68 The African states’ subscription is regarded as an 
important factor in motivating these countries to change their situation.  African countries also 
participated in another treaty, the New York Convention.  However their participation in this 
convention was lower than was the case with the ICSID Convention, and consequently the 
impact of the New York convention has been less pronounced in these countries.69  
In addition to international conventions, the African countries established regional 
organisations and conventions relating to arbitration.  The AALCC70 is one of the significant 
regional organizations which succeeded in attracting many African and Asian countries to 
become members.  The AALCC established a regional centre for arbitration, located in Cairo, 
which applied the UNCITRAL rules of arbitration.71 In 1987, the Preferential Trade Area for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (hereinafter the PTA) established a centre of arbitration to provide 
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its services to the sub- Saharan region: the PTA Centre for Commercial Arbitration, which is 
located in Djibouti.72  The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, 
(hereinafter the OHADO),73 has been prominent in encouraging African countries to participate 
in arbitration.  It aimed to co-ordinate the business laws of African countries and to modernise 
their commercial laws, and also to promote arbitration as the way to settle the disputes and to 
develop the investment sectors in these countries.  OHADA invited all members of the African 
Union (hereinafter the AU) to adhere to it.74   
These regional centres for arbitration, created by conventions or organizations, contributed 
to helping African countries to overcome their concerns about Western countries arbitration.   
Many African countries75 enacted arbitration laws by following the UNCITRAL Model Law in 
total or in part, or by enacting rules through their own legislative power.76 These laws were 
characterized by clarity and explicitness with regard to commercial arbitration, although they 
were not uniform or harmonized.77  However, they are considered as important indicators of the 
change in these countries’ attitudes towards arbitration. The Djibouti International Arbitration 
Law of 1984 provides a good example of what is mentioned above.  Sempasa argues that this law 
provides model of an integrated code.78 It is based on two important principles, the freedom of 
the parties to choose an arbitration procedure and the support of a judicial structure, with the 
domestic courts playing a supporting role to the parties if needed.  The Djibouti International 
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Arbitration Law also provides for a committee competent in international arbitration matters, 
known as the Commission for Arbitration Appeals.79  This Commission submits assist for 
dispute parties by offering them with suitable arbitral services.80 Djibouti was followed by 
Nigeria, which enacted its Arbitration and Conciliation Law No.11 in 1988: this was based on 
the UNCITRAL Model Law of Arbitration and the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rule of 1980.   
3.2.3. The Asian Pacific Attitude towards Arbitration: 
The situation in Asia is different from that of other continents. In the Latin American and 
African countries, there was an inherent hostility to arbitration, which was viewed as an 
instrument to serve the multinational companies, whereas in Asia it was widely accepted as a 
peaceful means of resolving a broad range of disputes.81 It was not considered strange or 
exceptional, since the concept of arbitration is rooted in ancient Asian traditions.82  
Some newly independent Asian countries became party to international conventions 
concerning arbitration after the Second World War.  The New York Convention of 1958 was one 
of the conventions found to be acceptable by Asian countries and signed by some of them83  The 
ICSID Convention also succeeded in attracting some Asian countries to become signatories.84   
The sympathetic attitude of Asian countries did not, however, prevent arbitration from 
facing some challenges and obstacles.  One of these obstacles was the absence of any mechanism 
of implementation or guidance for foreign arbitral awards in Asian courts, since some Asian 
countries had not ratified the New York Convention of 1958.85  The vagueness of the procedure 
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of foreign awards implementation was coupled with the intervention by courts, which used the 
pretext of public policy.86   
However, in the 1980s and 1990s, international commercial arbitration evolved dramatically 
in Asian-Pacific countries.  It became well known as a region where arbitration occupied an 
important place, and Greenberg et al report that at least 500 international arbitrations occur there 
annually,87 a major reason behind this growth has been the economic openness of the countries 
of this region.  Through the increase of commercial and investment transactions, the economies 
of countries such as Japan, China, Hong Kong, India and Singapore began to grow 
impressively.88 Hong Kong and Singapore became the most important seats for international 
commercial arbitration.89 Other arbitration centres were opened in Asia and became prominent, 
namely the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (hereinafter the SIAC), the Australian 
Centre of International Commercial Arbitration (hereinafter the ACICA),90 the Chinese 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (hereinafter CIETAC),91 the Hong 
Kong International Arbitration Centre (hereinafter the HKIAC),92 and the Kuala Lumpur 
Regional Centre for Arbitration (hereinafter the KLRCA).93  
A booming economic climate impacted positively on the commercial law of these countries, 
and on their arbitration law in particular.  The Asian-Pacific countries enacted and reformed 
national arbitration laws and took into account the compatibility of these laws with international 
developments.  Many Asian countries, such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Hong Kong, India and 
Japan, depend on the UNCITRAL Model Law.94  New Zealand was the first state in the world to 
adopt the revised UNCITRAL Model Law of 2006, and it was followed by Singapore and 
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Australia.95  In addition, the Asia-Pacific countries’ interest in arbitration theory attracted legal 
experts, practitioners and academic professors to conferences that specialized in arbitration 
media.96 
3.2.4. The Attitude of Middle East Countries towards Arbitration: 
Middle East countries, like many host states in other regions, have been suspicious of 
arbitration as a means of resolving disputes arising from petroleum contracts. They have 
preferred to resort to national courts, and this has been the case particularly with those which 
produce the largest amounts of oil, namely, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, Oman 
and Qatar.  Despite this suspicion, however, these countries are considered to be the first states to 
settle their petroleum disputes by arbitration.  The arbitration between Petroleum Development 
Ltd v. The Sheikh of Abu Dhabi 97 in 1951 followed a dispute that arose when the ruler of Abu 
Dhabi, Sheik shakibut, attempted to shift the drilling rights of Petroleum Development Limited 
to another American company.  The original agreement98 was concluded in 1939.  It included an 
arbitration clause in Article 15 (a) which provided that:  
[I]f at any time during the currency of this Agreement there should be any 
difference or dispute between the two parties as to the interpretation or execution of any 
provision thereof, or anything herein contained or in connection herewith, such dispute 
shall be referred to two arbitrators, one selected by each of the two parties, and a referee 
to be chosen by the arbitrators, before proceeding to arbitration.99  
The Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Company Ltd100 was another famous 
arbitration case in the history of Middle East petroleum concessions.  The agreement concluded 
between the Sheikh of Qatar and International Marine Oil Company refers to arbitration as a 
means of settling any dispute arising between the contractors with regard to rights and liabilities: 
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it also makes reference to the choice of arbitrators101 as also do the Saudi Arabia v. Arabian 
American Oil Co (ARAMCO)102 and Kuwait v. American Independent Oil CO (LIAMCO).103  
It should be stated that in the past all arbitration involved Western companies and that 
developing countries viewed this arbitration as being designed to serve the interests of Western 
countries.  The situation was reflected in these companies’ domination of the contractual 
relationship, including the arbitration clauses, and in the fact that the arbitrators did not apply the 
national law of the host states.  Al- Samaan argues that the arbitral tribunals upheld the view that 
the laws of the host countries were immature and deficient in the principles that should govern 
oil concessions.104 It is significant that these arbitrations were ad hoc rather than institutional 
forms of arbitration.105  
The unbalanced position created by this situation gave the host countries involved a strong 
incentive to change their policies with regard to arbitration. The inadequacies revealed by these 
cases resulted in the emergence of an urgent need to promulgate and codify arbitration and trade 
laws.106  
In the view of the present author, this shift in attitude on the part of the Arab Middle East 
countries was not because they preferred arbitration as a means of resolving petroleum disputes 
and therefore freely chose it. It was because they wished to avoid those factors which would lead 
them to lose if they were forced to resort to arbitration in the future.  
Nonetheless there was a shift towards support for arbitration and this alteration appeared in 
different forms. It resulted in the accession of the Middle East countries to international 
                                                          
101 M. Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problem of State Contracts, (Longman 
Singapore1990) 534. 
102 ARAMCO (Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co) (1958) 27 ILR 117. 
103 Aminoil (the Government of the State of Kuwait v The American Independent Oil Company) (1982) 66 ILR 560. 
104 Yahya Al- Samaan, ‘Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia’ (2000-2001) 71 Islamic & Middle East Law 79.  
105 Jalal El Ahadab, ‘Arab Arbitration v. International Arbitration? The Case for a Reconciliation’ (2008) 25 Journal 
of International Arbitration 279 note 19. 
106 Husain M.Al-Baharna, ‘International Commercial Arbitration in a Changing World’ (1994) 9 Arab Law 
Quarterly 150. 
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conventions, such as the New York Convention of 1958107 and the ICSID Convention,108 and 
also regional conventions, such as the Arab League Convention of 1952, the Arab Amman 
Convention on Commercial Arbitration of 1987109and the Riyadh Convention on Judicial 
Cooperation of 1983.  This latter convention addressed the important issue of arbitration in 
articles 25 and 37, which deal with the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.110 
Several centres of arbitration were established in the region, namely the Gulf Cooperation 
Council Countries Commercial Arbitration Centre 1995, the Dubai International Financial 
Centre in 2004, and the Dubai Centre for Conciliation and Arbitration, the Bahrain Centre of 
International Arbitration, 1993, the Kuwait Centre for Commercial Arbitration, the Qatar 
Arbitral Centre and the Saudi Arabia Centre in 2007.111  
The legislation movement in the region was not limited to the Arab countries: it included 
Iran, one of the major petroleum – exporting countries. Iran subjected the Sapphire case to 
arbitration and took important steps to develop its arbitration laws.  Its arbitration law of 1997 
followed the UNCITRAL Model Law 1985, whereas previously it had relied on the Civil 
Procedure Code, 1939 (Articles 632-676).  These provisions are, designed to govern domestic 
arbitration, also applied international law, because they made no distinction between domestic 
and international arbitration.112 Iran also became a member in the Iran-United States’ Claims 
                                                          
107 Bahrain (1988), Iran (2001), Jordan (1979), Kuwait (1978), Qatar (2002), Saudi Arabia (1994), United Arab 
Emirates (2006).  The list of the states members in the York Convention of 1958 is available at <http://www. 
newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-contracting-states > accessed on 19 August 2014.  
108 Bahrain (1996), Jordan (1972), Kuwait (2009), Qatar (2011) Saudi Arabia (1980), Syria (2006), United Arab 
Emirates (1982). The list of the states members in the ICSID Convention is available at 
<https://icsid.worldbank. 
org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ContractingStates&ReqFrom=Main> accessed on 
19 August 2014.   
109 Iraq (1989), Jordan (1989), Lebanon (1992), Sudan (1993), Yemen (1988).  The list of states members is 
available at <http://www.Jurisint.org/en/ins/155.htm> accessed on 16 June 2014. 
110 This convention’s articles are available at < http://www.unchr.org/refworld/type,MULTILAT > accessed on 12 
June 2014. 
111 Jalal El Ahadab, ‘Arab Arbitration v. International Arbitration? The Case for Reconciliation’ (2008) 25 Journal of 
International Arbitration 280. 
112 Hamid G. Gharavi Salans, ‘The 1997 Iranian Law on International Commercial Arbitration: The UNCITRAL 
Model Law à l’Iranienne’ (1999) 15 International Arbitration 2; Jamal Seifi, ‘New Trends – Actors in Iranian 
Law Relating to Arbitration’ (2000) 75 Philippine Law Journal 47. 
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Tribunal, which is considered to be one of the most significant multi-claim arbitration tribunals 
of recent times.113  
3.3. The Attitudes of Iraq, UAE and PRC towards Arbitration: 
3.3.1. The Iraqi Attitude towards Arbitration: 
The stance adopted by Iraq, one of the most important petroleum-producing countries in the 
world, was not different from that of countries of the other regions.  Suspicious and distrust were 
the features that characterized the Iraqi position towards arbitration.  
Although arbitration come to play an increasing role worldwide as a means to resolve 
disputes and also as a way to attract foreign investors, the Iraqi legislature enacted no laws to 
regulate the country’s involvement in international commercial arbitration; neither does it 
distinguish between domestic arbitration and international arbitration.  Iraqi law regulate 
domestic arbitration by means of the CCP,114 Chapter Three (Articles 251-276) the most relevant 
parts and, thereafter any arbitral tribunal held in Iraq, even if it occurred between foreign parties, 
applied the CCP provisions.115  The recourse to arbitration in Iraq was considered as an 
exception to the public authority of the judiciary.116 The court plays an important role in 
enforcing the arbitral award.  Article 272 of the CCP stipulates that the award cannot be enforced 
unless the competent court approves it through verifying its compatibility with the substantive 
and formal rules of Iraqi law.  Majid is one of the views see that as prevents the arbitration from 
attaining its objectives of saving time, effort and costs.117 
As mentioned above, Iraqi law, unlike the law of other countries,118 regulates domestic 
arbitration without any reference to international arbitration. However, Iraqi law has neither 
                                                          
113 Jamal Seifi, ‘New Trends – Actors in Iranian Law Relating to Arbitration’ (2000) 75 Philippine Law Journal 47. 
114 Iraqi Civil Procedures Law No83 of 1969 published in the Iraqi Official Gazette vol. 2, 1969 477. 
115 Saleh Majid, ‘Arbitration in Iraq’ (2004) 19 Arab Law Quarterly 267. 
116 Article 3 of the Judiciary Authority Law of 1962 provides that Iraqi courts should have judicial authority over 
civil and criminal cases held in Iraq. 
117 Saleh Majid, ‘Arbitration in Iraq’ (2004) 19 Arab Law Quarterly 267. 
118 For example,  Article 3 of Egyptian Arbitration Law No. 27 of 1994 which provides that: 
     Within the context of this Law, the arbitration is international whenever its subject matter is a dispute 
related to international commerce in any of the following cases:  
      First: If the principal places of business of the two parties to the arbitration are situated in two different 
States at the time of the conclusion of the arbitration agreement. If either party to the arbitration has more 
than one place of business, due consideration shall be given to the place of business which has the closest 
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regulated nor prohibited international arbitration, and therefore one would agree that Iraq is not 
opposed to international commercial arbitration as a means of settling petroleum disputes.  This 
seems to be the implication of some Iraqi national laws which recognise international arbitration 
as a way to resolve disputes arising from commercial transactions and regional and international 
conventions signed by Iraq, and also in practice.  The following sub-sections will discuss Iraq’s 
acceptance of international commercial arbitration under national law, international conventions 
and in practice.  
  3.3.1.1. The Position of International Commercial Arbitration in Iraqi National Laws:  
As mentioned previously, the Iraqi CCP does not regulate international commercial 
arbitration.  However, it could be concluded from some national laws that arbitration has actually 
got a place in the Iraqi legal system.   
Civil Law:  Article 16 of Iraqi Civil Code No. 40 of 1951119 declares that foreign arbitral 
awards may be enforced in Iraq.  The act regulating this matter is Law No. 30 of 1928,120 which 
recognised the enforcement of the foreign award, so that if the Iraqi party concludes an 
agreement with a foreign company and agrees also to have recourse to arbitration by a foreign 
tribunal, and that tribunal renderes an arbitral award, then this award would be enforced in Iraq 
and the foreign award could not be restrained under a plea that Iraq did not accept international 
arbitration.  In recent decades, it has become common for the contractual parties to conclude a 
model agreement which contains an arbitration clause.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
relationship with the arbitration agreement. If either party to the arbitration does not have a place of 
business, then the place of its habitual residence shall be relied upon.  
      Second: If the parties to the arbitration have agreed to resort to a permanent arbitral organization or to an 
arbitration centre having its headquarters in the Arab Republic of Egypt or abroad.  
      Third: If the subject matter of the dispute falling within the scope of the arbitral agreement is linked to 
more than one country.  
      Fourth: If the principal places of business of the two parties to the arbitration are situated in the same 
State at the time of the conclusion of the arbitration agreement, but one of the following places is located 
outside the said State:  
     a) the place of arbitration as determined in the arbitration agreement or pursuant to the methods provided 
therein for determining it;  
      b) the place where a substantial part of the obligations emerging from the commercial relationship 
between the parties shall be performed; or  
    c) the place with which the subject matter of the dispute is most closely connected.  
Egyptian Arbitration Law No. 27 of 1994.  It is published in the Official Gazette No.16 (bis) on 21 April 1994.   
119 Iraqi Civil Law No.40 of 1951, published in the Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 3015 on 8 December 1951 243. 
120 The Iraqi Law for the Enforcement of Foreign Courts’ Judgments.  Published in the Iraqi Official Gazette, 1928 
61. 
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Commercial Law: Iraqi Commercial Law No. 30 of 1984,121 Article 297, states that the 
parties have the freedom to refer to the model contract.  Article 295 of this law states that the 
provisions of the law governed international transactions.  However, the parties are free to agree 
to an alternative. Iraqi commercial law therefore gives the parties freedom to regulate their 
agreements and to choose the clauses that are consistent with their interests, and among these 
clauses is an arbitration clause.   
The Iraqi Law for Enforcement No. 45 of 1980122 provides in Article 3 (2) that foreign 
arbitral award can be enforced in Iraq in accordance with Law No. 30 of 1928.   
The Investment Law123 No (13) was promulgated in 2006 and refers explicitly to arbitration 
as a means of resolving disputes in Article 27 paragraph 4 and 5.  Paragraph 4 provides that: 
 [I]f one of the parties to a dispute is subject to the provisions of this law, they may, 
at the time of signing the agreement, agree on a mechanism to resolve disputes, 
including arbitration, pursuant to the Iraqi law or any other internationally recognized 
entity.124   
It seems that international commercial arbitration is recognised by this law as an amicable 
way to settle disputes by giving the contractual parties the freedom to choose arbitration as one 
of a range of option.   
The Draft International Commercial Arbitration Law of 2011 (the DICAL):  
 Although this draft has not yet been passed by the Iraqi Parliament, it is a significant 
indication of Iraq’s new attitude towards arbitration.  It is an important step towards placing Iraq 
on the world map of arbitration. This draft, however, regulates international commercial 
                                                          
121 Iraqi Commercial Law No 30 of 1984, published in the Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 2987, 2 April 1984, vol 1, 
230. 
122 Iraqi Law for Enforcement No 45 of 1980, published in the Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 2762, 17 March 1980, 
vol 1, 444. 
123 The Iraqi Investment Law No 13 of 2006,  published in the Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 4031, 17 January 2007, 4  
124 The translation from Arabic to English is available at <http://investpromo.gov.iq/policies-and-laws/ > accessed 
on 10 April 2014. 
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transactions,125 whereas this thesis argues that the petroleum agreement is a special kind of 
investment agreement.   
The DLOG 126 refers to arbitration as acceptable way to resolve petroleum disputes.  Article 
(39) paragraph (b) provides that: 
 B- If the dispute cannot be resolved by agreement, the matter shall be referred to 
the Minister to resolve through discussions with senior officers of the holders of the 
rights concerned.  Failing resolution through these discussions, the matter of dispute 
may be submitted to arbitration or to the competent judicial authority.127   
It is seems from this that Iraqi law recognises arbitration as a means to settle petroleum 
disputes.  It is apparent from this review of Iraqi national laws that Iraq accepts and recognises 
arbitration in commercial, investment or petroleum agreements.  
    Regulations for Implementing Government Contracts No.1 of 2014:128  
     The Regulations for Implementing Government Contracts No.1 of 2014 gives the contractual 
parties three options to choose if they failed to settle their disputes amicably.  These options are 
arbitration, refer the disputes to the Iraqi national court and choose one of the way that provides 
by contract to settle the disputes.  Article 8 (second) 2 states that: 
 Second- When the contractual parties cannot reach to agreement to settle their disputes 
amicably, the parties must recourse to one of the ways that provides by the contracts 
which are: 
A- Arbitration, which should be according with follow: 
2) International Arbitration: the parties can choose arbitration as one of the way to 
settle the disputes in necessary cases and strategic venture or important venture and 
that should be when one of the contractual parties is foreigner.129   
                                                          
125 Article 1 (4) of the Iraqi DICAL, which provides that “the arbitration will be international commercial arbitration 
if the subject matter of the dispute relates to international trade.” This Article was translated from Arabic to 
English by the author.  Below the Arabic text: 
هيلودلا هراجتلاب قلعتي اعازن هعوضوم ناك اذأ ايلود يراجتلا ميكحتلا نوكي :يلودلا يراجتلا ميكحتلا :اعبار  
126 This Law has not yet been passed by the Iraqi Parliament. 
127 Translation from Arabic to English available at Council Of Ministers Oil and Energy Committee 
<http://www.krg.org/uploads/documents/Draft%20Iraq > accessed on 10 April 2014.  
128 Regulations for Implementing Government Contracts No.1 of 2014.  Published in the Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 
4325, 16 June 2014, 56. 
129 The translation from Arabic to English is conducted by author.  Below the Arbic text: 
 داملا8 :يتلأاك يهو دقعلا يف اهيلع صني نأ بجي يتلا بيلاسلاا دحأ ىلا ءوجللا متي يدو قافتا ىلا لصوتلا مدع دنع :ايناث  
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  3.3.1.2. The Regional and International Conventions:   
Iraq is party to many of the regional conventions concerned with arbitration concluded 
between Arab States, such as the Convention of the Arab League of Nations for the Enforcement 
of Judgments, which was concluded on 15 September 1952,130 the Arab Amman Convention on 
Commercial Arbitration, 1987, and the Riyadh Convention for Judicial Cooperation of 1983 
(hereinafter Riyadh Convention).131 Despite Iraq being a member of many inter-Arab 
conventions, its adherence to other international conventions is almost non- existent, except for 
its ratification of the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses in 1923 (hereinafter Geneva 
Protocol of 1923).132 Although is party to this Protocol, there has been no resulting simplification 
of the procedural rules of arbitration and no change in Iraqi laws to facilitate the enforcement of 
arbitral foreign awards.133  Iraq has until this time, failed to join to the leading international 
conventions that regulate arbitration, namely as the ICSID and the New York Convention of 
1958.  The reasons behind Iraq’s refusal to adhere to the New York Convention have been legal 
and political.  The Iraqi Office of Legal Codification explained in Decree No. 122/1978 of 28 
August 1978, the reasons preventing Iraq’s ratification of the New York Convention 1958 as 
follows: 
 International Commercial Arbitration includes foreign elements when taking place 
outside the borders of Iraq, and the arbitrators could be foreign nationals, applying 
foreign law, either substantive law or procedural law.  Therefore, the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards inside the territories of the Iraqi Republic face legal and 
sovereignty obstacles (……….) therefore adherence to the New York Convention of 
1958 and the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards would require the 
agreement of the Iraqi authorities responsible for planning public economic policy. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
أ- :يتأي امل اقفو نوكيو ميكحتلا  
2ىربكلا هيجيتارتسلأا عيراشمللو هرورضلا تلااح يف تاعزانملا ةيوستل يلودلا ميكحتلا رايتخا دقاعتلا ةهجل :يلودلا ميكحتلا ) أ نوكي امدنعو همهملا و
 .ايبنجأ دقعلا يفرط دحأ 
130 Iraq becomes party of the League of Arabic States Convention for Enforcement of Judgments 1952 according to   
law No. 35 on 26 March 1956 which published in Iraqi Official Gazette, issue 3802 on 6 June 1956.  Yahya Al- 
Samaan, ‘Dispute Resolution in Saudi Arabia’ (2000-2001) 71 Islamic & Middle East Law 79.  
131 Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation of 1983, it entered force on 30 October of 1985, league of Arab 
States.  Iraq became party to this convention according to law No. 110 of 1983 which is published in Iraqi 
Official Gazette, issue 2976 on 16 of January 1984, 22.   
132 The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 signed at Genva on 24 September 1923, LNTS, vol XXVII, 
No. 678 of 1924, 158.   
133  26،ءاضقلا ةلجم ،1993،2 ،يقارعلا عيرشتلا يف هيئاضقلا ماكحلاا ىلع همكحملا ةباقرو ميكحتلا طرش ،سنوي ديمح   
     [Hameed Younis, ‘Arbitration Clauses and  Court Censorship concerning Arbitrators’ Awards in Iraqi 
Legislation’ (1993) (2) A-l Kazaa Journal 26]  
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Because of its political aspects, accession would involve the reform and alteration of 
Iraqi laws. 134     
Furthermore, Iraq did not join the Geneva Convention for Excution of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards of 1927135 (hereinafter Geneva Convention of 1927) which encouraged member states to 
recognize arbitral awards rendered by other member states and to recognize agreements 
involving persons subject to different jurisdictions.136  
However, this did not prevent Iraq from agreeing, on an ad hoc basis, to resolve disputes 
through arbitration by concluding with some foreign companies contracts containing arbitration 
clauses.137 
In this respect, Article 9 of the Iraqi Commercial and Industrial Union Law No.24 of 1983 
set out the functions this Union, namely, to act as arbitrator, to participate in arbitral tribunals in 
order to resolve commercial and industrial disputes taking place between the members of this 
Union themselves, or between them and other parties, and to choose experts and arbitrators.  
                                                          
134 Decree No. 132/1978 as of 28 of August 1978.  The translation from Arabic to English is by the author.  See 
below the Arbic text : 
دق بناجا نيمكحم ىلا هب دهعتي دقو .دلبلا دودح جراخ متي دق هنا ثيح .ايبنجأ ارصنع نمضتي يلودلا يراجتلا ميكحتلا نأ ق نوقبطي نم ءاوس ايبنجأ انونا
ي هيقارعلا هيروهمجلا قاطن لخاد هيبنجلأا ميكحتلا ماكحأ ذيفنت نأف هيلعو .هيئارجلأا دعاوقلا ةيحان نم مأ هيعوضوملا دعاوقلا ةيحان لئاوح هنود يقلا
 كريوين ةدهاعم ىلا مامضنلأا نأف هيلعو ).......( هيدايسو هينوناق1958 كحأب فارتعلأا نأشبر دارختسأ مزلتسي اهذيفنتو هيبنجلأا ميكحتلا ما يأ
تايضتقمو اهتاعارم يغبني هيسايس بناوج مامضنلأا كلذ يف نلأ هماعلا هيداصتقلأا هسايسلا طيطختب موقت يتلا ايلعلا تاهجلا  يعدتست هيلمع
.اهليدعتو هيقارعلا نيناوقلا ةعجارم بجوتسي مامضنلأا كلذو هساردلا 
135 The Geneva Convention for Excution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927, signed at Geneva on 26 September of 
1927, LNTS, vol XCII, 302.  
136 Article (1) of Genva Convention of 1927provides that: 
       In the territories of any High Contracting Party to which the present Convention applies, an arbitral 
award made in pursuance of an agreement, whether relating to existing or future differences (herein after 
called “a submission to arbitration”) covered by the Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, opened at Geneva 
on September 24, 1923, shall be recognized as binding and shall be enforced in accordance with the rules 
of the procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, provided that the said award has been 
made in a territory of one of the High Contracting Parties to which the present Convention applies and 
between persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of one of the High Contracting Parties.   
137 Article (1) of Genva Convention of 1927 provides that: 
       In the territories of any High Contracting Party to which the present Convention applies, an arbitral 
award made in pursuance of an agreement, whether relating to existing or future differences (herein after 
called “a submission to arbitration”) covered by the Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, opened at Geneva 
on September 24, 1923, shall be recognized as binding and shall be enforced in accordance with the rules 
of the procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, provided that the said award has been 
made in a territory of one of the High Contracting Parties to which the present Convention applies and 
between persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of one of the High Contracting Parties.   
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3.3.1.3 The Practice  
 As indicated in a previous chapter, the Iraqi petroleum industry witnessed important events, 
such as nationalisation and changes in circumstances brought about by revolutions and coups.  
These events created disputes arising from petroleum concessions, which were characteristically 
of long duration.  Iraqi policy towards arbitration for the settlement of disputes emerged from 
petroleum agreements that were not fixed and specific, but depended on the varied economic 
policies of the different governments which ruled Iraq.  
When the first concessions were concluded between Iraq and foreign companies, (the IPC, 
MPC and BPC), in the 1930s, disputes arising from petroleum concessions were referred to 
arbitration as a means of settlement. This was enabled through the agreements themselves, for 
example Article 40 of the petroleum concession agreement between Iraq and the IPC in 1925138 
and Article 36 of the petroleum concession agreement between Iraq and the MPC in 1932139 also 
Article 41 of the petroleum concession agreement between Iraq and the BPC in 1938.140  
As was indicated in Chapter Two, the dominance of these companies and their monopoly of 
the petroleum exploration contracts were achieved through long- term concessions.141  Iraq was 
under a British mandate when it concluded these contracts and most of the companies were of 
British nationality.142  This resulted in an imbalance between the contracting parties, which is 
reflected in the clauses of the petroleum concessions concluded in this period, including the 
arbitration clauses.  
As previously explained, in 1958, new policies began to emerge in Iraqi, with the state now 
playing an important role in the petroleum industry, particularly after the enactment of Law 
No.80 in 1961, reducing the concession areas controlled by the petroleum companies.143  
Disputes arose from the enactment of this law, and the petroleum companies subsequently called 
                                                          
138 40 ،ءاضقلا ةلجم ،2 ،1971 ،طفنلا دوقع ىلع هريثاتو ميكحتلا طرش ،يولع مشاه 
     [Hashem Allawe, ‘The Arbitration Clause and its Implications in Iraqi Petroleum Contracts’ (1971) 2 Al- Kaza 
Journal 40]. 
139 ibid. 
140 ibid. 
141 See Chapter Two section two.   
142 See sub-section 2.2.1.2. (The Role of Britian) of Chapter Two. 
143 See sub- section 2.2.2.2 (Iraqi Government Intervention in the Petroleum Industry after World War II) of Chapter 
Two.  
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for Iraq to settle disputes through arbitration, since they regarded the new law as a unilateral 
action by Iraq.144 However, the Iraqi government rejected the companies’ complaints. The Iraqi 
government justified its rejection on the basis of its sovereign right to promulgate whatever 
measures it found necessary for the protection of its natural resources, and argued that there was 
no reason to resort to arbitration.145    
However, Iraqi’s rejection of arbitration through the enactment of law No. 80 did not mean 
that Iraq completely rejected arbitration. Several economic and commercial agreements 
concluded between Iraq and other countries refer to arbitration as a way to settle disputes.146 In 
this period Iraq did not pursue a single-minded policy with regard to arbitration, as is apparent 
from the arbitration clauses in the aforementioned agreements.  In some of them, Iraq accepted 
arbitration in principle, but neglected to explain important details, such as the law which should 
govern the dispute, and the choice of the arbitrator and the seat of arbitration.147 The economic 
protocol for the transfer of capital and investment between Iraq and Kuwait, however, included 
details concerning the choice of arbitrator and the law governing the disputes.148 The Economic 
Cooperation Protocol between Iraq and Germany did not specify the application of Iraqi law to 
any disputes that might arise,149 while other agreements allowed a recourse to arbitration if the 
common committee failed to settle the dispute.150   
As the above examples show, arbitration clauses were not a universal procedural feature of 
agreements concluded between Iraq and other parties. This was due to the lack of any 
international arbitration law regulating the arbitration clause. 
                                                          
144 1966،48 ،توريب ،هيقارعلا طفنلا ةيضق لوح ،فاوشلا فيطللا دبع 
     [Abdul Lateif Al- Shawaf, Concerning the Case of Iraqi Petroleum (Beirut 1966) 48].  
145 ibid. 
146 Article 16 of the economic and technical cooperation between Iraq and Gecko Slovakia in 1960 refers to 
arbitration as a mean to settle any dispute arising from this agreement; Article (10) of the economic development 
agreement between Iraq and Bulgaria in 1967 refers to arbitration.  
147 Article 16 of the economic and technical cooperation between Iraq and Gecko Slovakia in 1960 refers to 
arbitration as a means of settling any dispute arising from this agreement. 
148 Article 60 of the economic protocol for the transfer of capital and investment between Iraq and Kuwait in 1964. 
149 Article H of this Protocol. 
150 Article 10 of the economic development agreement between Iraq and Bulgaria in 1967 refers to arbitration.  
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 In the 1970s and 1980s the official Iraqi attitude became more emphatic in its resistance to 
arbitration.151 Iraq made arbitration the last option for the amicable resolution of disputes.  Only 
if a committee formed from the contracting parties failed to settle the dispute by negotiation 
would they have recourse to arbitration.152  Iraq considered that arbitration affected the principle 
of national sovereignty and detracted from the prestige of the Iraqi judiciary.153  This is made 
clear in a statement, (No. 920, of 1973), by a committee on petroleum matters and enforcement 
of agreements, addressed to the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, which declared that “the International 
Arbitration clause impacts on the principle of sovereignty and the sovereignty of Iraqi national 
courts”. 
In a nutshell, the official Iraqi attitude towards the role of international arbitration in 
petroleum disputes was distinctly negative during this period, and arbitration during petroleum 
disputes with foreign companies was avoided. 
The official position changed gradually after 2003 due to the exceptional political, economic 
and legal circumstances.  Iraq emerged from the war with its economy completely destroyed.  
The destruction encompassed the vital petroleum sector.  Iraq depends largely on revenue from 
this sector to rebuild the infrastructure, and that task requires the participation of foreign 
companies with the necessary technical equipment and capital, and obviously the creation of a 
favourable investment climate and protection for them.  International arbitration is the best 
means to resolve petroleum disputes for international companies.  It reduces the concerns of 
these companies, which do not like submitting themselves to the judgments of the national court 
of the host state.  In the case of Iraq, the situation is compounded by the absence of an 
international arbitration law and the lack of any mechanism to enforce the foreign arbitral award, 
as well as the intervention of the courts in arbitration procedures.154  These factors contributed to 
a review of economic and legal policy in Iraq.  As mentioned in the previous sub-section, Iraq 
promulgated Investment Law No.13 of 2006, which recognizes arbitration, and there is also a 
                                                          
151 Jalal El- Ahdab, Arbitration with The Arab Countries (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2011) 231. 
152 Saleh Majid, ‘Arbitration in Iraq’ (2004) 19 Arab Law Quarterly 267. 
153 Jalal El- Ahdab, Arbitration with The Arab Countries (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2011) 231. 
154 David Brent Grantham, ‘Caveat Investor: Assessing the Risk and Rewards of ICOs Entry into Iraq’ (2010) 3 
Journal of World Energy Law & Business 304. 
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reference to arbitration for the settlement of petroleum disputes within the Oil and Gas Law. 
Consequently, arbitration in Iraq can be said to have entered a new era.  
The changes affected institutions as well as laws.  A new centre for arbitration was 
established in Al-Najaf, in the south of Iraq.155  
To sum up, the status of arbitration in Iraq passed through two historical phases.  The first 
phase began in 1958 with state intervention in the petroleum industry,156 and continued until 
2003.  In this period, although Iraq had a generally negative attitude to arbitration, it accepted a 
resort to arbitration as a means of settling disputes in several economic and petroleum 
agreements. Sometimes the country resorted to arbitration under the pressure and influence of 
petroleum companies, and sometimes it did so to encourage investment and to attract foreign 
companies that possessed modern technology.  In any case, Iraq did not follow a fixed and 
specific rule with regard to arbitration clauses and procedures, and it also avoided becoming a 
party to the New York Convention 1958, which aimed to facilitate the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral award and the enactment of laws regulating international 
arbitration.157     
The second phase began after 2003, when Iraq and its economic sector underwent a torrent 
of changes.  The country tried to root arbitration in its legal environment, influenced by a strong 
desire to attract foreign investors and to rebuild its devastated economy.158  This endeavour took 
different forms, including changes in the law and the establishment of an arbitration institution. 
This chapter shown how significant feature of host states has been the alteration in their 
attitudes towards arbitration, from early antipathy to a sympathetic view, expressed by their 
adherence to international conventions, such as the New York Convention 1958, the ICSID 
Convention or regional conventions, and also by the enactment or updating of local laws.  Their 
aim is to attract investors and to strengthen their economies, and this is particularly the case with 
countries which have natural resources but at the same time suffer from poverty, wars, and a 
                                                          
155 International Commercial arbitration Centre Najaf is available at <http://www.najafchamber.net/en/centers/icacn 
/index.1.htm> accessed on 14 May 2014. 
156 See pages 40 and 41 of Chapter Two.  
157 See pages 100 and 101 of this chapter.   
158 See sub-section 2.2.3 (Post Occupation Iraq 2003 Onwards) of Chapter Two. 
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dearth of capital and technology.  In this respect, an important question arises: has the alteration 
in the attitudes of these countries to arbitration been imposed through necessity, because these 
states remain the weaker parties, or does the alteration result from these countries becoming 
aware of the importance of arbitration as an amicable method for settling the disputes?  In other 
words, is the choice of arbitration based on genuine free will?   
Arguably, the parties from developing countries would prefer not to choose arbitration at all.  
Samir Saleh has observed, “It can almost be said that it is only when left with no alternative –and 
then racked by apprehension- that an Arab party will comply with an arbitration clause.”159 
Developing countries were bound to arbitration by the urgent need for capital and technology. 
They accepted arbitration because they were the weaker parties in the economic equation of 
concession agreements, in which they accepted many unfair terms.160  At the same time, the main 
petroleum producers from Western countries, for example the United States and the United 
Kingdom, have exempted their own petroleum disputes from arbitration.161 Moreover, the 
multinational oil companies do not own recourse to arbitration to resolve disputes between 
themselves.162 This confirms the specificity of petroleum disputes.  
In the case of Iraq, a developing country and one of the major petroleum producers, wars 
exhausted its economy and the petroleum sector bore a major part of the destruction.  The sector 
needs reform through attracting foreign investors with advanced technology.  The situation in the 
country remains unstable due to insecurity, corruption and the sabotage of petroleum 
installations, such as the refinery pipes.  Does Iraq accept arbitration based on free will and its 
commitment to the importance of arbitration or because it urgently needs to attract international 
oil companies?  In fact, arbitration is becoming the legal system adopted by many host states as 
they find it a suitable way to resolve disputes and also to protect their capital and investment. 
Reality has dictated the need for host states to access technology and scientific potential.  If 
handled carefully, it can be an effective mechanism for the resolution of disputes through the 
                                                          
159 Samir Saleh, ‘The Settlement of Disputes in the Arbitration World. Arbitration and Other Methods – Trends in 
Legislation and Case Law’ (1985-1986) 1 Arab Law Quarterly 199. 
160 ibid.  
161 Thomas Wälde, ‘Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty’ [1996] CEPMLP Journal Online < 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/htm > accessed on 29 June 2011. 
162 Thomas Wälde, ‘The Role of Arbitration in the Globalization of Energy Markets’ [2000] CEPMLP Journal 
Online < http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/htm > accessed on 29 June 2011. 
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enactment of special rules to safeguard petroleum arbitration and the establishment of special 
institutions and centres for the settlement of petroleum disputes.  The existence of such 
institutions and centres would encourage parties from developing countries to submit their 
disputes to them, particularly when the representation in them of developing countries is 
increased.  The organization of conferences devoted to the subject of petroleum arbitration would 
further help to spread the legal arbitration culture in developing countries, as would the 
application of national laws to the petroleum contracts of the host state and the modification of 
national laws to bring foreign arbitration awards in line with international laws.   
3.3.2. The Attitude of the UAE towards Arbitration: 
The UAE is one of the most important petroleum producers and a member of OPEC. Its 
attitude towards arbitration has varied from rejection to acceptance it is an important case study 
for Iraq.  In order to understand this evaluation in its approach this section will examine the 
situation there.   
The UAE has depended largely on the rules of arbitration set out in the Abu Dhabi Code of 
Civil Procedures (hereinafter ADCCP) which came into force in 1970.163 Its chapter 9 (Articles 
82 to 98), deals with arbitration rules.  This law has been widely influential, not only in Abu 
Dhabi but also in other Emirates.  The ADCCP is considered to be the first UAE law to devote 
such attention to arbitration.164 However, its promulgation did not prevent some Emirates from 
prohibiting arbitration outside Emirate borders.  In 1988, the Emirate of Dubai issued a Decree:   
 Ordering that from 6th February 1988, no contract to which the Government of Dubai 
or one of its departments is a party may provide for arbitration outside Dubai nor that 
any such arbitration be subject to any law or procedure other than the laws and 
procedures in force in Dubai.165   
 
                                                          
163   1983،5ةدحتملا ةيبرعلا تاراملاا ةعماج تاعوبطم هيندملأ تاعفارملا نوناق ،معنملا دبع رمع 
    [Omer A. M, The Law of Civil Procedure (U.A.E. University publication 1983) 5]. 
164 The contract law of 1971, which was effective in two emirates, Dubai and Ra’s al-Khaymah, provided general 
provisions of arbitration.  However this law did not refer to different types of arbitration, and the ADCCP filled 
the lacuna by recognizing the various types.  
165 Dubai Official Gazette of 1988, issue No 166 p.11.  This text was translated by Obaid Saqer Busit, ‘The System 
of Arbitration in the U.A.E Problems and Prospects’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham 1991). 
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The purpose of the Decree was to establish a national arbitration system in the UAE after 
cases relating to petroleum disputes were lost166 and to keep arbitration within the UAE so that 
its national laws would apply.  However, the Decree could not realize its aims because foreign 
companies did not welcome Dubai’s decision to apply its own domestic law.167  A new Decree 
was promulgated, amending the first one.  It is provided that: 
Excluding from {the first Decree} wherever the general interest demands, the Ruler 
of Dubai may exclude the Government of Dubai departments and corporations from the 
obligation of the 1988 Decree.168 
The experience of the UAE with regard to petroleum arbitration has not fulfilled 
expectations. Its arbitration law is undeveloped, there has been a lack of uniformity in its 
approach to arbitration, and its laws have failed to recognize the various types of arbitration 
agreement.  In addition, many of the Arab Gulf States have lost legal cases related to petroleum 
disputes.169   
In the past two decades, however, the UAE has adopted a more positive attitude towards 
arbitration, as demonstrated by its promulgation of the Federal Code of Civil Procedures No.11 
of 1992.170 This law devotes its Chapter III (Articles 203 to 218) to arbitration provisions, thus 
filling a legislative gap.171  As indicated above, the UAE had no federal law governing 
arbitration.  The 1992 Code does not distinguish between domestic arbitration and international 
arbitration but it recognizes different types of arbitration agreement.172 The UAE recently 
reviewed the draft of a federal arbitration law which is based on UNCITRAL Model law.173 This 
law was drafted in response to the UAE’s need to assume an important role in international trade 
and investment.  The relevant article of this law will be explained in this study, as will Federal 
Law No.11 of 1992.  The promulgation of this law is not the only factor that contributed to the 
                                                          
166 Petroleum Development Ltd v. The Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR 144.  
167 ibid. 
168 Dubai Official Gazette of 1988 issue No.167, 10. 
169 Petroleum Development Ltd v. The Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR 144; The Ruler of Qatar v. International 
Marine Oil Company Ltd (1953) 20 ILR 534. 
170 UAE Federal Code of Civil Procedures Law No. 11 of 1992 published in the Official Gazette, issue No. 235, 8 of 
March 1992. 
171 Essam Al Tamimi (ed.), A Practitioner’s Guide to Arbitration in the Middle East and North Africa (Jurist Net 
2009) 485. 
172 Jalal El- Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2011) 784. 
173 Essam Al Tamimi (ed.), A Practitioner’s Guide to Arbitration in the Middle East and North Africa (Jurist Net 
2009) 485. 
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enhancement of arbitration in the UAE: the country also became a party to conventions that were 
important for arbitration.  It became a party to the New York Convention of 1958 on 19 
November 2006, and also joined the ICSID Convention on 22 January 1982.  These conventions 
contributed to bring the UAE into the international investment community.  Moreover, the UAE 
became a party to many regional conventions which impacted on the enforcement of arbitral 
awards.  It became a party to the Gulf Cooperation Council Convention on the Enforcement of 
Judgments in 1996 and the Riyadh Convention in 1983.  
The factors cited above contributed to giving arbitration a prominent place in the UAE as a 
method for the resolution of disputes arising from investment disputes in general and petroleum 
agreements in particular.   
As a result of the supportive attitude towards arbitration, important centres appeared in the 
UAE, such as the Dubai International Arbitration Centre, which has become one of the most 
important centres in the Middle East.174 There was also the Dubai International Financial Centre, 
which opened in 2004.  Today, the UAE, unlike Iraq, can be a good example to be a nation of 
pivotal importance in the world of petroleum. 
 3.3.3. The Attitude of PRC towards Arbitration: 
PRC is different from Iraq and the UAE in that it has a long and rich cultural history of 
arbitration.  This culture qualifies Chinese law to be one of the bases to comparison in this study.  
The history of arbitration in China began in 1912, when the Chinese government promulgated 
the Institution for Business Arbitration Office in 1912, followed in 1913 by the Working Rules 
for Business Arbitration Office.175  The latter law allowed for disputes to be submitted to the 
Business Arbitration Office.176 In 1930, China promulgated the Law of Settling Disputes 
between Labour and Management, and in 1949 the municipal government of Tianjin 
promulgated the Tianjin Municipality Interim Rules of Organization for Mediation and 
                                                          
174 Reza Mohtashami, Antonia Birt and Lee Rovinescu, ‘Arbitration Guide IBA Arbitration Committee: United Arab 
Emirates’ (1913) International Associated Bar 1. 
175 Jingzhou Tao, Arbitration Law and Practice in China (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2008) 1. 
176 ibid.  
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Arbitration Commission, which set up rules for mediation and arbitration.177 In this period, China 
did not distinguish between domestic and foreign- related arbitration.  The distinction between 
those terms grew gradually in the 1949.178  
Before the promulgation of the Arbitration Law of 1994, arbitration was exclusively 
domestic, since all disputes arising from various issues were subject to domestic arbitration.179 In 
the 1970s, China abandoned the socialist trade system and inaugurated a new “Open Door 
Policy.”180 This policy was combined with the promulgation of many new laws to enhance this 
reform.  In 1981 China promulgated the Economic Contract Law of the PRC.  This law offered 
amicable ways to resolve disputes arising in regard to economic contractual relationships, such 
as consultation, conciliation and arbitration.181 In 1983, the State Council of China promulgated 
the Regulation on Economic Contract Arbitration of the PRC, which provided in its Article 2 that 
“The State General Administration for Industry and Commerce and the economic contract 
arbitration boards established by local administrations for industry and commerce are the organs 
of arbitration for economic contracts”.  As shown above, China had passed a series of laws 
regulating economic arbitration contracts.  These laws, however, were not independent, 
autonomous party principles and the arbitral award was not binding.182 The new economic policy 
followed by China motivated it to review its arbitration law.  PRC tried to make domestic 
arbitration consistent with international standards by promulgating the Arbitration Law of 
1994,183 which contains important international principles.  It enhances the independence of the 
arbitration process by preventing China’s agencies from interfering with the arbitration process 
through the appointment of arbitrators.  Article 8 of the PRC Arbitration Law provides that 
“Arbitration shall be carried out independently according to law and shall be free from 
                                                          
177 Jennifer Sackin, ‘Online Dispute Resolution with China: Advantageous, But at What Cost?’ (2010) 12 Cardozo 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 245. 
178 Jingzhou Tao, Arbitration Law and Practice in China (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2008) 2. 
179 ibid.  
180 Zhang Yuqing and James S. McLean, ‘China's Foreign Economic Contract Law: Its Significance and Analysis’ 
(1978) 8 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 120; Peter Fenn, Michael O’Shea and Edward 
Davies (eds.), Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management in Construction: An International Review (2nd edn, 
Routledge 2005) 45. 
181 Ge Liu, ‘International Commercial Arbitration in China: History, New Developments, and Current Practice’ 
(1995) 28 The John Marshall Law Review 539.  
182 Jingzhou Tao, Arbitration Law and Practice in China (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2008) 4. 
183 Adopted at the Ninth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress on August 
31, 1994 and promulgated by Order No.31 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on August 31, 
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interference of administrative organs, public organizations or individuals”. Article 14 of the 
Arbitration Law of 1994 also provides that “Arbitration commissions shall be independent from 
administrative organs and there shall be no subordinate relationships between arbitration 
commissions and administrative organs”.  In addition, this law recognised the autonomy of the 
parties and gave them the freedom to choose the arbitrators.184 Moreover it is gave the arbitral 
award binding force.185  
In 1982, the Chinese State Council promulgated the Regulation on the Exploration of 
Offshore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises in 1982.186 This law 
encouraged the amicable resolution of petroleum disputes, and in the case of failure to resolve 
the dispute in this way, the parties would be able to have recourse to an arbitration commission 
in China for mediation or arbitration.187 The Sino- Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law of the PRC 
of 1983 provided in Article 97 that “Disputes arising over the interpretation or execution of the 
agreement, contract or articles of association between the parties to the joint venture shall, if 
possible, be settled through friendly consultation or mediation. Disputes that cannot be settled 
through these means may be settled through arbitration or judicial means”.  These laws display 
China’s attitude to arbitration and are considered also as an important step forward. 
                                                          
184 Article 6 of the PRC Arbitration Law of 1994 provided that “The arbitration commission shall be selected by the 
parties through agreement”.                                                                                                                     
The English text is available at <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/ 2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> 
accessed on 17 of May 2014. 
185  Article 9 of the PRC Arbitration Law of 1994 provided that : 
       A system of a single and final award shall be practiced for arbitration. If a party applies for arbitration to 
an arbitration commission or institutes an action in a People’s Court regarding the same dispute after an 
arbitration award has been made, the arbitration commission or the People’s Court shall not accept the 
case.  
       If an arbitration award is set aside or its enforcement is disallowed by the People’s Court in accordance 
with the law, a party may apply for arbitration on the basis of a new arbitration agreement reached 
between the parties, or institute an action in the People’s Court, regarding the same dispute.   
The English text available on < http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> 
accessed on 17 of May 2014. 
186 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources in 
Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises Promulgated by the State Council on January 30, 1982, Order No.318. 
187 Article 27 of Regulation on the Exploration of Offshore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign 
Enterprises of 1982 stated:  
     Any dispute arising between foreign and Chinese enterprises during the cooperative exploitation of 
offshore petroleum resources shall be settled through friendly consultations. If it cannot be resolved 
through consultation, mediation and arbitration may be conducted by an arbitration body of the People’s 
Republic of China, or the parties to the contract may agree upon arbitration by another arbitration body. 
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 China ratified the New York Convention of 1958 on 2 December 1986.188 This step by 
China enhanced international commercial arbitration and also had the effect of encouraging 
foreign investors to submit their disputes to international arbitration institution in China.  In 
1990, China also joined the ICSID Convention.189     
3.4. The Attitudes of Petroleum Companies towards Arbitration:  
 Arbitration became the preferred alternative to the national courts of the host state for the 
resolution of disputes because it possessed the advantages of enforceability, speed, neutrality, 
flexibility and economy.190   
 There were additional reasons for the international petroleum companies to prefer arbitration, 
and sometimes even to impose it on Third World countries.  These companies did not believe 
that the legal frameworks of the host states were adequate for the settlement of such disputes, 
and therefore sought to avoid the national laws and the national courts of the host states.  As far 
as laws were concerned, the companies regarded those of the host states as to immature to be 
applied to petroleum disputes and suffered from deficiencies in terms of their ability to absorb 
and comprehend the advanced technology which characterised such agreements.  These factors 
are apparent in the Aramco award, where the arbitral tribunal stated that: “The regime of mining 
concessions, and, consequently also of oil concessions, has remained embryonic in Moslem law 
and is not the same in different schools.  The principles of one school cannot be introduced into 
another, unless this is done by an act of authority.”191 These companies also avoid submitting 
themselves to the national court of the host state.  They believe that, because the other party 
would be the host state, the latter’s case would make a stronger impact on the court, so that the 
award would be in the host state’s interest.  This view has been supported by commentators from 
                                                          
188 China accessed the New York Convention of 1958 in accordance with a decision issued by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress on China Joining the Convention on the Recognition and 
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189 International Centre of for Settlement of Investment Disputes available at <https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
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western countries, who argue that the judicial authorities of the host countries are not 
independent and are subject to political pressure.192 Paulsson does not mince his words that: 
 Level-headed Third World negotiators will in fact concede that truly independent 
judiciaries do not yet exist in many of their countries.  You can say it just as brutally as 
that.  There is no reason to hide what is in everyone’s mind.  If you have a large 
contract involving the Government, there is no reason to pretend that the local judiciary 
will be exempt from political pressure.193  
Also: “For it is a fact of life that the tradition of a truly independent judiciary, impervious to 
political pressures, is lacking in large parts of the Third World (which is not to say that it is 
always present in developed countries).”194  
Arbitrators, by contrast, are chosen by the parties on the basis of their expertise in specific 
areas relevant to each particular dispute.  These arbitrators have a background in commercial 
transactions and especially in petroleum agreements, which require knowledge of continually 
evolving technology, and such knowledge may be not available to a host state judge.195 
3.5. Conclusion: 
This chapter has presented the views of both developing and developed countries towards 
arbitration and the reasons behind the diversity of attitudes.  The points of view of developing 
countries and western countries tend to be different. There is a wary attitude towards 
international commercial arbitration in general, and petroleum arbitration in particular.  Several 
reasons for this distrust have been suggested; some of these reasons, such as colonisation, 
breaches of the host state’s sovereignty, and the superior economic power of the petroleum 
companies, are shared by the developing countries.  Hostility has also stemmed from the absence 
of a legal culture in regards to arbitration and the lack of representation for developing countries 
in the institutions of arbitration.  There are also reasons specific to each group of developing 
countries.  Latin American countries take a stern view of arbitration because they consider it as 
foreign intervention by alternative means when it allows for foreign laws to be applied to such 
                                                          
192 Jan Paulsson, ‘Third World Participation in International Investment Arbitration’ (1987) 19 ICSID REVIEW- 
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193 Jan Paulsson, ‘North- South Arbitration’ (1984) 50 Journal of International Arbitration 42. 
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disputes.  African countries were colonised by western countries for many decades and subjected 
to unbalanced investment agreements with foreign companies. 
However, many host states have changed their attitudes, and various factors have 
contributed to this alteration. The need to encourage foreign investment has led developing 
countries to adhere to new international and regional conventions, and the promulgation by the 
United Nation of the UNCITRAL Model law has also been an important positive influence on 
the arbitration laws in developing countries.  Many new centres for arbitration have opened and 
arbitration laws have been updated or newly enacted, based partially or wholly on UNCITRAL 
Model law.   
The situation in Iraq is not very different from that of other developing countries.  It has 
taken a suspicious view of arbitration.  It did not distinguish between domestic and international 
arbitration and regulated arbitration in accordance with its civil procedures.  It ratified most of 
the regional arbitration conventions but it did not sign or ratify international conventions such as 
the New York Convention of 1958 and the ICSID Convention.  In the 1960s many Iraqi 
investment agreements contained clauses referring to arbitration, although there was no 
uniformity in these agreements.  Antipathy reached a peak in the nineteen seventies, when Iraq 
refused to be subjected to arbitration because it was considered prejudicial to the principle of 
national sovereignty.   
The Iraqi suspicious view of arbitration based mainly on political concerns.  After 2003, 
Iraqi attitudes to arbitration changed under the pressure of a need to rebuild its economy.  This 
evolution has taken different forms, such as the enactment of new laws referring to arbitration as 
means of settling disputes and the establishment of a centre of arbitration.  The Iraqi suspicious 
view of arbitration based mainly on political concerns.   
Foreign petroleum companies prefer arbitration to other means of dispute settlement, 
because it avoids the interference of national courts and also frees them from the necessity to 
subject themselves to the laws of the host states, which they believe are insufficiently mature for 
the governance of such disputes.  
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Chapter Four: Petroleum Arbitration Agreements 
4.1. Introduction: 
International arbitration is a preferred mechanism for settling disputes, including petroleum 
disputes, but it cannot take place unless the parties agree to submit their dispute to arbitration.  
They do so through an arbitration agreement.  In a typical petroleum dispute, the jurisdiction of 
the national court is excluded and the dispute is submitted to an arbitral tribunal.  The agreement 
is considered to be the guide for all involved, as it contains provisions that define the procedures 
of the arbitration process as a whole.  Hence, such an agreement contains the critical issues that 
govern the arbitration.   
A dispute may already exist or may be anticipated, and so arbitration agreements need to 
cover both cases.  Therefore, there are two types of arbitration agreement, which are known as 
arbitration clauses and submission agreements.  
These arbitration agreements can only be enforced if certain formal requirements are met, 
and consequently any deficiency in these requirements renders the agreement unenforceable.  
The non-enforceability of the arbitration agreement extends to the settlement of the arbitral 
award itself.  
The arbitration agreement plays an important role in the success of the arbitration process 
but only if it is independent of the petroleum agreement itself, which is primary.  Logically and 
legally, every clause in the main agreement should follow the fate of the agreement that contains 
the clause.  However, the typical petroleum arbitration agreement, whether it is a submission 
agreement or an arbitration clause, is independent of the main petroleum agreement.  That means 
the validity of the arbitration agreement is determined separately from the validity of the main 
agreement itself.  However, this issue raises debate, especially in the case of an arbitration clause 
that is considered an integral part of the main contract from the physical aspect.    
To prepare the ground for an examination of the important issues related to arbitration 
agreements for petroleum disputes under Iraqi law, this chapter presents the two forms of this 
agreement in Iraqi law, the arbitration clause and the submission agreement.  This chapter also 
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examines the formal and substantive requirements of a petroleum arbitration agreement, focusing 
on the Iraqi state and its entities, and their capacity to conclude the arbitration agreement in 
transition.  The chapter will also consider whether or not Iraqi law considers petroleum disputes 
to be arbitrable.  In addition, the chapter examines the Iraqi law applicable to arbitration 
agreements and whether this law is consistent with international standards.  The subject of the 
applicable law is still controversial in petroleum arbitration, as it raises the important issue of the 
validity of arbitration agreements.  In particular, the Iraqi CCP1 does not contain the laws 
applicable to the arbitration agreement.  It refers instead to the conflict of laws in Iraqi Civil Law 
No. 40 of 1951.2  
This chapter seeks to establish whether current Iraqi provisions concerning arbitration 
agreements are sufficient to deal with petroleum arbitration agreement, or whether there is a need 
to update and amend them.  In this chapter the author also seeks to answer the question of 
whether the petroleum arbitration agreement is considered a waiver of sovereign immunity 
jurisdiction.  In addition, the author seeks to answer the question of whether petroleum 
arbitration agreements under Iraqi law will still be effective if the primary agreement is void. In 
other words, does Iraqi law consider the petroleum arbitration agreement to be separate from the 
main contract? This chapter will devote a separate section to examining the severability question 
under Iraqi law and compares the Iraqi approach to that of the PRC and of the UAE. 
      4.2. The Types of Arbitration Agreement:   
There are two fundamental kinds of arbitration agreement.  The first type is in the form of a 
clause that is usually contained in the main contract, a so-called “arbitration clause”.  The second 
type is a separate contract and is known as a “submission agreement”.3 According to Iraqi law, 
the parties can conclude an arbitration agreement before or after a dispute has arisen between 
them, and they can also enter into an arbitration agreement even if a procedure before the court 
                                                          
1 Iraqi Civil Procedures Law No. 83 of 1969, published in the Iraqi Official Gazette, vol. 2, 1969, 477. 
2 Iraqi Civil Law No.40 of 1951, published in the Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 3015, 8 December 1951, 243. 
3 Article 7 (1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985 provides that “An arbitration agreement may be in the form of 
an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement”.  UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration with amendment as adopted in 2006 according to the General Assembly Resolution 40/72 
on 11 December of 1985 and the General Assembly Resolution 61/33 on 4 December of 2006.  
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has started.4  Article 251 of CCP, provides that “It is permissible to agree on resolving a certain 
dispute through arbitration.  Also, it is permissible to agree on arbitration as a dispute resolution 
mechanism for all disputes that may arise from the implementation of a certain contract”.5 
UAE law also recognises different kinds of arbitration agreements. Article 203 (1) of the 
Civil Procedures Law No 11 of 19926 provides that “The parties to a contract may generally 
stipulate in the basic contract or by a supplementary agreement”.7 According to this Article, the 
arbitration agreement has two forms under UAE law.  The first can take the form of a clause, 
while the second can take the form of a separate agreement.   
The PRC Arbitration Law 19948 recognises arbitration agreements.  Article 16 provides that 
“An arbitration agreement shall include arbitration clauses stipulated in the contract and 
agreements of submission to arbitration that are concluded in other written forms before or after 
disputes arise.”9 According to Chinese law, an arbitration agreement can be a basic term in the 
main contract or can be a separate agreement concluded between the parties after the dispute 
arises.10  
The following section will be divided into two sub-sections, the first one dealing with the 
arbitration clause and the second with the submission agreement. 
                                                          
4 Article 252 of CCP provides that:  
     The arbitration agreement may not be proved except by written evidence. However, arbitration can be 
agreed upon during the action (proceedings).  If the arbitration agreement was proved to the court or if the 
court has approved such an agreement in the course of the proceedings, then the court shall decide to 
postpone the suit until an arbitral award is issued.  
The translation from Arabic to English is available at < http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes/> accessed on 14 June 
2014.  The Court of Appeal of Baghdad decided that, if the parties decide to recourse to arbitration, the court will 
consider this decision and delay the suit until the arbitral award is rendered by the arbitral tribunal.  The Court of 
Appeals of Baghdad- Resaffa, decision No 109 on 1 of February 2010. 
5 The translation from Arabic to English is available at < http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes/> accessed on 10 
March 2014. 
6 The UAE Federal Code of Civil Procedures No. 11 of 1992 Published in the Official Gazette No. 235 of 8 March 
1992. 
7 The translation from Arabic Language to English Language available at < http://www.diac.ae/idias/ rules/uae/ 
chapter3/> accessed on 2 September 2014. 
8 Adopted at the Ninth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress on August 31, 
1994 and promulgated by Order No.31 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on August 31, 1994. 
9 The English text is available at < http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> 
accessed on 17 of May 2014. 
10 Tang Houzhi, ‘Arbitration- A Method Used by China to Settle Foreign Trade and Economic Disputes’ (1984) 4 
Pace Law Review 519. 
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     4.2.1. Arbitration Clause: 
An arbitration clause is a clause stating that disputes or differences which may arise from the 
main contract in the future will be settled by arbitration.11  As mentioned above, this type of 
agreement is in the form of a clause that is one of the terms of the main agreement.  This type of 
clause has flourished and become widespread in international trade in general, and in petroleum 
agreements in particular,12 since the third decade of the twentieth century.13 For example, Article 
40 of the 1925 agreement between Iraq and the IPC contains an arbitration clause referring 
disputes to arbitration.14  
An arbitration clause may be wide in scope, as when the parties agree to refer to the 
arbitration of all disputes which may arise from the contract concluded between them, regardless 
of the nature of the dispute (whether it is legal, financial or technical).  Also this clause may be 
narrow if the parties limit it to a specific dispute.15  Generally, this type of agreement is brief16 
and general, since it cannot contain all the details concerning a dispute which has not yet 
happened.17   
The clause contains the contractual parties’ agreement and the manner in which they should 
behave when disputes arise between them.  The parties are obliged to submit their dispute to 
arbitration.  The clause is considered to make apparent their desire to waive their right to 
litigation before the dispute arises.18  
In the arbitration clause, the parties plan for the risk that a dispute may arise, and give their 
consent based on this possibility.  This issue causes debate in civil law countries, because the 
                                                          
11 Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (Cambridge University 
Press 2008) 17.  
12 The concession agreement between Iran and the D’Arcy Company in 1901 Art 17, the concession agreement 
between Saudi Arabia and Aramco in 1933.  
13 ibid. 
14 The concession agreement between Iraq and IPC in 1925. 
15 Hans van Houtte, ‘Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings’ in Petar Sarcevic (ed), Essays on International Commercial 
Arbitration (Martinus Nijhoff 1989) 122; Oliver Dillenz, ‘Drafting International Commercial Arbitration 
Clauses’ (1997-1998) 21 Suffolk Transnational  Law Review 221.  
16 Arab African Energy Corporation Ltd. v. Olierproducten Nederland BV, [1983] 2 Lloyds’ Rep 419.  
17 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
86. 
18 Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, International Arbitration Law and Practice (2nd edn, Kluwer International Law 
2001) 197. 
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dispute has not yet arisen, and the parties do not know if it will arise or not, so the clause 
expresses their agreement to an undetermined possibility.19  Under Iraqi law arbitration clauses 
can be also drafted by the competent authority.  For example, Article 69 of the “General 
Conditions of Contract for Works of Civil Engineering of Construction”20 stipulates that any 
dispute arising out of the contract or performance of the work should first be referred to the 
engineer, who will give his decision to settle the dispute.21  The engineer’s decision will be 
binding on the parties, but  
If the Employer or the Contractor be dissatisfied with any such decision then and in 
any such case either the Employer or the Contractor may within 30 days after receiving 
notice of such decision require that the matter be referred to a Committee of Arbitration 
to be formed in the following manner.22 
However, Iraqi Civil Law excluded this type of arbitration agreement with regard to 
insurance policies and considered arbitration clauses contained in policy documents to be null 
and void.23   
   4.2.2. Submission Agreements: 
A submission agreement is a supplementary agreement between disputing parties to refer an 
existing dispute to arbitration.  It is concluded between them after the dispute arises.24 
The characteristics of a submission agreement are different from those of an arbitration 
clause.  It is a separate document, and independent of the main contract.  It consists of several 
clauses determining significant elements and matters governing the arbitration process.  It 
identifies the subject matter of the dispute, the applicable law, the costs of the arbitration, 
identity and contact details of the agreed arbitrators and the mechanism for appointing them, the 
                                                          
19 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
87; W. Laurence Craig and others, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2000) 38.  
20 General Conditions for Works of Civil Engineering Construction,  issued by Iraqi Ministry of Planning, Legal 
Department 1973.  The translation from Arabic language to English language is by Mahir Jalili, ‘International 
Arbitration in Iraq’ (1987) 4 Journal of International Arbitration 109. 
21 ibid. 
22 ibid. 
23 Article 985 (4) of Iraqi Civil Law No 40 of 1951,  published in the Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 3015 on 8 
December 1951 243. 
24 Andrew Tweeddale and Keren Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and English Law 
and Practice (Oxford University Press 2007) 98. 
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place of arbitration, the domain of arbitration and other important matters.25 Therefore it is 
usually longer than an arbitration clause.  However, sometimes the submission agreement takes a 
brief form.26  
The question about the parties’ consent is less important than with arbitration clauses 
because the dispute is known and determined.  The parties are dealing with a fact, not just a 
possibility; they have full knowledge and awareness of the dimensions of the dispute and so they 
know what they are agreeing to.  The submission agreement therefore tends to be specific and 
tailored.  
It is important to distinguish between a submission agreement and an arbitration clause.  The 
latter is only considered valid and enforceable if followed by a valid and enforceable submission 
agreement.27  The reason for this may be  that, the as the disputes become more clearly defined 
and the details become clearer, the arbitration clause, as mentioned above, becomes shorter and 
contains fewer details of the arbitration.  Therefore, some legislation stipulates that the parties 
should conclude an agreement that expresses the particular arbitration procedures, even if the 
main contract contains an arbitration clause.28  In any event, this situation has been changing 
recently, and some legislators have abandoned this view.29 
 The difference between the types of arbitration agreement is not a legal difference but rather 
a difference in form.  Both types have the same legal implications.  The Iraqi CCP does not 
                                                          
25 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
86. 
26 W. Laurence Craig et al., International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 
2000) 39. 
27 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
86. 
28  For example, Argentinian law stipulates that parties should conclude a submission agreement in oreder for the 
arbitration clause to be considered valid.  The ICC Rules adopt the same doctrine and do not consider the 
arbitration clause effective unless the submission agreement is submitted by the parties.  Alejandro E Fargosi, 
‘Commercial Arbitration in Argentina’ (1989) 20 University of Miami Inter- America Law Review 687; W. 
Laurence Craig et al., International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2000) 
38; Jean-François Poudret and Sébastien Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration (Sweet & 
Maxwell 2007) 122. 
29 French law changed in 1925.  For more details, see Emmanual Gaillard and John Savage (eds), International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 1999) 191-196.  
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distinguish between the types of arbitration agreement.30 Therefore in this study, the term 
“arbitration agreement” is used to refer to both types of arbitration agreement.   
        4.3. Requirements for the Validity of Petroleum Arbitration Agreements: 
There are several requirements for the petroleum arbitration agreement to be enforceable 
under Iraqi Law.  Without these legal requirements, the arbitration agreement will be considered 
null and void and then the arbitration will not take place at all.  These requirements concern the 
formal aspect of the arbitration agreement, which is that it should be in writing, or concern the 
substantive aspects of the agreement, such as the consent of the parties to the arbitration, the 
capacity of the contractual parties and arbitrability.  Therefore, this section will discuss these 
requirements in two subsections.  The first will discuss the formal requirements and the second 
will discuss the essential requirements.  
     4.3.1. Formal Requirements: 
The foundation of any contract is consent.  The agreement is concluded if there is consent 
between the parties, and without this important element the contract is null.31  However, the 
arbitration agreement is subject to the further formal requirement that it must be embodied in 
writing.32  This requirement is very important for many reasons.  First, the arbitration agreement 
is considered the foundation of the arbitration: it is necessary in order for the arbitration to occur 
and it sets up the arbitration procedures.  Second, it ensures that the parties agree to recourse to 
arbitration instead of submitting their dispute before the national courts, so it serves as a waiver 
of their right to take up their dispute before a national court.33 Third, a written form is needed as 
evidence for the existence of this agreement and its contents.34  
                                                          
30 In this regard, Article 251 CCP. 
31 Article 73 of the Iraqi Civil Law provides that “A contract is the unison of an offer made by contracting party with 
the acceptance of another party in a manner which establishes the effect thereof in the object of the contract”.  
The translation from Arabic language to English language available at < http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes/> 
accessed on 23 March 2014. 
32 Jean-François Poudret and Sébastien Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell 
2007) 148. 
33 J.D.M Lew and S.M Kroll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer International Law 2003) 
Para 7-7, 131. 
34 Toby Landau, ‘The Requirement of a Written Form for an Arbitration Agreement’ in Albert Jan van den Berg 
(ed), International Commercial Arbitration: Important Contemporary Questions (Kluwer Law International 
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However, the importance of the written requirement has been criticized by some authors.  
Kaplan has argued:  
[I]f an arbitration clause is contained within an otherwise binding agreement why 
should it be necessary to be able to point to a signature or to a written record of the 
agreement? Contracts involving millions of dollars are created in this way and it is 
permissible to ask what is so special about the arbitration clause to require it to comply 
with Article 7(2).35   
Herrmann also argues that the requirement for the arbitration agreement to be written is 
obsolete and there should be complete freedom of form.36  That is because such requirements 
may restrict the parties’ freedom, particularly in the scale of international commercial 
transactions, which require rapid action.37  This view was adopted by the UNICTRAL Model 
Law38, which release the arbitration agreement from the requirement to be in written form in 
order to facilitate the commercial transaction in practice. 39  
However, among both supporters and opponents of this requirement there are several 
questions in respect of the writing requirement under Iraqi law, namely: Is an oral agreement 
valid or not? Do modern communication methods like telex, telephone or email qualify to meet 
this requirement? If the arbitration agreement is to be in writing, must it also be signed in order 
to be considered valid, or is the written form alone sufficient to be valid?  
To answer the first question, there is no doubt that the written requirement has great weight 
in national laws.  However, the legal importance of the written requirement varies from country 
to country, and there is no universal or fixed approach to determine the validity of an oral 
agreement.  As a consequence, the answer will vary from country to country.  One could classify 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2003) 43; Emilia Onyema, International Commercial Arbitration and the Arbitrator’s Contract (Routledge 
2010) 17. 
35 Justice Neil Kaplan, ‘The Model Law in Hong Kong- Two Years On’ (1992) 8 Arbitration International 223.  
36 Gerald Herrmann, “The Arbitration Agreement as the Foundation of Arbitration and its Recognition by the 
Courts” the ICC congress series no. 9 (1999)  
37 Alan Uzelac, ‘The Form of the Arbitration Agreement and the Fiction of Written Orality.  How Far Should We 
Go?’ (2001) 8 Croatian. Arbit Y bk 83. 
38 Article 7 (2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985 amendment on 2006 provides that “The arbitration 
agreement shall be in writing”. 
39 Jack Graves, ‘ICA and The Writing Requirement: Following Modern Trends Towards Liberalization or Are We 
Stuck In 1958?’ (2009) 3 Annals FLB - Belgrade Law Review 36; Richard Garnett and Luke Nottage ‘The 2010 
Amendments to the International Arbitration Act: A New Dawn for Australia?’ (2011) 7 Asian International 
Arbitration Journal 29. 
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the national laws in terms of their attitudes to this requirement into three categories. The first 
group provides that the arbitration agreement must be in writing, otherwise it is considered 
null.40 These national laws consider the written nature of the arbitration agreement as a 
requirement of validity, not for its evidentiary function only.41   
The second group of national laws requires the arbitration agreement to be in written form 
only for evidential purposes.42 
The third group of legal systems does not stipulate any particular form of writing.  Such an 
approach is followed by Germany and Denmark.43 An oral arbitration agreement is valid 
according to the German law if the parties stipulate that it is to be so.44  
Iraqi Law follows the second approach.  The Iraqi CCP stipulates in Article 252 that “The 
arbitration agreement may not be proved except by written evidence”.45 Iraqi law does not 
stipulate the specific form of arbitration agreement and gives the parties absolute freedom to 
design its form.  Arbitration agreements under Iraqi law are considered consensual contracts:  
this approach was approved by the Iraqi Court of Cassation which considers that the arbitration 
agreement is a consensual agreement that is evidenced in writing.46 
The UAE has also adapted the second approach of a written requirement.  The Civil 
Procedures Law of 1992, Article 203 (2), declares that the arbitration agreement cannot be 
approved unless it is in written form.  The UAE draft arbitration law of 2008, Article 7 (2), 
requires that the arbitration agreement must be in writing, otherwise it is void.   
                                                          
40 Peter R. Sonderby, ‘Commercial Arbitration: Enforcement of an Agreement to Arbitrate Future Disputes’ (1971-
1972) 5 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure 72. 
41 For example, the Jordanian Arbitration Law No. 31 of 2001 at Article 10 (A) provides that “the arbitration 
agreement must be in written, otherwise it void”. 
42 For instance the UK Arbitration Act of 1996, Section 5 (3) provides: “where parties agree otherwise than in 
writing by reference to terms which are in writing”.  It is clear from this provision that an oral arbitration 
agreement is to be considered in writing as soon as the parties make reference to a clause as already in writing.  
The Netherlands Arbitration Law 1986 also uses the written form for evidence purposes. This Act declares that 
the arbitration agreement shall be confirmed by writing explicitly or inclusively.  Article 1021 of the Netherlands 
Arbitration Act of 1986 provides that “The arbitration agreement must be proven by an instrument in writing. 
For this purpose an instrument in writing which provides for arbitration or which refers to standard conditions 
providing for arbitration is sufficient, provided that this instrument is expressly or impliedly accepted by or on 
behalf of the other party”. 
43 Jur Jorgen Trolle, ‘National Reports: Denmark’ (1980) 28 V YB Comm. Arb 29. 
44 Ottoarndt Glossner, ‘National Reports: Germany’ (1980) 60 YB Comm. Arb 64. 
 
46 The Iraqi Court of Cassation decision No355 on 13 May 1971, published in Judiciary Review (2) third year 158. 
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Chinese law adheres to the first approach, that of a written requirement.  Article 16 of the 
PRC Arbitration Law of 1994 provides that “An arbitration agreement shall include arbitration 
clauses stipulated in the contract and agreements of submission to arbitration that are concluded 
in other written forms before or after disputes arise”.47 The arbitration agreement must be in 
writing otherwise it is considered void.48  
The difference between the pertinent national laws on the significance of the written 
requirement is not the only difficulty.  There are also differences among these legal systems as to 
the manner of meeting this requirement, and the acceptability of modern methods of 
communication, such as telex, e-mails and telegrams.  Article II (2) of the New York 
Convention49 defines the arbitration agreement in writing “[t]he term ‘agreement in writing’ shall 
include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or 
contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams”.  The Convention tries to give a definition of 
the term “agreement in writing” to overcome this obstacle, but this definition remains too narrow 
to cover all the issues related to this requirement, since modern technology is constantly 
developing new methods of communication.50 However, the inflexibility of the New York 
Convention in regard to a definition of written agreement is alleviated by the definition of 
‘writing’ in the UNCITRAL Model Law 1985.  This is broader than the New York Convention 
definition and goes further in respect of modern communication methods.  Article 7 (4) of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law provides for the validity of: 
 The requirement that an arbitration agreement be in writing is met by an electronic 
communication if the information contained therein is acces[-]sible so as to be useable for 
subsequent reference; “electronic communica[-]tion” means any communication that the 
parties make by means of data messages; “data message” means information generated, 
                                                          
47 The English text is available at < http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> 
accessed on 17 of May 2014. 
48 Article 18 of the China Arbitration Law of 1994 provides that “If an arbitration agreement contains no or unclear 
provisions concerning the matters for arbitration or the arbitration commission, the parties may reach a 
supplementary agreement. If no such supplementary agreement can be reached, the arbitration agreement shall 
be null and void”. The English text is available at <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_ 
1383756.htm> accessed on 17 of May 2014. 
49 The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, adopted on 
3 May 1956, entered into force on 7 June 1959, UNTS vol 330, 3.  
50 Andrew Tweeddale and Keren Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and English Law 
and Practice (Oxford University Press 2007) 100. 
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sent, received or stored by electronic, magnetic, optical or similar means, including, but not 
limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.51 
 In spite of Iraq following the strict approach in respect to the written requirement, the CCP 
does not describe the written form, nor does it refer to modern telecommunications.  Article 252 
is devoid of any reference to the written form, and this presents a serious lacuna.  The reason for 
this deficiency is that the CCP was promulgated in 1969, when many modern forms of written 
communication were yet to be discovered.  This provision clearly needs to be updated if Iraq is 
to succeed in attracting more foreign investment.   
With regard to the UAE, Article 203 (2) of the Civil Procedures Law of 1992 does not 
contain any definition of the written form.  However, the UAE Federal Arbitration Draft Law of 
2008 defined the written form in Article 7(2) and refers to modern telecommunications and the 
exchange of letters and email.   
According to Tao, the PRC arbitration law does not provide a clear definition of written 
form and has left the door open in respect of the range of written forms of arbitration 
agreement.52  Article 16, which is enacted to meet the formal requirement, mentions “other 
written form”, but this phrase is not clear.  In any event, Article 11 of PRC Contract Law of 
199953 provides a definition of ‘written form’ and thus it fills the shortcoming in arbitration law. 
It enumerates specific written forms, such as the exchange of letters, email, telex and facsimile.54 
This article mirrors the modern forms of writing and the development of methods of 
communication followed by commercial transactions: it captures any textual means that are used 
by the parties to give a visual expression of the contents of the agreement.   
                                                          
51 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration with amendment as adopted in 2006 according 
to the General Assembly Resolution 40/72 on 11 December of 1985 and the General Assembly Resolution 61/33 on 
4 December of 2006. 
52 Jingzhou Tao, Arbitration Law and Practice in China (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2008) 42; Manjiao Chi, 
‘Is the Chinese Arbitration Act Truly Arbitration-Friendly: Determining the Validity of Arbitration Agreement 
under Chinese Law’ (2008) 4 Asian International Arbitration Journal 104. 
53 Adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress on March 15, 1999 and promulgated by 
Order No. 15 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on March 15, 1999. 
54 The China Contract Law of 1999 Article 11 provides that “A writing means a memorandum of contract, letter or 
electronic message (including telegram, telex, facsimile, electronic data exchange and electronic mail), etc., 
which is capable of expressing its contents in a tangible form”.  The English text is available at < 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/ englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> accessed on 17 of May 2014. 
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It is recommended that Iraqi law should follow the UAE Draft Law of 2008 by mentioning 
the form of the written document.  It is worth mentioning that the DICAL adopted this approach 
and stipulates that the arbitration agreement must be in writing, otherwise the arbitration 
agreement will be invalid.55 
 Many legal systems do not require the arbitration agreement to be signed, so that the 
arbitration agreement meets the requirements simply by being written.  However, the New York 
Convention requires the arbitration agreement to be signed by the parties: Article II (2) contains 
the phrase “signed by the parties”.  Nevertheless, it could be said that this requirement has 
largely disappeared.56 Iraqi law does not require the signature of the parties on arbitration 
agreements that are in the form of a submission agreement.  However, the UAE Federal 
Arbitration Draft of 2008 follows a different approach: it stipulates that the agreement of 
arbitration is ‘written’ if it is signed by the parties.57 Signatures are not necessary in the PRC’s 
arbitration law, where the written arbitration agreement is sufficient to meet the requirement for 
writing.58 
In view of the abovementioned discussion, the author presents the view that Iraq should 
follow the approach of the Chinese Arbitration Law of 1994 by stipulating that the arbitration 
agreement must be in a written form, and that otherwise it will be null and void.  In respect of 
petroleum arbitration agreements, the foundation of petroleum arbitration, without this 
agreement the arbitration will not occur.  It constitutes a map for the contractual parties.  It draws 
up the procedures of arbitration, and contains other important details. Without such a map the 
negotiations may go astray and the parties led into costly and time-wasting subsidiary disputes.  
There is a need for clarity and precision, and these features may be missing from an oral 
agreement, and so the written form is an important requirement in arbitration agreements.  This 
is especially true in cases where the subject matter of the dispute is petroleum.  The latter may 
constitute one of the main national resources of the host state, and the value of capital and 
                                                          
55 Article 4 (1) of Iraqi DICAL. 
56 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
89. 
57 The UAE Federal Arbitration Draft of 2008 Article 7 (2) ; Essam Al- Tamimi (ed), Practitioner’s Guide to 
Arbitration in the Middle East and North Africa (Juris Net LLC and Excelencia FZ 2009) 494.  
58 Frederick Brown and Catherine A. Rogers, ‘The Role of Arbitration in Resolving Transnational Disputes: A 
Survey of Trends in the People’s Republic of China’ (1997) 15 Berkeley Journal of International Law 329.   
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equipment supplied by investors is enormous.  A written arbitration agreement upholds the rights 
of the parties and protects them from the danger of falling into the limbo that may result from an 
oral agreement.  In the interests of clarity, the required written form should be defined by 
adopting the approaches of the UAE Arbitration Draft and the PRC Contract Law.  The modern 
forms and methods of writing should be permissible.   
 The petroleum arbitration agreement, then, must be in written form and must also signed by 
the parties, whether physically or electronically, in order to prove the parties’ consent and to be 
considered as a valid agreement.  In this regard, the Iraqi DICAL recognizes modern modes of 
communication, such as fax and email, and also stipulates that the arbitration agreement should 
be signed by the parties.  The Iraqi draft approach is successful with regard to the written 
requirement.59  
An important issue that arises in regard to the requirement for writing is the applicable law. 
There is a question of which applicable law is to govern the formal requirements and to ensure 
that the arbitration agreement is valid under Iraqi law.  The CCP does not stipulate the law that 
should govern the formal requirements of arbitration agreements, and the law governing the 
formal requirements of a contract is therefore determined by the conflict rules of Iraqi civil law.  
Article 26 of the Iraqi Civil Law No. 40 of 1951 provides that “The form of contracts shall 
conform to the law of the state wherein they have been concluded”.60  And so, for example, if an 
agreement with an Iraqi entity subject to Iraqi civil law was concluded in France, then under the 
Iraqi civil law French law would be applicable.   
The UAE Civil Procedures Law of 1992 does not contain an article regulating the applicable 
law, and neither is it covered in the Draft UAE Arbitration Law of 2008.  However, Article 19 of 
the UAE Civil Law Transaction No.5 of 1985 provides that the formal requirements are either 
subject to the law of the state that is the common domicile of the contractual parties if they have 
the same domicile; or subject to the law of the state on whose territory the contract was 
concluded if the parties have different domiciles, unless the parties agree to apply another law.  
                                                          
59 Article 4 (1) of the Iraqi DICAL.  
60 The translation from Arabic language to English language is available at <http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes/> 
accessed on 23 March 2014. 
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The PRC Arbitration Law does not address the law that will govern the formal requirements of 
arbitration agreements.   
4.3.2. Substantive Requirements: 
The arbitration agreement will be valid substantially and thus enforceable if it is based on 
three foundations: consent, capacity and arbitrability.  The parties to arbitration must give their 
consent, having the legal capacity to do so, the dispute must be one that is capable of being 
settled by arbitration.  These requirements will be discussed in the three following sub-sections.   
4.3.2.1. Consent: 
Consent to arbitration is considered the most significant of the substantive requirements.  It 
is the heart of the arbitration agreement, which is in turn the core of the arbitration process.  Most 
national laws and international conventions stipulate that consent must be in writing, and in some 
legal systems it must be signed in order to be valid. 
  Consent in an arbitration agreement means that the parties have agreed to refer their 
dispute to settlement by arbitration.  It grants the arbitral tribunal the jurisdiction to settle the 
dispute, without which the tribunal can take no action.61 If there is no consent between the 
parties, or if there is misrepresentation or duress, the arbitration agreement will be void, and no 
arbitration will take place.62 Therefore, the parties should show their unequivocal consent to the 
arbitration, as in, for example, Article II (1) of the New York Convention, which requires the 
parties to the dispute to “undertake to submit to arbitration”.   
Schreuer argues that consent is the convergence of the offer issued by one of the parties with 
acceptance from the other party.63 The consent of the parties must be clear and not ambiguous, 
and this must be apparent in the words explaining the parties’ intention to have recourse to 
arbitration and the manner in which it is to be arranged. In other words, the existence of consent 
                                                          
61 Christoph Schreuer, ‘Consent to Arbitration’ [2005] 5 Transnational Dispute Management < URL: 
www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=555> accessed on 30 April 2014; Andrew 
Newcombe and Liuis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law 
International 2009) 44.  
62 W T Major and Christine Taylor, Law of Contract (9th edn, Pearson Education Limited 1996) 5-7. 
63 Christoph Schreuer, ‘Consent to Arbitration’ [2005] 5 Transnational Dispute Management <URL: 
www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=555> accessed on 30 April 2014.  
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depends on the clarity of the way the consent is formulated.  Therefore, any vagueness in 
drafting the parties’ intention can cause problems in determining the consent.  The parties can 
explain their consent in any form or means of communication chosen from the means cited in the 
previous section.  
 By subjecting disputes arising from petroleum agreements to the jurisdiction of other courts or 
institutes, the host state accepts the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the national court. Without 
the host state’s waiver of sovereign immunity in petroleum agreements or its consent to an 
arbitration agreement, it cannot be subjected to the jurisdiction of another state’s courts.  
Therefore, Sullivan argues, consent in arbitration agreement expresses the host state’s implied 
waiver of its sovereignty immunity of jurisdiction.64 
The question arising here is whether the Iraqi state’s consent to petroleum arbitration 
agreements can be considered as a waiver of Iraqi sovereign immunity jurisdiction.  Iraq, like 
many civil law countries, does not regulate sovereignty issues.  This is in contrast to common 
law countries.65 Iraq is also not party to relevant international conventions, such as the ICSID or 
the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property of 2005 
(hereinafter the CJISTP).66 However, the present author’s view is that Iraq waives its sovereign 
immunity impliedly as soon as it consents to arbitration.  This implicit waiver applies across the 
board, and includes petroleum disputes.  The existence of arbitration agreements in main 
petroleum contracts gives evidence that Iraq waives its jurisdiction immunity.  Similarly the 
UAE does not regulate sovereignty issues.  The PRC Civil Procedures Law of 199167 gives the 
jurisdiction to settle foreign-related disputes to an arbitration agency if there is a written 
arbitration agreement.  Article 257 of this law provides that: 
                                                          
64 Gary B. Sullivan, ‘Implicit Waiver of Sovereign Immunity by Consent to Arbitration: Territorial Scope and 
Procedural’ (1983) 18 Texas International Law Journal 329 (comment); Wang Houli, ‘Sovereign Immunity: 
Chinese Views and Practices’ (1987) 1 Journal of Chinese Law 23. 
65 For example the UK promulgated the State Immunity Act 1978 and the USA promulgated the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976. 
66 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property was adopted during the 65th 
plenary meeting of the General Assembly by resolution A/59/38 of 2 December 2004.  In accordance with its 
articles 28 and 33, the Convention shall be open for signature by all States from 17 January 2005 until 17 
January 2007, at United Nations Headquarters in New York. 
67 Adopted at the Fourth Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress and promulgated by Order No. 44 of the 
President of the People’s Republic of China on April 9, 1991. 
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 [I]f the parties have (……….) written arbitration agreement stipulating the 
submission of the dispute for arbitration to an arbitral organ in the People’s Republic of 
China handling cases involving foreign element, or to any other arbitral body, they may 
not bring an action in a people's court.68 
China is one of the states that signed the CJISTP.69    
  4.3.2.2. Capacity: 
The general rule in any contract is that the parties must have the legal capacity to conclude 
the contract; otherwise it is void.  Arbitration agreements are no different from other contracts.  
The consent in an arbitration agreement must issue from parties having full capacity, otherwise 
the arbitration agreement will be considered void.  Therefore the lack of parties’ capacity 
provides a good basis to claim that an arbitration agreement is void and thus recognition and 
enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused.70  The New York Convention of 1958 declared 
that “the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if the parties to the 
arbitration agreement were under incapacity”.71 
In Iraqi law, a natural person72 or a legal person73 can conclude an arbitration agreement if 
she, he or it has the legal capacity.  However, this sub-section will focus on the capacity of the 
Iraqi state and its entities to enter into an arbitration agreement when it is one of the parties to an 
agreement with a foreign petroleum company.   
The capacity of parties with regard to arbitration agreements raises some critical issues, such 
as the manner in which Iraqi law deals with the capacity of the state and its entities in regard to 
petroleum arbitrations, and the law that governs the parties’ capacity to conclude arbitration 
agreements.   
                                                          
68 The English text is available at < http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> 
accessed on 17 of May 2013. 
69 PRC sign this convention in 14 September 2014.  United Nations Treaty Collection < 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=III-13&chapter=3&lang=en> accessed on 12 June 
2014.   
70 Article V (1) of New York Convention 1958.  
71 The New York Convention of 1958 Art V. 1 (a).  
72 The Iraqi civil law determines that the age at which a person has the legal capacity to conclude a contract, whether 
it is a civil or a commercial contract, is 18 years.  Article 106 of Iraqi Civil Law No 40 0f 1951 provides that 
“the age of majority is eighteen years completed”.  The translation from Arabic language to English language is 
available at < http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes/> accessed on 23 March 2014. 
73 Article 47 of Iraqi Civil Law No 40 of 1951. 
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Do the Iraqi State and Its Entities Have the Power to Conclude a Petroleum Arbitration 
Agreement? 
International conventions and national laws have different positions with regard to the 
capacity of the state and its entities to enter into an arbitration agreement.  
At the international level, the Geneva Protocol of 192374 and the Geneva Convention of 
192775 do not contain any article to regulate the states’ capacity to enter into arbitration 
agreements.  However, the European Convention of International Commercial Arbitration 196176 
(hereinafter Euoropean Convention of 1961) declares explicitly that legal persons have the 
capacity to conclude arbitration agreements.  Article 2 (1) provides that ““legal persons of public 
law” have the right to conclude valid arbitration agreements.  This convention affects many 
countries which have incorporated this rule in their national law.77  
On the level of national laws, there is no universal approach in respect of the capacity of the 
state and its entities.  Some countries have a strict position towards the state and its entities.  
They impose rigorous restrictions or prohibit the state and its establishment from concluding 
arbitration agreements.  For example, in a law of 30 November 1986, Libya prohibited recourse 
to arbitration, and the Libyan state and its entities do not have the capacity to enter into 
arbitration agreements, including petroleum arbitration agreements.78 Some other states impose 
restrictions on the capacity of the state and its entities. For example, the Saudi Arabian 
Arbitration Regulation of 198379 restricts the capacity of the state and its agencies by requiring 
the agreement of the President of the Council of Ministries; otherwise the state does not have the 
                                                          
74 The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 signed at Genva on 24 September 1923, LNTS, vol XXVII, 
No. 678 of 1924, 158.  
75 The Geneva Convention for Excution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927, signed at Geneva on 26 September of 
1927, LNTS, vol XCII, 302.  
76 The European Convention 1961 of International Commercial Arbitration, entered into force on 7 January 1964, 
No. 7041, UNTS vol 484, 349. 
77 For instance, Article 177 (2) of the Swiss Private International Law of 1987 provided that “A state, or an 
enterprise held by, or an organization controlled by a state, which is party to an arbitration agreement, cannot 
invoke its own law in order to contest its capacity to arbitrate or the arbitrability of a dispute covered by the 
arbitration agreement”. 
78 Jalal El Ahadab, ‘Arab Arbitration v. International Arbitration? The Case for a Reconciliation’ (2008) 25 Journal 
of International Arbitration 279.   
79 The Saudi Arabia Arbitration Regulation, Article 3, provides that “Government Agencies are not allowed to 
resorted to arbitration for the settlement of their disputes with third parties except after having obtained the 
consent of the President of the Council of Ministers.  This provision may however be amended by resolution of 
the council of Ministers”.   
132 
 
capacity to enter into arbitration agreements.80 In most European countries, and in some Latin 
American countries, such as Chile, the laws recognise the capacity of the state and its entities to 
conclude arbitration agreements without restriction.81  
However, Iraqi law does not refer explicitly to the capacity of the state and its institutions to 
enter into arbitration agreements.  Article 245 of the Iraqi CCP merely provides that the parties 
must have the capacity to enter into an arbitration agreement.  However, this article does not 
refer to the capacity of a legal person or the Iraqi state’s capacity to conclude international 
arbitration agreements.  It also does not make any provision for international arbitration.  The 
Iraqi DICAL also does not contain any article to define the capacity of the parties, particularly 
the capacity of a legal person, although it is concerned with international commercial arbitration.  
It could be inferred from that this draft left the issues to be regulated by the general principles of 
civil law, which explain the categories of legal persons and considers the state to belong to one 
of these categories.  Article 47 of the Iraqi Civil Law provides that “Juristic persons are: a) The 
State”.82  At the same time, the Iraqi legislature has not promulgated any regulation to prohibit 
itself from settling its petroleum disputes by arbitration, nor has it imposed any restriction on 
recourse to arbitration.  Also, practice shows that Iraq has concluded many petroleum 
agreements containing arbitration clauses, such as Article 40 of the petroleum agreement made 
as long ago as 1925 between Iraq and the IPC.83  It could be concluded that Iraq has the capacity 
to conclude petroleum arbitration agreements, even though the Iraqi government rejected the 
submission to arbitration of disputes between Iraq and petroleum companies with the 
promulgation of Act No. 80 of 1961.84   The Iraqi position is that it does not prohibit arbitration, 
but that it does not regard arbitration as the best option for the resolution of such disputes.  So it 
can be argued that the Iraq state or any agency, enterprise, political subdivision or 
                                                          
80 W M Ballantyne, ‘Arbitration in the Gulf States: “Delocalisation”: A Short Comparative Study’ (1985-1986) 1 
Arab Law Quarterly 205. 
81 Rene David, Arbitration in International Trade (Kluwer Law and Taxation 1985) 171. 
82 The translation from Arabic language to English language is available at <http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes/> 
accessed on 23 March 2014. 
83 Article 40 of the petroleum agreement between Iraq and IPC. 
84 The law of determine the investment area of petroleum companies No 80 of 1961 publish in Iraqi Official Gazette, 
Issue 616 on 12 December 1961, 380. 
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instrumentality of the state, does have the sovereign authority to conclude arbitration 
agreements.85  
Like Iraqi law, the UAE Federal Civil Procedures Law does not define what constitutes a 
legal person.  It stipulates that the parties who conclude the arbitration agreement should have 
full capacity,86 but does not state whether the parties have to be natural persons or legal persons.  
However, the UAE Federal Arbitration Draft of 2008 mentions the capacity of a legal person in 
Article 7 (1).  The PRC Arbitration Law of 1994 also provides in Article 2 that “legal persons 
and other organizations that are equal subjects may be arbitrated”.87  
   Which Law Is to Govern the Parties’ Capacity in Petroleum Arbitration 
Agreements?   
The choice of the law which is to govern the authority of the state and its entities is 
important in order to determine whether the state has the capacity to enter into an arbitration 
agreement.  As a general rule in Iraqi law, capacity is subject to personal law.  This means that 
the capacity of contractual parties is governed and determined by their own law.  Article 18 (1) 
of Iraqi Civil Law No. 40 of 1951 provides that “capacity shall be governed by the law of the 
state of which the person (individual) is a national”.88 The law that applies is national law not 
domicile law, meaning that the law of the individuals that rely or a legal entity’s place of 
incorporation on head office will determine the matter. 
                                                          
85 In this regard  see Article 2 (b) of CJISTP of 2005 which provides that “(b) “State” means: 
(i) the State and its various organs of government; 
(ii) constituent units of a federal State or political subdivisions of the State, which are 
entitled to perform acts in the exercise of sovereign authority, and are acting in that capacity; 
(iii) agencies or instrumentalities of the State or other entities, to the extent that they are 
entitled to perform and are actually performing acts in the exercise of sovereign authority of the State; 
(iv) representatives of the State acting in that capacity”.  United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and Their Property was adopted during the 65th plenary meeting of the General Assembly by resolution 
A/59/38 of 2 December 2004.  In accordance with its articles 28 and 33, the Convention shall be open for 
signature by all States from 17 January 2005 until 17 January 2007, at United Nations Headquarters in New 
York. 
86 Article 203 (4) of UAE Civil Procedures Law No 11 of 1992. 
87 The English text is available at < http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> 
accessed on 17 May 2014. 
88 The translation from Arabic language to English language available at < http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes/> 
accessed on 23 March 2014. 
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The question then arises as to whether this principle also applies to the parties’ capacity in 
respect of petroleum arbitration agreements. 
Before answering this question it would be helpful to review first of all the New York 
Convention,89 which addresses the parties’ capacity to conclude arbitration agreements.  This 
convention offers a popular provision concerning the applicable law of capacity.  Article V (1) 
(a) refers to “the law applicable to them” without determining exactly which law should govern 
capacity.  According to Craig, the normal practice is to refer to the personal law, whether that of 
the nationality or the domicile, rather than to the law chosen by the parties.90 This principle has 
gained wide acceptance despite the convention’s failure to determine a universal approach in 
regard to the application of the law of nationality or domicile.91  However, Iraq was not a party to 
the New York Convention, and so it can be argued that Iraq does not need to depend on this 
principle with regard to capacity in petroleum arbitration agreements. 
The UAE Civil Procedures Law No11 of 1992 does not stipulate the law that governs legal 
capacity.  However, Article 11 (1) of the UAE Civil Law No 5 of 1985 provides that the law 
governing the legal capacity is personal law, and thus the parties’ nationality is the decisive 
factor.  This is similar to the Iraqi approach.  
 The PRC’s Arbitration Law of 1994 does not determine which law should govern the 
parties. Likewise, Article 143 of the PRC Civil Code of 1986 does not determine the applicable 
law of the capacity of a legal person; it only determines the applicable law of the natural person.  
However Article 14 of Decree of the President of the People’s Republic of China No. 36 of 
201092 provides that: 
                                                          
89 Similarly, the European Convention adapts this principle in Article 6 (2) which provides “(...) courts of 
Contracting States shall examine the validity of such agreement with reference to the capacity of the parties, 
under the law applicable to them”. 
90 W. Laurence Craig et al., International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 
2000) 44, foot note 3.  
91 For Example, Article 11 (1) of Egyptian Civil Law No 131 of 1948, Article 11 of Libyan civil Law of 1953, and 
Article 33 of Kuwaiti Law to regulate the relationship contain foreign element No 5 of 1961. 
92  The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Laws Applicable to Foreign-related Civil Relations was 
adopted on 28 October 2010 at the 17th session of the Standing Committee of the 11th National People’s 
Congress of the People’s Republic of China, and came into effect on 1 April 2011. 
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Items such as the civil capacity, civil competence, organizational structure and 
shareholder rights, etc. of a juridical person and its branches are governed by the law of 
the place of registration.  
The law of the principal place of business of a juridical person may be applicable where 
such principal place of business is different from the place of registration. The principal 
place of business of a juridical person shall be deemed to be its habitual residence.93 
A review of the New York Convention and the UAE approaches to the applicable law on the 
parties’ capacity suggests that there is consensus that the applicable law will be personal law, and 
dependent on the nationality criterion.  Therefore, returning to the issue of Iraq, it is suggested 
that it should apply Article 18 of its Civil Law, meaning that the issue of capacity will be 
determined by personal law, and that the national law of the parties will be considered in this 
kind of agreement.  
 The personal law as the applicable law has some drawbacks.  However, one of these is that 
a state could use the personal law in a plea to avoid arbitration, on the ground that, under the law 
of nationality, that state’s legislation lacks the legal capacity to conclude an arbitration 
agreement.94  This could cause violation to the principle of good faith, and could also lead to 
instable transactions.95 It is unacceptable that parties who enter into contractual relationships 
freely and who accept the submission of the dispute to arbitration can later defeat this agreement 
by invoking their national law.  Previous knowledge of national laws by contractual parties and 
the good faith principle should prevent the state or its entities from avoiding arbitration 
agreement under the plea of some restrictions contained within its own national laws. Legal 
restrictions have been introduced in some countries96 in order to prevent the parties to arbitration 
agreements from hiding behind their personal legislation. 
                                                          
93 English text is available at < http://cjcl.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/185.full> accessed on 12 June 2014.  
94 Andrew Tweeddale and Keren Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and English Law 
and Practice (Oxford University Press 2007) 130. 
95 H. Van Houtte, The Law of International Trade (Sweet & Maxwell 1995) 389; W. Laurence Craig and others, 
International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2000) 45. 
96 For instance, the Swiss Federal Law on Private International Law of 1987 Article 177 (2) provides that “A 
state.......which is party to an arbitration agreement, cannot invoke its own law in order to contest its capacity to 
arbitrate or the arbitrability of a dispute covered by the arbitration agreement”. 
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To prevent the parties to arbitration agreements from hiding behind their personal 
legislation, some contemporary opinion holds that certain mandatory rules of law and 
international public policy should apply.97  
However, in the present author’s view, capacity should be considered a personal case and it 
should be covered by the personal law of the contractual parties.  It should also follow a 
universal approach in regard to which personal law is the law of nationality or domicile.  Also, if 
we consider the nationality law as a personal law, then that would be the law applicable to the 
parties’ capacity to conclude petroleum arbitration agreements. That is because such law is 
characterized by stability and it is easy to determine it through identifying the state to which the 
party belongs, thus determining the applicable law.  Moreover, one could choose the domicile 
law as a subsidiary choice if the nationality law was not sufficient to determine the applicable 
law, for example, in cases where one of the parties has more than one nationality.   
    4.3.2.3. Arbitrability: 
Arbitrability as a substantive requirement deals with the issue of whether the dispute is 
capable of being settled by arbitration.  In general, the subject matter of an arbitration agreement 
must be capable of being settled by arbitration, otherwise the arbitration agreement would 
became void and thus unenforceable.98  
 In this regard, we should distinguish between the term “scope of arbitration” and the term 
“arbitrability”.  As mentioned above, the arbitrability issue is connected with the validity of 
settling the dispute by arbitration, while the “scope” or “domain” of the arbitration agreement 
deals with the kind of disputes that are covered by the arbitration agreement.  Therefore the 
                                                          
97 Jean-François Poudret and Sébastien Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell 
2007) 187. 
98 Richard C. Reuben, ‘First Options, Consent to the Arbitration, and the Demise of Arbitrability: Restoring Access 
to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions’ (2003) 56 SMU Law Review 819; Loukas A. Mistelis, 
‘Arbitrability- International and Comparative Perspectives. Is Arbitrability a National or an International Law 
Issue?’ in Loukas A. Mistelis and Stavros L. Brekoulakis (eds), Arbitrability: International & Comparative 
Perspectives (Kluwer Law International 2009) 3. 
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parties to an arbitration agreement may contain in that agreement different types of disputes to be 
settled by arbitration, but one of them may be incapable of settlement by arbitration.99  
The arbitrability issue is controlled by different factors, including economic and political 
ones, and it is also impacted by the public policy of the country.100  In other words, if the 
arbitration agreement conflicts with the public policy of the state it will be considered 
inarbitrable and then void as a matter of domestic law.101  Public policy as a notion is of course 
flexible, and differs from country to country and from time to time.102  
   It is recognised that each state has the freedom to determine through its laws and policies 
which issues may or not be settled by arbitration.  International conventions recognise this right 
of the states.  Article II (1) of the New York Convention provides that the subject matter must be 
of a kind “capable of settlement by arbitration”.   
Unsurprisingly, national laws take various approaches to determine the disputes capable of 
being settled by arbitration.  Iraqi law declares that arbitration is not valid except in matters 
which it determines.103  The general rule in Iraqi law in regard to arbitration is that an issue that 
cannot be resolved by settlement, such as crimes, taxes and other matters of public policy, is 
considered inarbitrable.  Article 704 (1) and (2) of the Iraqi Civil Code No. 40 of 1951 sets out 
the scope of settlements in Paragraph (1), which provides that “[T]he subject matter of the 
compromise  must be something against which a consideration may be taken and must be 
                                                          
99 Klaus Peter Berger, ‘Re-examining the Arbitration Agreement: Applicable Law – Consensus or Confusion?’ 
[2006] < htpp://law.queensu.ca/international/globallawprogramms> accessed at 14 November 2011; W. 
Laurence Craig et al, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2000) 
86. 
100 Marna Lourens, ‘The Issue of ‘Arbitrability’ in Context of International Commercial Arbitration (Part1)’ (1999) 
11 South Africa Mercantile Law Journal 363; Ilias Bantekas, ‘The Foundations of Arbitrability in International 
Commercial Arbitration’ (2008) 27 Australian Ybk of Intl L 193. 
101 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfren and Hunter on international Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
124. 
102 Jean-François Poudret and Sébastien Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell 
2007) 292. 
103 Article (254) of Iraqi CCP provided that “Arbitration is only allowed in matters that can be subject to 
reconciliation, and by parties who are entitled to dispose of their rights.  Arbitration may be implemented among 
spouses according to the civil status law and the provisions of the Islamic [Share’a]”. The translation from 
Arabic language to English language is available at < http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes/> accessed on 23 
March 2014. 
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defined if it is something which needs to be received and delivered”.104 It seems from this article 
that arbitration is not permissible in contracts that are free of charge, such as secondment 
contracts and those based on a donation but it is permissible in other contracts, such as insurance 
contracts and mortgage contracts, as long as these do not conflict with public policy.105  
Paragraph (2) of this Article set out the issues that were to be considered inarbitrable by 
stipulating that: 
No composition may be concluded in respect of matters related to the public order 
or morality, but composition is allowable in respect of financial interests which result 
from the personal status or which arise from the commission of an offence.106  
The Iraqi DICAL also provides that the arbitration should not be on issues which may not be 
subject to reconciliation, or which are contrary to public order or related to nationality or 
personal statutes, except for issues involving a financial interest.107   
The UAE law has the same approach, and does not determine explicitly the matters that may 
be resolved by arbitration.  According to Luttrell, it considers inarbitrable matters which cannot 
be resolved by settlement.108  In China, the arbitration law offers more determination in regard to 
disputes capable of being settled by arbitration.  Tao explains that it permits all disputes having a 
commercial nature and extends also to disputes over rights of intellectual property and 
securities.109 However, this law excludes administrative disputes, personal rights disputes, labour 
disputes and agricultural projects.110   
                                                          
104 The translation from Arabic language to English language available at < http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes/> 
accessed on 23 March 2014.  
105 63،روبين راد ،هنراقم هسارد :هتاءارجإو ميكحتلا دقع ماكح لضاف دعسأ 
     [Assad Fadell, The Provisions of Arbitration Agreement and Its Procedures: Comparative Study (Niebuhr 
publications 2011) 63].  
106 The translation from Arabic language to English language available at < http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes/> 
accessed on 24 March 2014. 
107 Article 9 of Iraqi International Commercial Arbitration Draft of 2011. 
108 Sam R. Luttrell, ‘Arbitration in Dubai’ (2009) 12 International Trade and Business Law Review 140. 
109 Jingzhou Tao, Arbitration Law and Practice in China (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2008) 59. 
110 China Arbitration Law 1994 Article 3 (1) and (2)  provides that “The following disputes may not be arbitrated: 
(1) Marital, adoption, guardianship, support and succession disputes;   
(2) administrative disputes that shall be handled by administrative organs as prescribed by law”.  The English text is 
available at < http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> accessed on 17 May 
2014. 
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The arbitrability issue raises important questions in Iraqi law: are petroleum disputes 
capable of being resolved by arbitration?  And which law should govern the question of 
arbitrability?   
Generally, the national laws of petroleum-producing countries differ in regard to whether 
petroleum disputes are capable of being settled by arbitration.  Some countries consider 
petroleum disputes arbitrable,111 but others exclude petroleum disputes from settlement by 
arbitration.112  Iraqi law permits petroleum disputes to be settled by arbitration, although it does 
not determine explicitly whether petroleum disputes are arbitrable. However, many petroleum 
agreements113 concluded with different petroleum companies refer to the settlement by 
arbitration of disputes arising from the agreements.  Moreover, the Iraqi DLOG declares 
explicitly that petroleum disputes may be settled by arbitration.114  
In a landscape of diversity, arbitrability raises the issue of conflict of laws, especially when 
the disputes involve a petroleum agreement. In these cases, the question arises as to which law is 
applicable to arbitrability, and according to which law can the arbitrator or the court determine 
whether or not the dispute is arbitrable; and also which law is applicable under Iraqi law  
Indeed, in order to determine the law that governs arbitrability we should distinguish 
between two cases.  The first case is when the issue of arbitrability arises before the arbitral 
award is rendered, based on the claim of one of the parties that the arbitration agreement is not 
valid because the dispute is inarbitrable.115  The second case is when the arbitrability arises 
before a national court at the stage of recognition and enforcement of the arbitration award.  In 
the first case, arbitrability is considered a substantive requirement and it must be subject to the 
law governing the arbitration agreement.116 This approach is that used by certain international 
                                                          
111 For instance, Libyan Law No. 25 of 1955 and the Iranian Petroleum Law of 1957. 
112  Spanish Petroleum Law of 26 of November 1958 Article 57.  
113 For instance, Article 40 of petroleum agreement of 1925.  
114 Article 39 (c) from the Iraqi DLOG. 
115 Ilias Bantekas, ‘The Foundations of Arbitrability in International Commercial Arbitration’ (2008) 27Australian 
Y bk Intl L193. 
116 This approach can be concluded from the international conventions.  Article IV (2) (a) of the European 
Convention 1961 provides “under the law to which the parties have subjected their arbitration agreement”.  The 
European Convention 1961 of International Commercial Arbitration (enter into force 7 January 1964) 7041 
UNTS vol 484, 349. According to this convention, the law governing arbitrability is the law governing the 
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conventions.  For example, Article IV (2) (a) of the European Convention 1961 provides “under 
the law to which the parties have subjected their arbitration agreement” the law governing 
arbitrability is the law governing the arbitration agreement.   
In the second case, arbitrability is important to the recognition and enforcement of the 
arbitration agreement.  Then, a court dealing with the matter will apply its national law to decide 
whether or not the dispute is capable of being settled by arbitration.117 This principle has been 
adopted by many international conventions. Article 1(b) of the Geneva Convention on 
Arbitration of 1927 provides that “the subject-matter of the award is capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of the country in which the award is sought to be relied upon”.  Also, 
Article V (2) of the New York Convention declares that the arbitral award cannot be enforced if 
“the subject matter of the differences is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of 
that country”.  Moreover, the European Convention of 1961 has the same approach in Article IV 
(2) (b), similarly referring to “the law of the country in which the award is to be made”.   This 
approach was also adopted by the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985 in Article 34.    
The Iraqi CCP does not determine the applicable law of arbitrability.  It could be said that 
Article 25 (1) of the Iraqi Civil Law applies. This Article will be discussed extensively in the 
following section.118  
To sum up, the arbitrability issue is governed by the law governing the arbitration agreement 
and also by the national law of the court which enforces the arbitration award.  International 
conventions do not have a uniform approach with regard to the law that should govern 
arbitrability. They refer to two laws, which may lead to the possibility of inconsistency.  The 
judge applies its national law and the arbitrator applies the law of the arbitration agreement in 
regard to arbitrability, because the arbitrator cannot know in advance which country will enforce 
the award of arbitration.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
arbitration agreement; See Emilia Onyema, International Commercial Arbitration and the Arbitrator’s Contract 
(Routledge 2010) 19. 
117 Andrew Tweeddale and Keren Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and English Law 
and Practice (Oxford University Press 2007) 225.  
118 See page 144 of the following section.   
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4.4. The Applicable Law of Petroleum Arbitration Agreements:  
The petroleum arbitration agreement, like any other arbitration agreement concerning 
investment agreements or commercial transactions, raises issues related to the applicable law.  
But there are also special issues that arise, and these will be discussed here.   
In fact, this issue comes into existence when one of the partys’ claims before the arbitrator 
that the arbitration agreement is not valid on the grounds of the formal requirements, or the 
parties consent and their capacity or the disputes is not arbitrable.  The arbitrator should therefore 
settle these issues on the basis of the law governing the arbitration agreement.119  
Also, the issue of the law governing the arbitration agreement is raised before the national 
court on the occasion of recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award after it has been 
rendered.120  Therefore, for all these possibilities, it is necessary to determine the law governing 
the arbitration agreement in order to determine its validity.   
The present author view is that express choice by the parties of the law governing the 
arbitration agreement is of great advantage in avoiding the difficulties of conflict of laws.  Also, 
if such a choice is made, it will be easy for the arbitrators to know the law that will decide the 
validity of the arbitration agreement and this will save the time and effort for both the parties and 
the arbitral tribunal.  Nevertheless, the parties often do not determine the law that will govern the 
arbitration agreement, especially when the arbitration agreement takes the form of a clause inside 
the main contract.121  The parties prefer to leave this matter to the discretion of the arbitral 
tribunal.  In most cases, when the parties cannot reach an agreement they are more worried about 
the petroleum agreement clauses than the issue of the law governing the arbitration clause.122 In 
case of the parties’ choice, the domestic court or the arbitral tribunal must determine the law that 
                                                          
119 Gary Brian Born, International Commercial Arbitration, vol 1 (Kluwer Law International 2009) 426. 
120 Article V (1) (a) of the New York Convention 1958; Leonardo Graffi, ‘The Law Applicable to the Validity of the 
Arbitration Agreement: A Practitioner’s View’ in Franco Ferrari and Stefan Kröll (eds), Conflict of Laws in 
International Arbitration (European Law Publisher 2011) 22. 
121 Gary Brian Born, International Commercial Arbitration, vol 1 (Kluwer Law International 2009) 428; Hege 
Elisabeth Kjos, Applicable Law in Investor-State Arbitration: The Interplay between National and International 
Law (Oxford University Press 2013) 116. 
122 Carlo Croff, ‘The Applicable Law in an International Commercial Arbitration: Is It Still a Conflict of Laws 
Problem?’ (1982) 16 International Lawyer 613; Bernard Hanotiau ‘The Law Applicable to Arbitrability’ report,  
ICCA Congress Paris, 1999, (no.9) p. 146-167; Jean-François Poudret and  Sébastien Besson, Comparative Law 
of International Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell 2007) 142. 
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governs the arbitration agreement.  This question raises vigorous debates.  Several possibilities 
and presumptions result from this debate that could be applied to the arbitration agreement, 
particularly when the arbitration agreement is autonomous of the main contract.123 In this regard, 
there are significant questions to be answered, such as what is the applicable law that should 
govern the arbitration agreement and how to determine the law that governs the petroleum 
arbitration agreement under Iraqi law.  
To answer the first question, it could be concluded from the international conventions 124 
and national laws125 that there are two laws that can be applied to the arbitration agreement.  The 
first is the law which governs the main agreement and the second is the law of the seat of 
arbitration.   
It seems logical that the law governing the main contract should govern the arbitration 
agreement also.  Since this agreement sometimes has an arbitration clause126 forming part of the 
contents of the main contract, regardless of the principle of severability of the arbitration 
agreement,127 this approach has been supported and adopted by many authors and national 
laws.128  One author states that “The autonomy of the arbitration clause of the principal contract 
does not mean that they are totally independent one from the other”.129 
In addition, this view was adopted by arbitration practice in the ICC Award, Case No. 2626, 
which held that “the law applicable to the main contract also tacitly governs the situation of the 
                                                          
123 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfren and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
166. 
124 Article V (a) of New York Convention 1958 and European Convention 1961 Article VI (2) and also Article 34 
(2) of the Model Law.   
125 Article 178 (2) of Swiss Private International Law of 1987, and Article 458 of Algerian Arbitration Law of 1993.   
126 In this regard see Union of India v McDonnell Douglas Corp [1993] 2 LIoyd’s Rep 48. In this case, the court 
stated that “An Arbitration Clause in a commercial contract like the present one is an agreement inside an 
agreement (…..)The parties may make an express choice of law to govern their commercial bargain and that 
choice may also be made of the law to govern the agreement to arbitrate”. 
127 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfren and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
166. 
128 Likewise, according to the Swiss Private International Law Act 1987, the law applicable to the arbitration 
agreement may be the same law that governs the main contract. Article 178 of this law provides that “As to 
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arbitration clause, in the absence of any specific provisions”.130 Therefore, the law governing the 
main contract may govern the arbitration agreement as a choice when the express choice of the 
parties is absent, even where the arbitration agreement is autonomous of the main contract as 
mentioned above. 
However, in 1952 Professor Sauser Hall, in a report submitted to the Institute of 
International Law, stated that the law of the seat of arbitration should govern the arbitration 
totally, including the arbitration agreement.131 He justified his opinion on the basis of the 
contractual and jurisdictional nature of arbitration.  This leads inevitably to applying the law of 
the state which has the closest connection to the arbitration, which is the state containing the 
venue of the arbitration procedures.132  This point of view was adopted by the Amsterdam 
Resolution of 1957 in Article 11.133 The law of the seat of arbitration as the law applicable to the 
arbitration agreement has been given great weight in arbitration practice, national law and 
international conventions.  In Deutsche Schachtbau v. Shell International Petroleum Co Ltd 134 
the law governing the arbitration agreement was Swiss law, although the arbitral tribunal decided 
to apply general principles of law.135 The law of the seat of arbitration finds wide acceptance in 
private international law, because such law is considered to have the closest connection with the 
arbitration agreement.  This seems obvious from Article V (1) (a) of the New York Convention, 
which gives weight to the law of the seat in cases where the parties do not choose the law 
governing their arbitration agreement.136 Moreover, this approach can be found in Article 18 (1) 
                                                          
130 S. Jarvin and Y. Derains, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 (1990) 316. 
131 Sauser Hall, ‘The Arbitration in Private International Law’ (1952) 1 Yearbook of Institute of International Law 
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132 ibid.  
133 Article (11) of Amsterdam Resolution of 1957 provided that: 
The rules of choice of law in force in the state of the seat of the arbitral tribunal must be followed to settle the law 
applicable to the substance of the difference  
Within the limits of such law, arbitrators shall apply the law chosen by the parties or, in default of any express 
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134 Deutsche Schachtbau v. Shell International Petroleum Co Ltd [1991] 1 A.C. 295. 
135 ibid 310. 
136  Article V (1) (a) of the New York Convention 1958 which provide that “under the law of the country where the 
award was made”.  
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of the ICC Rules of 2012, which provide that “The place of the arbitration shall be fixed by the 
Court unless agreed upon by the parties”.137  
      It seems that the international conventions, in addressing the issue of applicable law, give the 
law of the seat of arbitration great importance by subjecting the arbitration agreement to this law 
if the parties do not choose the law.  It should be noted that the UNCITRAL Model Law 2010 
considered this approach to determine the law which applies to arbitration agreements in Article 
35 (1) “(......) Failing such designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law 
which it determines to be appropriate”.  
Based on this review of the international conventions and national laws, the author’s view is 
that, when the parties cannot reach agreement to determine the law applicable to their arbitration 
agreement, the law that should govern the arbitration agreement should be the law of the main 
contract because it is considered the closest to the parties’ will.  Also, there is a close relationship 
between the arbitration agreement and the main contract, because the aim of the former is to 
settle the dispute arising from the latter.  Moreover, the choice of law of the main contract might 
limit the conflict of law by applying a uniform legal system to govern both contracts instead of 
different laws.  Furthermore, applying this law can avoid the contrast of autonomous arbitration 
agreements in particular.  Some laws do not accept this principle, as will be discussed in the next 
section of this chapter.   
In connection with the second question, it could be said that determining the applicable law 
of petroleum arbitration agreement under Iraqi law raises difficulties.  That is because, like many 
national laws, Iraqi law has been silent on this issue it does not regulate arbitration arising from 
                                                          
137 Article 18 (1) of ICC Rules, 2012; Article VI (2) of European Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration of 1961 which provided that Furthermore, the European Convention of 1961 adopted this basis in 
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       In taking a decision concerning the existence or the validity of an arbitration agreement, courts of 
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parties, under the law applicable to them, and with reference to other questions.  
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petroleum disputes.138  However, the rules of conflict of laws in Civil Law No. 40 of 1951 
address the applicable law of contracts in Article 25 (1), which provides that: 
The contractual obligations shall be governed by the law of the state wherein lies 
the domicile of the contracting parties if they have a common domicile; where they 
have a different domicile the law of the state within which the contract was concluded 
will be applied unless the contracting parties have agreed (otherwise) or where it would 
be revealed from the circumstances that another law was intended to be applied.139 
This article can be applied to arbitration agreements on the grounds that it deals with 
contracts.   
Therefore, as Article 25 (1) indicates, the law applicable to the arbitration agreement may be 
the law chosen by the parties.  This choice may be based on different grounds, such as the 
nationality of one party, the law of his domicile and also the law of the place where the contract 
was performed.  In this case, the Iraqi court has the last word in deciding the validity of this law, 
as long as does not conflict with the mandatory rules of the Iraqi legal system.  Iraqi courts have 
a broad discretion in applying the law chosen by the parties after they have ensured that this law 
does not offend against Iraqi public order rules.140 However, sometimes the parties disagree 
about the applicable law, in which case the court has a broad discretion to decide the law that 
should apply to the arbitration agreement, based on evidence such as the court’s choice of the 
place, or the language of the main agreement.   
Also, Article 25 (1) indicates that the law of common domicile could be applied if the 
parties are domiciled in the same place.  However, this choice raises difficulties.  It is rare, for 
example, for contractual parties in a petroleum transaction to have the same domicile.  Even if it 
should happen that the applicable law will be the national law of both, it is easy for the parties to 
change their domicile and this makes it difficult for the court to determine the domicile and thus 
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the applicable law.  The author’s view is that Iraqi law should depend on the nationality of 
parties rather than their domicile to determine the law applicable to an arbitration agreement.   
The third law that may apply, according to Article 25, is the law of the place of contract. 
Based on this choice, the law of the place which the parties concluded their contract will apply to 
the arbitration agreement.  In this case, if the parties concluded the main contract in Baghdad, 
Iraqi law will apply to the arbitration clauses also. 
In view of the fact that the Iraq Civil Law was enacted in the 1950s, it now needs to be 
reviewed in order to absorb the latest development in the world in regard to conflict of laws and 
the applicable law of commercial agreements. The law should be consistent with modern 
international developments and fit to serve the Iraqi targets in transition. 
The UAE Civil Procedures Law does not offer any provision to show the applicable law of 
arbitration agreements.  However, Article 19 of UAE Civil Transaction Law No5 of 1985 states 
that the applicable law of contract is the personal law of the parties, depending on the domicile 
criterion if the contractual parties have a common domicile. Otherwise, the law of the state 
where the contract was concluded will apply, unless the parties agreed to apply a different law.    
The PRC Arbitration Law does not address the question of the law applicable to the 
arbitration agreement.  However, the Supreme People’s Court has recently addressed the 
applicable law of arbitration agreements.  In its most recent judicial interpretation of 2006, it 
declared that the parties may agree on the law that will govern the arbitration agreement.  If, 
however, the parties cannot agree on the applicable law, the law of the place of arbitration will 
be applicable, or otherwise the law of the place where the court is situated.141 This interpretation 
is compatible with Article V (1) of the New York Convention, to which China is a party, 
although Iraq has not yet become a party. It seems that the PRC law concerning the applicable 
law of the arbitration agreement has been successful, and it is proposed that Iraq should follow 
                                                          
141 Article 16 of The Supreme People’s Court provided that: 
      the law as agreed by the parties shall apply to the examination over the validity of the foreign –related 
arbitration agreement; where the parties concerned have not agreed on the applicable law but have agreed 
on the place of arbitration, the law of the place of arbitration shall apply; and where neither the applicable 
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laws of the place where the court is located shall apply.  
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the Chinese approach, which combines the law of the main agreement as a first choice, with the 
seat of arbitration as a second option, leaving the laws of the place where the court is situated as 
a last option.      
4.5. The Legal Relationship between the Petroleum Agreement and Arbitration 
Agreement:  
The petroleum agreement between the host state and petroleum company, like any other 
agreement, sometimes cannot be performed.  It may be, for example, that the principal contract is 
invalid as a result of the neglect of one of the essential requirements, or it may be that the 
contract is terminated.142  Either of these two cases may constitute a sufficient plea to allow the 
host state to subject the matter to the national courts instead of arbitration, by claiming that the 
arbitration clause is invalid due to the invalidity of the main contract. In such cases, the question 
is whether the host state can legally claim that the arbitration agreement follows the main 
contract’s fate; in other word, does the invalidity extend to cover all clauses of the petroleum 
agreement, including the arbitration clause, or does the arbitration clause remain valid and 
capable of performing its function of settling the disputes between the parties? There is also the 
question of the legal relationship between the arbitration agreement and the petroleum 
agreement: if one of the parties claims that the arbitration clause is invalid, will that have an 
effect on the main underlying contract?   
 The answer to the above question is expressed by the doctrine of separability of the 
arbitration agreement, which prevents the host state from evading arbitration under a plea of the 
invalidity of the main contract.  According to this doctrine, the petroleum arbitration agreement 
is valid even if the main contract is not valid, and vice versa.143  Therefore, based on this 
doctrine, the petroleum arbitration agreement is totally separate and independent from the 
petroleum agreement,144 although it is physically part of the main contract. Therefore the 
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arbitration agreement does not have an accessory relationship.  This doctrine gives the arbitration 
process a new dimension, which is to protect the transaction as a whole and to become binding 
for both parties, which cannot evade it.145 Even if the main contract containing the arbitration 
clause is invalid, this clause will remain valid in order to play its important role in resolving 
disputes.146  It could be described as a weight that tipped the balance in favour of the arbitration 
process: the survival of the arbitration clause means the survival of the arbitration process as a 
whole.   
However, the separability doctrine raises many questions, such as whether this doctrine has 
recognition in international instruments or arbitration laws. If so, what is the position of the Iraqi 
arbitration law in relation to this doctrine? Is the petroleum arbitration agreement independent 
under Iraqi law? And also, what are the legal implications of this doctrine? These questions will 
be discussed in the following sub-sections. 
4.5.1. Is the Separability Doctrine a Universal Approach? 
Recently, the separability doctrine has raised extensive debate among lawyers, especially in 
regard to arbitration clauses that have a physical relationship with the main contract, in contrast 
to submission agreements.147 Some authors148 do not accept the separability doctrine, claiming it 
lacks legal logic or that it is a mere legal fiction.  They believe that there is not a single reason to 
justify the assertion that can the arbitration clause should survive and not share the invalidity of 
the rest of the main contract’s clauses.149 They argue the parties’ obligation to settle the dispute 
by arbitration disappears as soon as the main contract, which is considered the container of this 
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clause, is invalid150 because “Nothing can come from nothing”.151 This saying was used in the 
USA decision Pollux Marine Agencies Inc.v.Louis Dreyfus Corp.152 The court stated that “(......) 
it does seem to the court that something can be severed only from something else that exists. 
How can the court ‘serve’ an arbitration clause from a non-existent charter-party?”153 Sornarajah 
has stated that: “Assuming that the contract is based in the law of the host state and derives its 
external validity from that system, a valid law destroying the contract will have the effect of 
destroying all its clauses”.154 The present author’s view is that the latter arguments would be 
valid if the arbitration clause is considered as an ordinary clause, but the arbitration clause is 
rather a contract in clause form.  It promises to conclude the contract in future by resolving any 
dispute that may arise from the main contract.  The parties’ intention to include this in their main 
contract may also entail that they sometimes choose a law different from that of the the main 
contract, and this law may survive the arbitration clause.  So, how should we interpret the 
parties’ freedom to choose the law that governs this clause if it has a legal status different from 
that of other main contract clauses? 
Some authors155 try to accept this doctrine partially by distinguishing between the contract 
that is void ab initio and the non-existent contract.  According to this opinion, if the main 
contract was void ab initio the arbitration clause would not be affected by the fate of the main 
contract. It will be separable from the main contract but, if the main contract was non-existent, 
the arbitration clause will follow the fate of the main contract and it can be said that it is 
separable from the main contract.  In short, the separability doctrine cannot apply in cases of 
non-existent contracts.156 However, national laws157 and the arbitration rule158 have ignored this 
distinction. 
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However, the separability doctrine found support and justification in the arguments of Judge 
Schwebel, who in 1987, tried to construct a separability doctrine based on four pillars.  The first 
of these is the parties’ intention in deciding to resort to arbitration rather than to a court.159 
Second is the separability doctrine, which prevents the parties from using the invalidity of the 
main agreement as a plea to evade arbitration.  So, this doctrine closes the door in the face of the 
party which attempts this evasion.160  Third, the parties have in fact concluded two agreements 
with different targets. The first agreement is concluded as a commercial transaction and the 
second one is to settle any dispute arising from the first contract; and therefore if the main 
agreement is invalid or has a defect, the second one will survive to play its role and settle the 
dispute.161 Fourth, if the arbitration agreement is not separated, the dispute will be subject to the 
court, contrary to the provisions of the arbitration agreement, which aims to reduce time and 
costs.162  
However, the arguments of Schwebel did not escape criticism.  It has been said that they 
merely describe the result of the separability doctrine, and that they provide a theoretical 
justification without a practical dimension. 163 
In any event, the separability doctrine has taken strong and firm steps towards universality.  
It has gained wide recognition and acceptance by many arbitration laws, either directly164 or 
indirectly,165 and it has also been adopted in arbitration rules.  The doctrine has had great 
influence in practice in regard to petroleum arbitration, for instance, in the three arbitral tribunal 
awards between Libya and foreign petroleum companies, BP v. Libya166, Texaco v. Libya167 and 
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LIMCO v. Libya.168 The arbitration body in these cases applied the separability doctrine and 
confirmed that the arbitration agreements remained effective even after the Libyan government 
terminated the petroleum concessions by nationalisation.169 This doctrine has become a principle 
in international law.  In Elf v. NIOC, 170 the sole arbitrator stated that: “The autonomy of an 
arbitration clause is a principle of international law (…….) adopted by international 
organizations and in treaties.  Also, in many countries, the principle forms part of national 
arbitration law”. 171  
4.5. 2. Is The Petroleum Arbitration Agreement Independent under Iraqi Law?  
Iraqi law does not have a clear answer about the autonomy of the petroleum arbitration 
agreement in relation to the main contract.  There is no article in the CCP that expresses this 
doctrine.  However, it could be said that the separability doctrine finds its legal roots in the Iraqi 
Civil Code No 40 of 1951.  Article 139 provides that:  
Where the part of the contract is void that part only will be void and the remaining 
part of the contract will remain valid and be considered as an independent (separate) 
contract unless it is revealed that the contract would not have been concluded without 
the part which has been voided.172   
 This article provides that if one provision of the main agreement is invalid and the other 
provisions are valid, then the invalid one becomes null and the rest remain valid and effective.  
The invalid one does not affect the contract.  So, the invalid clause is excluded from the main 
contract while the valid ones are treated as an independent contract.173 However, this article 
cannot be applied unless the invalid clause was the motivation behind the conclusion of the main 
contract.174  This approach was confirmed by the Iraqi Supreme Court, which held that “if a 
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party’s acceptance of arbitration is not limited, then arbitration may cover all matters subject of 
the dispute”.175 Therefore, according to the above-mentioned article, the petroleum arbitration 
agreement has a position independent of the main agreement under Iraqi law, even if it is in 
clause form, and it remains valid and effective in cases where the main agreement is invalid.  
The Iraqi DICAL adopts the doctrine of the separability of arbitration agreements, thus reflecting 
the Iraqi desire to be consistent with modern international arbitration laws.176  By way of 
referencing, the UAE Federal Civil Procedures Law No. 11 of 1992 does not express the 
separability doctrine, which may put the arbitration clause in a critical position if one of the 
parties invokes the invalidity of the main contract which contains such a clause.177 However, in 
recent years, the UAE courts have tended to recognise the separability doctrine.178  The Draft of 
the Federal Arbitration Law 2008 recognises this doctrine explicitly in Article 16 (1).179  
In regard to the position of China’s Arbitration Law of 1994 on the separability doctrine, 
Article 19 provides that: “An arbitration agreement shall exist independently. The amendment, 
rescission, termination or invalidity of a contract shall not affect the validity of the arbitration 
agreement. The arbitration tribunal shall have the power to affirm the validity of a contract”.180  
This doctrine is also to be found in China’s contract law of 1999, which in Article 57 provides 
that “If a contract is null and void, revoked or terminated, it shall not affect the validity of the 
dispute settlement clause which independently exists in the contract”.  However, China 
recognised the doctrine before the Arbitration Law 1994, when it signed the Vienna Convention 
on the International Sale of Goods.181 This convention provides in Article 81 (1) that “Avoidance 
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does not affect any provision of the contract for the settlement of disputes or any other provision 
of the contract governing the rights and obligations of the parties consequent upon the avoidance 
of the contract”.182  
To sum up, the petroleum arbitration agreement is separable from the main contract under 
Iraqi law.  So, it is immune from any litigation that considers it null or void because the main 
contract is null.  Thus, petroleum arbitration agreements are distinguished from other agreements 
and clauses.  The separability doctrine gives petroleum arbitration agreements a special 
character.    
  Iraq needs to include this doctrine in its petroleum arbitration because of its theoretical and 
practical importance for the country, and because it will play a significant role in attracting 
investment. Investors will then feel reassured that the arbitration process will be effective and the 
arbitration agreement will remain valid even if the petroleum agreement is void. The type of 
arbitration is one of the most important considerations for foreign investors.  
4.5.3. Legal Implications of the Separability Doctrine: 
 The separability of the arbitration agreement from the primary agreement has important 
positive implications, particularly with regard to the enhancement of the arbitration process and 
the enforcement of the arbitration agreement. 
Firstly, the petroleum arbitration agreement does not share the fate of the main contract and 
so remains valid and effective even if the main agreement is void, regardless of whether this 
agreement takes the form of an arbitration clause or a submission agreement.  This doctrine can 
be considered as the legal foundation for the survival of the arbitration agreement.183 However, it 
is worth mentioning that to apply the separability doctrine and that the arbitration agreement 
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should be valid that means there is no lack of essential requirements, but if the lack of main 
agreement affect on the arbitration clause in this case cannot apply this doctrine.   
Secondly, the law governing the petroleum arbitration agreement may be different from the 
law governing the main contract.184  The parties have the freedom to choose the law that governs 
their petroleum arbitration agreement, which is not necessarily the same law as the one that 
governs the primary agreement.185 
Finally, the separability doctrine enhances and protects the competence-competence 
principle which gives the arbitral tribunal the power to determine on its own jurisdiction, 
whether or not the main agreement which concluded the arbitration agreement is valid.186  The 
separability doctrine is different from the competence-competence principle. The latter means 
that the arbitrators have the power to settle the dispute even when the primary agreement which 
concluded the arbitration clause is invalid,187 while the former decrees that the arbitration 
agreement is still valid even if the main agreement is void, so that these principles have different 
domains.  However, they are frequently linked, because they have a common target, that of 
preventing judicial interference from hindering the arbitration process.188  
 
 
 
                                                          
184 Edward Brunet et al., Arbitration Law in America: A Critical Assessment (Cambridge University Press 2006) 
260. 
185 Edward Brunet et al., Arbitration Law in America: A Critical Assessment (Cambridge University Press 2006) 
260; James H. Carter and John Fellas, International Commercial Arbitration in New York (Oxford University Press 
2010) 15. 
186 Mahmood Bagheri, International Contracts and National Economic Regulation: Dispute Resolution through 
International Commercial Arbitration (Studies in Comparative Corporate & Financial Law) (Kluwer 
International Law 2000) 131. 
187 Richard C. Reuben, ‘First Options, Consent to the Arbitration, and the Demise of Arbitrability: Restoring Access 
to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions’ (2003) 56 SMU Law Review 819. 
188 John J. Barcelo, ‘Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and Competence- Competence in 
Transnational Perspective’ (2003) 36 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1115. 
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4.6. Conclusion: 
The aims of this chapter were to address and examine the petroleum arbitration agreement, 
particularly with regard to Iraqi law.  Such agreements lie at the heart of the arbitration process 
and without them petroleum arbitration could scarcely exist.  Generally, it was noted that Iraq 
has no arbitration law; it therefore relied on the Civil Procedure Law and the Civil Law to 
regulate arbitration agreements.  In general, the CCP has regulated several issues and left other 
important issues related to this agreement to the Civil Law. The reasons for the inability of the 
law to regulate these issues have been diagnosed: it was seen that Iraqi law has not addressed 
international arbitration, and furthermore the relevant laws were out of date, and inconsistent 
with international standards and unsuited to the task of encouraging the foreign investment in the 
petroleum sector.  Therefore, the current laws for regulating petroleum arbitration agreements 
cannot be relied upon.    
Although DICAL attempted to design provisions for regulating international commercial 
arbitration in a manner consistent with modern arbitration laws, the draft contained no articles 
addressing important issues such as the applicable law of arbitration agreements and the 
applicable law of formal requirements. Furthermore it did not refer to the capacity of both 
parties, leaving that matter to the provisions in the CCP Law and Civil Law.    
To ensure it is enforceable, an arbitration agreement should fulfil several requirements, 
classified into two types and known as formal and essential requirements.  Iraqi law considers 
the written requirement to have an evidential purpose.  The author’s view is that petroleum 
arbitration agreements must be in writing because of their subject matter, petroleum, which 
represents a critical amount of the national wealth of the host state and large capital investment 
and technological equipment provided by foreign companies, all of which could be lost to the 
parties through litigation.  Consent, however, should come from both parties.  Consent is also 
considered as a waiver by the host state of its sovereign immunity jurisdiction.  The parties in a 
petroleum agreement are the host state or its entities and a foreign company.  There is no 
restriction on the capacity of the Iraqi state and its entities to prevent or prohibit them from 
entering into a petroleum arbitration agreement.  
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 However, in Iraqi, it is not clear what law should govern the issue of capacity in the 
arbitration agreement. The author suggests that the applicable law in regard to the arbitration of 
petroleum agreements is personal law, depending on the nationality of the party, which ensures 
greater stability than domicile law.  The last essential requirement is that the petroleum dispute 
should be arbitrable under Iraqi law, and in this regard Iraqi law has not determined whether or 
not the petroleum agreement is capable of being settled by arbitration.  However, practice 
suggests that Iraq considers that petroleum disputes can be resolved by arbitration.   
The applicable law on arbitration agreements can be found in the form of general principles 
in Iraqi civil law.   The petroleum arbitration agreement has an autonomous position in relation 
to the petroleum agreement.  It is separate and distinct from the primary agreement, which means 
that this clause does not affect the main agreement’s invalidity and vice versa.  Iraqi law has not 
invoked this doctrine explicitly, although it could be concluded that it is affirmed in Article 139 
of the Iraqi Civil Law No. 40 of 1951.  The author suggests that Iraqi law should adopt this 
doctrine explicitly in regard to petroleum arbitration.  Such an action would encourage foreign 
investment in the petroleum sector, where arbitration as a means to solve the dispute could be 
effective, even in cases where the main agreement was invalid. 
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  Chapter Five:  The Law Applicable to Petroleum Arbitration Procedures 
and Substantive Issues 
5.1 Introduction: 
The parties have the freedom to choose where the arbitration process takes place and they 
are also free either to choose the law of the place where the arbitration is held or to opt for a 
different legal system.  The laws of the place of arbitration and its influence on proceedings can 
give rise to acrimonious debate.  There are two theories involving this issue.  One of them 
deprives the laws of the place of arbitration of any influence by removing the procedures from 
the control and supervision of those laws and delocalizing the arbitration process.  The other 
theory gives greater significance to the place where the arbitration is held by conducting it under 
the control and supervision of the domestic courts.  This division of opinion impacts on arbitral 
tribunal awards for which there is no universally accepted standard.   
Determination of the legal system under which the arbitration takes place is important 
because it is that system which governs some very important issues, such as conduct of the 
arbitration process, its form and substance, its accessibility and the validity of the arbitration.  
The autonomy of the parties involved is given priority and under Iraqi law they have the 
opportunity to choose the law which determines all these issues in accordance with the relevant 
international conventions and existing laws: if they do not do so then that task falls to the 
arbitrators.    
The applicable law of arbitration is considered to be a critical issue as it involves serious 
multi-dimensional challenges for both contractual parties.  It has practical and economical as 
well as legal dimensions.  Arbitration is no longer a process by which the arbitrator seeks only 
what is equitable; there is also the question of which laws are to govern the arbitration process as 
a whole.  The task facing the arbitral tribunal is made more difficult when the contending parties 
disagree on the issue of applicable law, especially when there is uncertainty as to which law 
should govern the arbitration process.  Arbitral tribunals then have to confront competing claims 
as to which law should govern their procedures and which law should determine the rights and 
duties of the parties involved.  Petroleum arbitration raises two questions with regard to 
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applicable law.  These are: which law governs the petroleum arbitration procedures and which 
law governs the substantive issues arising from the petroleum agreement under Iraqi Law? 
The controversy becomes more intense when the subject of debate is the law applicable to 
petroleum agreements.  Determining the applicable law in this case is not limited to its legal 
aspects but can also draw in a struggle between the economic and political interests of each party 
when, as mentioned above, each mistrusts the other’s legal system.  The host state has an 
inherent concern that petroleum companies’ states laws were designed to serve those companies’ 
interests in situations where the host state has much to venture and much to lose.  On the other 
hand, the petroleum companies may regard the legal institutions of the host state as immature 
and unfit for the purpose of governing such complex and high value agreements.  Choosing laws 
to govern these agreements is not therefore a matter of theoretical preference; various legal and 
economic consequences arise from the choice made, and these will be taken into consideration 
by the parties who determine the law.  Some of the attempts to find appropriate laws involve 
removing these agreements from the domain of national law and applying international law.  
Others theorists would subject petroleum agreements to systems removed from both national and 
international law, such as general principles are a sources of international of law, transnational 
law or lex contractus; while still others try to subject these agreements to national law.  The 
latter theory is widely accepted by international organizations.  It is supported by OPEC and the 
United Nations.  Controversy over the law applicable to petroleum agreements has practical as 
well as theoretical significance in the determination of arbitral tribunal awards, which are made 
without employing any universal standard of applicability.  Most of these awards apply 
international law on the grounds that the national law is unsuitable for governing such 
transactions in the modern world.  
This chapter seeks to establish if the current provisions regarding law applicable of 
petroleum arbitration adequate to deal with petroleum disputes or it is need to update and 
modernize them.  Therefore, the following section is dedicated to examining the law governing 
general arbitration procedures under Iraqi law, UAE Law and PRC Law.  It is also reviewing the 
important theories and approaches to arbitral awards and their place in Iraqi law, UAE and PRC. 
Section three is devoted to examining the laws applicable to petroleum agreements in Iraq, UAE 
and PRC while section four contain represent important conclusions of this chapter.   
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       5.2. Procedural Law in Arbitration:  
Neutrality is the most important characteristic of arbitration between parties in a dispute and 
it may be sought in different ways, for example, by choosing arbitrators of different nationalities, 
or by choosing locations for the proceedings in countries other than those of the parties to the 
dispute.  The country which is chosen as a location should be unconnected to the parties by way 
of residency, nationality or business.1  As a result, the parties’ endeavours to achieve neutrality 
may lead to diversity with regard to the applicable laws.  The important issue arising here is the 
choice of the law which will govern the arbitration procedures.  This will differ from the 
substantive law, which was discussed in Section Three of this chapter.  The former law governs 
the arbitration procedures while the latter deals with the merits of disputes.2 It was believed for a 
long period that the law governing substantive issues applied also to arbitration proceedings, so 
that the applicable law of arbitration procedures was considered to present a serious problem of 
conflicting laws.3 However, this view has changed and the law governing arbitration procedures 
is no longer held to be necessarily the same as the law governing the substantive issues.4  
It is important to distinguish between the lex arbitri and procedural law.  The lex arbitri 
offer the legal mandatory rules for the settlement of disputes between parties by arbitration.5  The 
lex arbitri regulate various issues concerning control and validity of the arbitration process.6 It 
may also extend to other matters, such as determining whether the dispute is capable of 
settlement by arbitration, the formation of the arbitral tribunal through the appointment or 
replacement of arbitrators, defining the arbitrators’ powers, deciding the interim measures, 
ensuring the equality of the parties and their freedom to determine certain procedural rules, 
providing the assistance of judicial power if needed, hearing the claims and counter-claims of the 
                                                          
1 Christopher Dugan et al., Investor-State Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2008) 92. 
2 Roy Goode, Goode on Commercial Law (Ewan McKendrick ed, 4th edn, Penguin Books 2010) 1341. 
3 Vitek Danilowicz, ‘The Choice of Applicable Law in International Arbitration’ (1985- 1986) 9 Hasting 
International and Compartive Law Review 235. 
4 The first recognition of the autonomous lex arbitri was in Sumitomo Heavv lndustry v Oil and Natural Gas 
Commission [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 45. 
5 Andrew Tweeddale and Keren Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes:  International and English Law 
and Practice (Oxford University Press 2007) 233. 
6 Simon Greenberg, Christopher Kee and Romesh Weeramantry, International Commercial Arbitration: An Asia –
Pacific Perspective (Cambridge University Press 2011) 60. 
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parties, overseeing the methods used by parties to present their disputes and the form and validity 
of  the arbitration award.7 
The lex arbitri issues which are regulated differ from one country to another and from one 
arbitration to another, depending on the parties’ willingness to be bound by a set of applicable 
rules.8 It may be said that despite a significant body of literature devoted to the study of lex 
arbitri there is no commonly accepted approach for determining the issues involved.9  Procedural 
law set out the rule that how arbitration is conducted and equal treatment.10 Some authors try 
explaining the differences between lex arbitri and procedural law “is to consider the lex arbitri as 
governing matters external to the arbitration and the procedural law as governing matters internal 
to the arbitration procedure (but excluding substantive issues).”11 
The applicability of lex arbitri is not of merely theoretical importance.  It has vitally 
important practical implications.  As mentioned previously, this form of law offers the parties to 
the dispute and the arbitrators’ mandatory provisions in regard to procedural rules for the tribunal 
and may assist in deciding its constitution, the place of arbitration and the law applicable to the 
arbitration procedures.12 The question of the applicable law confronts the arbitrator, and may 
also confront the judge when the court has recognises and enforces the arbitral award.  The 
award may be the subject of an appeal by one of the parties on the grounds that the arbitral award 
is invalid because the arbitral tribunal was not constituted according to the applicable law of lex 
arbitri or because the award was given in accordance with procedures which were incompatible 
                                                          
7 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
177; P D Ehrenhaft, ‘Effective International Commercial Arbitration’ (1977) 9 Law and Policy in International 
Business 1191. 
8 Joseph F. Morrissey and Jack M. Graves, International Sales Law and Arbitration: Problems, Cases and 
Commentary (Kluwer International Law 2008) 333. 
9 Gabriel M. Wilner, ‘Determining the Law Governing Performance in International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Comparative Study’ (1965) 19 Rutgers Law Review 646; Alain Hirsch, ‘The Place of Arbitration and the Lex 
Arbitri’ (1979) 34 Arbitration Jurnal 44; Smedresman, ‘Conflict of Laws in International Commercial 
Arbitration: A Survey of Resent Development’  (1977) 7 California Western International Law Journal 263. 
10 Simon Greenberg, Hristopher Kee and J. Romesh Weeramantry, International Commercial Arbitration: An Asia-
Pacific Perspective (Cambridge University Press 2011) 59. 
11 ibid. 
12 Article 1493 of the French Civil Code provides that: 
     If difficulties arise in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal in an arbitration which takes place in France 
or which the parties have agreed shall be governed by French procedural law, the most diligent party 
may, in the absence of a clause to the contrary, apply to the Precedent of the Tribunal de Grande Instance 
of Paris.  
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with the applicable law of lex arbitri.  Hence, determining the law applicable to lex arbitri plays 
an important part in instruments of international law as well as in academic debates.   
5.2.1. The Methods for Determining the Applicable Law of Petroleum Arbitration 
Procedures, the Lex Arbitri: 
The methods for determining the applicable law of petroleum arbitration procedures have 
been addressed largely by international conventions13 and their formulations have developed 
significantly.  These developments can be classified into three stages.  The first stage allowed the 
parties to choose the lex arbitri and the seat of arbitration.  This approach was embodied in the 
Geneva Protocol of 192314 and the Geneva Convention of 1927.15  Article 2 of the 1923 Geneva 
Protocol of Arbitration provided that “The arbitral procedure, including the constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal, shall be governed by the will of the parties and by the law of the country in 
whose territory the arbitration takes place”.  It appears that this Article did not explain clearly 
which law should apply mainly and which should be secondary, that is, should the law chosen by 
the parties apply mainly and the law of the country in which the arbitration takes place apply in a 
secondary way.  This ambiguity in the text of Article 2 gave rise to debates over its 
interpretation.  This debate continued even after the Geneva Convention 1927 came into force, 
since the latter did not address the question of the applicable law of arbitration but instead 
referred back to the Geneva Protocol 1923.16   
The second stage, clearer and more coherent than the first, allowed the parties to choose 
which law should be given priority and for the law of the seat of arbitration to be applied 
secondarily.  This was the principle adopted by the New York Convention of 1958,17 which 
provided in Article V (d) that: “The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure 
                                                          
13 Starting with the Geneva Protocol of Arbitration 1923, and followed by the Geneva Convention 1927, the New 
York Convention 1958, the European Convention of International Commercial Arbitration 1961, the ICSID 
Convention or Washington Convention 1965. 
14 The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 signed at Genva on 24 September 1923, LNTS, vol XXVII, 
No. 678 of 1924, 158.   
15 The Geneva Convention for Excution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927, signed at Geneva on 26 September of 
1927, LNTS, vol XCII, 302.  
16 Horacio A. Grigera Naón, Choice-Of- Law Problems in International Commercial Arbitration (J. C. B. Mohr 
1992) 272. 
17 The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, adopted on 
3 May 1956, entered into force on 7 June 1959, UNTS vol 330, 3.   
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was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in 
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place.” 
Unambiguously, the New York Convention provided that the arbitration proceedings must 
be consistent with the parties’ agreement and if the latter could not reach agreement about the 
procedural law the law of the arbitration seat would apply.  The third stage is represented by the 
European Convention of 196118 and the ICSID Convention 1965.19  These conventions are 
similar to those mentioned above insofar as they grant the parties autonomy in choosing the 
applicable law of arbitration procedure but take a different approach in cases where the parties 
fail to reach agreement in determining the law governing those procedures.  For example Article 
IX (d) of the European Convention of 1961, provides that:  
1. The setting aside in a Contracting State of an arbitral award covered by this 
Convention shall only constitute a ground for the refusal of recognition or enforcement 
in another Contracting State where such setting aside took place in a State in which, or 
under the law of which, the award has been made and for one of the following reasons: 
 
(d) the composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accor- 
dance with the agreement of the parties, or failing such agreement, with the provisions 
of Article IV of this Convention. 
This convention apparently gives the parties freedom and autonomy in choosing the law 
applicable to arbitration procedures.  However, the law applicable when the parties fail to reach 
agreement about the law governing their arbitration procedures is addressed in Article IV.  Its 
provisions are designed for cases where agreement over the choice of applicable law is absent.  
1. The parties to an arbitration agreement shall be free to submit their disputes:  (a) to 
a permanent arbitral institution; in this case, the arbitration proceedings shall be held in 
conformity with the rules of the said institution; (b) to an ad hoc arbitral procedure; in this 
case, they shall be free inter alia (iii) to lay down the procedure to be followed by the 
arbitrators. 
                                                          
18 The European Convention 1961 of International Commercial Arbitration, entered into force on 7 January 1964, 
No. 7041, UNTS vol 484, 349. 
19 According to Washington Convention the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes was   
established in 1965 to settle the disputes between the states and nationals from other states.  It is known as ICSID 
Convention or Washington Convention.  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States, adopted on 18 March 1965, enterd into force on 14 October 1966, UNTS, vol 575, 
159. 
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3. Where the parties have agreed to submit any disputes to an ad hoc arbitration by one 
or more arbitrators and the arbitration agreement contains no indication regarding the 
organization of the arbitration, as mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article, the necessary 
steps shall be taken by the arbitrator(s) 
4. When seized of a request the President or the Special Committee shall be entitled  
as need be: (d) to establish directly or by reference to the rules and statutes of a 
permanent arbitral institution the rules of procedure to be followed by the arbitrator(s),20 
The selected paragraphs from Article IV of the European Convention, 1961, apparently 
distinguish between the law applicable to the arbitration procedures when the parties chose the 
institutional arbitration and the law in ad hoc arbitration.  In the former case, the arbitration is 
conducted according to the rules of the institution which is chosen by the parties to settle their 
disputes, while in the latter, the arbitrators are empowered to choose the applicable law or, in 
cases where the arbitrators do not do so, “the President or the Special Committee” chooses the 
arbitral law to be applied.   
The approach of the ICSID Convention to the applicable law of arbitration proceedings is 
embodied in Article 44, which provides that: 
Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of 
this Section and, except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the Arbitration 
Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to arbitration. If any question 
of procedure arises which is not covered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or any 
rules agreed by the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the question.21 
It could be concluded that the above article is designed to prescribe methods to be followed 
in choosing the applicable law in arbitration proceedings.22 According to Article 44 of the ICSID 
Convention, there are four ways to determine the applicable law: firstly, by applying the 
convention’s provisions, except in cases where the parties agree otherwise; secondly, by the 
agreement of the parties involved; thirdly, if the parties cannot reach agreement, the ICSID 
Center Arbitration Rules as they stand at the time of the parties assent to arbitration will be 
                                                          
20 The European Convention 1961 of International Commercial Arbitration, entered into force on 7 January 1964, 
No. 7041, UNTS vol 484, 349. 
21  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, adopted on 
18 March 1965, enterd into force on 14 October 1966, UNTS, vol 575, 159. 
22 Thomas V. Firth, ‘The Law Governing Contract in Arbitration under the World Bank Convention’ (1968) 1 New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics 253. 
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applied.  Finally, the arbitral tribunal is empowered to decide on all procedural questions not 
covered by the provisions of the convention.    
It can be concluded from the above that the lex arbitri can be determined either by parties to 
the dispute or by arbitrators, or, by dint of failure to reach agreement or simply by preference, the 
matter may be left to the discretion of the arbitral tribunal.  
5.2.1.1. By Parties: 
Allowing the parties to choose the law governing their arbitration procedures was the first 
measure to be widely welcomed and it was accepted by international instruments23 and by 
national law.24 It facilitates the arbitrator’s task by precluding conflict and offering pragmatic 
choices for the legal governance of arbitration procedures, based on the wishes and the consent 
of the parties involved.25  The latter can determine the legal procedure provided by the arbitration 
agreement before or after the disputes arise.26 The parties can determine the applicable law either 
explicitly or implicitly.  The explicit choice will normally be included in the arbitration 
agreement as a written term or alternatively may be agreed orally before the arbitral tribunal.  
The implied choice may be indicated by acts or words which make the intentions of the parties 
clear to the arbitrators through the vocabulary which is used and the facts which are presented 
and these will be relied on as evidence of the parties’ intentions.27 For example, the arbitrators 
may feel entitled to conclude from references made to the place of arbitration chosen by the 
                                                          
  23 See the previously pages; See also Article 19 (1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law “Subject to the provisions of 
this Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the 
proceedings”. 
24 Article 182 (1) of the Swiss Private International Law of 1987, Article 1039 of the Netherlands Code of Civil 
Procedure of 1986 and Article 25 of Egyptian Arbitration Law No. 27 for 1994. 
25 Tibor Varady, John J. Barcelo III and Arthur T. Von Mehren, International Commercial Arbitration: A 
Transnational Perspective (4th edn, West, Thomson Reuters 2009)  
26 Article 3 (2) of Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations of 1980 provided that: 
      The parties may at any time agree to subject the contract to a law other than that which previously 
governed it, whether as a result of an earlier choice under this Article or of other provisions of this 
Convention. Any variation by the parties of the law to be applied made after the conclusion of the 
contract shall not prejudice its formal validity under Article 9 or adversely affect the rights of third 
parties. 
 This convention was opened to signature on 19 June 1980 and it came into force on 1 April 1991.  
27 John Collier and Vaughan Lowe, The Settlement Of Disputes In International Law: Institutions and Procedures 
(Oxford University Press 1999) 240-241; Julian D. M Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis and Stefan M. Kroll, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer International Law 2003) 415. 
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parties that the latter intend to accept the arbitration procedures of that place.28 However, to draw 
conclusions regarding the applicable law from the parties’ intentions may create major 
difficulties for the arbitrators because of disagreement between the parties with regard to the 
applicable law.29  
The Iraqi CCP30 recognises the parties’ autonomy in determining the law that will govern 
the arbitration procedures.  According to Article 265 (1), the parties have freedom to choose the 
law which will govern the arbitration procedures.  They can conduct the arbitration under Iraqi 
law or they can reject it by subjecting their arbitration procedures to some other body of national 
law.  Alternatively they may choose the UNCITRAL Model Law31 or combine the laws of more 
than one legal system.32 This freedom, however, is not absolute.  Certain rules are compulsory 
and the parties are not permitted to formulate rules which are in contradiction of public policy.  
They are restricted by Iraqi mandatory rules which are the rules of the seat of arbitration.33 
Article 39 (D) 1 of Iraqi DLOG determines the procedural law.  It is suggested that the parties 
follow “the Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings of Paris, Geneva or Cairo for the 
Settlement of Disputes between States and Nationals of other States and based on the Iraqi 
Law.”34  It seems from this that the parties are restricted to three options of law, while Article 
265 (1) of the Iraqi CCP does not restrict the parties gives them the freedom to choose any law 
                                                          
28 In case of Union of India v McDonnell Douglas the Judge Saville stated that:  
      If the parties do not make choice of procedural law to govern their arbitration, then the court will consider 
whether they have made an implicit choice.  In this circumstance the fact that the parties have agreed to a 
place for the arbitration is a very strong pointer that implicitly they must have chosen the law of that place 
to govern the procedures of the arbitration. 
 Union of India v McDonnell Douglas, [1993] 2 LIoyd’s Rep 48, 50. 
29 Julian D. M Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis and Stefan M. Kroll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer International Law 2003) 415. 
30 Iraqi Civil Procedures Law No. 83 of 1969 published in the Iraqi Official Gazette vol 2 of 1969, 477. 
31 The UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985 provides that: 
 Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may, subject to the provisions of this Law, conduct the arbitration 
in such manner as it considers appropriate. The power conferred upon the arbitral tribunal includes the power to 
determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence.  
32 Article 265 (1) of Iraqi CCP provides that “The arbitrators shall abide by the rules and procedures stipulated in the 
Civil Actions Law, unless the arbitrators were expressly exempted from that in the arbitration agreement, or any 
other subsequent agreement, or a particular procedural process was put down for the arbitrators’ task”.  The 
translation from Arabic language to English language is available at < http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes/> 
accessed on 26 March 2014.  
33 Article 265 (2) of the Iraqi CCP. 
34 This translation from Arabic language to English Language by Council Of Ministers Oil and Energy Committee 
the whole text is available  at <http://www.krg.org/uploads/documents/Draft%20Iraq > accessed on 10 April 
2014.  
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unless it against the Iraqi mandatory law.35  It is suggested that the Article 265 (1) can be apply 
on petroleum arbitration which enhance the parties autonomy principles so, the parties have 
autonomy to decide which law can govern their arbitration procedures unless it in contrast with 
Iraqi mandatory rules.  Article 39 (D) of the Iraqi DLOG mirrored the Iraqi need for independent 
institution involved in petroleum disputes.  It is important indication that there are legal vacuum 
in regard of legal system of resolving disputes.  Therefore Iraq as post-conflict state tries to full 
this gap by borrowing the forum of resolving petroleum disputes.36 The UAE Federal Code of 
Civil Procedures No. 11 of 199237 gives the parties freedom to determine the law applicable to 
arbitration procedures.38  The UAE Draft Arbitration Law of 2008 has followed the same route 
as the international conventions and most national legal systems by recognising the parties’ 
autonomy to choose the law which will govern the arbitration procedure.39 In China pre 1948, 
the parties’ ability to choose the procedures of arbitration was not consistent with international 
practise.40 This was so because any dispute submitted to China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission41 (hereinafter CITAC) will subject to this center’s rules.42 
However the situation is changed in 2005 when the last revision of the CITAC Rules provided in 
Article 4 (2) that “the parties’ agreement shall prevail”, this means that the parties have 
autonomy to choose the law that will govern the arbitration proceedings.43 
The Iraqi law follows the same path as international conventions and modern national law 
by granting the parties’ autonomy to choose the applicable law of arbitration procedures but that 
                                                          
35 Article 21 of Iraqi DICAL also gives the parties freedom to choose the procedural law. 
36 Tai- Heng Cheng, ‘Law on Loan: Legal Reconstruction after Armed Conflict’ in in Virtus C. Igbokwe, Nicholas 
Turner and Obijiofor Aginam (eds), Foreign Direct Investment in Post- conflict Countries: Opportunities and 
Challenges (Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd 2010) 86. 
37 The UAE Federal Code of Civil Procedures No. 11 of 1992 Published in the Official Gazette No. 235 of 8 March 
1992. 
38 Abdel Hamid El- Ahdab and Jalal El- Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (3rd edn, Kluwer Law 
International 2011) 798. 
39 Article 28 (1) the UAE Draft Arbitration Law of 2008.  
40 Jingzhou Tao, Arbitration Law and Practice in China (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2008) 125. 
41 Revised and Adopted by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade /China Chamber of 
International Commerce on January 11, 2005. Effective as from May 1, 2005. 
42 ibid. 
43 Michael Moser and Peter Yuen, ‘The New CITAC Arbitration Rules’ (2005) 21 Arbitration International 394. 
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does not mean that the parties can exclude the rules which have a compulsory nature or agree on 
rules which violate the public policy of Iraq.44  
5.2.1.2. By Arbitrators: 
 
The parties do not always make use of their right to choose the law that will govern the 
arbitration procedure, either through neglect or because they cannot reach agreement about the 
law or because they prefer to leave the matter to the arbitral tribunal.  Whatever their reasons, if 
the parties do not express their choice of procedural law, it will be determined by the 
arbitrators.45  The arbitrators, like the parties, have the freedom to determine the procedural law.  
They can apply the law of the seat of arbitration, or international law, or may choose the general 
principles of law, unlike the judge, who is restricted by lex fori, the law of the forum.  However, 
the arbitrators’ freedom to choose the procedural law is determined by the mandatory rules46 of 
the place of arbitration and the parties’ agreement.47 The arbitrators can choose the seat of 
arbitration law or can choose set of arbitration rule or select several national laws.  The Iraqi 
CCP law gives the arbitrators the authority to determine the procedural law in cases where the 
parties fail to make a choice.48 However, Iraqi Law determines the arbitrators’ freedom to choose 
the procedural Law of arbitration in public policy of Iraq.49 Article 265 (2) provided that “if the 
arbitrators are authorised by the parties to reach a compromise, then they shall not be bound to 
follow the rules of court, nor the rules of law, except those rules relating to public order”.50  The 
Iraqi DICAL also gives the arbitrator freedom to select the procedural law if the parties cannot 
reach to agreement.51 The Federal Code of Civil Procedure of UAE No.11 of 1992 empowers the 
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arbitrator with wide freedom to determine the procedural law when the parties cannot reach 
agreement.  Article 212 (1) of The Federal Code of Civil Procedure of UAE No.11 of 1992 
provides that: 
The arbitrator shall issue his award without being bound by any procedures other than 
those stipulated in this Chapter and those pertaining to calling of the parties, hearing of 
their pleas and enabling them to submit their documents. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, the parties to the dispute may agree on certain procedures to be followed by 
the arbitrator.52   
The UAE Arbitration law Draft of 2008 recognises the arbitral tribunal’s right to determine 
the procedural law. 
The PRC arbitratin law does not refer to the arbitraitor right to determine the applicable law 
if the parties cannot reach to agreement.  However, Article 33 (1) of CIETAC rules of 2012 
provided that:  
The arbitral tribunal shall examine the case in any way that it deems appropriate unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties. Under any circumstance, the arbitral tribunal shall act 
impartially and fairly and shall afford reasonable opportunities to all parties for 
presentations and debates.53 
5.2.2. The Relationship between the Procedural Law and the Seat of Arbitration: 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the parties have the freedom to choose the place where 
they feel the arbitration can be conducted naturally where they can determine the law governing 
the arbitration procedures.54  They may choose the law of the seat of arbitration or a different 
domestic legal system or they can apply international law.  The question arising here is: to what 
extent are the arbitration proceedings restricted by association with the law of the seat of 
arbitration?  Are the arbitration procedures free from the controllers of the seat of law or are they 
subject to the legal framework of the arbitration seat? With regard to petroleum disputes, there 
are two views governing the relationship between the place of arbitration and procedures of 
arbitration:  delocalisation theory and national or seat theory.  The arbitral awards in petroleum 
disputes play a major role in providing the foundation stone for these theories and also contribute 
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to the development and maturation of these theories.  Therefore any examination of the 
relationship between the arbitration proceedings and the seat of arbitration should be conducted 
by following two approaches.  The first approach is theoretical: it proceeds by examining the 
most significant theories in this area.  The second approach is the practical one, and consists of 
selecting the most influential arbitral awards in petroleum disputes.     
5.2.2.1. The Delocalisation Theory: 
This theory claims there is no relationship between the arbitration process and the place 
which hosts this process.55 It entails detaching the petroleum arbitration proceedings completely 
from the control of the courts and the laws of the state where it takes place.  It also aims to unify 
the system of law.56 The arbitration award is independent of the local courts or the interventions 
of domestic law.57 But does it serve and protect the interests of both parties with regard to 
petroleum arbitration?  
It is a theory which has raised acrimonious debates among scholars.  Its proponents have 
produced various arguments in its support.  They argue that the parties who choose a foreign 
state as the seat of arbitration are not related to that state and have no connection with it, and the 
state courts have no control over the arbitration process as a long as the parties have no 
connection with that state.58  When the arbitration and the enforcement of the arbitral award are 
subject to the supervision of the state courts where it takes place, then the process is subject to a 
dual legal system the national law of the arbitration place and the law govering the arbitration 
procedures.  It should be subject only to the law of the place where the award is made and the 
court of this place should play the main role in the arbitration process.59 In this regard, the 
capacity of the national court and law to control the arbitration process may allow national 
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interests to dominate international interests.60 The supporters of the theory, moreover, advocate a 
contractual concept of arbitration which considers the agreement of the parties to be the source 
of the legitimacy of the arbitration.61 Furthermore, giving the laws of the seat of arbitration 
control over the arbitration may hinder its progress and cause delays due to the restrictions and 
impediments imposed by those laws.62 For all the above-mentioned reasons, supporters of this 
theory claim that arbitration proceedings should be free from the controlling influence of 
domestic law and that the interests of international commerce require it to be independent of any 
national legal system.  It can depend, for example, on public international law.63  
However, this theory faces various criticisms.  The arguments of its opponents emphasize 
the importance of the place of arbitration in relation to the enforcement of the arbitration award 
and the significant contribution made by the court to the success of the arbitration process.  
These opponents argue that any legal activity which takes place in a particular state should be 
subject to the law of that state.64 Mann contends that “(.....) [e]very arbitration is a national 
arbitration, that is to say, subject to a specific system of national law”65 and that “the Loi de 
l’arbitrage is the law of the country in which the tribunal has its seat”.66 He believes that the 
arbitral award should be obligatory for the parties if they are associated with the law of the place 
where the arbitration occurs.67 This view rejects the theory that the parties should have complete 
control over the arbitration process by establishing their own legal system and argues that they 
should be neither autonomous nor exempt from the jurisdiction of the legal system of the 
arbitration seat.68  The legal system of the place of arbitration, the argument goes on, does not 
deny the parties’ freedom but rather describes and determines the parameters of that freedom.  It 
has been stated that “According to this principle the parties are at liberty to make such 
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arrangement as they like but, as is well known, in all legal systems the principle of party 
autonomy is subject to a great and growing number of qualifications”.69 In addition even the 
proponents of the delocalisation theory concede that arbitration does not take place in a legal 
lacuna70 and that the parties will, sometimes ask the court to assist in certain matters, for 
example, the appointment of arbitrators or the imposition of arbitral orders, or the enforcement of 
interim measures of protection.71 Therefore the ancillary role played by the court is indispensable 
to the parties and to the arbitral tribunal.  Moreover, the parties look to save costs and time by 
conducting the arbitration process quickly.  They give great importance to this and, while 
accepting the subjection of the arbitration process to the arbitration court’s supervision, they 
wish for the enactment of correct and valid awards.72 The parties would not want complete 
freedom to the detriment of the arbitral award’s validity.  Furthermore, detaching the arbitration 
procedures from the procedural law of the place where the arbitration takes place may give 
grounds for setting aside the award, which then could not be enforced. 73    
Despite the arguments defending the theory, there has been a general failure of delocalisation in 
practice.  A prominent example of this failure is to be found in the laws of Belgium, specifically 
Article 1717 of the Code Judiciaire of 27 March 1985 which provided that: 
The Court of Belgium may be seized of a request for annulment only if at least one of 
the parties to the dispute decided by the arbitral award is either a physical person having 
Belgian nationality or residence, or a legal entity created in Belgium or having a branch or 
any other establishment in Belgium.74 
According to this article, parties who are not Belgian citizens or do not reside in that country 
or have a business connection there were not subject to review by Belgian courts but were 
subject only to the court of the country where the arbitral award was sought to enforce.  
However, parties started to avoid Belgian as a seat of arbitration and the article was amended in 
                                                          
69 Clive M. Schmitthoff, Select Essay on International Trade Law (Chia- Jui Cheng ed, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers 1988) 654. 
70 Jan Paulsson, ‘Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why It Matters’ (1983) 32 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53. 
71 Hong-lin Yu, ‘A Theoretical Overview of the Foundations of International Commercial Arbitration’ (2008) 2 
Contemproray Asia Arbitration Journal 256; Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International 
Commercial Arbitration (Cambridge University Press 2008) 57. 
72 Andrew Tweeddale and Keren Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes:  International and English Law 
and Practice (Oxford University Press2007) 250. 
73 Okezie Chukwumerije, Choice of Law in International Commercial Arbitration (Quorum Books 1994) 89. 
74 The Belgain Code Judiciaire of 27 March 1985. 
172 
 
1998.75 Professor Goode examined the reason for this amendment and concluded that: “this 
ingenious measure back-fired as the arbitration community came to see that its effect was to 
leave parties who wanted judicial assistance or had good grounds for annulment with nowhere to 
go”.76 
However, it could be said that the theory of delocalisation has not gained wide acceptance 
either from the legal community or from the parties themselves, who feel that detaching the 
arbitration process from any supervision by the court of the place in which they choose to 
conduct the process would endanger their chances of achieving valid enforceable awards. 
Subjecting the arbitration procedures to the court and law of the place of arbitration allows the 
arbitral award to be scrutinized for any defects which the losing party considers as grounds for 
setting aside the arbitral award.  Therefore the most important part of the arbitration process, 
which is the enforcement of the arbitral award, may be challenged and as a consequence the 
award may not be made.  With regard to petroleum disputes, it could be said this theory was 
designed to serve and protect the petroleum companies’ interests to the detriment of the interests 
of the host state.   
5.2.2.2. The Seat Theory: 
In the seat theory, unlike the delocalisation theory, there is a link between the municipal 
laws governing the arbitration procedures and the place where the arbitration takes place. 
Accordingly, the law of the place of arbitration would govern the arbitration procedures and the 
court of this place would also have the jurisdiction to supervise the arbitration process.77 The 
purpose of the connection between the law of the place and arbitration procedures is to make 
sure that the arbitration process is conducted in a sound manner, or as Redfern puts it. “the Lex 
arbitri helps to ensure that the arbitral process works as it should”.78 The arbitration process 
derives its legality and legitimacy from the seat of arbitration which also guarantees the 
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legitimacy of the arbitral award.79 The seat of arbitration is determined by the parties directly or 
indirectly by reference to specific institutions and often this institution’s rules indicate to the 
parties how to choose the arbitration place,80 and in the absence of a choice by the parties the 
arbitral tribunal may choose.81 Determining the seat of arbitration has great importance in 
identifying many issues, namely arbitrability, the arbitral tribunal establishment, the formal 
requirements of any arbitration agreement and then ensuring its validity, and the procedures for 
setting aside the arbitral award.82 The seat of arbitration is the place of the arbitral tribunal but 
that is not necessarily its geographical location.  It is rather the “legal domicile or the judicial 
home of arbitration”.83 In this regard, the question of the seat raises some practical issues.  For 
various reasons, the arbitrators may hold the hearing and meetings in different countries.  In that 
case it would have to be decided which place was to be recognised as the seat of arbitration and 
consequently which national system of law was to govern the arbitration procedures.  In this 
respect, it is critically important to distinguish between the geographical place of arbitration in 
which it is convenient84 to conduct the meetings or hearings and the legal seat of arbitration.85 
The issue is dealt with in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 2010, Article 18 (2).86  It 
distinguishes between the seat of arbitration, which provides the arbitration procedures with its a 
legal framework, and the geographical location where it is convenient to conduct the hearing.87 
Article 18 (1) provides that “The award shall be deemed to have been made at the place of 
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arbitration”.  The conducting of hearing sessions outside of the arbitration seat does not have any 
impact of the legal seat of arbitration.88 
The important question arising here is whether Iraq can be a suitable seat of arbitration and 
then if it could be argued that a centre of petroleum arbitration should be established in Iraq? 
To answer this question the need to know the criteria that the parties depend on to choose 
the seat of arbitration.  As mentioned previously the parties will be looking for a place that has 
neutrality this means it has no connection with either party law.89 The other important issue 
looked for by the parties is the seat of arbitration should be a party of New York Convention of 
1958.90  In order to facility enforcement of arbitral award which is most of countries became 
parties of this convention.  So, is that compatible with Iraqi prospect to establish petroleum 
arbitration centre? 
 In fact this considered one of the important challenges facing Iraq that because has not yet 
joined to New York Convention.  Therefore Iraq should join to this convention to facilitate 
enforcement arbitral award.   
Despite certain practical problems, however, the seat theory has wide support.  Mann and 
Sauser are considered to be its most famous proponents.  Professor Sauser gives emphasis to the 
law of the seat of arbitration in its function of governing the arbitration process.  He stresses the 
necessary association between the arbitration and the procedural laws of its seat.91  Mann 
strongly supports this theory, arguing that every arbitration should be controlled by national law.  
It is not acceptable for it to be “suspended in the air”.92  As mentioned earlier in this section, he 
stated that every arbitration is a national arbitration and that the arbitral award should not be 
compulsory unless it is linked to the law of the arbitration seat.93 According to the proponents of 
this view, the arbitral award derives its binding force from the legal system of the arbitration 
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seat.94 Its proponents have additional concerns about nationless awards which find themselves 
existing in a legal vacuum.95  
This theory has won the support not only of scholars but also state, which have adopted 
international instruments96 and national laws that incorporate it.97  However, the Iraqi CCP does 
not include any article explaining the Iraqi position regarding the seat of arbitration.  Therefore, 
if the parties do not themselves determine the seat of arbitration, it will be determined by the 
arbitrators, and if the latter fail to do so, the court having the original jurisdiction shall determine 
it.98 According to Article 26999 of the CCP, the Iraqi court has the original jurisdiction to settle 
any problem concerning arbitration proceedings.  Article 28 of the Iraqi Civil Law No.40, 1951, 
states that the law of the place of venue will govern and determine the terms of reference, and as 
a result, any arbitration must occur in Iraq.100 It seems from both articles that the Iraqi procedural 
law governs the arbitration procedures.  The Iraqi DICAL gives the parties the freedom to chose 
the arbitration seat101 they can determine the seat inside or outside Iraq.102  However, as 
mentioned previously, the Iraqi DLOG, in Article 39 (D) (1), determines the law that will apply 
to arbitration procedures in regard to petroleum disputes and it decrees that the procedural rules 
of Paris or Geneva or Cairo will be followed.103 This article permits foreign procedural law to 
govern the arbitration procedures.  The present author’s view that establish center to settle 
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petroleum disputes in Iraq became necessary to remove any contracts may be happen in this 
regard.  This centre will apply the Iraqi procedural law.   
The Civil Procedures Federal Law of UAE No.11 of 1991 addresses the seat of arbitration 
indirectly in Article 208 (1).  According to this article, the arbitrator should inform the parties of 
his or her decision regarding the arbitration seat within a maximum period of thirty days from the 
starting date of the first session of the arbitral tribunal.104 It can be concluded from this Article 
that the existing federal law restricts the parties’ freedom to determine the seat of arbitration by 
giving the arbitrator the exclusive power to determine it.  However, the Draft Federal Law of the 
arbitration of 2008 takes a different view concerning the place of arbitration and gives the parties 
freedom to choose the arbitration seat themselves or by the arbitral tribunal only in cases where 
the parties cannot not reach agreement.105 The arbitral tribunal should further bear in mind the 
circumstances of the case and the choice of place of the parties.106 The freedom of the arbitral 
tribunal under this draft law is restricted by the UAE Law of the rules of arbitration.107  They 
may only choose from among places inside the UAE and without reference to anywhere outside 
the UAE borders in order to avoid the possibility of a foreign arbitral award.108   
The PRC Arbitration Law of 1994109 does not address the seat of arbitration directly.  
However, Article 16 of the Supreme People’s Court Judicial Interpretation of 2006 rules that in 
cases where the parties do not locate the place of arbitration in their arbitration agreement it is 
assumed that the location will be decided by the selected arbitration commission.110 The PRC 
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Arbitration Law does not discriminate between domestic and foreign arbitration with regard to 
determining the place of arbitration.  This may cause problems in practice when the parties 
choose a foreign location for domestic arbitration.111 The Code of Contract Law of 1999 
provides that the parties can choose a place outside PRC if the dispute meets the criteria of being 
foreign- related.112 
The 2008 UAE Draft Law addresses the question of the seat of arbitration by giving the 
parties the right to choose the arbitration place: if they cannot do so, the arbitrators will 
determine the arbitration seat.  Iraqi law should adopt and follow the UAE approach in this 
regard by adopting the seat theory.  This is so because this theory serves both parties interests, 
whether the Iraqi state or a petroleum company.  It provides sufficient supervision of the 
arbitration process by subjecting this process to the court of the state where the arbitration is 
being conducted.   
However, the wide acceptance of the seat theory by the legal community does not immunise 
it from criticism.  From a practical viewpoint, the choice of a seat of arbitration either by parties 
or by the arbitral tribunal may be motivated by economic or other reasons without consideration 
of the subjective or objective connections between the parties or their attitude to the law 
governing the applicable procedures.113  The parties may not always be content to associate with 
a particular legal system when they commit themselves to its jurisdiction or they may not have 
adequate knowledge of the law selected to govern their arbitration procedures.114 Moreover, it is 
necessary for the parties to check the mandatory rules of the national law wherever the 
arbitration takes place in order to avoid an invalid award.115 In addition, not every country has a 
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legal system suitable for governing arbitration procedures.  This may harm the interest of the 
parties, who might choose a place for reasons of convenience without considering the 
implications of that choice. 116  
However, the seat theory has widespread support within the legal community at all levels.  It 
embeds the arbitration process in a legal framework, thus protecting the parties’ interests and 
ensuring the validity of the arbitral award.  The parties can avoid countries where the legal 
system is unsuited to the arbitration process, In any case, most countries have attempted to 
modernise their national law with regard to arbitration.  The solution is for the parties to give 
close attention to the national law of the seat country and not simply to settle for the most 
obvious or convenient place.     
5.2.1.2.2. Petroleum Arbitration in Practice:  
The roots of delocalisation are to be found in the arbitral award of Saudi Arabia v. Arabian 
American Oil Company (ARAMCO).117  The arbitral tribunal encountered the issue of 
identifying the procedural law.  The arbitral tribunal decided to exclude Saudi Arabian national 
law and USA law, due to various considerations.  The parties had already chosen Geneva as the 
seat of arbitration to comply with the principle of equal treatment for both parties.118  Also the 
arbitral tribunal excluded the law of the seat of arbitration and upheld the jurisdictional immunity 
of the states on the grounds that “the jurisdictional immunity of States (.....) excludes the 
possibility, for the judicial authorities of the country of the seat, of exercising their right of 
supervision and interference in the arbitral proceedings which they have in certain cases”.119 
Therefore the arbitral tribunal applied public international law as the law governing the 
arbitration procedures.  The arbitral tribunal justified its decision thus:   
(…..) It follows that the arbitration, as such, can only be governed by International 
Law, since the Parties have clearly expressed their common intention that it should not 
be governed by the Law of Saudi Arabia, and since there is no ground for the 
application of the American Law to the other Party.  This is not only because the seat of 
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the Tribunal is not in the United States, but also because of the complete equality of the 
Parties in the proceedings before the arbitrators.120  
The arbitral tribunal chose “the Draft Convention on Arbitration Procedure, adopted by the 
International Law Commission of the United Nations in its Fifth Session 1955”.121  The award in 
this case is considered to be the first example of the application of public international law 
directly to the arbitration procedures in a petroleum dispute.   
Professor Dupuy, the sole arbitrator in the case of Texaco v. Libya,122 stated that when the 
parties have not determined the applicable law of arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator should 
determine it.  He held that there are two options when choosing the law to govern the arbitration 
procedures.  The first option is to apply the national law, specifically the law of the seat of 
arbitration.  The second option is to apply public international law.  The arbitrator chose to apply 
public international law and follow the ARAMCO case award in accordance with the principle of 
state sovereignty.  He justified his choice of international law as the applicable law of arbitration 
procedures by stating:  
(……) [t]he fact that, in the present dispute, the parties had agreed to have 
recourse, if need be, to the President of the International Court of Justice implies that it 
was their intention that this arbitration should come under the aegis of the United 
Nations and, therefore, that the system of law governing this arbitration should be 
international law.123 
On this issue, the reasoning of the arbitrator was unsatisfactory.  He supposes that the parties 
consented to apply public international law merely because they were willing to be subject to the 
judgment of the President of International Court of Justice.  He makes this the foundation stone 
of his argument but in doing so he attributes to the parties intentions which in reality may not 
exist.  The choice of the President of International Court of Justice does not necessarily reflect 
the parties’ desire to be subject to the arbitration procedures of public international law.  If it 
were the case that the parties chose a French arbitrator would it imply willingness for the arbitral 
procedures to be subject to the national law of France?   
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 Another award drawing on the delocalisation theory is to be found in the case of Libyan 
American Oil Company v. Libya Arab Jamahiriya 124 (LIAMCO).  The parties were unable to 
determine either the seat of arbitration or the law of the arbitral procedure, therefore the matter 
was left to the sole arbitrator, Dr Mahmassani, who determined that “by decision of the Arbitral 
Tribunal, independently of the local law of the seat of arbitration”,125 he would apply “the 
general principles contained in the Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure elaborated by the 
International Law Commission of the United Nations.”126 The arbitrator justified that because 
this approach was adopted by International Law Commission of the United Nations.127 In 
addition to that this approach is adopted by international conventions for example Article 44 of 
the ICSID Convention, and in domestic law such as Article 24 of the Swiss International 
Arbitration Convention of 1969.128 Moreover, he depends on the ARAMCO Case approach, 
which detached the procedural law of arbitration from the seat of arbitration by applying 
international law.  He also relied on the Sapphire Case.129  However, it seems that his reasoning 
is not so clear because he depends on two different cases’ approach.  The arbitrator in the 
ARAMCO Case it will be relied on delocalisation theory, while in the Sapphire Case the 
arbitrator used a different approach by applying the law of seat of arbitration.   
All the above mentioned cases applied international law rather than the national law of the 
seat of arbitration, thus detaching the arbitration procedures from national law.   
In Sapphire International Petroleum ltd v. The National Iranian Oil Co,130 the sole 
arbitrator, Cavin, adopted a different approach by subjecting the arbitration procedures to the law 
of the seat of arbitration, which in this case was Swiss law.131 He justified his position by arguing 
that if the parties have the freedom to choose the place of arbitration and they choose instead to 
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leave the matter to the arbitral tribunal then by implication they are willing to submit them to the 
law of the place of arbitration.132 “Even if this interpretation of the parties’ intention is wrong, 
the rule is that (………) the arbitration is submitted to the judicial sovereignty of the seat of the 
arbitration”.133 
In BP v. Libyan Arab Republic,134 Judge Lagergren, who was the sole arbitrator in the case, 
did not adopt the ARAMCO approach with regard to the application of public international law.  
He rejected the ARAMCO reasoning that applying the procedural law of the seat of arbitration is 
a violation of the jurisdictional principles of the state which is a party in of the arbitration.135 He 
followed the Sapphire case136 approach and chose Danish law, which was the law of the seat of 
arbitration, as the law applicable to the arbitration procedure.137 Judge Lagergren reasoned that 
the parties submitted their dispute to arbitration because they deemed it an effective mechanism 
for settling their dispute, even if one of the parties was a state.  Therefore applying international 
law as the procedural law of arbitration in stateless arbitration would be less effective than 
choosing national law as the applicable law for those procedures 
In the case of Kuwait v. AMINOIL 138 the situation was different from the above-mentioned 
cases.  The parties selected the applicable law of arbitration procedures and the substantive 
issues of the petroleum agreement according to Article IV (1) of the arbitration agreement 
between the parties.  This stated that the proceedings of the arbitration were subject to the 
mandatory rules of the place where the arbitration took place.139 However, the arbitral tribunal 
explained that this article did not mean that the arbitration proceedings should be entirely subject 
to the law of the seat, in this case French law, because  
[t]he [P]arties themselves, in the Arbitration Agreement, provided the means of 
settling the essential procedural rules, when they conferred on the Tribunal the power 
to “prescribe the procedure applicable to the arbitration on the basis of natural justice 
                                                          
132 Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company (1963) 35 ILR 163. 
133 ibid. 
134 BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (1979) 53 ILR 297. 
135 ibid 309. 
136 Sapphire International Petroleum Ltd. v. National Iranian Oil Company (1963) 35 ILR 163. 
137 BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic (1979) 53 ILR 297. 
138 Aminoil (the Government of the State of Kuwait v The American Independent Oil Company) (1982) 66 ILR 518. 
139 ibid 523. 
182 
 
and of such principles of transnational arbitration procedure as it may find 
applicable”140  
It is apparent from the above discussion that there is dichotomy and uncertainty involved in 
subjecting the arbitration proceedings to the law of the place where the arbitration is held.  Some 
of the arbitrators have adopted international law and have thus become free from the control of 
the national law of the place of arbitration, so that the arbitral award becomes stateless, while in 
other cases the law of the place of arbitration has been adopted. 
5.3. Substantive Law in Arbitration:  
After it has determined the law of the arbitration procedure, the next task of the arbitral 
tribunal is to decide which law is to govern the dispute itself.  It is this law which determines the 
rights and obligation of the parties, the legality of the agreement, the courses to be followed by 
the parties in fulfilling the agreement, the interpretation of the terms of the agreement and the 
implications involved in breaches of the agreement.141 This law is unquestionably the most 
sensitive and critical issue facing the petroleum arbitration process, since the parties involved, 
the host state and the petroleum company, have different concerns and conflicting interests.  The 
host state, or whatever alternative sovereign entity is involved, will not wish to waive this 
sovereignty by submitting its dispute to another state’s court or by applying the law of another 
nation.  Also, as indicated in Chapter Three, the host state may take a dubious view of the 
arbitration, suspecting that the adoption of foreign law may be designed to protect the interests of 
the petroleum company and that the petroleum agreement itself may be a legal tool for the 
appropriation of a natural resource which is the life’s blood of the host state’s economy.  The 
petroleum company, on the other hand, may be reluctant to subject itself to the courts or the 
national law of the host state because of a belief that the legal system will serve the interests of 
the host state and also that the court is associated with the prevailing political power.  The 
different perspectives of the parties involved generate controversy regarding the choice of the 
law which law will govern the petroleum agreement.  Furthermore it raises concerns as to 
whether arbitration is an effective method for settling disputes.   
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 Determining which law is to be applied to a dispute is more difficult for an arbitrator than 
for a judge.  This is because arbitrators do not have lex fori, whereas judges are restricted to the 
lex fori of their state142 and can easily determine the applicable law by referring to the rules 
governing the conflict of laws.143   
In any event, the applicable law of merits in petroleum disputes raises several questions.  
How can the applicable law be determined in general, and what approach is followed by Iraqi 
law, UAE and PRC in this regard? Which law will be suitable to apply and why? An attempt to 
answer these questions will be made in the following sub-sections.    
5.3.1. The Method for Determining the Law Applicable to Substantive Issues: 
5.3.1.1. By Parties: 
The parties involved in the early stages of petroleum negotiations agree at that stage on 
various provisions and clauses in order to determine the rights and obligations of each party.  
They can also choose for themselves the law that will apply to the merits of the dispute because 
they are more capable than others of understanding what is required from the agreement and how 
best to protect their mutual interests.  The parties have the freedom to determine the law by 
which the merits of each set of arguments will be assessed.  This principle of party autonomy has 
great influence in the legal community: it is recognised both by international instruments144 and 
by national laws.145 The parties can explain their choice of law directly by including in their 
agreement a written term stipulating the law that will govern the agreement; or they can express 
their choice tacitly before the arbitral tribunal.146 Express agreement by both parties with regard 
to this law serves to avoid any possible ambiguities when the arbitral tribunal comes to apply the 
substantive law.  When the parties make only an implicit choice, then the arbitral tribunal must 
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draw its conclusions as to the intentions of the parties by inferences drawn from observed facts 
and the connotations of the language used.147  
The parties are free to choose the law at any time.148 They can make their agreement 
regarding the applicable law at the time of concluding the agreement, which is the normal 
practice or they can choose the law at the time when the dispute is heard before the arbitral 
tribunal.149 However, the most suitable time for choosing the applicable law is the time when the 
parties conclude their agreement.  This is because choosing the applicable law at the time when 
the dispute arises may be difficult due to the viewpoints of the parties differing as a consequence 
of the dispute between them.  In any event, the parties are free to choose either the national law 
of one of the parties, or the law of third state.  They can also choose more than one law to govern 
different issues in the contractual relationship, a principle known as depecage. 150  
It may nonetheless be asked whether the parties are completely free to determine the law or 
whether that freedom is in reality limited.  The parties’ wishes should be taken into 
consideration151 by the arbitrators but the autonomy of the parties is limited by legal restrictions 
and factors related to the applicable law chosen by the parties themselves.152 The freedom of 
parties is limited by mandatory law and public policy: they cannot choose laws or rules which 
are contrary to mandatory law or which violate the public policy of the state.  Article 32 of Iraqi 
Civil Law No 40 of 1951 restricts the parties’ autonomy by stating that the provisions of foreign 
law may not apply if this law is contrary to public order and public morality in Iraq.  Legal 
restriction is not the only obstacle to the autonomy of the parties.  There may be other factors 
which make the arbitral tribunal refuse to comply with the wishes of the parties and apply a law 
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different from the one chosen by them.153 This is the principle of “unsatisfactory theories”154 and 
it means that the applicable law should be mature and can govern all aspects and issues of the 
agreement, as demonstrated clearly by the arbitral award in Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American 
Oil Company (ARAMCO).155 The arbitrator justified the application of a law different from the 
one chosen by the parties by stating that the law determined by the parties was not complete 
enough to govern the petroleum concession agreement but had “remained embryonic in Moslem 
law”.156 However, these are old decisions (1958 is not that long age) and in most cases the host 
states try to promulgate modern laws to serve their investment ambitions, (as described in 
Chapter Three).   
Following this discussion about the freedom of parties, an important question arises: does 
Iraqi law allow the parties to be involved in choosing the law in regard to petroleum agreements 
or does it adopt a different approach?    
No article in the Iraqi CCP recognises the parties’ right to choose the law applicable to the 
merits of a dispute.  This is because, as mentioned in earlier chapters, this law does not regulate 
international arbitration, and therefore gives little attention to the law applicable to the merits of 
a dispute.  However the Iraqi DICAL recognises the parties’ autonomy and gives the parties 
freedom to choose the applicable law of their main agreement.157 The Iraqi Investment Law No 
13 of 2006158 contains no article explaining the mechanism by which either the parties or the 
arbitrator might choose the applicable law, although it does allow the parties to have recourse to 
arbitration to resolve disputes.  Article 27 (4) of this law reads: “if the parties to a dispute are 
subject to the provisions of this law, they may, when concluding their contract, agree on the 
mode of settlement of their disputes, including recourse to arbitration according to Iraqi law or to 
any internationally recognized scheme”.159  It is apparent from this article that the phrase 
“recourse to arbitration according to Iraqi law” does not mean that Iraqi law governs the merits 
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of the dispute but that the arbitration process is to be conducted according to the Iraqi law by the 
establishment of an arbitral tribunal of Iraqi arbitrators.160 However, even if the Iraqi Investment 
Law had addressed the applicable law issue its approach would not be comprehensive because 
the Iraqi Investment Law itself excludes oil and gas from its scope.161  The Iraqi Regulations for 
Implementing Government Contracts No.1 of 2014162 did not express the parties’ right to choose 
the applicable law.  The Iraqi DLOG of 2007 likewise does not express the principle of the 
parties’ autonomy in choosing the applicable law.  A review of these articles involving different 
branches of Iraqi law leads to the conclusion that Iraqi law does not follow the party autonomy 
approach in regard to petroleum agreements.  However, some Iraqi authors163 argue that Iraq 
gives the parties the freedom to choose the law applicable to the dispute.  This view is based on 
their interpretation of Article 25 (1) of Iraqi Civil Code No 40 of 1951which states that:  
The contractual obligations shall be governed by the law of the state wherein lies 
the domicile of the contracting parties if they have a common domicile; where they 
have a different domicile the law of the state within which the contract was concluded 
will be applied unless the contracting parties have agreed (otherwise) or where it would 
be revealed from the circumstances that another law was intended to be applied.164 
They argue that the parties can agree to apply a law other than Iraqi law.  However, in the 
view of the present author, this opinion is incompatible with the Iraqi approach to petroleum 
agreements, since the model for the technical service contract of petroleum does not give the 
parties the right to choose the applicable law.  The resolution of the debate is to be found in 
Article 37 (1) of that law, which provides that “this contract shall be governed, interpreted, and 
construed the rights and obligations of the Parties determined in accordance with the laws of the 
Republic of Iraq”.  Thus the principle of the autonomy of the parties is limited in practice, which 
considers the application of Iraqi Law to be compulsory with regard to petroleum agreements.    
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The same position is to be found in the Arbitration Law of China,165 which limits the parties’ 
autonomy with regard to substantive law.  It does not include any article setting out the principle 
of the parties’ autonomy and their freedom to select the applicable law.  The Chinese Contract 
Law of 1999 permits the parties to select the law which will govern the elements of the dispute 
when one of the parties is foreign, except when “otherwise provided by law,”166 a proviso which 
indicates that the  freedom of the parties is also restricted in Chinese law.  These restrictions are 
found in laws relating to mineral resources.  An example is Article 12 of the Equity Joint 
Venture Implementing Regulations, which states that “(…….) [t]he resolution of disputes arising 
there under shall be governed by the Chinese law”.167   
The UAE Federal Law No 11 of 1992 and the UAE Draft Law recognise the doctrine of the 
autonomy of parties and give the parties freedom to select the law applicable to their dispute in 
Article 28 (1).  
5.3.1.2. By Arbitrators:   
The arbitrators may also play a role in selecting the applicable law when the parties fail to 
make a choice: they can also play an auxiliary role when the parties’ choices do not apply to all 
the relevant issues or when the law chosen by the parties is unsatisfactory.  In such cases it is the 
arbitrator who has the task of determining the applicable law.168 For example, the petroleum 
agreement between Iraq and ERAP Petroleum Company granted the arbitral tribunal the power 
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to determine the applicable law of merits of the agreement dispute as in Article 35 (d).169 
However, Iraqi Law does not give the arbitral tribunal the right to select the applicable law. The 
relevant laws, such as the CCP, the investment laws and the DLOG do not empower the 
arbitrator to determine the applicable law.  However, the Iraqi DICAL gives the arbitrators the 
freedom to choose the applicable law of the substantive issues but this freedom restricted in the 
terms of contracts and commercial customs.170 This approach is not consisting with the Iraqi 
approach in regard of petroleum disputes which provides that the Iraqi law will govern the 
substantive issue of contract.  Similarly the PRC Arbitration Law also does not give the arbitral 
tribunal the power to select the applicable law.  The UAE Arbitration Draft Law of 2008 
transfers the rights of the parties to the arbitrators if the former do not choose the applicable law 
according to Article 28 (2).  However, the arbitrators are required to apply the national law of a 
particular state in accordance with the UAE rules governing the conflict of laws.171  
However, the law applicable to petroleum agreements is the subject of differing opinions 
and approaches.  In the following sub sections, these varying approaches will be discussed and 
an attempt will be made to decide which of them is best suited to the governing of petroleum 
agreements.   
5.3.1.2.1. The Theoretical Approach: 
  Petroleum disputes inspire controversies as to which law should govern them because these 
disputes have a special status.  It is not simply a question of finding agreement in order to 
achieve commercial aims; other issues of a legal and political nature are involved.  As a 
consequence of this debate, different types of law are presented as being the appropriate form of 
applicable law.  The important questions are: which of these forms of law should govern 
petroleum agreements and for what reason should a particular form of law be considered 
adequate?  What follows is an attempt to answer these questions.  
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5.3.1.2.1.1. The Public International Law (Internationalisation Theory): 
The traditional view concerning the law applicable to petroleum agreements is that they 
should be subject to public international law: this is known as the internationalisation theory.  
Internationalisation theory can be traced back to the petroleum concession agreements concluded 
in the last century in the Middle East.172  The theory emerged as a response to what was regarded 
as the insufficiency of the national laws of the developing countries which were the host states 
when laws for the governance of international commercial agreements were required.173  
International law has been strongly defended by some authors,174 who believe it to be 
capable of governing and regulating the aforementioned type of agreement and that the laws of 
the nation states to which the parties belonged is inadequate for the governance of contractual 
agreements, where the agreements are to be considered as a treaty between “international 
persons”.  Thus Mann has argued that “[T]he commercialization of treaties as well as the 
internationalization of contracts are different aspect of the same fundamental idea”.175 Mann 
perceived that these agreements contained objective elements related to international law and for 
that reason it could be assumed that the parties would wish to transfer their agreements from the 
sphere of municipal law to that of international law.  However, is the abovementioned view 
compatible with the nature of petroleum agreements? Would the adoption of international law as 
the applicable law be adequate in governing all the issues and questions involved in such an 
agreement?  
Regarding the first of these questions, it could be said that the petroleum agreement is not an 
international treaty.  This point was established in the discussion of the legal status of petroleum 
agreements in Chapter Two.  There is nonetheless a similarity between international treaties and 
petroleum agreements in the manner of the conclusion of both agreements.  Both types of 
agreement have similar formal and substantive requirements, for example, the consent, the 
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signatory of parties and their capacity.  The difference lies in the process of ratification and 
fulfilment.176 Also the parties involved in an international treaty are different from the parties in 
petroleum agreements.  In the former the parties represent states or a state organization whereas 
in the latter the parties are states and private legal entities, namely the petroleum companies.177  
In addition, the international treaty may contain the principle of “reservation”, which gives the 
state the right to disagree on regarding specific provisions of the treaty, whereas the petroleum 
agreement contains no such principle and the parties are obligated by all the terms of the 
agreement.178 Moreover, the aims of the international treaty differ from the aims of the petroleum 
agreement in which, as in any commercial activity, the motivation is the maximization of profits.  
Whereas the international treaty draws upon and regulates the legal system appropriate to this 
activity.  The petroleum agreement differs from the international agreement in so many respects 
that the application of international law to both is not a reasonable option.179   
   It could be said then that international law is not suited to the governance of agreements 
between petroleum companies and the state because it was designed to govern the 
interrelationships of nation states or to mediate between nation states and international 
organisations like the United Nations.180 Sereni argues that the provisions of international law do 
not apply only to international persons and each rule of international law is designed to be 
consistent with the needs and behaviour of those persons who related to the international legal 
system which considered these provisions a part of this system and also aim to regulate the 
relationship among the bodies for which it was established.181  
Furthermore, international law cannot effectively cover issues related to private contracts.  It 
is insufficiently developed to address issues such as set-offs and mistakes in contracts.182 
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However, as described previously in Chapter Three, the adoption of international law as the 
applicable law is welcomed by petroleum companies since it enables them to avoid the national 
law of the host state applying natural and developed law.  From both practical and theoretical 
points of view, the arguments favouring the application of international law to petroleum 
agreements are doubtful.     
 5.3.1.2.1.2. The General Principles of Law (McNair’s Theory) 
The general principles of law recognised by civilized nations can be the applicable law of 
petroleum agreements if the parties do not determine any other specific legal system to govern 
their agreement and prefer arbitration as a means of settling their dispute.  This statement was the 
core of Lord McNair’s theory.183 McNair argued that the applicable law of agreements cannot be 
national law because the national laws of many host states are not sufficiently developed to 
regulate petroleum agreements.  On the other hand, petroleum agreements cannot be subject to 
public international law stricto sensu, because such agreements are not concluded between states 
or international persons.184 He also criticized the view which advocates the Lex Contractus or 
Lex Loci Solutionis as the applicable law of petroleum agreements because the nature of the 
contracts and the circumstances of the agreement it is not computable with these laws.  He 
rejected the idea that any agreement between the parties applies the Lex Loci Solutionis as 
applicable law.185 The general principles of law have been mentioned in Article 38 (1) (c) of 
Statute of the International Court of Justice.186 However, it is worth mentioning that the 
principles referred to in Article 38 were considered as second sources of international law and 
not as an independent legal system.187  
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However, just like Article 38 (1) (c) Lord McNair did not define exactly what was meant by 
“the general principles of law.”  He merely comments that “this is a legal doctrine which can be 
said to have already attained a large measure of recognition as a general principle of law”.188  He 
did not specify these principles because, he claimed, they can be developed by parties and by the 
arbitral tribunal.189   
Cheng defined these principles of law as ““general principles of law” which are not, 
therefore, peculiar to any legal system, but are inherent in, and common to, them all. They 
constitute the common foundation of every system of law”.190 The sole arbitrator Cavin defined 
the principles as “rules of positive law, common to civilized nations, such as are formulated in 
their statutes or are generally recognized in practice”.191 It appears that the notion of general 
principles of law is not clear and cannot be enumerated and therefore to identify and formulate 
these principles is a difficult task.192  
A theory which claims to apply the general principles of law recognised by “civilized 
nations” must confront several criticisms.  The general principles of law recognised by civilized 
nations do not constitute an independent legal system, distinct from domestic legal systems and 
international legal systems as McNair claims.  Lalive, who follows this approach, is similarly 
open to challenge.  Lalive stated that “It is therefore likely that all these facts point to the 
emergence of a new system of law, somewhat half-way between international law stricto sensu 
and domestic law. This is transnational law”193  Mann says that these principles “are not a legal 
system at all”.194  
 By their nature, general principles cannot be formulated in any detail.  They are no more 
than general principles which leave petroleum agreements in a legal vacuum while raising 
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several theoretical and practical problems.195 It is significant that there is no detailed enumeration 
of these principles.  As Lalive conceded, “the search of general principles of law is not easy”196 
Other authors197 have noted that, when employed as the applicable law, the general principles of 
law “do not provide the kind of detailed code appropriate to complex commercial transactions; 
and the manner of their application is not always a predictable matter.”198 
It can be concluded their generality, dependency and lack of any developed code make these 
principles unsuitable for the governance of such matters as petroleum agreements which contain 
critical and precise issues.   
Despite powerful criticisms, the general principles of law recognized by “civilized nations” 
have established a place for themselves in the proceedings of petroleum agreements.  They were 
applied in some important petroleum proceedings of the last century, such as the Sapphire 
Case,199 the Texaco case200 and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi Case.201 These cases will be discussed 
extensively in subsequent sub sections.  
5.3.1.2.1.3. Transnational Law (The Transnational Theory) 
This theory advocates transnational law as the applicable law for use in to petroleum 
agreements.  It has been supported by C. F. Amerasinghe202, J. Cherian203 and P. Jessup, who 
tried to define transnational law by including all laws that govern commercial activities taking 
place beyond national borders of the states which contain private and public international law 
and also general principles of law related to investment agreements.204 It is apparent from this 
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definition that transnational law is aimed mainly at overcoming the traditional division between 
public international law and private international law with regard to some issues which transcend 
the borders of the state.  Furthermore it is a law which cannot be attributed to the legal system of 
any specific country.   
To determine what transnational law means, however, a distinction should be made between two 
trends. 
The first trend is to use the terms transnational law and lex mercatoria indiscriminately as if 
both had the same meaning.  Goldman defines the lex mercatoria as “a set of general principles, 
and customary rules spontaneously referred to or elaborated in the framework of international 
trade, without reference to a particular national system of law”.205 The second trend is to 
consider the lex merctoria as one of the constituent elements of transnational law, along with 
commercial custom and general principles of law.206   
This theory has been supported by a number of authors.207  It is said to offer flexible rules 
compatible with the nature of commercial agreements.  It also offers contractual parties and 
arbitrators release from the strictures of national law through the application of common 
commercial principles which are widely acceptable.208 
 However, transnational theory considered to be an incomplete system because some issues 
which cannot be regulated or governed by transnational law, for example, questions such as the 
capacity of contractual parties, consent and interest, require recourse to national law.  The 
deficiencies of this form of law are inescapable inevitable to avoid the lack in this law.209 Indeed 
some authors regard transnational law as “mythical”: it cannot be determine easily, consequently, 
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it makes the arbitrator’s task more difficult, particularly because there is no exhaustive catalogue 
of all the rules of transnational law.210 Furthermore, the commercial community is not a coherent 
and uniform body, it contains ideologies and commercial policies which vary from country to 
country.  For example, developing countries and industrial countries possess different aims and 
strategies.211  This casts doubt on the possibility of a uniform transnational legal system.  
5.3.1.2.1.4. The Lex Contractus 
This approach aims to exclude petroleum agreements from the ambit of national law and 
also from that of public international law by classifying that type of agreement as quasi- 
international and then subjecting it to the terms and conditions of the contract concluded between 
the parties.212 The Lex contractus theory was developed and upheld by Verdross who argued 
strongly that petroleum agreements should be subject to the pacta sunt servanda principle, as 
represented by the agreement concluded between the parties.213  He justified his thesis by saying 
that an agreement concluded between the state and a foreign investor should not be governed by 
the national law of a particular state because the parties to the agreement are of different 
nationalities and do not have a common domicile; and also the agreement does not have the 
international character which would justify its subjection to international law.214  According to 
Verdross’s theory the parties not only choose the law governing their agreement but also create 
this law on the basis of the terms and conditions of their agreement.215 Therefore, the argument 
runs, the terms and conditions designated by the contractual parties constitute an independent 
and comprehensive legal system governing the contractual relationship, so that the agreement 
will constitute the resources of that legal system.216 Accordingly the arbitrator can exclude the 
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rules of substantive law by substituting them for the terms of the parties’ contract.217 This theory 
is based on two fundamental elements: pacta sunt servanda and the valid agreement concluded 
between the parties, considered as a legal system binding for both parties.218  
The question raised here is whether the Lex Contractus can offer an integral legal system 
covering all issues arising from a petroleum agreement which is isolated from any legal system.  
The contractual parties cannot create petroleum agreements which contain comprehensive 
resolutions of all the issues facing them and also regulate the contractual relationship perfectly 
without being associated with some form of legal order.219 This legal system is necessary to 
answer all the eventualities and problems related to the contract, for example, the performance of 
the agreement, its validity, its interpretation and its implications, all of which cannot be answered 
by the agreement.220 In ANACONDA-Iran, Inc. v. Iran 221 the arbitral tribunal refused to apply 
the pacta sunt servanda principle for which the claimant had argued.  The tribunal stated that 
“the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda is not a rule which, per se, suffices to resolve the remaining 
issues raised in this case”.222 Another criticism persistently raised against this theory that the 
validity of an agreement must be based on an external legal system, whether national or 
international. It is this legal system which describes the route to be followed in order for it to be 
valid and functional.223 Lord McNair had claimed that a contract can be exclusive of any legal 
system. This approach was rejected by the arbitrator in the ARAMCO Case.224 The sole arbitrator 
Professor Sauser, who was the sole arbitrator, said that “It is obvious that no contract can exist in 
vacuo, i.e., without being based on a legal system.”225 Mann likewise did not believe that the 
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parties’ freedom can found in isolation from the legal system “which grant(s) it or confer(s) any 
measure of sovereignty upon the contracting parties”226 
In short, the lex contractus theory is unacceptable within the legal community because it fails 
to justify the autonomy of lex contractus.  Furthermore, in making the contract entirely subject to 
the freedom of the parties there is a danger that this will impinge negatively on the weaker 
participants in the agreement.  
5.3.1.2.1.5. The National Law of the Host State: 
 Before the Second World War, state contracts concluded with foreign companies, and 
particularly with petroleum companies did not expressly apply national law as the applicable 
law.  That these agreements did in reality consider national law as the applicable law is apparent 
from the stabilisation clauses included in these agreements, which oblige the host state not to 
amend or abolish the contract unilaterally.227 It is well known that contracts did not contain 
clauses of this sort unless national law was the applicable law.228 The subjection of petroleum 
agreements to the national law of the host state is considered the main objective of a struggle 
engaged in by developing countries in order to govern their contractual relationship with the 
petroleum companies.  The host states claim that they are entitled for several reasons to apply 
their own national law.  They point to the significance of the fact that the physical existence of 
the investment is in the host state and that the contract will be carried out in the host state so that 
there is a strong connection between the petroleum agreement and the national law of the host 
state.229 Other considerations relate to foreign investors who accept to apply the national law of 
the host state when concluding an agreement.230 In addition, it is argued that foreign companies 
are subject to the law of the host state with regard to taxes and fees and the criminal code and so 
why, they ask, is that law excluded when the matter is the contract itself?  
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However, the notion of applying the national law of the host state is not well received by the 
petroleum companies, who claim that petroleum projects are linked to economic risk and that 
this risk is increased when the municipal law of the host state is applied to petroleum 
agreements.231 In addition, subjecting petroleum agreements to the national law of the host state 
places these agreements in danger of being amended or abolished unilaterally by the host state.232 
There is also the criticism that the national law of the host state is insufficiently mature to govern 
such agreements. This criticism was enhanced by the arbitral award in the ARAMCO Case.233  
Here, Saudi Arabian national law was excluded because it was deemed to be too undeveloped to 
govern the petroleum agreement.234 Therefore, foreign petroleum companies attempted to evade 
the application of the national law of the host state by subjecting petroleum agreements to 
international law.  However, this option did not gain acceptance since, petroleum companies are 
neither an international person nor an organisation, and therefore the logical choice would be to 
apply the municipal law of the host state.  This was the view that prevailed in the Serbian Loans 
case, heard by the Permanent Court of International Justice.  The judgment stated that: “(...) any 
contract which is not a contract between States in their capacity as subjects of international law is 
based on the municipal law of some country.”235 The United Nations also supported the 
application of the national law of the host state, especially in cases involving natural resources.  
A controversial General Assembly United Nations Resolution declared that foreign investment 
should be governed by municipal state law exclusively.236 This perspective was strongly 
supported by OPEC in a Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy.  This statement urged 
OPEC members to govern the petroleum agreement by asserting the national law of the host state 
as the applicable law in petroleum agreements, on the grounds that, since these states are the 
owners of the natural resources and so their laws should have priority.237  
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 Although Iraq retained the petroleum agreement arbitration clause, it stipulated that Iraqi 
law should be the applicable law of petroleum agreements.  The Iraqi Model Technical Service 
Contract, Article 37 (1), declared that “this contract shall be governed, interpreted, and construed 
and the rights and obligations of the parties determined in accordance with the laws of the 
Republic of Iraq.”  The Iraqi DLOG, Article 39 (1), made provision for the resolution of disputes 
in accordance with Iraqi law and for the application of Iraqi law in petroleum agreements.  The 
present author believes that the time is ripe for the enactment of an oil and gas law which reflects 
Iraq’s aspirations and prospects.  Such a law would also embody the developmental and 
economical aims of the Iraqi petroleum sector.  With regard to mineral resources, Chinese 
municipal law will apply exclusively in petroleum agreements Article 12 of the Equity Joint 
Venture Implementing Regulations state that “(…….) [t]he resolution of disputes arising there 
under shall be governed by the Chinese law”.  
Article 10 of the UAE Civil Law declared that UAE Law was to be regarded as the 
authoritative source for the governance of relationships in conflicts of law.238  
Can Iraqi Law Function Adequately as Substantive Law?  
The author believes that most host states in general, and Iraq in particular, have tried to 
develop and update their national laws and to adopt developed concepts with regard to 
investment in general and mineral resources in particular in order to attract and encourage 
foreign investors and also to avoid any allegations from these investors that their national laws 
are not adequate to the task of governing petroleum agreements.  The charge made against 
national law that it is inadequate is no longer acceptable.  Since 2003, Iraq has sought to update 
and reform its national law with regard to petroleum agreements and has tried to pass new oil 
and gas laws which recognise arbitration as a means of resolving disputes amicably.  Moreover, 
applying the national law of the host state avoids problems arising from the ambiguities or want 
of detail which may be encountered in alternative systems such as transnational law or general 
principles of law.  The national law may be considered more effective and more capable of 
resolving any problems which arise within the negotiation.  National law has the capacity to 
address issues which cannot be resolved by other legal systems, such as questions of consent and   
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interpretation and the implications of the contract.  Furthermore the host state tried to promulgate 
legislation containing provisions reflecting its interest in protecting its natural resources. 
5.3.1.2.2. Petroleum Arbitration in Practice:  
 Subjecting petroleum agreements to the national law of the host state is widely favoured by 
developing countries, and is supported by United Nations resolutions and the OPEC Declaration.  
For legal and political reasons, many arbitral tribunals are reluctant to apply national law to 
petroleum agreements.  They give various reasons for choosing alternative systems, claiming for 
example that the national law is legally inadequate or that is not consistent with public order.    
In the Abu Dhabi case 239 that country’s national law was excluded as the applicable law by 
Lord Asquith, the sole arbitrator in the case.  He justified the rejection of Abu Dhabi municipal 
law, although he recognised its priority in application.  He declared Abu Dhabi law too primitive 
and inconsistent to be used in an advanced form of commercial agreement.240 He held that “it 
would be fanciful to suggest that in this very primitive region there is any body of legal 
principles applicable to the construction of modern commercial instruments.”241 He added that 
the agreement itself had referred to “the application of principles rooted in good sense and 
common practice of generality of civilized nations - a sort of modem law of nature.”242 
Furthermore, he believed that the parties’ agreement was intended to exclude any application of 
national law “I do not think that on this point there is any conflict between the parties.”243  
 Basing his judgment on these considerations, Lord Asquith proceeded to exclude the 
competent Abu Dhabi municipal law of merits of dispute and applied instead the English 
municipal law of petroleum company contracts, despite the fact that he found English municipal 
law inapplicable to this and relied instead on some rules related to that law which were “so 
firmly grounded in reason, as to form part of this broad body of jurisprudence” 244 
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It seems that Lord Asquith justified his decision on the grounds of the deficiency of the 
municipal law of the host state which made it unsuited to govern such a modern transaction.  The 
author believes that any legal system, however close it is to perfection, will encounter issues 
beyond its competence.  It can however, repair its shortcomings by adaptive legislation.  In the 
case of Abu Dhabi municipal law it would have been possible for it to assert its legal relevance 
by employing the backup resources of the law.  So, an arbitrator should not exclude the 
municipal law under inadequate consideration of the municipal law Municipal law should not 
have been excluded in this case, since; the arbitrator could have sought out supplementary legal 
resources to compensate for any inadequacies.  Unfortunately, he then the decision’s reasoning 
indicates that possessed an insufficient knowledge of Islamic law, which has viable theories of 
contract and obligation which would have been to an extent suitable for the legal governance of 
such a case. 
An approach similar to that followed in the Abu Dhabi case can be found in Ruler of Qatar 
v. International Maritime Oil Company.245 In this case, the municipal law of Qatar was 
excluded as the applicable law under the same considerations as those of the Abu Dhabi award.  
The arbitrator, Sir Alfred Bucknill, chose to apply the general principles of law because he 
considered that the Islamic law of the host state, Qatar, was not adequate for the governance of 
the petroleum agreement.  He decided instead that the parties regulate their agreement in 
accordance with “principles of justice, equity and good conscience”246  
It is worth mentioning that, at the beginning that the arbitrator enumerated several facts 
which weighed heavily in favour of Qatar municipal law: the subject matter of the case was 
located in Qatar, one of the parties was the Ruler of Qatar and the agreement had been written in 
the Arabic language.247  However, all these facts were discounted.  Therefore, Qatar law was 
excluded from the case because was not adequate to govern petroleum agreement.   
In the Sapphire case, 248 the sole arbitrator, Swiss Federal Judge Pierre Cavin, noted that the 
parties did not express their choice of applicable law.  Consequently, he undertook the task of 
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discovering principles common to the national laws of both parties.249 However, despite evidence 
and indications favoring the application of Iranian law, such as that the location of both the lex 
loci contractus and the lex loci executionis being Iran, the arbitrator concluded they intended to 
exclude the application of Iranian law facts and applied general principles of law.250  The 
arbitrator draws from Lord McNair’s and Jessup’s perspectives to support his justification of the 
arbitral award.251  Judge Cavin stated that: 
It is quite clear from the above that the parties intended to exclude the application 
of Iranian law.  But they have not chosen another positive legal system, and this 
omission is on all the evidence deliberate.  All the connecting factors [the diverse 
nationalities of the parties, force majeure clause, capital risk], point to the fact that the 
parties therefore intended to submit the interpretation and performance of their contract 
to the principles of law generally recognized by civilized nations.252 
The sole arbitrator also cited Article 37 (2) of the agreement which provided that the force 
majeure clause should be determined in accordance with the principles of public international 
law.253  In addition, he relied on Article 38 (1) of the same agreement, which excluded any 
application of Iranian law and applied the principles created through the common practice of 
“civilized nations”. 254 Accordingly, if Article 37 (2) is combined with Sub paragraph (1) the 
result “can reasonably be regarded as having a wider application than simply referring to force 
majeure. It is possible to find in it further evidence of the intention of the parties to submit the 
interpretation and performance of their agreement to the general principles of law.”255  
Moreover, the arbitrator relied on previous petroleum agreements concluded by Iranian National 
Oil Company (NIOC) and other petroleum companies.  As with the Sapphire Company 
agreement, these agreements applied general principles of international law.256  
However, this case award showed that the main reason behind the exclusion of Iranian law 
was the protection of the petroleum company’s interests.  The arbitrator made apparent when 
stated that: 
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(…) [t]he foreign company was bringing financing and technical assistance to Iran, 
which involved it in investments, responsibilities, and considerable risks.  It therefore 
seems natural that they should be protected against any legislative changes which might 
alter the character of the contract,(………) This could not be guaranteed to them by the 
outright application of Iranian Law, which it is within the power of the Iranian State to 
change.257 
It is apparent from the above that the arbitrator saw the exclusion of the national law as 
providing protection for the foreign company.  He asserted that it was in the interest of both 
parties to apply the general principles of law separate from the peculiarities of the municipal law 
of the host state which often is unable to offer suitable solutions, especially when the contract 
performance of the state is unknown to the other party.258 In appears that the arbitrator excluded 
the national law under the implied idea of public order.   
 The Libyan nationalisation cases259 are considered remarkable in that they rejected 
national law as the applicable law and instead applied international law.  The dispute in these 
cases arose from the same cause, the nationalisation of Libyan oil.  In BP v. Libya260 the 
arbitrator Lagergren depended on Article 28 (7) of the petroleum agreement concluded between 
the parties, which stipulated the application of principles common to both Libyan law and 
international law and the application of general principles of law in the event of no such common 
principles being found.  261 The arbitrator sought these common principles but was unable to find 
them and so he decided to apply general principles of law.262  
The arbitrator in Texaco and California Asiatic Oil Company v. Libya 263 determined the 
applicable law by beginning with the question of which law should be applicable to the contract 
and asking whether parties have the right to identify the law governing their agreement according 
to the principle of party autonomy.  The arbitrator, Professor Dupuy, answered the above 
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question with the assertion that, in international contracts, the principle of the parties’ autonomy 
means that all legal systems may apply.264  The arbitrator saw the necessity for determining the 
legal foundation for applying the doctrine of the parties’ autonomy in the current case, then made 
a distinction between the law governing the contract and the law which gave the contract its 
binding power, which was international law.   
The arbitrator concluded that “the reference which is made mainly to the principles of 
international law and, secondarily, to the general principles of law, must have as a consequence 
the application of international law to the legal relationship between the parties.”265  
Although the arbitrator gave justifications for his decision, it appears to the present author 
that the main intention which lay behind it was to protect the foreign company from a unilateral 
change to the law by the host state.  As Professor Dupuy himself stated, there was a “need for the 
private contracting party to be protected against unilateral and abrupt modifications of the 
legislation in the contracting State.”266 
At the beginning of the LIAMCO case267, the arbitrator emphasized that the legal systems of 
the two parties were different, hence if there was no express choice of applicable law it would be 
unfair to choose one and exclude the other.268  The arbitrator decided therefore that when one of 
the parties to the dispute is foreign, the tribunal should be guided by general principles of 
conflict law related to private international law269 According to these principles the applicable 
law is the law chosen by the parties expressly or implicitly in accordance with the principle of 
the autonomy of parties.270  The arbitrator based his decision on Article 28 (7) of the agreement 
between Libya and the Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO).  He stated that the proper 
law for governing the concession agreement between the parties 
 (…..) [i]s in the first place the law of Libya when consistent with international law, 
and subsidarily the general principles of law.  Hence, the principal proper law of the 
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contract in the concession was Libyan domestic law.  But it was specified in the 
Agreements that this covers only "the principles of law of Libya common to the 
principles of international law”.  Thus, it excludes any part of Libyan law which is in 
conflict with the principles of international law.271  
The arbitrator decided that the applicable law was Libyan law after excluding those 
principles which were not consistent with international law.272 It is worth mentioning that the 
arbitrator stated that “Libyan law in general and Islamic law in particular have common rules and 
principles with international law, and provide for the application of custom and equity as 
subsidiary sources.”273 
In the ARAMCO case, 274 the arbitral tribunal began with the question of which law was to 
govern the contractual relationship.275 Article IV of the arbitration agreement contained the 
solution agreed by the parties. This Article decided that the proceedings would be:276  
a) [i]n accordance with the Saudi Arabian law, as hereinafter defined, insofar as 
matters within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia are concerned; 
(b) [i]n accordance with the law deemed by the arbitration tribunal to be applicable 
insofar as matters beyond the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia are concerned.277 
The arbitral tribunal confirmed that the applicable law agreed by the parties was compatible 
with the principles of private international law observed in the majority of civilized nations and 
therefore the arbitral tribunal must observe that law.278 However, the parties did not specify the 
application of a sole law: they agreed to apply the law determined by the arbitral tribunal with 
regard issues not within the scope of Saudi Arabian jurisdiction.279  The arbitral tribunal 
excluded the lex contractus theory from the scope of the application because it believed that the 
contract could not be created from a vacuum but must be based on a particular legal system.280  
In addition, the arbitral tribunal excluded international law as the applicable law because the 
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concession agreement of 1933 has been concluded between the state and private foreign 
companies and was not concluded between two states, in accordance with the ruling in the 
Serbian Loans case.281  
The arbitral tribunal shows a different solution was reached by applying private international 
law.  It explained that, according to the principles of private international law, any contract 
which has an international character should first be subject to the law chosen by the parties 
according to the doctrine of the autonomy of parties.282 If the parties’ express choice it would 
depend on the law presumably proposed by the parties.283 It also explained the subsidiary laws to 
which the parties referred could be the “the common lex patriae of the parties, or to the lex loci 
contractus, or to the lex domicilii debitoris, or to the lex loci executionis, or to the law of the 
country with which the contract has the closest connection.”284 In addition, the arbitral tribunal 
explained that the contract could be split into different parts and each part subjected to different 
legal systems.285  
The arbitral tribunal confirmed that the concession agreement is considered as international 
law but then the law chosen by the parties should apply.  It was considered that the Saudi law 
chosen by the parties was a suitable choice because it is the law of lex loci contractus and also 
the lex loci executionis.286  
However, the arbitral tribunal decided to apply the “solutions prevailing in British and Swiss 
practise (.........) this is the law of the country with which the contract has the closest natural and 
effective connection”287 in the matters which were not within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabian 
law, whereas the issues related to private law would be principally subject to Saudi law.  This 
law contains rules of interpretation and general principles of law and usages followed in the 
petroleum industry. 
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 However, Saudi Arabian law was applied only in some areas.  Interestingly, the contract 
was split and each part subjected to different law.  The partial application of the municipal law 
implied that the municipal law of Saudi Arabia was deemed to be inadequate as applicable law.  
In the Aminoil case, 288 the arbitral tribunal confirmed that Kuwaiti law applied to several 
issues, “over which it is the law most directly involved”.289 However, the Aminoil tried to have 
recourse to transnational arbitration and apply international law, it relying on the argument that 
petroleum agreements should apply transnational law.  However, the arbitral tribunal considered 
that Kuwaiti law is developed the Kuwait government had announced that the international law 
is to be considered a part of domestic law and the general principles of law are considered a part 
of public international law.  Also it refers to the application of these principles on petroleum 
agreements, in fact, according to the agreement terms which they contain.290  The arbitral 
tribunal based its argument on Article 3 (2) of the agreement between the parties which declared 
that: 
The law governing the substantive issues between the parties shall be determined 
by the tribunal, having regard to the quality of the parties, the transnational character of 
their relations and the principles of law and practice prevailing in the modem world.291  
As a result of these arguments, the arbitral tribunal applied Kuwaiti law. 
Comment: 
  In all the above mentioned cases, there is apparently no uniform and fixed approach to the 
application of substantive law to petroleum agreements.  It is noted that in several cases, such as 
Abu Dhabi, the Ruler of Qatar, Sapphire and the Libyan nationalisation cases the national law 
was removed from the ambit of application as substantive law and the general principles of law 
recognized by “civilized nations” was applied. If there are civilized nations there are by 
implication uncivilized nations.  In all these cases the municipal law was excluded because the 
arbitral tribunal considered that these laws were unsuitable for the governance of such developed 
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agreements.  The justification used by the arbitral tribunals in all these instances was vague and 
did not define the meaning of the term “unsuitable” in the context of international transactions.  
Does it mean that these national laws were excluded because they did not possess an advanced 
standard of development in line with international law or does it mean there were shortcomings 
in its rules or did it mean there were cultured objections policy?  Therefore the exclusion of 
national law on the grounds of unsuitability lends an arbitrary quality to the award  
In the Sapphire and Texaco cases the arbitrators revealed that the main reason behind the 
removal of the national laws from the sphere of applicability was that these laws would threaten 
the interests of the petroleum companies in the event of a host state unilaterally altering its own 
legislation.  The arbitral tribunals therefore wished to replace national law with international law 
In some instances, the arbitrator based his decision on the presumed intentions of the parties.  
If the parties did not refer to the application of national law, it was assumed that they did not 
wish to apply it and that they preferred the general principles of international law recognized by 
“civilized states”.  This approach is evident in the Sapphire case, when the arbitrator excluded 
Iranian law.  However, the absence  of reference to national law by the parties does not mean that 
the parties desire to exclude it but, as explained in earlier sections of this chapter, the parties did 
not give much attention to determining the applicable law, due to the rush to complete the 
negotiations and sign the contract. 
The partial application of municipal law by restricting it to some specific matters and 
excluding it from others is another way to arrange the exclusion of national law.  This practice 
was evident in the ARAMCO case.  
5.3.1.2.3. The National Law and the International Organizations Approach: 
Developing countries strove vigorously to insert state contracts in general and petroleum 
agreement in particular into their national legal systems and resisted any attempt by the 
petroleum companies to extract these agreements from the sphere of national law transfer them 
to the sphere of international law.  The resistance crystallised into the policies of the OPEC and 
the General Assembly of United Nations.  Their resolutions were the outcome of that striving 
209 
 
and became the basis for much petroleum legislation292 and the agreements293 negotiated in the 
member nations. 
5.3.1.2.3.1. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): 
 OPEC’s members have championed the localization of petroleum agreements, and oppose 
the application of public international law or the use of legal systems other than the municipal 
law of the host state.  OPEC’s Conference XVI in 1968 led to formulation of a resolution dealing 
with the settlement of investment disputes. It provided that:  
Except as otherwise provided for in the legal system of a member country, all 
disputes arising between the government and operators shall fall exclusively within the 
jurisdiction of the competent national courts, as and when established.294  
After this declaration, OPEC members continued to stipulate that their own national laws 
were to be the laws applicable to their agreements with foreign petroleum companies and they 
continued to emphasize the importance of re-localisation in state contracts.295 In Iran, the 
service contract agreed in 1978 between the NIOC and the Ultramar Company declared that 
“This service contract shall be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the law of 
Iran”.296 Following the same pattern, the agreement between Saudi Arabia and ENI provides 
that “the right of the second party (ENI) hereunder shall be exercised in a lawful manner, 
subject to the laws of Saudi Arabia”.297 Similar stipulations were included in changes 
concluded the legislation of many host states which adopted the OPEC resolution, for 
example, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya.298 
                                                          
292 For example, Article 13 of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s System of Foreign Investment as formulated by 
Royal Decree of 11 April 2000.  
293 The production sharing agreement between Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and Ashland Oil Nigeria 
Limited on 12 June 1973.   
294 Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries, Resolution No. XIV.90, 1968 OPEC 
Conference, Vienna, Austria, reprinted in OPEC Official Resolutions and Press Releases, 1960- 1990, 63.  
295 Lawrence Atsegbua, ‘International arbitration of Oil Investment Disputes: The Severability Doctrine and 
Applicable Law Issues Revisited’ (1993) 5 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 634. 
296 Service contract agreement between (NIOC) and Ultramar Company in 1978, cited in J. Kuusi, The Host State 
and the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of Legal Relationships (Hampshire: Saxon House 1979) 140. 
297 Lawrence Atsegbua, ‘International arbitration of Oil Investment Disputes: The Severability Doctrine and 
Applicable Law Issues Revisited’ (1993) 5 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 634. 
298 ibid 654. 
210 
 
The OPEC resolution therefore was the inspiration for the enhancing of OPEC members’ 
confidence in their own internal laws in the governance of agreements with foreign 
companies.  It strengthened their ability to influence outcomes which had been weakened by 
the exclusion of municipal law from the arbitral tribunals in most cases.  As Hasan Zakariya, 
the secretary of OPEC, stated:   
[t]he OPEC countries considered their internal laws were sufficiently mature to govern 
the oil agreements and to provide adequate procedures for dispute settlement and (that) 
(.... ) there was no reason to continue the tradition of divorcing oil contracts from 
domestic legal systems.299  
5.3.1.2.3.1.2. The United Nations 
Another international organization, the United Nations, supports the re-localisation doctrine 
in state contracts dealing with mineral resources.  Some important UN resolutions helped 
motivate developing countries to re-localize their petroleum agreements.  In 1962, the United 
Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 1803, on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources (hereinafter PSNR).300  Article 3 of this resolution reads “In cases where authorization 
is granted, the capital imported and the earnings on that capital shall be governed by the terms 
thereof, by the national legislation in force, and by international law”.301 This controversial 
resolution confirmed the rights of the host states to have control over their natural resources and 
have permanent sovereignty over theses resources.  In addition, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations adopted further resolutions: Resolution No. 3171 (in 1973)302 and Resolution No. 
3201 (in 1974),303 which established a new international economic order.  Resolution 3201 
(NEIO) provided for each state to have the permanent and complete sovereignty over its natural 
resources and all economic activities on its territory.  In addition, the state may protect these 
resources by utilizing them in an appropriate manner, and this autonomy would empower the 
state with the right to nationalise its resources. Article 2 (2) (c) of United Nations Resolution No. 
3281304 of the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (herein after CERDS) 
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provided that: “In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it 
shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalising State and by its tribunals.”   
All of the abovementioned resolutions confirm the priority of the law of the host state in the 
governance of state contracts, particularly petroleum agreements, and cuts any possible links 
between these contracts and international law which means the concept of the 
internationalisation of state contracts concept is no longer viable. 
   5.4. Conclusion: 
The applicable law is the most critical legal issue in the petroleum process, both in the law 
governing the procedures and in substantive issues.  There is no universal or uniform approach to 
regulating this issue. 
Although Iraqi law has not been regulating international arbitration, it recognises the 
principle of the autonomy of the parties with regard to the applicable law of petroleum 
arbitration procedures.  The arbitrators can also determine this law in cases of there is no express 
choices made by the contractual parties, although this freedom is restricted by mandatory rules 
and the public policy of Iraq. 
The law governing the place of arbitration has a great impact on the law governing the 
arbitration procedures.  In this regard there are two dominants theories, delocalisation theory and 
seat theory.  In some arbitral tribunals, the procedures are detached and free from any application 
of the national law of the arbitration place or any supervision or control on the part of the 
domestic law of the place of arbitration.  This approach is applied in accordance with the theory 
of delocalization which denies any relationship between the arbitration procedures and the place 
of arbitration.  However, this theory has had limited success because it could not protect the 
developing countries’ interests and is viewed by these countries as a theory designed to protect 
the interests of the petroleum companies by removing the arbitral award from any supervision by 
the domestic legal institutions.  The seat theory enhances the relationship between the place of 
arbitration and the law governing the procedures.  Accordingly, the arbitral tribunal procedures 
should subjected to the supervision and control of a national court, where arbitration is 
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conducted to ensure that the arbitral award is both effective and enforceable.  This theory has 
won an established place in international conventions and national laws.   
The applicable law of petroleum agreements is not devoid of controversy.  This controversy 
causes divisions when attempts are made to determine the applicable law of petroleum 
agreements.  The division has more than a merely theoretical aspect. It also involves practical 
aspects such as the arbitral tribunal awards when there is the intention to apply international law 
and remove agreements from the ambit of national law.  Most of these awards have not applied 
the national law of the host state on the grounds of the insufficiency of the municipal law of the 
host state.  However, this consideration dissembles the most important motivation, which is to 
protect the petroleum companies’ interests from any change which might occur in the legislative 
policy of the host state, for example nationalisation.  However, most host states now try to 
develop and update their involvement laws and include within their legislation modern 
conceptions for the protection of foreign companies, such as like stabilization clauses and 
adequate compensation.  Therefore, any criticism of national law is no longer acceptable as a 
justification for completely evading the application of national law.  This shift in attitude has 
been upheld by United Nations Resolutions No. 1803, 3171, 3201 and 3281 and also the 
declarations of OPEC.     
Iraq is one of those countries which have tried to update its laws regarding national 
involvement.  Nonetheless, although Iraq has promulgated and updated several laws related to 
the investment sector but there is still no regulation covering the petroleum sector of the 
economy.  The time is ripe for the promulgation of such laws for the governance of the most 
important sector in Iraqi economy, the petroleum sector, and for the regulation of petroleum 
agreements.  Iraqi law should govern the substantive issues in arbitration, which is also the 
conclusion embodied in Article 39 of DLOG. 
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Chapter Six: Enforcement of Arbitral Award 
6.1. Introduction: 
The parties’ aim in the arbitration process is to resolve the dispute which arises between 
them through the rendering of an award by an arbitral tribunal.  Therefore, if the arbitral award is 
not recognised by the losing party the arbitration loses its value as a method of resolving the 
dispute.  The announcement of the award by the arbitrator ends one important part of the 
arbitration process and a new and critical stage of this process begins, which is enforcement of 
the arbitral award.  At this stage of the arbitration, the winning party will seek to enforce the 
arbitral award by means of a court of law, which may enforce it or set it aside, according to the 
state enforcement laws of the state involved; while the losing party will be subjected to the 
arbitral tribunal award or may seek to challenge this award.  Therefore, the foreign investor is not 
only conscious of the arbitration laws in the host state but will also be aware of the capacity of 
the host state’s laws to bring about the enforcement of such awards.  
In Iraq, enforcement of foreign arbitral awards faces some challenges.  These challenges 
originate in the absence of arbitration law and enforcement law.  There is no article in the CCP 
and the accompanying laws which provides explicitly for the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards in Iraq.1  This has led to a critical lacuna in the legal system which governs such awards.  
There has been a consequent diversity of opinion regarding the enforcement of such awards in 
Iraq.  Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is jeopardized since there are no texts under Iraqi 
law for the enforcement of such awards.  Despite Iraqi law provided that petroleum disputes can 
be resolved by arbitration, it does not design any clear mechanism to enforce petroleum arbitral 
award. 
Given the importance and sensitivity of the enforcement issue, international efforts have 
been made to regulate it.  The enforcement of arbitral awards was regulated by bilateral 
agreement, regional conventions and multilateral conventions.  The Geneva Convention of 1927, 
the New York Convention of 1958 and the ICSID Convention are considered to be important 
conventions in this regard. The New York Convention is recognised as the most significant 
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convention for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  Many states are 
members of this convention, which tries to unify the rules governing enforcement issues by 
adopting this convention’s provisions and integrating them into the national laws of the member 
states.  However, despite its importance, Iraq has not yet signed or ratified the New York 
Convention.  Therefore, this chapter will discuss Iraqi laws involving the enforcement of foreign 
judgments and also the international and regional conventions that Iraq has joined and the ways 
in which these conventions affect Iraqi law.  Furthermore, it examines the prospects for the 
enforcement of foreign petroleum arbitration awards through the facilities provided by Iraqi law.  
This chapter explains and addresses Iraqi courts’ capacity to enforce foreign arbitral award and 
the role which they play in that enforcement.  
The endeavour to enforce foreign arbitral awards against a state or its entities is considered a 
sensitive and difficult task, more so than the enforcement of such an award against private 
individuals.  This is because such enforcement collides with state sovereign immunity, especially 
when the enforcement involves arbitration awards in petroleum disputes.  Many legal systems 
deal with national resources, particularly gas and petroleum, as sovereignty issues and they are 
subject to this doctrine.  This chapter will examine this doctrine under Iraqi law and how Iraq 
deals with this issue.   
 Sovereign immunity is not the only hindrance to the enforcement of arbitral awards.  The 
public policy of the state is also considered to be an obstacle facing the parties.  The latter issue 
does not have a clear or specific scope and moreover the contents of this conception are not 
known.  Public policy is of different kinds, namely domestic, international and transnational.  
This diversity in public policy determines the availability of the international elements in 
transactions.  The current chapter dedicates a separate section to addressing this issue and 
explains how Iraqi law deals with public policy.     
This chapter will seek to examine whether the current provisions of enforcement foreign 
judgments is sufficient to deal with foreign petroleum arbitral awards or these provisions need 
update and amend. 
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      6.2. The Grounds for Enforcing Arbitral Awards under Iraqi Law, UAE and 
PRC: 
Notwithstanding the fact that Iraqi law professes to enforce foreign judgments, it does not 
refer explicitly to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.2  Iraq has no law regulating the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  Despite Iraqi Investment Law No. 13 of 
2006,3 referring to arbitration as a method to resolve disputes arising from investment 
agreements, it has not designed any mechanism to enforce foreign arbitral awards.  The silence 
of Iraqi law regarding the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards has created differences of 
opinion in this matter.  According to one opinion,4 the Iraqi legal system does not recognise and 
cannot enforce foreign arbitral awards.  This is because the system does not explicitly regulate 
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, either in the Iraqi Implementing Law or in the Iraqi 
CCP.  In addition, the foreign judgment should be final in the country where it is rendered in 
order for it to be in force under Iraqi law.5  This opinion derives from Article 272 (1) of the Iraqi 
CCP which provides that:  
 
According to the request of either party, and after the payment of specified fees, the 
arbitrators’ award shall not be implemented by the executive departments whether the 
arbitrators who issued it were appointed by court or by way of mutual agreement, unless 
the competent court of approved it.6 
 
So, according to this view the foreign arbitral award must be confirmed by the foreign court 
before the foreign arbitral award can be enforced in accordance with the Enforcement Law of 
Foreign Judgments in Iraq No.30 of 1928 (hereinafter ELFJ).  Taking another view, Haddad 
agrees that it cannot be inferred from the provisions of the relevant Iraq laws that the legislation 
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is intended to deal with the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.7  However, Haddad states 
that the foreign arbitral award rendered in foreign countries may be enforceable in Iraq pursuant 
to the conventions, if any, to which Iraq and those countries are parties.8 
A different line of argument posits that the foreign arbitral award is to be considered as a 
national arbitral award and is consequently enforceable under Iraqi Law, pursuant to Articles 
272-274 of the CCP, which deal with the enforcement of arbitral awards.  These provisions are 
general: they do not distinguish between domestic or international arbitration and so contain 
provisions for regulating both types of arbitration.9   
A third position on10 argues that foreign arbitral awards should be treated like foreign 
judgments and can be enforced according to Iraqi implementing laws.  The proponents of this 
view argue that the foreign arbitral award may have foreign judgment status in the country where 
it is rendered through its confirmation it by the court of the state where the foreign arbitral award 
was rendered.11 It then becomes tantamount to a foreign judgment and is consequently subject to 
the ELFJ in Iraq.   
The present author agrees with the third opinion and argues that foreign arbitral awards can 
be enforced according to the Iraqi ELFJ.  It could be said that the condition provided by Article 
272, which stipulates that the arbitral award should be confirmed by the competent court in order 
to be enforceable was designed to apply to national arbitration.  Also this article gives no 
indication that the Iraqi CCP is intended to prohibit enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
absolutely:  it stipulates that this award should be confirmed by a competent court which can 
enforce it.  In addition, the first opinion argues that the arbitral award should be final in order to 
be enforceable under Iraqi enforcement law this condition cannot be realized with respect to 
foreign arbitral awards.  However, it could be argued that foreign arbitral awards in some cases 
                                                          
7 Hamzeh Haddad, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Award in Jordan and Iraq’ (A Lecture addressed to the 
IBA Conference) Bahrain (5-8/3/1989). 
8 ibid.  
918 ،1977 ،توريب ،ميكحتلا يف زيجولا ،نمؤملا نيسح 
   [Hussein Al- Mu’men, Brief in Arbitration (Beirut 1977) 18].  
10 ibid;  1973،212،دادغب ،نراقملا نوناقلاو يقارعلا نينوناقلل اقفو صاخلا يلودلا نوناقلا ،ميركلا دبع حودمم 
      [Mamduh Abdul Kareem, Private International Law According to Iraqi Law and Comparative Law (Baghdad 
1973) 212]. 
11 ibid. 
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can be final by dint of their confirmation in the court where they are rendered and, in ICSID 
awards, foreign arbitral awards are treated as final judgments.12  Moreover, enforcement of 
foreign arbitral award has significant impact on the arbitration process.  Hence, the success of 
any arbitration law depends on the facilities and mechanisms of enforcement offered by the 
enforcement laws.  Therefore, the success of any arbitration law in Iraq depends on enforcement 
laws which revive this process and at the same time encourage foreign investors. So, the 
promulgation of arbitration law will not be effective unless the Iraqi ELFJ is amended by the 
addition of new articles explicitly regulating the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards or 
promulgating new laws involving the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.    
Article 16 of the Iraqi Civil Law No.40 of 195113 provides that judgment rendered by a 
foreign court would not be enforceable in Iraq unless it is considered a foreign judgment 
according to the relevant law.  The Iraqi Civil Law provision is confirmed by Article 12 of Iraqi 
Implementing Law No.45 of 1980 which also stipulates what should be considered a foreign 
judgment according to the Iraqi Enforcement Law No. 30 of 1928 or international convention 
that applies in Iraq.  Consequently, the law governing foreign judgments and foreign arbitral 
awards would be the Iraqi ELFJ.  According to this law, the judgment is considered foreign 
under Iraqi law if it is rendered by a foreign court according to Article 1 of Iraqi ELFJ, which 
defines a foreign judgment as “A judgment which is rendered by a non- Iraqi court”.14  So, the 
Iraqi law depends on a territorial criterion to distinguish foreign awards from national awards.15 
Based on this criterion adopted by Iraqi law, arbitration awards rendered on Iraqi territory are 
considered national even if rendered by foreign courts established in Iraq, whereas the legal 
                                                          
12 Article 54 (1) of ICSID which provided that “Each contracting state shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to 
this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as 
if it were a final judgment of a court in that state”. 
13 Iraqi Civil Law No.40 of 1951 published in the Iraqi Official Gazette, Issue 3015 on 8 December 1951, 243. 
14 Translated from Arabic to English by Hamzeh Haddad, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Award in Jordan 
and Iraq’ (A Lecture addressed to the IBA Conference) Bahrain (5-8/3/1989). 
15 This was criterion adopted by New York Convention 1958 in Article I (3)  
     When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension under Article X hereof, any 
State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply the Convention to the recognition and 
enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State. It may also declare that it 
will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of le; al relationships, whether contractual or 
not, which are considered as commercial under the national law of the State making such declaration. 
The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, 
adopted on 3 May 1956, entered into force on 7 June 1959, UNTS vol 330, 3.   
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criterion states that the judgment is considered foreign if it is based on a foreign element, that is, 
if one of the parties is of foreign nationality, notwithstanding the place where the court resides.   
The UAE provides explicitly in its laws for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  Articles 
235 and 238 of Federal Civil Procedures Law No 11 of 199216 provide for the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards.  Article 235 (1) provides that “Judgments and orders passed in a foreign 
country may be ordered for execution and implementation within UAE under the same 
conditions provided for in the law of foreign state for the execution of judgments and orders 
passed in the state”. 17 
  PRC law avoids any diversity of opinion by referring to foreign arbitral awards expressly 
in Article 62 of the China Arbitration Law of 1994.18 This provides that: 
 The parties shall perform the arbitration award. If a party fails to perform the 
arbitration award, the other party may apply to the People’s Court for enforcement in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Law.  The People’s 
Court to which the application has been made shall enforce the award.19   
In addition to this article, China’s Law mentions foreign arbitral awards in Articles 257 and 
267 of PRC Civil Procedures Law of the People’s Republic of China 1991.20  
                                                          
16 The UAE Federal Civil Procedures Law No 11 of 1992 published in the Official Gazette No. 235 of 8 of March 
1992. 
17 The translation from Arbic to English is available at < http://www.diac.ae/idias/rules/uae/chapter4/> on 27 August 
2014.  
18 Adopted at the Ninth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress on August 31, 
1994 and promulgated by Order No.31 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on August 31, 1994. 
19 The English text is available at < http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> 
access on 17 of May 2014. 
20 Article 257 of PRC Civil Procedures Law of the People’s Republic of China 1991 provides that:  
      If one party fails to comply with the award made by a foreign-affair arbitration institution of the People’s 
Republic of China, the other party may apply for the enforcement of the award to the intermediate 
people’s court located in the place where the person against whom the application for the enforcement is 
made has his domicile or where the property of the person is located.   
The English text is available at < http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> 
access on 17 of May 2014. 
Article 267 of same law provided that:  
      If an award made by a foreign arbitration institution needs the recognition and enforcement of a people’s 
court of the People’s Republic of China, the party shall directly apply to the intermediate people’s court 
located in the place where the party subject to the enforcement has its domicile or where its property is 
located. The people’s court shall deal with the matter according to the relevant provisions of the 
international treaties concluded or acceded to by the People’s Republic of China or on the principle of 
reciprocity.  
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6.2.1. The Legal Basis for the Enforcement of Arbitral Foreign Awards under Iraqi Law, 
UAE and PRC: 
 The ELFJ regulates the enforcement of foreign judgments. It was the first law to deal with 
foreign judicial awards.  As argued previously, this law can apply to foreign arbitral awards.  It is 
designed to define foreign judgments and contains criteria for distinguishing foreign awards from 
national ones.  This law also details, in Article 6, the conditions that should be available in 
foreign judgments in order for them to be enforceable and, as argued previously, these conditions 
should be available also in foreign arbitral awards under Iraqi law.  Article 11 determines the 
scope of this law and the types of foreign judgment that it refers to.  Such judgments have to be 
“(a) foreign judgments issued in a country that has a bilateral agreement with Iraq, (b) and if 
such country is specifically named by Iraq regulations issued by the government, (c) and subject 
to a condition of reciprocity.”21   
The second law dealing with the enforcement of foreign judgment awards is the 
Implementing Law No 45 of 1980.22  Its Article 3 (2) shows the scope of this law.  This article 
states that “the law applies to foreign judicial decisions, which become enforceable in Iraq, 
subject to any applicable international agreement”.23 Article 12 of the above mentioned law 
refers to the conditions for the enforcement of foreign judicial awards.  Article 12 provides that 
“no foreign judgment will be enforceable in Iraq unless it is deemed enforceable in accordance 
with the law of enforcement of foreign judicial awards, or with an international agreement”. 
The law of the UAE regulates enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Federal Code of 
Civil Procedures Law No 11 of 1992, in Articles (235, 236, 237 and 238).  It shows the 
conditions that should be available in a foreign arbitral award for it to be enforceable.  The 
conditions are contained in article 235 of the current arbitration law.     
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The English text available at <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> 
access on 17 of May 2014. 
Adopted at the Fourth Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress and promulgated by Order No. 44 of the 
President of the People's Republic of China on April 9, 1991. 
21 Translation from Arabic to English by Hamzeh Haddad, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Award in Jordan 
and Iraq’ (A Lecture addressed to the IBA Conference) Bahrain (5-8/3/1989). 
22 Implementing Law No 45 of 1980 published in Iraqi Official Gazette issue 2762 on 17 May 1980, 444. 
23 The translation from arbic to English by Saleh Majid, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Arbitration Awards 
in Iraq’ (1998) International Trade Law Quarterly 173. 
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There were no provisions in Chinese law to regulate the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
award prior to 1982.  The enforcement of such awards until then depended entirely on voluntary 
acquiescence to the judgment by the party against whom the award had been granted, and 
sanctions for reinforcement were of an unofficial kind.24 In 1982, PRC promulgated the Trial 
Civil Procedure Law which was in then replaced by the Civil Procedures Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, 1992.  This law is considered to be an important step towards recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in China.25 It affirms the grounds for enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards, which are the bilateral agreements and the reciprocity principle.  Article 
204 of the Civil Procedures Law details these grounds.  The Chinese Arbitration Law of 1994, 
Article 62, also regulates foreign arbitral awards.  
6.2.2. The Conditions of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards under Iraqi Law, UAE and PRC:  
There are certain conditions stipulated by Iraqi law, UAE and PRC to enforce any foreign 
arbitral award and if any one of these conditions is not met the foreign arbitral award would be 
unenforceable.26  The Iraqi courts have the authority to check the presence of these conditions 
automatically in foreign arbitral awards even if the losing party does not submit its appeal 
against the award.27 These conditions are provided by Article 6, 8 and 11 of ELFJ and they will 
be discussed in the following paragraphs: 
6.2.2.1. Service of Notice: 
The Iraqi CCP gives the service notice great importance in any suit.  It is considered the 
basis of the suit’s legality and also gives validity to the suit procedures.  Iraqi law considers this 
makes to be related to public order.28 The party against whom the award is rendered must be 
notified by the foreign court about the action in sensible and sufficient ways.29 This party should 
be given sufficient notice of the arbitral process and it must be certain that the parties receive a 
                                                          
24 The translation from arbic to English by Saleh Majid, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Arbitration Awards 
in Iraq’ (1998) International Trade Law Quarterly 173.  
25 Jingzhou Tao, Arbitration Law and Practice in China (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2008) 160.  
26 Article 6 of the Iraqi ELFJ. 
27 ibid. 
28 Article 27 of Iraqi CCP. 
29 Article 6 (a) of Iraqi ELFJ. 
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fair hearing.30 A similar provision is found in the UAE Federal Civil Procedures Law No 11 of 
1991, Article 235 (c) which stipulates that the parties receive the proper notice of action.  The 
PRC Civil Procedures Law of 1991 also follows the same approach of Iraq and UAE Laws and 
stipulated that the parties should be noticed.31 
6.2.2.2. Jurisdiction:  
As noted earlier, the foreign arbitral award would be enforceable in Iraq if it is rendered by a 
foreign court which has territorial and subject matter jurisdiction.32 The jurisdiction and all 
procedures of the court are determined by the law of the country where the court located.33  Iraqi 
ELFJ considers the foreign court has the jurisdiction if one of these conditions is available.  
Article 7 of this law provided that: 
A) where the action relates to moveable or immovable things existing in that country, or 
B) it relates to a contract concluded in that country, or to be performed totally or 
partially in its territories, or  
C) it relates to acts done totally or partially in the said country, or  
D) where the judgment debtor has voluntarily appeared before the court of that country, 
or  
E) where he has agreed to the jurisdiction of the foreign court.34 
UAE law provides the same rule by stipulating that the foreign court must have the jurisdiction.35 
The PRC law does not explain this condition.   
 
                                                          
30 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
643.  
31 Article 258 (2)of PRC Civil Procedures Law of 1991 which provided that “the defendant is not duly notified of 
the appointment of the arbitrators or the arbitration proceedings, or the defendant fails to express his defense due 
to the reasons for which he is not held responsible”. 
32 Article 6 (b) of the Iraqi ELFJ. 
33 Article 28 of Iraqi Civil Code No 40 of 1951 provided that “The rules of competence (of courts) and all questions 
of procedures shall be governed by the law of the state wherein a suit is initiated or the proceedings have been 
commenced”. Translation from Arabic language to English language is available at < http://gjpi.org/library 
/primary/statutes/> accessed on 12 April 2014. 
34 Translated from Arabic to English by Hamzeh Haddad, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Award in Jordan 
and Iraq’ (A Lecture addressed to the IBA Conference) Bahrain (5-8/3/1989). 
  35 Article 235 (b) of UAE Federal Civil Procedures Law No 11 of 1992 provides that “Judgment or order was 
passed   by the competent court according to the law of the country in which it was passed”.   The translation from 
Arbic to English is available at < http://www.diac.ae/idias/rules/uae/chapter4/> on 27 August 2014. 
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6.2.2.3. Award Concerning a Debt or Sum of Money or Civil Compensation: 
The Iraqi ELFJ provides in Article 6 (c) that the foreign award will be enforceable if it 
concerns debt, a certain sum of money or civil compensation if the foreign judgment is rendered 
in regard to criminal action.  The enforcement of foreign awards is limited to the private law 
domain, such as judgments related to civil cases, personal status cases and commercial cases; and 
therefore the award concerning public law will not be subject to enforcement by the ELFJ.   The 
UAE and PRC laws do not adopt such condition by stipulate that the foreign award should be 
concerns debt.   
6.2.2.4. Public Order: 
In Iraqi law, the interests of the community, political, social, economic, moral or religious, 
can be protected by public order.  The parties cannot enter into an agreement in conflict with 
these interests, even if this agreement achieves their interests.  Therefore, no foreign award can 
be enforced in Iraq if it is in conflict with the supreme principles of the Iraqi state.36  The 
question of whether or not a foreign award is against public order is subject to the discretion of 
the court, which has the authority to enforce this judgment.  The court’s discretion would be 
subject to Court of Cassation (Mahkamat Al Tammeez) supervision.  If a Court of Cassation 
(Mahkamat Al Tammez) finds that this award is against public order then it will reject the 
enforcement of the award.37  Iraqi ELFJ confirms this principle by stipulating in Article 6 (d) that 
the foreign award must be not being contrary to public order.  Therefore the foreign arbitral 
award must not be in contrast with Shari’a, customs, habits and other issues.  The UAE adopted 
the same provision and considers foreign award unenforceable if they are deemed to be against 
public order.38 Similarly, the PRC provides that a foreign award will not be enforceable if the 
People’s Court fined this award to be contrary to social and public interest of PRC.39 
                                                          
36 Article 32 of Iraqi Civil Law No.40 of 1951. 
37 .1963،194 دادغب ،داشرلا ةعبطم ،ثلاثلا ءزجلا،نيناوقلا عزانت :صاخلا يلودلا نوناقلا يف زيجولا ،يوادهلا نسح 
      [Hassin Alhadawei, Brief in Private International Law: Conflict of Laws (El Rashad Press 1963)194.]  
38 Article 235 (e) of UAE Federal Civil Procedures Law No 11 of 1992 provides that “It does not conflict or 
contradict with a judgment or order previously passed by another court in the State and does not include any 
violation of moral code or public order.   
39 Article 260 of PRC Civil Procedures Law of 1991 which provided that “if a people’s court determines that the 
enforcement of an award will violate the social and public interest, the court shall make a ruling to disallow the 
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  6.2.2.5. Fraud or Dol: 
The foreign award must not have been rendered as a result of fraud by one of the parties 
Article 8 (a) of Iraqi ELFJ stipulates that fraud is any behaviour committed by one party in order 
to change the facts of a case is to his benefit, for example, bribing another party’s witnesses or 
theft of the other party’s documents.  Within of this definition fraud and dol are considered to be 
significant grounds for not enforcing the foreign award.40 The UAE does not mentioned any 
article explain fraud and dol condition.  Article 213 (6) of PRC Civil Procedures Law, similarly, 
provides that “the arbitrators have committed embezzlement, accepted bribes or done 
malpractice for personal benefits or perverted the law in the arbitration of the case”.41 
6.2.2.6. Reciprocity: 
In order to enforce the foreign arbitral award, the principle of reciprocity should be available 
between Iraq and the country where the award is rendered.  Article 11 of Iraqi ELFJ provides 
that:  
[T]his Act applies to the judgments rendered by foreign courts whenever judgments 
rendered by Iraqi courts become enforceable in foreign countries according to a 
particular agreement with the state of Iraq or to particular ordinances to be announced 
from time to time or according to the laws applicable in these foreign countries (......)”42  
So, in order to enforce foreign award Iraq should be has an agreement with the state that its court 
rendered the foreign award.  Iraq engages in regional agreement for enforcement arbitral award 
but it does not become party in international conventions.43  The UAE adapts the same approach 
and stipulated that there is should be mutual recognition and enforcement between the UAE and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
enforcement of the arbitration award”. The English text is available at <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc 
/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> access on 17 of May 2014. 
40 Article 196 of Iraqi CCP.  
41 The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending the Civil Procedure 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the 30th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth 
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of the China on October 28, 2007, is hereby promulgated 
and shall go into effect as of April 1, 2008. 
 The English text is available at <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> 
accessed on 17 of May 2014. 
42 This Article translated from Arabic to English by Hamzeh Haddad, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and 
Award in Jordan and Iraq’ (A Lecture addressed to the IBA Conference) Bahrain (5-8/3/1989).  
43 Section 6.3 of this chapter discuss this point extensively.  
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the country where the award is rendered.  Article 235 (1) of UAE Federal Law No 11 of 1992 
Provides that:  
Judgments and orders passed in a foreign country may be ordered for execution and 
implementation within UAE under the same conditions provided for in the law of 
foreign state for the execution of judgments and orders passed in the state.44   
Article 236 also provides that: 
Provisions of the preceding Article shall apply to the arbitration decision passed in 
foreign countries. Arbitration decisions must be passed on a matter which may be 
decided on by arbitration according to the law of the country and must be enforceable in 
the country it was passed in.45 
The PRC also provided the same condition and adopted reciprocity.  Article 265 of PRC Civil 
Procedure Law46 provides that: 
(……) The foreign court may also, in accordance with the provisions of the 
international treaties concluded or acceded to by that foreign country and the People’s 
Republic of China or with the principle of reciprocity, request recognition and 
enforcement by a people’s court.47 
6.2.3. The Procedures for Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards under Iraqi Law, UAE 
and PRC: 
In order to give a clear explanation of the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, it is first of 
all necessary to distinguish between two cases.  The first case is when the enforcement of the 
foreign arbitral award in Iraq is in accordance with a treaty between Iraq and the state where the 
foreign arbitral award is rendered.  This case will be discussed extensively in subsequent 
sections.  The second case is the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award rendered in a state 
which has no treaty with Iraq.  
                                                          
44 The translation from Arabic language to English is available at < http://www.diac.ae/idias/rules/uae/chapter4/> 
accessed on 13 August 2014.   
45 ibid.   
46 The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending the Civil Procedure 
Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the 30th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth 
National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of the China on October 28, 2007, is hereby promulgated 
and shall go into effect as of April 1, 2008. 
47 The English text is available at <http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> 
access on 17 of May 2014. 
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To enforce in Iraq a foreign arbitral award rendered in a state which has no treaty with Iraq 
to regulate the enforcement, the Iraqi competent court should first render a decision.  This 
decision is known as the “enforcement decision”.48 It is rendered according to certain 
proceedings, by submitting an application in the form of a statement of claim to the competent 
court, which is the First Instance Court (Al-Bida’ya).49  The application should be attached to a 
duly legalized and translated copy of the foreign arbitral award.50 This court has the authority to 
render the enforcement decision only, without discussing the merits of the case.51 Article 3 (b) of 
Iraqi law determines the place where the competent court is located, which is the place where the 
defendant has his residence.  If the defendant has no fixed place of residence in Iraq it would be 
in the place where his property required a seizure.52 The question which will be raised here is: if 
the defendant has no domicile in Iraq and neither does he have property there, is the foreign 
arbitral award unenforceable in Iraq? It seems from Article 3 paragraph (b) that the debtor should 
have domicile in Iraq or property and without these two conditions the foreign arbitral award 
would be unenforceable.53 However, Article 41 of Iraqi CCP could be applied in these 
circumstances.  It states that “If the defendant has no domicile or residence in Iraq, then the suit 
shall be filed to the court of the plaintiff’s domicile or residence.  If the plaintiff has no domicile 
or residence in Iraq then the suit shall be filed to the courts of Baghdad”.54  The present author 
takes the view that this Article may be applied in order to answer the question of 
unenforceability of foreign arbitral awards in Iraq in cases where the requirements of Article 3 
are not met.  In order to render the enforcement decision, the court determines an appointment 
for the hearing summons the defendant for the hearing session and hears both parties’ defence.55 
If the court finds that the judgment meets all the conditions and requirements provided by law 
                                                          
48 Article 2 of the Iraqi ELFJ. 
49 Article 3 of the Iraqi ELFJ. 
50 Saleh Majid, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Arbitration Awards in Iraq’ (1998) International Trade Law 
Quarterly 173.  
51 The Iraqi Court of Cassation, No of judgment 10/11, on 30/01/1982.  This court state that “Court held has filed the 
request for an enforcement decision barred from discussing the merits of the case and its function is limited to 
render an enforcement decision”. 
52 Article 3 (b) of the Iraqi ELFJ. 
53 ibid.  
54 The translation from Arabic language to English language available at < http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes/> 
accessed on 12 April 2014. 
55 Saleh Majid, ‘Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Arbitration Awards in Iraq’ (1998) International Trade Law 
Quarterly 173. 
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No 30 of 1928 then it may render the enforcement decision.56  In the UAE the situation is 
different from Iraq because in 2006 the UAE became a member of the New York Convention of 
1958.  Generally, the terms of the convention supersede local law and therefore the New York 
Convention terms will apply in regard to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the UAE.  
It provides the UAE judicial system with the grounds to enforce the foreign arbitral award.  
According to Article IV (1) the procedures of enforcement of a foreign arbitral award are “(a) the 
duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof; (b) the original agreement 
referred to in Article II or a duly certified copy thereof”.  Moreover Article IV (2) of the 
convention stipulates that the award and the agreement must be produced and made in the 
official language of the country in which the award is relied on or a translated copy must be 
provided.  If these requirements and conditions are available the court will enforce the foreign 
arbitral award.  These procedures will be followed by member states of the New York 
Convention.  Article 23557 of UAE law No 11 of 1992 will apply to non-member states of the 
New York Convention or to states which do not have a treaty with the UAE in this regard.  In 
                                                          
56 Article 4 and 5 of Iraqi Law ELFJ. Article 40 (2) of Iraqi DICAL design the procedures of enforcement of foreign 
Arbitral award.   
57 This Article provides that:  
1. Judgments and orders passed in a foreign country may be ordered for execution and implementation within 
UAE under the same conditions provided for in the law of foreign state for the execution of judgments and 
orders passed in the state. 
2. Petition for execution order shall be filed before the Court of First Instance under which jurisdiction 
execution is sought under lawsuit filing standard procedures. Execution may not be ordered unless the 
following was verified:-  
a. State courts have no jurisdiction over the dispute on which the judgment or the order was passed 
and that the issuing foreign courts have such jurisdiction in accordance with the International 
Judicial Jurisdiction Rules decided in its applicable law. 
b. Judgment or order was passed by the competent court according to the law of the country in which 
it was passed. 
c. Adversaries in the lawsuit on which the foreign judgment was passed were summoned and duly 
represented. 
d. Judgment or order had obtained the absolute degree in accordance with law of the issuing court. 
e. It does not conflict or contradict with a judgment or order previously passed by another court in 
the State and does not include any violation of moral code or public order. 
The translation from Arabic language to English is available at < http://www.diac.ae/idias/rules/uae/chapter4/> 
accessed on 13 August 2014.   
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PRC Law the same procedures are followed because China is one of the New York Convention 
members. 
6.3. The Enforcing of Arbitral Awards under International Treaties: 
Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is considered a critical issue in the arbitration 
process and has great significance at an international level.  This is because the parties normally 
choose the place where the arbitral awards are rendered with a view to avoiding the choice of a 
place where a party may have assets to lose, should an award be made against that party, winning 
parties, however, look for states where the losing party has assets or property with a view to an 
attachment upon them.  Consequently, vigorous international efforts have been conducted to 
make uniform provisions concerning the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and to obtain the 
facility to enforce foreign awards in states where foreign arbitral award are not rendered in its 
territory.  The outcome of these efforts was the inauguration of some important conventions. 
6.3.1. Early Convention  
Early Convention to regulate the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards was 
the Geneva Convention of 1927.58  This convention aimed to recognize and enforce foreign 
arbitral awards in states which were members of the convention in regard to arbitral awards 
rendered according to arbitration agreements pursuant to the Geneva Protocol of 1923.59 This 
protocol emphasized that the arbitration award should be enforced in the state where the award is 
rendered.60  However, the Geneva Convention of 1927 goes further than this by providing that 
the arbitration award can be enforced in any territory of the states which are members of the 
convention.61 The convention stipulated some conditions which should be available in arbitration 
                                                          
58 The Geneva Convention for Excution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927, signed at Geneva on 26 September of 
1927, LNTS, vol XCII, 302.  
59 The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 signed at Genva on 24 September 1923, LNTS, vol XXVII, 
No. 678 of 1924, 158.   
Iraq became party to the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clause of 1923 according to law No.34 of 1928. 
60 Article 3 of Geneva Protocol Provided that “3. Each Contracting State undertakes to ensure the execution by its 
authorities and in accordance with the provisions of its national laws of arbitral awards made in its own territory 
under the preceding articles”.  
61 Article 1 of Geneva Convention 1927:  
     In the territories of any High Contracting Party to which the present Convention applies, an arbitral award 
made in pursuance of an agreement, whether relating to existing or future differences (hereinafter called 
"a submission to arbitration") covered by the Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, opened at Geneva on 
September 24, 1923, shall be recognised as binding and shall be enforced in accordance with the rules of 
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awards for them to be enforceable62 and also provided the grounds for non- enforceable 
awards.63  Iraq, UAE and PRC are not parties to the Geneva Convention of 1927.  
6.3.2. The New York Convention of 1958: 
The New York Convention of 195864 is considered the most significant convention with 
regard to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  It contains clear and simple 
procedures for the enforcement of such awards.  It has received wide acceptance from the 
international community.65  Iraq did not sign or ratify the New York Convention for political and 
legal reasons and circumstances.66 The present author’s view is that Iraq should access this 
convention, to which most of the world’s states have become parties.  The political 
circumstances which barred Iraq have ended and moreover this convention has designed simple 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, provided that the said award has been made 
in a territory of one  of the High Contracting Parties to which the present Convention applies and between 
persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of one of the High Contracting Parties.  
62 Article 1 of Geneva Convention of 1927 provides that:  
      (a) That the award has been made in pursuance of a submission to arbitration which is valid under the law 
applicable thereto;  
(b) That the subject-matter of the award is capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the 
country in which the award is sought to be relied upon;  
(c) That the award has been made by the Arbitral Tribunal provided for in the submission to arbitration or 
constituted in the manner agreed upon by the parties and in conformity with the law governing the 
arbitration procedure;  
(d) That the award has become final in the country in which it has been made, in the sense that it will not 
be considered as such if it is open to opposition, appel or pourvoi en cassation (in the countries where 
such forms of procedure exist) or if it is proved that any proceedings for the purpose of contesting the 
validity of the award are pending;  
(e) That the recognition or enforcement of the award is not contrary to the public policy or to the 
principles of the law of the country in which it is sought to be relied upon. 
63 Article 2 of Geneva Convention 1927:  
      (a) That the award has been annulled in the country in which it was made;  
(b) That the party against whom it is sought to use the award was not given notice of the arbitration proceedings 
in sufficient time to enable him to present his case; or that, being under a legal incapacity, he was not properly 
represented;  
(c) That the award does not deal with the differences contemplated by or fading within the terms of the 
submission to arbitration or that it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to 
arbitration. 
64 The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, adopted on 
3 May 1956, entered into force on 7 June 1959, UNTS vol 330, 3.   
65 Most of the world’s states are members of this convention.  It is about 147 states ratified this conventions. See the 
list of New York Convention states members available at <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_ texts 
/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html > accessed on 20 September 2014. 
66 For more details see chapter three pages 100 and 101; Nidham G Al Abasey, ‘Cakes without Sugar: Reasons 
behind Foreign Investor Reluctance to Enter Mesopotamia’ (2013) 42 Syracuse Journal of International Law and 
Commerce 147.  
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and clear rules for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  These rules would 
address the lack of enforcement and recognition of foreign arbitration in the Iraqi legal system.  
These rules are consistent with the nature of petroleum agreements.  Finally, Iraq’s accession to 
the New York Convention would encourage foreign investors to invest in Iraq, especially in the 
petroleum sector.    Article VII (2) of New York Convention provides that: 
 The Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 and the Geneva Convention on the 
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 shall cease to have effect between Contracting 
States on their becoming bound and to the extent that they become bound, by this Convention.67 
 Hence, according to this Article, the states which were members of the Geneva Protocol of 
1923 and the Geneva Convention of 1927 ceased their membership of both Geneva Conventions 
as soon as they became parties to the New York Convention of 1958.   
Article I (1) of the Convention indicates to whom the New York convention shall apply.  It 
refers to disputes “arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal.”  As is 
apparent from the wording of this article, the convention applies both to the physical person and 
the legal person.  However, the convention does not refer directly to states or their entities as 
persons of this convention.  The question which arises here is whether the state or its entities will 
be treated as private individuals (jure gestionis) or as public entities (jure imperii) and therefore 
whether the New York Convention could apply to them, notwithstanding the state sovereignty 
plea?  It could be said that the term “legal person” mentioned in this Article refers to a state and 
its entities as private persons (jure gestionis).  This view was confirmed by the ad hoc 
Committee68 which spoke of differences “between persons, whether physical or legal”. The 
Representative of Belgium had proposed that the article should expressly provide that public 
enterprises and public utilities should be deemed to be legal persons for purposes of this article if 
their activities were governed by private law.  The Committee was of the opinion that such a 
provision would be superfluous and that a reference in the present report would suffice”.69 This 
statement by the ad hoc committee gives a clear expression to the view that the legal term 
                                                          
67 The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958, adopted on 
3 May 1956, entered into force on 7 June 1959, UNTS vol 330, 3.   
68 United Nation Economic and Social Council, Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International 
Arbitral Award, Resumed nineteenth session Item 14, E/2704: E/Ac.42/4/Rev.1, 28 March 1955, Para 24. 
69 ibid. 
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“person” includes states and state entities, so that the convention is applicable to the state and its 
entities if they are involved in private law.    
This is not the only question raised in regard to the persons of the convention.  There is also 
the question of the reservation provided by the convention in Article I (3): “it will apply the 
Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, 
which are considered as commercial under the national law of the State making such 
declaration”. As discussed in Chapter Two, petroleum agreements are a special kind of 
investment agreement and the New York convention applies to commercial relationships.  
Hence, the question is: could the New York Convention apply to petroleum disputes, which are 
in fact a special kind of investment dispute, if Iraq became a party to this convention? Sornarajah 
states that “Disputes arising from state contracts involving natural resources also fall outside the 
convention”.70  He argues that “ there is a credible view that permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources constitutes a principle of ius cogens of international law”71 Under the New York 
convention the member state can determine the commercial relationship according to the national 
law of that state.72 According to this “commercial reservation”, a state can invoke a reservation 
to keep the particularity of a petroleum contract, which may not necessarily be considered an 
ordinary commercial transaction.73 Returning to the question, it could be argued that petroleum 
contracts are a state contract which also has a commercial nature and so the state would waive its 
immunity as soon as it signed this contract.  Moreover, a part of the answer of this question is 
connected with the arbitrability issue which, according to the New York Convention, is left to be 
determined by national law and should and can be a flexible ground for making the arbitral 
award non- enforceable.  Therefore the, New York Convention can apply to petroleum contracts 
under Iraqi Law.  However, the commercial reservation obstacle is diminished by the fact that 
many states who are parties to the New York Convention did not invoke the commercial 
reservation or withdraw their reservation.74   
                                                          
70 M Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problems of State Contracts (Longman 1990) 240. 
71 M Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problems of State Contracts (Longman 1990) 240. 
72 Article I (3) of the New York convention 1958.   
73 A. J. van den Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention 1958 (Kluwer 1981) 4-6. 
74 The list of states do commercial reservation of New York Convention is available at <http://www.newyork 
convention.org/ court-decisions/consolidated-list-countries > accessed on 12 April 2014. 
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It seems from the above discussion that the New York Convention can apply with regard to 
the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards arising from petroleum agreements and can also apply 
to a state and state entities.  Hence it could not be said that the New York Convention has limited 
scope.   
Therefore, it is worthwhile to consider the grounds for non-enforceable awards which were 
adopted by the convention.   
Article V (1) of the New York Convention provided exhaustive grounds for non- 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.75  According to this Article, the court may refuse to 
enforce the foreign arbitral award in the following cases: (a) the parties to the arbitration 
agreement were under an incapacity or the arbitration agreement was invalid under the 
applicable law; (b) the losing party received insufficient notice of the appointment of arbitrators 
or the arbitration proceedings or the party did not have the opportunity for a defence; (c) the 
arbitration award dealt with issues not referenced by the arbitration agreement; (d) the arbitration 
proceedings law was different from  the applicable law which was chosen by the parties for the 
governance of the procedures; (e) the court of the country where the arbitration decision was 
made set aside or suspended their decision or the award became non-binding for the parties.  It is 
worth mentioning that the competent authority in the country where enforcement of the award 
                                                          
75 The UNCITRAL Model Law also provides important ground for non enforcement arbitral award.  Article 36 (1) 
A of this Law provides that: 
(i) a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in article 7 was under some incapacity; or the said 
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication 
thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or 
(ii) the party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment of an 
arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case: or  
(iii) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to 
arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, 
provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so 
submitted, that part of the award which contains deci-sions on matters submitted to arbitration may be 
recognized and enforced; or 
(iv) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral proce-dure was not in accordance with the 
agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country 
where the arbitration took place; or 
(v) the award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a court of 
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made; or 
(b) if the court finds that: 
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of this 
State; or 
(ii) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of this State. 
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was sought cannot refuse recognition and enforcement of its own bases on the grounds provided 
by the convention but should receive a request from one of the parties.  However Article V (2) 
paragraph (a) and (b) of the convention give the competent authority in the country where 
recognition and enforcement of the award was sought the power to refuse the award by its own if 
the subject matter of the dispute is not arbitrable under the law of the country or it is inconsistent 
with the public policy of that country. 
The UAE ratified the New York Convention in 2006 pursuant to the Federal Decree No 43 
of 2006.  This Decree came into force on 19 November 2006.76   
The PRC became a party to the New York Convention on 2 December 1986, its accession 
becoming effective in China on 22 April 1987.77 China made two reservations; a reciprocity 
reservation and a commercial reservation.78 The Chinese accession to the New York Convention 
had a significant impact on the laws relating to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards.79  China amended the Civil Trial Procedures law and promulgated the Arbitration Law 
of 1994 and tried to bring this legislation closer to the provisions of the New York Convention 
provisions.80   
6.3.3 ICSID 1965: 
The third convention which has a significant place in international arbitration is the ICSID 
Convention of 1965.  This convention plays an important role with regard to the obligations of 
the arbitral award and its power of enforcement.  This issue is considered a critical problem 
facing the party who receives an arbitration decision in one country but seeks enforcement of it 
in a different country.  The ICSID engendered new procedures for enforcement of arbitral 
awards.  According to the ICSID, the arbitral award is equated with “final judgment of a court in 
that state”.81  Pursuant to this article the successful party can enforce an arbitral award as soon as 
it rendered.  The advantage of this procedure is to facilitate the enforcement of arbitral awards 
                                                          
76 Jalal El Ahadab, ‘Arab Arbitration V. International Arbitration? The Case for a Reconciliation’ (2008) 25 Journal 
of International Arbitration 819. 
77 Bruce R. Schulberg, ‘China’s Accession to the New York Convention: An Analysis of the New York Regime of 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards’ (1989) 3 Journal of Chinese Law 117. 
78 ibid.  
79 Jingzhou Tao, Arbitration Law and Practice in China (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2008) 161. 
80 ibid. 
81 Article 54 (1) of ICSID. 
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under ICSID arbitration.82  This is not the only factor which distinguishes ICSID Convention 
from New York Convention.  The public policy exception is not available.  Although the ICSID 
provides these important developments for the facilitation of the enforcement of arbitral awards, 
sovereign immunity remains an impediment.83 Article 55 of the Convention provides that 
“Nothing in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any contracting 
state relating to the immunity of that state or of any foreign state from execution.” It seems from 
this article that the ICSID Convention does not address the plea of sovereign immunity and 
maintains this plea.  Sovereign immunity from execution cannot be waived under this 
convention.  So, the enforcement of arbitral award is no different from that of other conventions 
with regard to the sovereign immunity plea.  Iraq did not accede to this convention.  The UAE 
ratified the ICSID Convention on 23 December 1981 while the ICSID Convention entered into 
force for China on 6 February 1993.   
6.4. The Enforcing of Arbitral Awards under Regional Conventions:  
Important regional conventions have been concluded between Arab countries in regard to 
arbitration.  These conventions try to regulate and address important issues related to the 
enforcement of judgments and arbitration awards rendered in Arabic countries.  These 
conventions which is Iraqi a party are: the League of Arabic States Convention for the 
Enforcement of Judgment of 1952,84 the Consolidated Convention for Investment of Arabic 
Capital in Arabic Countries of 1981, the Riyadh Convention of 198385 and the Arabic 
Convention for Commercial Arbitration of 1987.   
Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Iraq pursuant to these conventions is governed by 
Article 3 (2) of the Iraqi Implementation law No 45 of 1980 and not according to Article 11 of 
the ELFJ, because these arbitral awards do not need a specific order to be enforceable.  
According to decision No L/21/59 on 22 February 1962, promulgated by the Iraqi Ministry of 
                                                          
82 M Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problems of State Contracts (Longman 1990) 227. 
83 Okezie Chukwumerije, ‘ICSID Arbitration and Sovereign Immunity’ (1990) 19 Anglo- American Law Review 
166. 
84 Iraq becomes party of the League of Arabic States Convention for Enforcement of Judgments 1952 according to 
law No. 35 on 26 March 1956 which published in Iraqi Official Gazette, issue 3802 on 6 June 1956.     
85 Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation of 1983, it entered force on 30 October of 1985, league of Arab 
States.  Iraq became party to this convention according to law No. 110 of 1983 which is published in Iraqi 
Official Gazette, issue 2976 on 16 of January 1984, 22.   
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Justice consider Court of First Instance (Bida’ya) which enforcement decisions in regard of 
Arabic arbitral awards requests should be submitted to the First Instance Court. These awards 
have been rendered pursuant to the arbitration and judicial cooperation conventions mentioned 
above, according to Article 3 (a) of law No 30 of 1928.   
6.4.1. Riyadh Convention:  
The League of Arabic States Convention for Enforcement of Judgments 195286 was 
abolished by the Riyadh Convention in accordance with Article 72 of that convention.87  The 
Arabic Convention for Commercial Arbitration of 1987 does not enforce it, yet it has been 
ratified by six Arabic states.  Iraq is one of the states which ratified this convention.  The Riyadh 
Convention made significant provisions for dealing with the enforcement of arbitration awards. 
It does not, however, tackle issues involving arbitration agreements or applicable law, and this 
section therefore will give priority to the Riyadh Convention of 1983, focussing on Articles 
which regulate the enforcement of arbitral awards.   
The Riyadh Convention is one of the important regional conventions concluded between 
Arab countries in judicial cooperation.  It is considered the most up to date convention in the 
region with regard to the enforcement judicial judgments.  Article 37 of this Convention is 
devoted to regulating the enforcement of Arabic arbitration awards.  Iraq ratified this convention 
in 1984.88   
                                                          
86 Iraq becomes party of the League of Arabic States Convention for Enforcement of Judgments 1952 according to 
law No. 35 on 26 March 1956 which published in Iraqi Official Gazette, issue 3802 on 6 June 1956.     
87 Article 71 of Riyadh Convention provided that:  
     The present Agreement shall replace, in respect of the states which have ratified it, the three agreements 
concluded in 1952 within the framework of the League of Arab States in force at present and pertaining 
to judicial notifications and procurations, execution of penalties, and extradition of criminals. 
The English text is available at < http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38d8.html> accessed on 13 August 2014.  
88 Riyadh Convention was ratified by many Arab Countries except Egypt and Islamic State of Comoros.  These 
states are: Palestine, Iraq 1984, Yemen 1984, Sudan 1984, Mauritania 1985, Syria 1985, Somalia 1985, Tunisia 
1985, Jordan 1986, Morocco 1987, Libya 1988, United Arab Emirates 1999, Oman 1999, Bahrain 2000, Saudi 
Arabia 2000, and Algeria 2001.  The list of Arabic states members of Riyadh Convention of 1983 is available at 
< http://www.gn4me.com/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=329&level_id=199> accessed at 31August 2014.  
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The  Riyadh Convention deals mainly with important issues such as  judicial judgments, 
letters rogatory, legal assistance89, publication and notification of judicial and non- judicial 
documents90, extradition,91, and various other  issues related to  civil and commercial matters.92  
Article 37 of the convention deals specifically with the enforcement of arbitration awards 
which it calls the “arbitration decision award of the arbitrator”.  The Riyadh Convention focuses 
on the enforcement of arbitral awards rendered in Arab states which are members of the 
convention.93  According to Article 37 of the convention, the competent court in the country 
where recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award is sought is prevented from discussing 
the merits of case.94  
Article 31 (b) of the Convention provides that the procedural law of the state where the 
enforcement of the award is sought shall govern the enforcement of the arbitration award 
process, if the convention has not provided otherwise.95  The request for enforcement under the 
convention should be with the following documents attached as provided by Article 34 of the 
convention 
 (a) A full and official copy of the judgment signatures which must be authenticated 
by the competent authority. 
(b) A certificate attesting that the judgment is final and has the power of res 
adjudicata, unless this be specified in the text of the judgment itself. 
(c) A copy of the document whereby notice of the judgment was served attested to 
as a true copy or any other document demonstrating that the defendant had been duly 
                                                          
89 Article 4 of Riyadh Convention of 1983.  
90 Part II of Riyadh Convention of 1983. 
91 Article 5 of Riyadh Convention of 1983. 
92 Article 6 of Riyadh Convention of 1983. 
93 Article 37 of convention provides that:  
     Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 28 and 30 of this Agreement adjudications of arbitrators 
shall be recognized and executed by any contracting party in the manner stipulated in this Part subject to 
the legal norms of the requested party, and the competent judicial authority of the requested party may 
not discuss the subject of such arbitration nor refuse to execute the judgment except in the following 
cases:  
The English text is available at < http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38d8.html> accessed on 13 August 2014. 
94 ibid. 
95 Article 31 (b) of the convention provided that “Procedures pertaining to the recognition of a judgment or the 
execution thereof shall be subject to the laws of the requested party if not otherwise governed by the provisions 
of this Agreement.” 
The English text is available at < http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38d8.html> accessed on 13 August 2014. 
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and expressly notified of the action on which the judgment was pronounced when this 
was pronounced in absentia. 
This document submitted to the relevant court in a state which is party obliges the court to 
enforce the arbitration award.96  
The Riyadh Convention imposes some conditions for enforcing judgments which should be 
applied by the contracting states.  These conditions are referred to in different articles of the 
convention.  The first condition, which is provided by Article 25 (b) of the convention, stipulates 
that the relevant court must have the jurisdiction to render the judgment in accordance with laws 
applied in the country where the enforcement is sought.97  The second condition is that the 
parties should receive proper notice.98  The third is that the judgment should be consistent with 
public order.99 These conditions are included in the convention.  The convention does not refer to 
awards based on fraud or the condition of dol and does not refer to the reciprocity principle, as 
provided by Iraq and the UAE in their competent laws.     
It is worthwhile to consider the cases in which according to the convention the arbitral 
award would be non-enforceable.   
Article 37 of the Riyadh Convention enumerates cases where the award is  non-enforceable : 
(a) if the subject matter of the dispute was not arbitrable according to the law of the state where 
the parties sought to enforce it (b) if the arbitral award rendered was based on invalid arbitration 
                                                          
96 Article 37 of the Riyadh convention (h) which provided that: 
       If there be a proper, written agreement under which the parties had consented to submit to the 
competence of the arbitrators in settling a certain dispute or whatever other disputes arising between the 
two parties in respect of a certain legal relationship, a certified copy of such agreement must be 
submitted. 
The English text is available at < http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38d8.html> accessed on 13 August 2014. 
97 Article 25 (b) provided that: 
     (b) Subject to the provisions of Article 30 of this Agreement, each contracting party shall recognize the 
judgments made by the courts of any other contracting party in civil cases including judgments related to 
civil rights made by penal courts and in commercial, administrative and personal statute judgments 
having the force of res adjudicata and shall implement them in its territory in accordance with the 
procedures stipulated in this Part, if the courts of the contracting party which made the said judgments are 
competent under the provisions of the rules of jurisdiction in force in the requested party, and if the legal 
system of the requested party does not retain for its courts or the courts of another party the exclusive 
competence to make such judgements. 
The English text is available at < http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38d8.html> accessed on 13 August 2014. 
98 Article 30 (b) of Riyadh Convention of 1983.  
99 Article 30 (a) of Riyadh Convention of 1983.  
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agreement or the arbitral award has not become final (c) if the arbitrators do not have the 
competence according to the main contract or arbitration agreement or applicable law according 
to which law the arbitral award has been rendered.  (d) if the dispute parties have not been 
notified  in the proper ways (e) if the arbitral award is in conflict  with  Islamic Shari’a or public 
order in the country where enforcement of  the award is sought.  These cases are modeled on the 
League of Arabic States Convention for Enforcement of Judgments, 1952, except for one extra 
case added by the Riyadh Convention, which is that the award must be not inconsistent with 
Islamic Shari’a.  The state where enforcement of the arbitral award is sought must check that 
none of the above mentioned circumstances apply.     
Article 25 (c) of the Riyadh Convention excludes from the convention’s scope of application  
judicial  judgments  rendered against the contracting state where the judicial judgment sought to 
enforce  against one of its official employees as a result of conducting (or doing) their duty or 
during that. This article based on principle of execution immunity of the state.100  However, this 
Article concerns judgments rendered according to judicial procedures from courts or any 
institutions having the competent authority to render such judgment related to the dispute 
parties.101  It seems from the above discussion that Article 25 (c) does not include enforcement of 
arbitration awards even if it is rendered against the state where sought to enforce the arbitration 
award that because this state agree to recourse to arbitration to settle the disputes. Therefore, 
such a state should enforce the arbitration award unless this award contains one of the cases 
stated in Article 37.   
Article 30 of Riyadh Convention gives the contracting state the authority to not recognise 
and reject the enforcement of judgment in specific cases which are:  
 (a) If recognition would be in contradiction with the stipulations of the Islamic 
Shari'a, the provisions of the constitution, public order, or the rules of conduct of the 
requested party. 
                                                          
100 Article 25 (c) of Riyadh convention of 1983.  
101 Article 25 (a) of Riyadh convention of 1983 which provided that “In the application of this Part, judgement 
means every decision - regardless of nomenclature - made in pursuance of judicial or jurisdictional procedures of 
the courts or any competent authority of any party” . 
The English text is available at < http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38d8.html> accessed on 13 August 2014. 
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(b) If the judgment was passed in absentia without notifying the convicted party of 
the proceedings in an appropriate fashion that would enable him to defend himself. 
(c) If the law of the requested party applicable to legal representation of ineligible 
persons or persons of diminished eligibility were not taken into consideration. 
(d) If the dispute has given rise to another final judgment in the requested state, or 
in a third state and if the requested party has already recognized such a final judgment. 
(e) If the dispute is also the subject of a case being heard by the courts of the 
requested party and the action has been brought before the courts of the requested party 
on a date preceding the presentation of the dispute to the court of the requesting 
party.”102 
The Riyadh Convention does not address or deal with sovereign immunity issues in its 
provisions, therefore these issues are still impediments according to the Riyadh Convention.   
Iraq became a member of the Riyadh Convention in accordance with law No 110 of 1983.103 
The UAE became a member of this convention in 1999.104  The Riyadh Convention is considered 
useful for Iraq if enforcement of an arbitration award is sought in the UAE because, as 
mentioned previously, Iraq was not a member of the New York convention of 1958.    
6.5. Challenges to Foreign Arbitral Award under Iraqi Law, UAE and PRC: 
Rendering of the arbitral award is not in most cases the final part of the arbitration process 
and does not mean that the dispute between parties is at an end.  The losing party may resist 
compliance with the arbitral tribunal award by challenging this award before a competent court.   
Challenge is a critical step in arbitration.  A competent court may change the arbitration 
result to the advantage of the losing party if convincing grounds for challenge are submitted 
before the competent court.  Therefore, the court with the authority to amend the arbitral award 
may be considered to have an important role. At the same time, this reality provides the arbitral 
tribunal with a reason to be diligent about the fundamental legal rules that should be considered 
                                                          
102 Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation of 1983, it entered force on 30 October of 1985, league of Arab 
States.  Iraq became party to this convention according to law No. 110 of 1983 which is published in Iraqi Official 
Gazette, issue 2976 on 16 of January 1984, 22.   
103 The Law of ratify the Riyadh Convention Published in Iraqi Official Gazette Issue no 2976 on 16 March 1984.   
104 The list of Arabic states members of Riyadh Convention of 1983 is available at < http://www.gn4me.com/las 
/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=329&level_id=199> accessed at 31August 2014. 
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during the arbitration process.105 However, there also disadvantages in challenging the arbitral 
award, including delay of the arbitration process, the lack of privacy involved in the public 
hearing and the interference implicit in the challenge.  Moreover, both parties will need to pay 
additional costs.106  
 Iraqi law however recognises the challenge under the name of ‘recourse’107, as do many 
other civil law countries. 108 This term is adopted by Model Law 2012.109  The UAE also adopts 
the term ‘recourse’110 Chinese Law employs the term ‘challenge’,111 but it amounts to the same 
as ‘recourse’, and is consistent with the universal term.  
The challenge process raises important issues, namely the competent authority of challenge, 
reasons for the challenge, methods of challenge, time limits and procedures and the 
consequences of challenging the arbitral award. Therefore this section will divide into sub-
sections to discuss these issues, as follows:  
 6.5.1. Waiver of the Challenge:  
Under Iraqi Law the parties can waive their right to recourse to arbitral award.112 The waiver 
of the parties’ right to challenge the judgment can be also apply to the arbitral award and they 
can make such waiver after the rendering of the arbitral award but not before.113 The parties can 
make their waiver before the competent court or by submitting a document approved by a notary 
containing their waiver of challenging the arbitral award.114 UAE Law also gives the parties the 
right to waive the challenge, whether explicitly or tacitly after the award is made.115 However, 
                                                          
105 Michael J. Moser and Teresa Y. W. Cheng, Hong Kong Arbitration: A User’s Guide (Kluwer International Law 
2004) 79; Michael McIlwrath and John Savage, International Arbitration and Mediation: A Practical Guide 
(Kluwer International Law 2010) 330. 
106 ibid. 
107 The Iraqi DICAL also recognise this term Article 38. 
108 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
586. 
109 Article 34 (1) of Model Law 2012 provides that “(1) Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made 
only by an application for setting aside in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of this article”. 
110 Jalal El- Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2011) 818. 
111 Jingzhou Tao,  Arbitration Law and Practice in China ( 2nd edn , Kluwer Law International 2008) 164. 
112 Article 169 of Iraqi CCP. 
113 Jalal El- Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2011) 827. 
114 Article 169 of Iraqi CCP. 
115 Jalal El- Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2011) 827. 
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the parties cannot waive their right before the arbitration award is rendered.116 In PRC law, there 
is no provision allowing the waiver of the parties’ right to challenge.  However it could be said 
that the right to sue under PRC Law generally cannot be waived by consent.117  
6.5.2. The Competence of the Court to Decide the Challenge: 
In most cases, a specialised court of the place where the arbitral award is made or registered 
or where the arbitration procedures are has the jurisdiction to decide the challenge of the arbitral 
award.118   
 However, Iraqi Law does not determine whether the court has jurisdiction119 to decide the 
challenge to the arbitral award in regard to international arbitration.  That is because as noted, 
Iraq does not have specific legislation about international arbitration.  Therefore, the question 
which arises here is: in the absence of such a law, can any authority be competent to decide the 
challenge to the arbitral award? 
 Article 271 of the Iraqi CCP provides that: 
After the arbitrators issue their award in compliance with the foregoing, they shall 
give a copy of it to each of the parties, and hand over to the competent court the award 
along with the original arbitration agreement. This shall be done within the following 
three days of issue, making sure to obtain a receipt for it signed by the court’s clerk.120 
Also, Article 273 of the abovementioned law envisages an arbitrators’ award being 
presented to the “competent court”.121 It seems from these articles that the parties may present 
the arbitration award to the court which has the original jurisdiction for conformation and the 
party in this situation can seek to set aside the award or the court would have the imitative to set 
                                                          
116 ibid. 
117 Reza Mohtashami, Antonia Birt and Lee Rovinescu, ‘Arbitration Guide IBA Arbitration Committee: China’ 
(1913) International Associated Bar 1.  
118 Article 2 (a) of Geneva Convention of Arbitration of 1927 which provided that “That the award has been 
annulled in the country in which it was made” and also Article V (e) of New York Convention of 1958 which 
provided that “The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended by a 
competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.”   
119 The Iraqi DICAL in Article 5 determine the court has jurisdiction over the challenge of arbitral award which is 
Baghdad court of Appeal.  
120 The translation from Arabic language to English language is available at < http://gjpi.org/library/primary 
/statutes/> accessed on 2 June 2014. 
121 The translation from Arabic language to English language is available at < http://gjpi.org/library/primary 
/statutes/> accessed on 2 June 2014. 
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aside the award in certain circumstances.122  It could be concluded from the above article that the 
competent court under Iraqi Law is the court originally having jurisdiction over the dispute.123 
The competent court under UAE Law is the Court of Appeal.124 The same approach is 
followed by the Federal Draft of the UAE, which provides that the competent court for deciding 
the challenge to the arbitral award is the Abu Dhabi Federal Court of Appeals, which has a 
jurisdiction to hear the challenge request.125  
In Chinese Law the People’s Court would have the jurisdiction to decide the challenge to the 
arbitral award. Article 60 of the Arbitration law of 1994 provides that “The people’s court shall, 
within two months from the date of accepting an application for setting aside an arbitration 
award, rule to set aside the award or to reject the application”.126 
6.5.3. Reasons for Challenge:  
As discussed previously, Article 6 of the ELFJ stipulates several conditions that must all be 
available to enforce petroleum arbitral awards, otherwise the arbitral award would be non-
enforceable.  This article also provides that the court by its own self can decide that the award is 
null and then cannot enforce it even if the parties do not submit a request to the court containing 
the reasons that the arbitral award is null.  The Iraqi CCP Law specifies the reasons for challenge 
to the arbitral award in Article 273. (1) if the arbitral award rendered is based on an unwritten 
agreement or the agreement of arbitration was invalid or the award went beyond the scope of the 
arbitration agreement127 (2) if the award is in contrary to public order or morality or one of the 
rules of the law in question.128 (3) if there is any reason for re-trial  [according to this law]129 (4) 
if there is any substantive or procedural error which  affects  the validity of the award.130 It is 
worth noting that the article has a condition which is not found in Article 6 of the ELFJ.  This 
                                                          
122 Article 273 of Iraqi CCP.  
123 Jalal El- Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2011) 257. 
124 Article 222 of UAE Federal Code of Civil Procedures Law No.11 of 1992. 
125 Article 34 of UAE Arbitration Law Draft and also Article 6 of this law which determine the court have 
jurisdiction over request of set aside. 
126 The English text is available at < http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> 
accessed on 17 of May 2014. 
127 Article 273 (1) of Iraqi CCP.  
128 Article 273 (2) of Iraqi CCP.  
129 Article 273 (3) of Iraqi CCP.  
130 Article 273 (4) of Iraqi CCP.  
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condition relates to the arbitration agreement.  This is that ELFJ does not regulate or mention 
foreign arbitral awards, and so it is suggested that the conditions of article 273 of CCP law could 
be added to the reasons for a challenge to the arbitral award according to Iraqi law.131   
With regard to the UAE and PRC, as mentioned previously these countries are parties to 
international conventions and their approach to challenging foreign arbitral awards is in 
accordance with these conventions.  Here will be presented the reasons for challenges in regard 
of their national laws in cases where parties who sought to enforce the arbitral award are not 
engage in international conventions.     
 UAE law provides restrictive grounds for challenging the arbitral award in Article 219 of 
the Civil Procedures Law No 11 of 1992 in the following cases: 
 (a) if the arbitral award rendered is based on a void arbitration agreement or such agreement 
did  not exist or has expired or if the arbitrators exceed the scope of the agreement. 
 (b) if the arbitral award was rendered by arbitrators who were not appointed according to 
the law or the arbitrators did not have the permission to render such an award or if the award 
rendered was based on an arbitration agreement which did not identify the merits of the subject 
of the dispute or one of the parties did not have the capacity to agree on arbitration or it is 
rendered by an arbitrator who does not have the legal capacity to render such an award. 
 (c) if there is any invalidity in the award or invalidity in the procedural affect in the 
award.132  
Chinese Law listed the reasons of challenge the arbitral award in Article 58 of Arbitration 
Law of 1994 which provided that: 
(1) There is no arbitration agreement;  
(2) The matters decided in the award exceed the scope of the arbitration agreement 
or are beyond the arbitral authority of the arbitration commission;  
(3) The formation of the arbitration tribunal or the arbitration procedure was not in 
conformity with the statutory procedure;  
                                                          
131 Article 38 of Iraqi DICAL express the reasons of challenge.  
132 The UAE Arbitration Draft Law of 2008 provided the reasons of challenge in Article 34 (2).  
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(4) The evidence on which the award is based is forged;  
(5) The other party has withheld the evidence which is sufficient to affect the 
impartiality of the arbitration; or  
(6) The arbitrators have committed embezzlement, accepted bribes or done 
malpractice for personal benefits or perverted the law in the arbitration of the case.133 
6.5.4. Methods of Challenge: 
 
The parties can challenge the arbitral award in different ways, such as opposition, appeal, 
review and re-trial.  However, Iraqi Law does not regulate the methods of challenging the 
arbitral award: it merely allows a party to seek annulment of the arbitral award.  Article 275 of 
the CCP provides that “The judgment that is issued by the competent court according to the 
previous article is not be objected to. However, it shall be challengeable by other methods of 
appeal stipulated in the law.”134  It seems from this article that Iraqi Law limits in the competent 
court’s decision to annulment of the arbitral award.  The parties can challenge the arbitral award, 
employing the means of challenge provided by the law, except for opposition. However, 
according to Article 275, the parties can then go on to challenge the competent court judgment 
and pursue the challenge in ways provided by Article 168 of the Iraqi CCP which are “1) 
Objection to judgments in absence 2) Appeal 3) Retrial  4) Cassation 5) Rectification of 
cassation decision 6)  Objection by third party”135    
It can be concluded from the above that the method of challenge under Iraqi law with regard 
to arbitral awards is to challenge the arbitral award before the competent court, and that the law 
also challenges the judgments which are rendered by the competent court.   
                                                          
133 The English text is available at < http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> 
accessed on 17 of May 2014.  
134 The translation from Arabic language to English language available at < http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes/> 
accessed on 12 April 2014. 
135 The translation from Arabic language to English language available at < http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes/> 
accessed on 12 April 2014. 
244 
 
The UAE Federal Law No 11 of 1992 provided in Article 217 (1) that the arbitral award is 
not subject to any method of recourse.136  However, UAE law gives the parties the right to 
subject the competent court’s decision in regard of arbitral awards to suitable methods of 
recourse.137 However, the parties can recourse in certain cases, namely, if the arbitrators have the 
power to settle the dispute by submission; or the parties explicitly waive their right to appeal; or 
if the dispute value is no more than ten thousands dirham.138 
 According to PRC arbitration law an arbitration award is not subject to judicial appeal but 
that does not mean that the courts may not supervise arbitration process.  The courts can refuse 
enforcement of an award and repeal or set aside awards independently of the arbitral tribunal.139   
6.5.5. The Time Limits and Procedures: 
Most countries’ laws140 stipulate that the challenge to an arbitral award should be conducted 
within a limited period.  Iraqi law, however, does not provide fixed time limits for parties to 
submit their request to challenge the arbitral award before the competent court.  The UAE Civil 
Procedures Law No 11 of 1992 also does not determine the legal period for submitting the 
request to challenge the arbitral award to the competent court.  Chinese Law determines six 
months for the party to submit the request to challenge the arbitral award from the date of 
receiving the award.141   
                                                          
136 Article 217 (1) of UAE Federal Code of Civil Procedures law No 11 of 1992 provides that “The award of the 
arbitrators may not be contested by any manner of appeal”.  The translation from Arabic language to English is 
available at < http://www.diac.ae/idias/rules/uae/chapter4/> accessed on 13 August 2014.   
137 Article 217 (2) of UAE Federal Code of Civil Procedures law No 11 of 1991 provides that “The judgement 
approving the arbitrators’ award may be contested in any of the appropriate manners of appeal”.  The translation 
from Arabic language to English is available at < http://www.diac.ae/idias/rules/uae/chapter4/> accessed on 13 
August 2014.   
138 Article 217 (3) of UAE Federal Code of Civil Procedures law No 11 of 1992 Provides that “Notwithstanding the 
preceding paragraph, the award shall not be appealable if the arbitrators were authorized to reconcile the dispute 
or, if the parties have expressly waived their rights to file an appeal or if the disputed amount was not in excess 
of Dirhams ten thousand”. The translation from Arabic language to English is available at < 
http://www.diac.ae/idias/rules/uae/chapter4/> accessed on 13 August 2014.   
139 Articles 59 to 60 of PRC Arbitration Law of 1994. 
140 Section 70 (3) of English Arbitration Act of 1996 and Article 1486 of French Code of Civil Procedures of 1980. 
141 Article 59 of China Arbitration Law of 1994 which provides that “A party that wishes to apply for setting aside 
the arbitration award shall submit such application within six months from the date of receipt of the award”.  The 
English text available at < http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> access on 
17 of May 2014. 
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As mentioned previously, Article 273 of Iraqi Law specifies two ways to challenge the 
arbitral award. The first is by submitting a request to the competent court or by one of the parties 
or his agent.142 The second way is give the competent court the power to annul the award by its 
own motion when special circumstances are available.143  
In UAE Law the losing party can submit the request to challenge the arbitral award directly 
after the arbitral award is rendered.  This request should be contain all the conditions of legal 
action.144 
 PRC Arbitration Law gives the parties 30 days from the date of receiving the written award.  
Article 56 of PRC Arbitration Law of 1994 provides that:  
If there are literal or calculation errors in the arbitration award, or if the matters 
which have been decided by the arbitration tribunal are omitted in the arbitration award, 
the arbitration tribunal shall make due corrections or supplementation. The parties may, 
within 30 days from the date of receipt of the award, request the arbitration tribunal to 
make such corrections or supplementation.145 
6.6. The Sovereignty Issue: 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, the main reasons behind host states having concerns about 
arbitration is the submission of their disputes before foreign courts or allowing foreign laws to 
govern the disputes to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of national courts.  The host states regard 
these laws and arbitration institutions as entities devised to serve the interests of the petroleum 
                                                          
142 Article 273 of CCP Iraqi Law provides that: 
      When the arbitrators’ award is presented to the competent court, the disputing parties can revoke this 
award and so can the court on it's own initiative in the following situations  
1. If the award was not issued in a written document, or was based on an invalid agreement, or if it exceeded 
the limits of the agreement. 
2. If the award is not in accordance with or contradicts the rules public order and regulations or any of the 
arbitration rules specified in this law. 
3. For any grounds valid for a retrial. 
4. If there was a substantial error in the award or in any of the proceedings that might influence the validity 
of the award.   
The translation from Arabic language to English language available at < http://gjpi.org/library/primary/statutes/> 
accessed on April 2014. 
143 ibid.  
144 Jalal El- Ahdab, Arbitration with the Arab Countries (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2011) 827. 
145 The English text is available at < http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> 
accessed on 17 of May 2014. 
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companies.146  Iraq is one of the states which refuses to settle disputes arising from petroleum 
agreements by arbitration, on grounds of sovereign immunity.147 
Sovereign immunity is considered one of the most significant issues which may hamper the 
arbitration process, particularly in petroleum disputes.  It is a plea adopted by host state against 
foreign court’s jurisdiction over a dispute involving it.148 Sovereign immunity is one of the 
principles of international law and according to this principle states are equal and should not be 
subject to the foreign courts’ jurisdiction.149  
As indicated previously, petroleum arbitration agreements are considered to imply a waiver 
of the host state’s sovereignty immunity and the jurisdiction of the national court.  However, this 
does not mean the total exclusion of the national law of the host state from the governance of the 
petroleum arbitration agreement or other main contractual terms.  This view has been widely 
upheld by international conventions and laws.150 The abovementioned statement, however, raises 
some questions, namely: does this statement extend to the jurisdiction of enforcement; and has 
this statement resolved the debate about sovereign immunity and designed a uniform approach 
for national courts. 
With regard to the first question it could be said that there are different views of the 
arbitration agreement’s capacity to waive immunity.  The first opinion holds that the arbitration 
agreement amounts to an implied waiver of sovereign immunity that would usually present the 
court’s jurisdiction, where that court is a foreign court.  So, according to this view the waiver of 
sovereign immunity cannot extend to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  On this view, 
the effectiveness of the arbitration agreement’s capacity to waive sovereign immunity is very 
narrow and its jurisdiction is limited. 151 This view was adopted in Ohntrup v. Firearms Centre 
                                                          
146 Hoda Atia, ‘Egypt’s New Commercial Arbitration Framework: Problems and Prospects for the Future of Foreign 
Investment’ (2000) 5 International Trade & Business Law 1. 
147 See chapter three pages 100 and 101. 
148 M. Sornarajah, The Settlement of Foreign Investment Disputes (Kluwer Law International 2000) 290. 
149 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
666. 
150 See for example; Article 12 (1) of European Convention on State Immunity of 1972, Article 17 of Australian 
Foreign State Immunities Act 1985.    
151 Hazel Fox ‘Sovereign Immunity and Arbitration’ in Julian D.M Lew (ed) Contemporary Problems in 
International Arbitration (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1987) 323-33.  
247 
 
Inc152 the court did not accept the enforcement of an arbitral award made in another jurisdiction 
because “a waiver of immunity by a State to one jurisdiction cannot be interpreted as a waiver to 
all jurisdictions”153 
The second view is that the arbitration agreement is not limited to courts’ jurisdiction but 
also extends to other jurisdictions such as confirmation, recognition and enforcement of the 
arbitral award.154  This broader view is based on the New York Convention on the Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards.  The supporters of this opinion justify their opinion on the grounds 
that the state which is a party of convention and submission to arbitration is at the same time in 
“submission to the jurisdiction of other states which are parties to the convention.”155 However, 
this raises a question regarding the position of Iraq, which is not party to the New York 
Convention. Can this view apply to Iraq?  It seems from the above discussion that whether the 
arbitration agreement amounts to a general waiver of immunity or not is controversial and there 
is no universal or clear approach to overcoming this obstacle.  Sovereign immunity becomes 
more complex in states such as Iraq which have no act or law to regulate this important issue.  
The present author’s view is that the waiver of the sovereign immunity issue is a very important 
question.  It pertains to a very sensitive stage of the arbitration process, the enforcement of the 
arbitral award, which is the aim of the recourse to arbitration.  Therefore, the state should 
mention in its arbitration agreement the extent to which it waivers its sovereign immunity. This, 
like other details such as the determination of the applicable law and the arbitrable issue, could 
be contained in the arbitration agreement.  Here the issue of determining to what extend the 
arbitration agreement is considered as a waiver of sovereign immunity would be subject to the 
host state which can determine the limits of the waiver according to the host state’s own interest.  
By this means both parties can avoid an obstacle which would make the arbitration fruitless.   
     
The sovereign immunity issue may also arise in regard of enforcement of arbitral award 
made against the host state or its entities.  This principle could be used to defend the state from 
                                                          
152 Ohntrup v. Firearms Centre Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281, (E.D.Pa. 1981). 
153 ibid 1284-1285. 
154 Georges R. Delaume, ‘State Contracts and Transnational Arbitration’ (1981) 75 the American Journal of 
International Law 784. 
155 M Sornarajah, International Commercial Arbitration: The Problems of State Contracts (Longman 1990) 212. 
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the jurisdiction of a foreign court or tribunal.156  At this initial stage, the host state could invoke a 
plea of immunity to avoid the making of the award in that country.157  In the same context, the 
sovereign immunity issue may be raised as a basis of defence by the host state in the execution 
phase to prevent execution on state property, either before the arbitral award is rendered, when it 
is takes the form of a provisional measure, or after the arbitral award is rendered.158 
Sovereign immunity represents a serious potential obstacle facing petroleum arbitration with 
regard to the enforcement of arbitral awards against the host state.    
However, the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity has been undergoing.  In some 
countries, it has been abandoned or limited due to the increase in the host state’s role in 
commercial activities and enlarged investment between host states and private companies, which 
prefer arbitration as a way to settle disputes.  At the same time, host states seek to encourage 
foreign investment by offering facilities for these companies.159 Therefore it is frustrating when 
foreign companies cannot obtain justice because the host state or its entities invoke a sovereign 
immunity plea.160  In addition, the domain and nature of the state has changed fundamentally due 
to the significant influence of practices by the state in the commercial and economic sectors.161 
The restrictive sovereign immunity approach is based on a distinction between disputes 
concerning purely governmental actions (acta jure imperii) and disputes arising from investment 
contracts (acta jure gestionis) which is denied the sovereign immunity doctrine.162 It seems that 
this distinction is made on behalf of foreign investors.   
Notwithstanding, the restrictive approach of sovereign immunity abandoned the debate 
about the state immunity in regard of commercial activities’ norm to determine which of host 
state conduct considered governmental or commercial is still obstacle.  So, the question here is 
                                                          
156 A. van Blankenstein, ‘Enforcement of an Arbitral Award against a State: With Whom Are You Dealing?’ (1993) 
6 Leiden Journal of International Law Foundation 357.  
157 ibid. 
158 ibid 370. 
159 Michael Singer, ‘Abandoning Restrictive Sovereign Immunity: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction to 
Prescribe’ (1985) 26 Harvard International Law Journal 1. 
160 ibid. 
161 Nout van Woudenberg, State Immunity and Cultural Objects on Loan (Martinus Nijhoff Publications 2012) 109. 
162 A. van Blankenstein, ‘Enforcement of an Arbitral Award against a State: With Whom Are You Dealing?’ (1993) 
6 Leiden Journal of International Law Foundation 357. 
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what criteria can be depended upon to distinguish between governmental conduct and 
commercial conduct.   
Determining whether conduct is governmental or commercial is not an easy task.  However, 
the courts have established two tests, the purpose test and the nature test.163 The purpose test 
focuses on the purpose behind the conduct, whether it is public or private, while the nature test 
focuses on the act’s nature.  This mean that if private entities or individuals can fulfill the act 
then it would be private and consequently sovereign immunity will be denied.  If public entities 
can fulfill the act then sovereign immunity will apply.164 
However, the important question raised here is, how does Iraqi law address or deal with the 
sovereign immunity issue?  
It could be said that Iraq takes a wavering approach in dealing with the sovereign immunity 
doctrine.  Different economic ideologies were in force before 2003 and after this date. So 
differences in view with regard to sovereign immunity concerning economic issues are also 
apparent.  These different views can be seen in laws regulating the economic sector.  As 
mentioned in earlier chapters, Iraqi law tries to protect national resources by keeping these 
resources under a sovereign cloak.165 Article 15 of the former Iraqi constitution law of 1970 
gives the public property special protection166 and also restricts real estate to Iraqi citizens so, the 
foreigner cannot owner immovable property in Iraq.167 It seems from this review that the Iraqi 
state dominated investment in Iraq and a restrictive doctrine of sovereignty was clearly apparent.  
This doctrine was invoked strongly in 1978 when Iraq refused to join the New York Convention 
                                                          
163 Michael Singer, ‘Abandoning Restrictive Sovereign Immunity: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction to 
Prescribe’ (1985) 26 Harvard International Law Journal 1. 
164 Ernest K. Bankas, The State Immunity Controversy in International Law: Private Suits Against Sovereign States 
in Domestic Courts (Springer 2005) 188.  
165 Article 13 of the abolish Iraqi Constitution Law of 1970.  Interim Constitution of Iraq of 1970 published in the 
Official Gazette issue 1900, 17 July 1970, p 3.   
166 Article 15 of Iraqi Interim Constitutional Law of 1970 provided that: 
      Public ownership and properties of the Public Sector are inviolable. The State and all People are 
responsible for safeguarding, securing, and protecting it. Any sabotage to it or aggression against it, is 
considered as sabotage and aggression against the entity of the Society. 
An English language translation of the Interim Constitution of Iraq of 1970 is available at <http://gjpi.org/library 
/primary /statutes/> accessed at 25 May 2014.  
167 Article 18 of Iraqi Interim Constitutional Law of 1970 provided that “Immobile ownership is prohibited for non-
Iraqi, except otherwise mentioned by a law.” 
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of 1958.168  Iraq used the sovereign immunity doctrine to justify its reluctance to become a party 
to the New York Convention of 1958.169 This justification gives strong evidence of the Iraqi 
attitude towards the sovereign immunity doctrine and indicates the relationship between the 
sovereign immunity doctrine and investment in Iraq.  This view stemmed from the prevailing 
socialist conceptions and it dominated the economic policies of the Iraqi state.   
However, the Iraqi economic view changed after 2003.  It was filled with social trade 
system.  It formed the intention to stay out of this system and tended to adopt a more flexible 
policy towards foreign investment as a result of the political and economic events which 
happened after 2003 and the special circumstances that Iraq faced.  Iraq needs to reconstruct its 
exhausted economy after the destructive wars which decimated its economy and infrastructure by 
recovering its sovereignty through self-determination and reform of its legal system in order to 
serve Iraq’s ambition to encourage foreign investment.  After the occupation of Iraq the 
Colaition Provisional Authority (hereinafter CPA) promulgated a regulation declaring that all 
laws shall remain in force except those replaced by the CPA or superseded by the Iraqi 
authorities through legislation passed by these authorities.170 The CPA urged change in the Iraqi 
legal system with regard to the economic sector.171 These changes were reflected in many laws 
promulgated by the Iraqi legislative power dealing with the economic sector.  On the 19 
September 2003 the CPA issued Order No 39 which replaced all of Iraq’s existing foreign 
                                                          
168 The Iraqi Office of Legal Codification explained in Decree No. 132/1978 as of 28 of August 1978 the reasons 
preventing Iraq’s ratification of the New York Convention 1958 that: 
      The International Commercial Arbitration included foreign element, where it held outside the Iraqi border 
and the arbitrators could be foreign nationals which apply foreign law either substantive law or procedure 
law.  Therefore, enforce foreign arbitral award inside Iraqi republic territories facing legal and political 
obstacles (……….) therefore the adhering issue to the New York Convention in 1958 to recognize and 
enforcement the foreign awards require the Iraqi authorities agreement which plans the economic 
prospect public policy. Because in this accession many political aspects should observe, also this 
accession should reform the Iraqi laws and change some of it.  
See below the Arabic text: 
طي دق بناجا نيمكحم ىلا هب دهعتي دقو .دلبلا دودح جراخ متي دق هنا ثيح .ايبنجأ ارصنع نمضتي يلودلا يراجتلا ميكحتلا نأ ايبنجأ انوناق نوقب
جلا قاطن لخاد هيبنجلأا ميكحتلا ماكحأ ذيفنت نأف هيلعو .هيئارجلأا دعاوقلا ةيحان نم مأ هيعوضوملا دعاوقلا ةيحان نم ءاوسم هيقارعلا هيروه
 كريوين ةدهاعم ىلا مامضنلأا نأف هيلعو ).......( هيدايسو هينوناق لئاوح هنود يقلاي1958  هيبنجلأا ميكحتلا ماكحأب فارتعلأا نأشب
اوج مامضنلأا كلذ يف نلأ هماعلا هيداصتقلأا هسايسلا طيطختب موقت يتلا ايلعلا تاهجلا يأر دارختسأ مزلتسي اهذيفنتوهيسايس بن  يغبني
.اهليدعتو هيقارعلا نيناوقلا ةعجارم بجوتسي مامضنلأا كلذو هساردلا يعدتست هيلمع تايضتقمو اهتاعارم 
169 Decree No 132 / 1978 as of 28 August 1978.  
170 Conor Mccarthy, ‘The Paradox of the International Law of Military Occupation: Sovereignty and the 
Reformation of Iraq’ (2005) 43 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 43. 
171 ibid. 
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investment law.172 This Order was abolished when Iraq promulgated the Law of Investment No. 
13 of 2006, which regulated foreign investment in Iraq.   
The UAE does not expressly state that foreign states parties have or enjoy immunity.  The 
UAE is not immune from suits but it is immune from their execution.173  
The PRC has a strict view of sovereign immunity for the state and its property.174 China is 
one of the states which signed the CJISTP of 2005,175 which supports the restrictive approach to 
sovereign immunity.  
However, it could be said Iraq has overcome the sovereignty issue by allowing foreign 
investors to settle disputes arising from petroleum agreements by arbitration.  The state is 
considered to have waived its sovereignty immunity from jurisdiction as soon as it has agreed to 
settle a dispute arising a petroleum agreement, so in the view of the present author, the 
arbitration agreement is considered to waive of sovereign immunity. 
6.7. The Public Policy Issue: 
The sovereign immunity doctrine is not the only obstacle which can prevent enforcement of 
an arbitral award.  A public policy issue can also be used by host states to resist the enforcement 
of an arbitral award.  Public policy is a common and crucial plea which can be used to resist 
enforcement of an award or challenge the validity of the arbitration award.  Public policy as 
grounds for challenging the arbitration award includes not only the contents of the arbitral award; 
it is also contains the procedures whereby the arbitral award was rendered.176  
                                                          
172  Section 3 Paragraph 1 of CPA Order No. 39 issued on 19 September 2003 provided that “This Order replace all 
exciting foreign investment law”. 
173  Reza Mohtashami, Antonia Birt and Lee Rovinescu, ‘Arbitration Guide IBA Arbitration Committee: United 
Arab Emirates’ (2013) International Associated Bar 1. 
174 Peter Thorp and Huawei Sun, ‘Arbitration Guide IBA Arbitration Committee: China’ (2012) International 
Associated Bar 1. 
175 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property was adopted during the 
65th plenary meeting of the General Assembly by resolution A/59/38 of 2 December 2004.  In accordance with 
its articles 28 and 33, the Convention shall be open for signature by all States from 17 January 2005 until 17 
January 2007, at United Nations Headquarters in New York. 
176 Javier Carcia de Enterria, ‘The Role of Public Policy in International Commercial Arbitration’ (1990) 21 Law & 
Pol Int'l. Bus 389.  
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Despite the importance of the public policy issue, there is no universal concept determining 
the dimensions of this issue.  The concept of public policy is elastic and differs from country to 
country and also from time to time and therefore each country has a different conception of 
public policy.177  So, when an Iraqi court refuses to enforce an arbitral award on the grounds of 
public policy the award may possibly be enforced in another country.  However, determining the 
contents and the concept of public policy is not an easy task for the judge of the nation where the 
parties seek to enforce the arbitration award.   
There are three types of public policy, namely domestic, international and transnational.  
This diversity results from the nature of the transaction or from the nationality of the parties.  
The issue of domestic public policy may be raised in cases of domestic arbitration when both 
parties have the same nationality.178 National courts can reject the enforcement of arbitral awards 
which are contrary to national norms of ethics and justice.179  The rules of public policy are 
easily to be found in the legislation of the state and these rules designed to protect the public 
interests of the state.180 Sometimes the courts need to take into consideration the public policy of 
two or more states when the disputes contain international elements involving international 
arbitration.  In such cases the public policy would be international.181 Transnational public policy 
contains universal norms and widely accepted standards and the court considers this type of 
international arbitration to be governed by lex mercatoria.182    
There are some questions arising with regard to public policy: what is the concept of public 
policy under Iraqi Law? Does Iraqi law make a distinction between different types of public 
policy? This section will attempt to answer these questions.   
                                                          
177 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
656. 
178 Kenneth M. Curtin, ‘An Examination of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Judicial Review of Arbitral 
Awards’ (2000) 15 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 337. 
179 ibid. 
180 Marc Blessing, ‘Mandatory Rules of Law versus Party Autonomy in International Arbitration’ (1997) 14 Journal 
of International Arbitration 23. 
181 William W. Park, ‘The Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform’ (2003) 36 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law 1241. 
182 James D. Fry, ‘De´sordre Public International under the New York Convention: Whither Truly International 
Public Policy’ (2009) 8 Chinese Journal of International Law 81. 
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Iraqi law has no definition of the concept of public policy concept in any specific article or 
piece of legislation.  However, Iraqi law refers to this term in Civil Law as public order which 
has the same meaning as “public policy” and therefore, for the purposes of this study the term 
public policy will be employed.  The mandatory rules of public policy can be seen in different 
Iraqi legislations: for example, Article 32 of the Iraqi Civil Law prohibits the application of any 
foreign law which contravenes public policy.  As mentioned in an earlier section of this chapter.  
Iraqi law gives Iraqi courts the power to reject the enforcement of foreign judgments if this 
judgment is in contrast with public policy.183 Similarly, UAE Law prohibits the enforcement of 
any foreign arbitral award which is contrary to public policy.  Article 235 (e) of UAE Federal 
Civil Procedures Law No 11 of 1992 provides that “It does not conflict or contradict with a 
judgment or order previously passed by another court in the State and does not include any 
violation of moral code or public order”.184 The PRC law also does not allow enforce the foreign 
arbitral award if it is against the Republic of China public policy.  Article 260 of PRC Civil 
Procedure Law provides that “If the people’s court determines that the enforcement of the award 
goes against the social and public interest of the country, the people’s court shall make a written 
order not to allow the enforcement of the arbitral award”.185  
Iraqi law also does not distinguish between different types of public policy. It depends 
completely on the domestic public policy rules which are provided in different legislations. 
Therefore the author presents the view that the Iraqi courts will not enforce arbitral awards which 
conflict with Iraqi public policy with regard to petroleum disputes even if they contain foreign 
elements.  This approach was adopted by the New York Convention which provided in Article V 
(2) (b) that enforcement may be refused where “the recognition or enforcement of the award 
would be contrary to the public policy of that country”.  
                                                          
183 Article 6 (d) of ELFJ. 
184 The translation from Arabic language to English is available at < http://www.diac.ae/idias/rules/uae/chapter4/> 
accessed on 13 August 2014.   
185 The English text available at < http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383756.htm> 
accessed on 17 of May 2014.  Adopted at the Fourth Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress and 
promulgated by Order No. 44 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on April 9, 1991. 
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6.8. Conclusion: 
This chapter sheds light on the current legal system of enforcement of arbitral award under 
Iraqi law.  Iraqi law does not provide explicitly for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
and has not designed any mechanism to enforce such awards.  Iraq has two laws to regulate the 
enforcement of foreign judgments, but these laws do not refer explicitly to the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards.  The silence of Iraqi law on this subject has created a diversity of 
opinions as to whether or not there is a possibility to enforce foreign arbitral award under Iraqi 
law.   However, the author argues that the Iraqi ELFJ is applicable to the enforcement of such 
awards.  It seems that these laws can be applied to arbitral awards.  The deficiency in 
enforcement in the current legal system makes that system inadequate.  Therefore Iraq legislators 
should address this deficiency either by amending the laws involved so as to accommodate the 
new economic era of Iraq or by promulgating new laws for that purpose.  This is so because the 
absence of such laws may make the arbitration process ineffective and cause first confusion and 
then aversion among foreign investors.  
Iraq has resisted joining the most important conventions involved in the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards, such as, for example, the New York Convention of 1958 and the ICSID 
Convention.  This absence caused a major lacuna and a deficiency in provision for the regulation 
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Iraq.  However, those conventions did not address 
the sovereignty issue, which is considered an important obstacle in the arbitration process and 
they did not formulate definite solutions to this problem.  Iraq’s accession to the New York 
Convention would contribute to developing a legal system for the enforcement of arbitral awards 
by adoption of the facilities provided by this convention, particularly as most world states have 
become parties to this convention. Iraq has already joined most of the regional conventions 
concluded between Arab countries which regulate the enforcement of arbitral awards rendered in 
Arab countries, for example, the Riyadh Convention, which is considered important in this 
regard.  However, the Riyadh Convention also has not formulated articles to address the 
sovereign immunity issue.   
The sovereign immunity question plays an important role in the success of any arbitration or 
conversely can cause it to fail. The sovereign immunity issue, however still arouses acrimonious 
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debate in the context of the enforcement of the arbitral award, and there is no universal approach 
to this issue.  The author suggests that this issue should be regulated within the arbitration 
agreement like other issues.  The applicable law or the arbitrability issue and the extent to which 
the state party can waive its immunity should be explicated.    
The constitution of Iraq and its laws provide that the sovereignty of Iraq is protected.  
However, the author has consistently argued that Iraq waives its sovereignty immunity as soon as 
it agrees to the arbitration clause.  So the arbitral award rendered according to arbitration 
agreement contained the parties’ consensus to solve their dispute by arbitration.    
The elastic nature of public policy is considered problem for a national judge.  However it 
could be said there is consensus that the judge can depends on the content of international public 
policy.  Iraqi law does not distinguish between international and domestic public policy.  Iraq 
depends on the content of its domestic public policy.     
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Chapter Seven: A Vision for a Petroleum Arbitration Regime in Iraq:  
  The purpose of this study was to develop a vision to meet Iraq’s need for a legal 
mechanism sufficient to resolve disputes arising from petroleum agreements through 
promulgating petroleum arbitration laws and establishing a specialised institution for petroleum 
disputes.  Iraq could then depend on them as a means to resolve disputes arising from petroleum 
agreements in transition, which are considered to be a special kind of investment agreement.  
This is because these agreements concern sovereignty issues according to Iraqi law.1 The study 
has also provided an analysis of the attitude of host states from developing countries towards 
arbitration and how they achieve fairness of arbitration, focusing on a comparison of the 
experiences of PRC and UAE in this regard.  In addition, this study examined the applicable 
law of petroleum arbitration procedures and also the applicable law of petroleum agreement 
under Iraqi law and argued that the national law is the optimal choice for the governance of 
petroleum arbitration.  
7.1. The Key Findings of the Study: 
 The study examined and evaluated the current Iraqi regime of arbitration for the resolution 
of petroleum disputes and sought to discover whether this regime was adequate to deal with 
petroleum disputes or whether Iraq stood in need of a new and comprehensive regime of 
arbitration in order to achieve a balance between Iraqi interests and those of foreign investors.  It 
was found that the current Iraqi regime of arbitration is not fully adequate to deal with petroleum 
disputes.  The provisions regulating arbitration in Iraq are founded on various laws and there is 
no separate legislation for the regulation of international commercial arbitration.  The regulation 
of arbitration in Iraq depends mainly on the laws of the CCP, while the Civil Law regulates 
issues not covered by the CCP.  It also depends on the Iraqi ELFJ to regulate the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards, even though this law does not provide explicitly for the enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards, and provides rules for regulating the enforcement of foreign judgments 
in Iraq.  It is the author’s view that regulation by the CCP, Iraqi Civil Law and the Iraqi ELFJ 
does not provide a comprehensive and effective arbitration regime that is attractive to investors.  
It is suitable for everyday purposes but not for the special requirements of petroleum arbitration.  
                                                          
1 Article 111 of Iraqi Constitution of 2005 publishes in Official Gazette issue 4012 of 28 May 2005. 
257 
 
These laws do not regulate important issues in arbitration, such as international arbitration 
agreements, the applicable law of arbitration and the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  The 
author will review the findings extensively, chapter by chapter, and in the next section the 
manner in which the current Iraqi regime regulates these issues will be shown.  The author 
presents the view that these laws are designed to regulate domestic arbitration and not 
international commercial arbitration.  These laws need to be updated and modernised if they are 
to be effective in dealing with disputes arising from petroleum agreements.  Although there are 
some provisions in the abovementioned laws that can be applied to regulate and manage 
arbitration, this does not mean Iraq can depend on these laws in future.  Iraq needs to rebuild its 
shattered economy by attracting investors, particularly foreigner investors, who will seek legal 
guarantees, particularly with regard to the question of arbitration, which is of primary concern to 
the foreign investor wishing to invest in any host state.  Iraq needs a comprehensive petroleum 
arbitration regime that is compatible with international standards of commercial arbitration. It 
should follow the example of the UAE, which distinguishes between domestic and international 
arbitration, and it should update its relevant laws by following the example of the UAE Federal 
Draft of International Commercial Arbitration of 2008, which depends on UNICTRAL Model 
Law.   
The PRC promulgated the International Arbitration Law of 1994, which regulates the 
principles issues in arbitration, such as international arbitration agreements, applicable law and 
the enforcement of foreign arbitral law.  This law also distinguishes between domestic arbitration 
and international commercial arbitration.   
7.2. Summary and Review the General Findings by Chapters: 
Chapter one is devoted to an explanation of the key issues of the study as a whole.  It 
contains a review of petroleum arbitration in academic literature, and describes the differences of 
opinion among lawyers with regard to arbitration as a method for resolving petroleum disputes.  
The chapter shows that lawyers from developing countries tend not to favour arbitration as a 
means of settling petroleum disputes because it allows the application of foreign law and thus 
violates the sovereignty of the host state.  Some of these lawyers also take the view that 
petroleum agreements have certain distinctive characteristics that make them different from other 
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forms of commercial agreement.  Other lawyers, however, see arbitration as the best way to 
resolve petroleum disputes, and it also the method favoured by petroleum companies.   
Each chapter of this work offers significant findings and suggestions for a specialised and 
comprehensive modern arbitration regime.  The concluding discussion examines and reference to 
the laws of the UAE and the PRC which have inspired the author’s own vision. Each subsequent 
chapter answers the questions raised by the research.  
Chapter Two reviewed and evaluated the relationship between Iraq and the international 
petroleum companies by representing the history of Iraq and the role played in Iraq by some 
countries.  It has drawn considerable attention from powerful countries like Germany, Britain, 
France and USA.   Petroleum has been an important factor in the reshaping of Iraqi history and 
the history of the countries in the Gulf area.  It was the main reason behind the conflicts which 
happened in the Arabian Gulf, such as the war between Iraq and Iran and also between Iraq and 
Kuwait.  This chapter also showed that the Iraqi government before 1958 has no effective role 
played in petroleum industry.  However, after 1958, the Iraqi government started playing an 
important role and tried to manage this valuable sector by promulgating important laws2 and also 
revised the petroleum agreements it had previously concluded with petroleum companies and 
amended what it found to be unfair conditions in these agreements.  However, although Iraq 
controlled and nationalised its petroleum wealth, this sector was not managed well because of 
wars and UN economic sanctions.  Post 2003, Iraqi petroleum sector is facing dangerous 
challenges like looting, smuggling, corruption and destroyed by armed groups.  These challenges 
affected in investment on petroleum sector.   
The author has argued that petroleum agreements differ in character from investment 
agreements.  This is so because the Iraqi constitution gives petroleum as a natural resource a 
special importance by placing this wealth under the ownership of the Iraqi people.  This 
important feature granted by Iraqi law makes petroleum agreements a special kind of investment 
agreement.  Hence the author argue that the disputes arising from such agreements need a special 
kind of arbitration law and an institutional involvement in petroleum disputes, containing rules to 
achieve a balance between the interests of Iraq as a host state and those of petroleum companies 
                                                          
2 Law No. 80 of 1961, Law No. 11 of 1964, law No. 123 of 1967 and law No. 97 of 1967. 
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as investors in the petroleum sector.  The former conclusion is one of the more significant 
findings to emerge from this study.3 
The legal nature of petroleum agreements is a controversial question and causes differences 
in opinion.  The author argued that petroleum agreements are not international treaties and 
moreover neither administrative contracts nor private contracts.  They are contracts containing a 
mix of private and public law features.  Their special legal nature is determined by the state’s 
attitude towards its resources and legislation policy.4 Hence the author takes the view that the 
national law of the host state should be privileged in any such agreement.     
Chapter Three evaluated the host states’ general attitudes towards arbitration and also 
showed that the petroleum companies’ attitudes towards arbitration as a method of settling 
petroleum agreements are different from the host states’ attitude.  Traditionally, most host states 
did not welcome arbitration as an alternative to national courts for settling disputes, especially 
petroleum disputes. However, most of these states changed their attitudes of arbitration for many 
factors, among them the participation of many host states in regional and international 
conventions involving arbitration, such as the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention, 
which required updating their arbitration laws.  Petroleum companies, however, take an 
altogether different view of arbitration in the resolution of disputes.  They are reluctant to subject 
themselves to the national law of host states and fear that the latter’s courts may be subject to 
political pressure.   
Iraq, as a host states, has attitudes not much different from those other host states.  It views 
arbitration with suspicion, and therefore arbitration is not a welcome method for settling 
investment disputes in general and petroleum disputes in particular.  The current study has 
argued that there are two main issues behind Iraq’s attitude is sovereignty.  Iraq sees arbitration 
as a violation of Iraqi sovereign immunity jurisdiction,5 and a way to apply foreign law instead 
of Iraqi national laws.  The author argues that this view reflects negatively on Iraqi legal system 
and its capacity to settle disputes in amicable ways.  Iraq does not regulate international 
commercial arbitration and has not become party to important international conventions of 
                                                          
3 See section 2.4 of chapter two.  
4 For a fuller discussion see section 2.5 of chapter two.  
5 See pages 100 and 101 of chpter three. 
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arbitration.  Despite Iraq’s unwelcoming view of arbitration, this study argued that Iraq does not 
actually prohibit arbitration as a way to solve investment disputes in general and petroleum 
disputes in particular.  This can be inferred from different laws regulating amicable settlements 
of disputes.  Arbitration even has its legal basis the Civil Law6, the Commercial Law,7 the Iraqi 
Law of Enforcement8, the Investment Law9 and the Draft Oil and Gas Law of 2007.  Moreover, 
Iraq is party to many regional conventions which concern arbitration such as Riyadh Convention.  
However, even abovementioned laws contain provisions regulate arbitration it is not adequate to 
deal with petroleum disputes and then attract foreign investors.  This study has showed that Iraq 
need comprehensive and modernise arbitration regime distinguish between domestic and 
international arbitration.  
The UAE was one of the petroleum countries which also did not welcome arbitration.  
However, the UAE changed its attitude adopted a more positive attitude towards arbitration by 
updating its arbitration laws and distinguish between domestic arbitration and international 
commercial arbitration.  In addition to that, UAE accessing to the important international 
conventions, which are the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention. The UAE also 
developed its arbitration institutions.   
The PRC has a long history of arbitration and provided this study with a rich foundation.  It 
has updated its arbitration laws and it is a party to the New York Convention and the ICSID 
Convention. 
          Both the UAE and the PRC have established independent arbitration regimes to 
resolve investment disputes and these can be applied to the regulation of petroleum disputes.  It 
is argued that Iraq should follow these developing countries, which have been successful in 
attracting foreign investors by instigating modern independent regimes for arbitration. 
Chapter Four examine and analysis the current provisions of arbitration agreement and 
assisted if these provisions adequate to deal with petroleum disputes or it is needed to update and 
amend.   
                                                          
6 Article 16 of Iraqi Civil Law No. 40 of 1951. 
7 Article 297 No. 30 of 1984. 
8 Article 3 (2) of Iraqi ELFJ. 
9 Article 27 of Investment Law No. 13 of 2006. 
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This study argued that the consent to arbitration is also a mirror of the state party’s desire to 
waive its sovereign immunity jurisdiction.  Hence, the author argues that Iraq waives its 
sovereignty immunity jurisdiction as soon as it agrees to arbitration as a method to settle 
petroleum disputes.  The consent to arbitration should come from parties which have the capacity 
or the authority to conclude arbitration agreements.  The current study argued that according to 
Iraqi laws and practices the Iraqi state and its entities can conclude petroleum arbitration 
agreements because there is no law to prohibit Iraq from concluding such an agreement in regard 
to petroleum disputes.  Iraqi law and the UAE’s and PRC’s laws do not express which law 
should govern the capacity of arbitration agreement and leave the matter to the general rules in 
their civil laws to regulate such important issues, which favours the personal law of the party and 
gives weight to the nationality of the party to determine the personal law.  One of the more 
significant findings to emerge from this chapter is that petroleum disputes are arbitrable in Iraq 
and there is no law to prohibit such disputes from being resolved by arbitration;  also practice 
shows petroleum disputes can be settled by arbitration, since some petroleum agreements have 
been concluded between Iraq and petroleum companies.10  Similarly, the UAE and the PRC 
consider petroleum disputes arbitrable.   
This study show that the Iraqi CCP Law does not determine the law govern petroleum 
arbitration agreement whether that law should be the law of main agreement or the law of the 
seat of arbitration.  Determining the applicable law make arbitrator decide whether arbitration 
agreement valid or not on the basis of the law governing that agreement and then can enforce the 
arbitral award.   However, Article 25 of the Iraqi Civil Law regulates this issue and the author 
believes that this provision can govern the law governing petroleum arbitration agreements.  This 
article determines three laws which can govern such agreements, which are the law chosen by 
parties or the law of the place where the contracts will be carried out, or the law of the place of 
contract.  This article enhances the parties’ autonomy principles by give the parties a freedom to 
determine the law that will govern petroleum agreement.  The UAE Civil Procedures Law also 
does not determine which law should govern the arbitration agreement and also refers to general 
rules in civil law, which prefer the personal law of the parties if they have a common domicile, 
depending on domicile criteria or the law of the location of the contract and also can apply the 
                                                          
10 Article 40 of petroleum agreement of 1925. 
262 
 
law chosen by the parties.  The PRC has an approach which differs somewhat from that of Iraq 
and the UAE.  It states that the law of the court of the place can apply the arbitration agreement 
as a last choice, after the parties’ autonomy and the seat of arbitration.    
This study showed that the petroleum arbitration agreement has autonomy from the 
petroleum agreement under Iraqi law.  Hence, petroleum arbitration agreements are immune 
from claims that they will be null because the main contract is null under Iraqi law.  This 
argument is based on Article 139 of Iraq Civil Law No. 40 of 1951.11  The author argues that due 
to this article, the petroleum arbitration agreement is effective and valid even if the petroleum 
agreement was void.  Severability doctrine enhances the arbitration process and considered 
important principles should contain by the Iraqi arbitration regime to attract foreign investment.   
The foreign investors fell save that the host state will not evade under plea that the petroleum 
agreement is null.  The UAE accepted this principle, as did the PRC, which also adopted this 
principle in its arbitration law.  This study also argued that the severability principle has taken 
strong and firm steps towards universality.  This ensures that the petroleum arbitration agreement 
does not have the same fate as petroleum agreements and the law governing petroleum 
arbitration agreement may differ from the main agreement.   
This study has found that generally there is lack of provision for the regulation of arbitration 
agreements because Iraq does not enact international commercial arbitration.  Consequently, it 
depends on general rules and principles of Iraqi law to regulate important agreements, for 
example, the CCP and Civil Law.  The CCP does not regulate important issues concerning 
arbitration agreement like the applicable law of that agreement and also does not recognise the 
severability doctrine of arbitration agreement which consider one of the important features of 
petroleum arbitration agreement.   Although, civil law deals with applicable law issue and offer 
the grounds for severability doctrine in Article 139, this law is not adequate to deal with 
petroleum disputes.  Most of these laws are outdated and need to be reformed so as to be suit to 
the international model of international commercial arbitration laws.   
Chapter Five discusses the procedural law and the substantive law of petroleum arbitration 
and describes how the current regime of arbitration deals with these important issues.  According 
                                                          
11 See section 4.5 of chapter four. 
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to Iraqi law, the procedural law can be determined by the parties, or by arbitrators if the parties 
cannot reach agreement.  Iraqi law recognises the principle of the parties’ autonomy but this 
principle is not absolute.  It cannot be applied if it is in contrast with public policy or the 
mandatory rules of the Iraqi state.   The UAE and the PRC have similarly adopted the principle 
of the autonomy of the parties in determining the procedural law of arbitration, with the 
arbitrators’ choice as a secondary means of determining that law.  Chapter Five also explains the 
theories that deal with the procedural law of arbitration, the delocalisation theory and the seat of 
arbitration theory, both of which have had a major impact on the law governing arbitration 
procedures.   This chapter showed that the Iraqi, UAE and PRC law have adapted this theory.  
The author vision that Iraq should adapt this theory to govern procedures law of petroleum 
arbitration because Seat theory enhances the relationship between the seat of arbitration and the 
law of arbitration procedures through giving the law of arbitration seat weight by linking the 
arbitration place law with the municipal laws governing the arbitration process.  Despite some 
criticisms of this theory, it has gained wide acceptance in some arbitral awards, international 
devices and national laws.   
The law governing the legal relationship between the host state and the petroleum 
companies is considered one of the most controversial topics in legal circles.  Applicable law 
also mirrors the conflict between the host state’s sovereignty and petroleum companies’ interests.  
The agreement’s parties have the freedom to select the law governing their agreement but the 
autonomy of the parties is restricted by public order issues according to Iraqi law.  The law 
chosen by parties should not be contrary to the public order of morality.  This view was adopted 
by Article 23 of Iraqi Civil Law.  Iraqi law restricts the parties’ autonomy in regard to petroleum 
agreement and applies the Iraqi law compulsorily.  This reflects Iraqi sovereignty in regard to 
petroleum agreement.  Similarly the PRC laws restrict the parties’ autonomy in regard to mineral 
resources and apply China’s law of petroleum agreement.  The Iraqi, UAE and Iraqi law and 
PRC law does not give the arbitrator the right to select the applicable law of petroleum 
agreement.   
This chapter showed that determining the applicable law of petroleum agreement raises 
debate at theoretical and practical levels and also among international organizations which try to 
find approaches which serve the host state’s interest.  The difficulty in finding a universal 
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approach is related to the nature of this agreement and the peculiarity of the subject matter of this 
agreement.  The conflict between the petroleum agreement parties’ interests helps in preparing a 
fertile soil for the appearance of important theories aimed at finding a universal approach to this 
critical question.  Most of the theories aim to detach petroleum agreements from the national law 
sphere and apply different laws, such as international law, the general principles of law, 
transnational law or Lex Contractus.   
This study has argued that Iraqi national law can be an adequate choice as the applicable law 
of petroleum agreements.  This is so because Iraq after 2003 promulgated some laws involving 
investment and also national laws containing clear details which cannot be found in other laws, 
such as transnational law or the general principles of law.  Moreover, host states promulgated 
laws reflecting its intention to protect their natural resources in line with the international model.  
This approach has gained wide acceptance from international organization such as OPEC and the 
UN, which has promulgated some resolutions reflecting this approach.   
Chapter Six evaluated the current legal system for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
in Iraq and examine whether this system adequate to deal with enforcement foreign arbitral 
award or not.  This chapter showed that Iraq has no law explicitly regulating foreign arbitral 
awards in general or petroleum arbitral awards in particular.  The laws currently over 
implementation of regulate foreign judgments, but there is no regulation of foreign arbitral 
awards.  This lacuna causes diversity in opinions as to whether Iraqi law is applicable to the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  The author has argued that foreign arbitral awards in 
general and petroleum arbitral awards in particular are enforceable under Iraqi law even if Iraqi 
Implementing Laws do not express explicitly the enforcement of foreign arbitral award.  
Following the argument that foreign arbitral awards can be treated as foreign judgments, then the 
Iraqi Implementing Law No. 30 of 1928 can be applied to enforce foreign arbitral awards.  This 
is so because there is no law prohibiting enforcement of such awards and also foreign arbitral 
awards have a condition in some cases, for example, the awards rendered by the ICSID and also 
the Iraqi Implementing Law.12  The UAE and PRC laws provide explicitly for enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards and regulate them through their arbitration laws. Thus, regulate 
enforcement of foreign arbitral award by UAE and PRC arbitration laws give a clear image of 
                                                          
12 For a fuller discussion see section 6.2 of chapter six.  
265 
 
foreign investors that the host state recognize enforcement foreign arbitral award.  Iraq should 
follow this approach by provided explicitly enforcement foreign arbitral award and regulate that 
enforcement.  Enforcement of foreign arbitral award is the second question will ask by foreign 
investors when come to invest in Iraq after arbitration.   
This chapter analysis that the Iraqi political concern was the main reason to prevent Iraq 
from joining to international commercial arbitration thus, depriving it of links to international 
arbitration conventions and this created a lacuna in the Iraqi legal system regarding the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  Iraqi adoption of the New York Convention could 
develop its legal system for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, create the legal 
mechanism for enforcement of such awards and encourage foreign investors.  This study has 
argued that the New York Convention can apply to the state and its entities and also this 
convention can apply to petroleum agreements.  Despite these agreements having special 
conditions, they contain also commercial feature and also the host state can determine whether or 
not the disputes arising from this agreement are arbitral.  These agreements are important and 
have wide acceptance, but the conventions do not address the important obstacle facing 
enforcement foreign arbitral awards, which is the problematic issue of sovereignty.  
Unlike Iraq, UAE and PRC become party on New York Convention and ICSID Convention.  
That is help these states to facility enforcement of foreign arbitral award and update their 
involvement laws and then encourage investors.  
One of the important findings in this study is that sovereign immunity plays an important 
role in the success or failure of any arbitration.  This study has argued that Iraq would be waived 
of its sovereign immunity as soon as consent submit petroleum dispute to arbitration and arbitral 
award rendered according to this agreement.  This waiver can extend to the enforcement of the 
foreign arbitral award.    
Public policy is also considered one of the important obstacles facing enforcement of the 
arbitral award.  This is so because of its elastic nature.  There is a consensus that a national judge 
can depend on an international public policy.  However, Iraq does not distinguish between 
domestic and international public policy and is still dependent on domestic public policy.  
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The main argument submitted by this thesis is that the legal system for resolving petroleum 
disputes in Iraq is inadequate and the provisions of current laws involving arbitration, like the 
CCP, cannot be totally depended on.  It has many lacunae: this is so because this law was 
designed to regulate national arbitration, not international commercial arbitration.  Meanwhile, 
Iraq looks forward to rebuilding a solid economy in transition and, due to the special 
circumstances of Iraq, its petroleum sector is considered to be its best prospect at this stage of its 
history.   
Given the special status of petroleum agreements, they should have their own legal system 
of arbitration supported by a special institution for petroleum arbitration.  There is no legal 
impediment to prevent Iraq from promulgating an arbitration law to settle petroleum disputes.  
Petroleum disputes are arbitrable under Iraqi law and these disputes can be submitted to 
arbitration.13  This law gives the Iraqi national law great weight and furthermore does not violate 
the sovereign immunity of Iraq.  Iraq does have the capacity to promulgate arbitration laws and 
establish a petroleum arbitration centre.         
7.3. A New Vision for an Iraqi Petroleum Arbitration Regime:   
The author’s vision for the Iraqi legal system’s governance of the petroleum investment 
environment is set out below.  These suggestions would be important in making a suitable 
environment for the success of a petroleum arbitration law and a petroleum arbitration centre in 
Iraq and of their function as an alternative way for Iraqi courts to resolve petroleum disputes. 
7.3.1. General Vision: 
  The evidence from this study suggests the need to promulgate oil and gas law, to regulate 
the petroleum industry as whole and also to regulate the management of Iraqi petroleum wealth 
between the Iraqi regions and provinces in order to serve the interests of the Iraqi people and to 
give the IFG a wide role in this regard by giving it the exclusive right to manage the petroleum 
industry in Iraq.  This is because the government is supposed to be the most able to understand 
the Iraqi people’s needs and to distribute the petroleum revenues fairly between Iraqi people. 
This law should also improve the prospects of the Iraqi people.  In addition, this study suggests 
                                                          
13 See section 4.3.2.3 of chapter four. 
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that Iraq should avoid concluding PSAs in the transitional period for economic reasons, and also 
because PSAs place unfair terms on Iraq which are obstacles preventing it from rebuilding its 
economy.  Moreover Iraq should be stricter of PSAs concluded by KRG which is not have legal 
foundations to conclude it and also weakens the Iraq’s chances to attract international petroleum 
companies through the conclusion of this type of agreement by the KRG.     
 The results of this research support the idea that the time is ripe for Iraq to join the New 
York Convention of 1958.  This convention has designed provisions for the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards and also some provisions concerning arbitration agreements.  The 
author has argued that this convention can apply to petroleum disputes.  Iraqi access to this 
convention enhances and facilitates the legal system of enforcement of petroleum arbitral awards 
and attracts foreign investors.  This convention can also apply to both parties, the state and its 
entities and also foreign companies.  It has become widely popular and most states have become 
parties to this convention.  In addition to the New York Convention, Iraq also should access the 
ICSID Convention which also applies to host states or its entities and also to the other party as a 
legal entity.  The ICSID Convention has its own mechanism for the recognition and enforcement 
of arbitral awards and also the contracting parties should recognise and enforce ICSID arbitral 
award as the final judgment of its courts.  This advantage of ICSID awards could be consistent 
with Iraqi Implementing laws which provide that foreign judgment should be final and 
enforceable by Iraqi courts. 
Where the success of any arbitration process depends on what the enforcement laws offer in 
terms of facilities for the enforcement of arbitral award, the arbitration law will not be effective 
unless the Iraqi Implementing Law No. 30 of 1928 is amended and updated.  It should add an 
Article to regulate the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.    
To fill the gap in Iraqi legal culture about arbitration, this study suggests the adoption of 
commercial arbitration as one of the text books to be studied in Iraqi schools of law. 
The results of this study indicate that there should be a rehabilitation of the competent 
judicial institutions for the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in order to facility such 
awards.  
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The above-mentioned are general suggestions that this study proposes should be followed by 
the petroleum investment policy makers in Iraq.    
7.3.2. A Specialised Petroleum Arbitration Law:    
One of the main objectives of this study is to suggest rules for Iraqi arbitration law involving 
petroleum disputes.  These rules should create a balance between Iraqi interests and 
stakeholders’ interests.  The petroleum arbitration law should mirror important issues like parties 
autonomy, give priority to national laws for governing petroleum arbitration and address the 
sovereignty issue by prohibiting the enforcement of any arbitration award unless the states 
consent to the enforcement of such awards through arbitration agreement.   
Petroleum Arbitration Agreement:    
Petroleum arbitration agreements, as discussed previously, are considered to be the heart of 
the petroleum arbitration process.  It is so because it is considered the important procedures 
about the arbitration but it is also important because it expresses the state parties’ consent to 
waive its sovereign immunity.  The author argues that:    
1. The petroleum arbitration agreement must be in writing,14 otherwise it will be null 
and invalid.  Iraq in this regard should follow the PRC arbitration Law of 1994.  
Therefore the written form should be defined and should follow the PRC Contract Law of 
1999 definition of written form.  Moreover, the petroleum arbitration agreement should 
be signed by both parties to prove the parties’ consent, whether the signature is physical 
or electronic.15  
2. The state party should express its desire to waive its immunity and should 
determine to what extend it would waive its immunity.    
3. The law applicable of formal requirement should be provided by the petroleum 
arbitration law because of the importance of the written agreement in determining its 
validity.  This study proposes that the applicable law formally required in petroleum 
                                                          
14 For a fuller discussion see section 4.3.1 chapter four.  
15 See section 4. 3. 1 of chapter four.  
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arbitration agreements is the law of the state on the territory of which the contract was 
concluded.   This approach exists in Iraqi Civil Law.   
4. The capacity of the state and the legal person should be expressed by Iraqi 
arbitration law and should follow the PRC arbitration law.   
5. The applicable law of capacity in petroleum arbitration agreements should be the 
personal law of the parties.  Nationality criteria should be considered in order to 
determine personal law.  This approach exists in UAE, PRC and Iraqi Civil Law. 
6. The applicable law of arbitrability before the arbitral award is rendered should be 
the same law as that which governs the petroleum arbitration agreements and the 
governing the arbitrability in the recognition and enforcement petroleum arbitration 
agreement before national court should be the law of the court.   
7. The Iraqi petroleum arbitration law should offer some choices to the applicable 
law of petroleum arbitration agreement first law is the law of main agreement which is 
petroleum agreement or the law of the seat of arbitration or the law of court place.  
However, this study intend likely to base on the law govern main agreement.16  
8. The Iraqi law should express explicitly the separability doctrine of petroleum 
arbitration agreement and this agreement should be considered valid even if the 
petroleum agreement is invalid.  Iraq in this regard should follow the PRC arbitration 
Law of 1994.  This is so because the adoption of such a doctrine will survive the 
arbitration process and enhance competence -competence principles in arbitration.   
 
Applicable Law of Petroleum Arbitration: 
One of the main concerns of petroleum countries, including Iraq, towards arbitration is 
the exclusion of the national law of the host state and the application of other laws which have 
no connection to the national legal system of the host state.  The evidence from this study 
suggests that: 
1. In determining the procedural law of petroleum arbitration, weight should be 
given to the parties’ principles of autonomy and also to the seat of arbitration.  
                                                          
16 For further discussion see section 4.4 of chapter four. 
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Therefore this study suggests that the parties should have the freedom to select the law 
that will govern the procedural law of arbitration.  However this freedom should not 
be absolute: it should be restricted by Iraqi mandatory rules and the principle of public 
order.  The parties must not choose laws contrary to Iraqi mandatory rules or Iraqi 
public order.  If the parties cannot reach agreement on the applicable law then the law 
of the seat of arbitration should be applied.  The parties should have the freedom to 
choose the seat of arbitration, otherwise the seat of arbitration will be in Iraq.   
2. The applicable law of substantive issues should be Iraqi law.  The parties’ 
autonomy should be restricted in regard to petroleum agreements and priority given to 
Iraqi national law17 to govern substantive issues in the petroleum agreement.  Iraq 
should follow the International Organizations like UN Resolutions and OPEC.  This is 
the approach followed by PRC law.    
Enforcement of the Petroleum Arbitral Award: 
One of the main concerns of foreign investors is the legal system for the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral award and the way the laws of the host state deal with this issue.  In this regard, the 
present study has indicated that the current legal system in Iraq is not adequate and stands in 
need of important amendments.  The author puts forward some proposals for amending the legal 
system for the enforcement of petroleum arbitral awards.  These suggestions are intended to 
encourage foreign investors and to enhance the arbitration process in Iraq.   
1. As discussed previously, Iraqi law does not express the enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards. However, in this study it has been argued that arbitral awards can be 
enforced by means of Iraqi Implementing Law No. 30 of 1928.  It has been argued that 
foreign arbitral award amount to a foreign judgment.  However, to avoid any debate 
arising from this, Iraq should stipulate that petroleum arbitral awards should be 
enforced according to Iraqi law.   
2. Petroleum arbitral award cannot be enforceable unless the competent court is 
rendered exequatur.  The place of the competent court should be located where the 
defendant is resident.  If the defendant does not have domicile or property in Iraq, the 
court of Baghdad would then be the competent court.   
                                                          
17 For a fuller discussion see pages 198-199 chapter five.  
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3. The court should have the jurisdiction to set aside an arbitral award which was 
not regulated by Iraqi law.  This study suggests the competent court should be the 
court originally having jurisdiction over the disputes.  This is the practice followed by 
the UAE and PRC laws and also by the Iraqi CCP.   
4. The Iraqi Implementing Law does regulate the reasons of challenge related to 
the arbitration agreement.  This is because this law does not regulate arbitral awards 
explicitly.  In general, therefore, it seems that to add the reasons of challenge exit in 
Article 273 of CCP to the reason mentioned by Implementing Law No.30 of 1928 in 
Article 6.   
5. The public policy contents should be determined under Iraqi petroleum 
arbitration law.  This study intends to follow the international public policy type.   
7.3.3. A Vision for an Iraqi Petroleum Arbitration Centre:  
The study has argued that a petroleum agreement is a special type of investment agreement 
under Iraqi law. This is because petroleum agreements have special features that differentiate 
them from ordinary agreements.  Therefore the disputes arising from this agreement have no 
need of a special arbitration law framed exclusively to deal with petroleum disputes.  However 
these disputes need to be submitted to an institution concerned specifically with petroleum 
disputes, since the formal justice system in Iraq does not provide adequate means for settling 
petroleum disputes. There is also a need to attract and encourage foreign investors.18  Therefore 
one of the main objectives of this study is to propose the founding of a centre for petroleum 
disputes. 
There is a practical need for the establishment of such a centre, which would apply the 
procedural law of arbitration.  In this case Iraqi law would be applied. If the parties fail to agree 
on the law that governs the arbitration procedure the law will be that of the seat of arbitration. 
 Clearly there would be practical issues involved in founding such a centre. For example, 
conflicts of law, sovereignty issues and the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.19 However, 
                                                          
18 See Chapter One section 1.5.  
19 For fuller discussion see Chapters Five, Section 5.3.1 and Chapter Six, Section 6.6.  
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the establishment of such an institution would encourage petroleum companies to invest in Iraq 
and would provide foreign investors with a legal assurance that their disputes would be referred 
to arbitration.  The petroleum companies would be free to choose between the procedural rules of 
the centre or those of any other law.20  The centre should be located in Baghdad. This would 
strengthen and facilitate the application of Iraqi national law and have the effect of reducing 
conflicts of law.21  Iraq would be the seat of arbitration and this study gives the seat of arbitration 
considerable weight in deciding on the applicable law of arbitration.  Not only would the 
problem of conflict of laws be addressed; Iraqi concerns and controversies about sovereignty 
would also be reduced if Iraqi law were applied to petroleum disputes.22  In addition, the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards would be enhanced if these awards were subject to Iraqi 
national court supervision.23  For all these practical reasons the petroleum arbitration centre 
should be established in Iraq. 
The remit of this institution should be to conclude all disputes arising from petroleum 
agreements, from petroleum extraction from the petroleum field (upstream, midstream and 
downstream) and to exports to the global market. Its scope would include all petroleum 
transactions.   
This institution should be inter-governmental, like ICSID.   In order to function as an 
international forum, it should be established by an international convention.  The author chose 
ICSID as an example because the latter has become a natural centre for international arbitration. 
It has been successful in influencing many countries previously hostile to arbitration to become 
members.24 In addition, it provides members with important facilities, such as conciliation and 
arbitration, and has drawn up important rules to enforce foreign arbitral awards.   
The institution should be established under OPEC auspices.  That is because OPEC is one of 
the most important organizations concerned with petroleum and because it drafts petroleum 
policies for its members, who include the major producing countries.  OPEC also takes a strong 
line with regard to the application of national laws of petroleum agreement and towards the re-
                                                          
20 For fuller discussion see Chapter five section 5.2.  
21 For fuller discussion see Chapter five section 5.2.1.  
22 For fuller discussion see Chapter five page 199.  
23 For fuller discussion see Chapter five section 5.2.1.  
24 For fuller discussion see Chapter Three section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.  
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localization of petroleum agreements.25  Establishing such an institution under OPEC auspices 
may reduce the concerns about arbitration experienced by host states from producing countries.26 
The function of this centre should not be limited to the settlement of petroleum disputes: it 
should also be able to resolve disputes by consultation and mediation.  In addition, it should 
support other functions, such as annual conferences dealing with all aspects of petroleum 
arbitration, and conduct workshops and training courses in petroleum arbitration.    
The petroleum arbitration centre would establish and apply its own rules, which should give 
considerable weight to important principles, such as the parties’ autonomy in choosing the 
procedural law of petroleum arbitration.  The petroleum arbitration agreement should be 
separable from the main agreement.  In addition, the petroleum arbitral award should be rendered 
as a final award, like an ICSID award, and enforced in the same way as a domestic award.  
However, if the parties do not apply the petroleum centre rules then the national law of the host 
state should be applied instead.   
Petroleum producing countries would be members of the proposed centre, but the 
convention would not be limited to those countries. The major petroleum consumer countries and 
major petroleum industrial countries should be allowed to become members. Beside its original 
function, which is to resolve disputes arising between the host state and the petroleum 
companies, this institution would also settle the disputes arising between the petroleum countries 
and between the petroleum companies.   
The establishment of such a centre would play an important role for both producing 
countries (host states) and consumer countries.   Host states that joined such an institution under 
the auspices of OPEC would find that their apprehensions regarding petroleum arbitration were 
diminished. They would no longer view arbitration as a device designed to serve petroleum 
companies’ interests only.  In addition, combining both parties in the same convention would 
help to foster a convergence of views.27 This convergence would contribute to the creation of an 
international legal system for petroleum arbitration.  Moreover, submitting the producing 
                                                          
25 See Chapter Five Section 5.3.1.2.3.1.   
26 See Chapter Three, Section 3.2.  
27 See Chapter One, Section 1.1 and also page 29 for the quotation of Stephen Pelletiere.   
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countries themselves to the rules of such a centre would have the effect of reducing conflict 
between them.28 As indicated previously in the Iraqi petroleum history review, petroleum has 
been the main cause of the internal conflicts and wars that have ravaged Iraq.29  Conflicts 
between petroleum countries could be settled at this centre. Furthermore, submitting disputes 
between petroleum companies would help to reduce those companies’ concerns about submitting 
their disputes to arbitration.30   The establishment of such a centre in Iraq would encourage host 
states to have recourse to arbitration, since Iraq is one of the most important producing countries 
and also one of the developing countries that strongly supports the notion of arbitration.31 
Moreover, Iraq was one of the founder members of OPEC. |Iraq is a state that safeguards its 
petroleum wealth32 and considers petroleum as a sovereignty issue.  Therefore, establishing the 
centre would have the effect of encouraging other producing countries to deal with their 
petroleum wealth in the same manner as Iraq.   
   7.4. Recommendations for Future Research: 
In the light of the examination of the legal system for the settlement of petroleum disputes in 
Iraq, the main finding of this study is that most of the laws dealing with arbitration are 
inadequate. Arbitration laws need to be promulgated in line with the international scale model 
and in the political and economic interests of Iraq. In addition, significant amendments should be 
made to the Iraqi Implementing Laws.   
This study has tried to highlight important issues and to focus on what may contribute to the 
reform of the legal system of arbitration in Iraq, especially in regard to petroleum disputes.  The 
legal system in Iraq in relation to petroleum agreements is one of the important issues considered 
in this study.  The study shows that more research is required on Iraqi petroleum agreement 
clauses, particularly the stabilization clause and the adoption clause.  The arbitration clause acts 
as a guarantee that makes foreign investors feel that their investments are safe in host states.  
However, there are other concerns, regarding, for example, political changes and unwelcome 
                                                          
28 ibid. 
29 For more details see Chapter Two Section 2.2.  
30 Thomas Wälde, ‘Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty’ [1996] CEPMLP Journal Online < 
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/htm > accessed 29 June 2011. 
31 For fuller discussion see Chapter Three, Section 3.3.1.   
32 Article 111 of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005. 
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legislation on the part of the host state, such as the introduction of nationalization.   These 
clauses therefore need extensive study by researchers, especially in Iraq, a developing state 
which lacks stability in its political and economic circumstances.  
Iraq is one of the states that has witnessed armed conflicts, both internal and external, and 
these conflicts have had an undeniably negative impact on Iraqi natural resources, particularly 
petroleum.  It would be worthwhile to assess the effects of these conflicts on Iraqi petroleum 
investment and to provide a legal framework for protecting petroleum, the nation’s most valuable 
natural resource.   
This research has thrown up many topics in need of further investigation in regard to the 
KRG’s authority and its capacity to conclude petroleum agreements with foreign petroleum 
companies, particularly since the Iraqi Constitutional law of 2005 does not empower the KRG to 
conclude petroleum agreements. The question is, therefore, whether foreign petroleum 
companies can conclude agreements by recourse to arbitration.  This issue is one of the major 
challenges facing the Iraqi petroleum industry and it is one that merits considerably more 
research.  
The author finds this point is worthy of examination as it could contribute to the reform of 
the Iraqi legal system regarding petroleum.   
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